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This volume completes the publication of the project The Oath in Archaic and 
Classical Greece, based at the University of Nottingham and funded by the Lever-
hulme Trust (award no. F.00 114/Z), whose assistance is warmly acknowledged. 
The main previous publications of the project have been the Nottingham Oath 
Database (Sommerstein, Bayliss and Torrance 2007) and Oath and State in Ancient 
Greece, edited by Sommerstein and Bayliss and referred to in this volume as S&B.
The authors have in broad terms a common view of the nature and effect of 
oaths as a cultural phenomenon of ancient Greek society, as will be apparent 
from this volume, though – as will also be apparent – they inevitably disagree on 
matters of detail and nuance and on the interpretation of some particular pas-
sages and incidents.
The several chapters of the volume deal with different aspects of the oath 
phenomenon, and it thus inevitably often happens that the same passage is dis-
cussed from different points of view in more than one chapter.
We should draw attention to a peculiarity in the chapter numbering. There 
are some tall buildings that have no thirteenth floor, and some books in which 
chapter 14 directly follows chapter 12; this volume, contrariwise, has both a 
chapter 13 and a chapter 13a. This is because there are several references in S&B 
to specific numbered chapters of the present volume, and changes in the chapter 
plan since the publication of S&B would otherwise have rendered some of these 
references incorrect.
The acknowledgements made in the preface to S&B apply equally to this 
volume, and are gratefully reiterated. But it is particularly appropriate, on the 
occasion of his retirement from the Department of Classics of the University of 
Nottingham, that Alan Sommerstein should record explicitly his deep apprecia-
tion of all that the University, the Department, the School of Humanities, their 
academic and administrative staffs, and not least their students, have done to 
assist and encourage him over all but forty years, and especially over the ten 
years of the Oath project.
The authors are also pleased to acknowledge their gratitude to the Institute 
for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts at the University of Notre Dame for a small 
research grant which supported work on § 5.2, and for funding to support the cost 
of indexing, which was carried out with great efficiency by Dr Joanna Luke.
Alan H. Sommerstein (Nottingham), Isabelle C. Torrance (Notre Dame),  
Andrew J. Bayliss (Birmingham), Judith Fletcher (Waterloo),  
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WD Works and Days (Hesiod)
1 What is an oath?
A.H. Sommerstein
This book and its partner volume (S&B) are about oaths in archaic and classical 
Greece, and we should begin by defining our terms. Since we are not particu-
larly concerned with drawing a line between the archaic and classical periods, we 
need only set beginning and end points for an era comprising both. We take the 
archaic period to begin with the earliest surviving alphabetic Greek texts – which 
means, in practice, with the major Homeric and Hesiodic poems, these being the 
oldest texts that contain references to oaths – and the classical period to end with 
the deaths of Aristotle, Demosthenes and Hypereides in 322 BC. At various points 
we will be referring to later (and indeed to earlier) evidence, but these are the 
bounds of the timespan we are actually examining.
As to the term “oath” itself, we will use the definition embodied in the 
palmary formulation of Richard Janko,1 whereby “to take an oath is in effect 
to invoke powers greater than oneself to uphold the truth of a declaration, 
by putting a curse upon oneself if it is false”. An oath, then, is an utterance 
whereby the speaker – the swearer2 – does the following three things simulta-
neously.
(1) The swearer makes a declaration. This may be a statement about the present 
or past, in which case the oath is assertory; or it may be an undertaking for 
the future, in which case the oath is promissory.
(2) The swearer specifies, explicitly or implicitly,3 a superhuman power or pow-
ers4 as witnesses to the declaration and guarantors of its truth. In English the 
swearer is said to swear “by” (sometimes, colloquially, “to”) this power or 
powers; in Greek the guarantor power was normally the direct object of the 
1 Janko 1992, 194, on Iliad 14.271–9.
2 To be contrasted with the swearee, defined in the Nottingham Oath Database as “the person, if 
any, to whom an oath was addressed or who exacted it from the swearer”. 
3 Ancient Greeks usually, though not always, specified the power(s) by whom they were swear-
ing. When not explicitly specified, the identity of the guarantor power will be either implied in 
the context, or given by the culture. Contextual determination is to be found, for example, in 
Aesch. Eum. 762–74, where Orestes swears that, in his posthumous capacity as a hero, he will 
prevent the Argives from making any attack on Athens, but will bless them if they act as faithful 
allies to the Athenians: he does not specify by which god(s) he is swearing – but his promise is 
actually addressed to Athena, and she is well capable of punishing its breach.
4 Normally these are divinities, heroes, etc., but sometimes we find sacred or cherished objects 
(Eideshorte) filling the corresponding place in oath-formulae; see § 5.3.
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verb of swearing – strictly speaking, one did not in Greek “swear by Zeus”, for 
example; rather, one “swore Zeus”.5
(3) The swearer calls down a conditional curse on him/herself,6 to take effect if 
the assertion is false or if the promise is violated, as the case may be; that is, 
(s)he prays that in that event (s)he may suffer punishment from the guarantor 
power. This element need not be explicitly spelt out; it is often left to be un-
derstood from the words of the oath itself, particularly the performative verb 
“I swear” (in Greek omnumi, later omnuō); but it can always be made explicit 
when there is need for special assurance. At any rate, whether explicit or not, 
it is the key defining feature of an oath: an oath is a declaration whose cred-
ibility is fortified by a conditional self-curse.7
All the defining features of an oath are well seen in the oath which Medea exacts 
from Aegeus, king of Athens, in Euripides’ Medea (731‒58).8 When Aegeus arrives 
in Corinth, en route from Delphi to Trozen, Medea, who has been ordered by King 
Creon to leave Corinth with her children before the next day’s sunrise, suppli-
cates him to grant her asylum, promising him that she will use her magical skills 
to ensure that his long childlessness comes to an end. He says he is willing to do 
so, so long as Medea comes to Athens under her own steam. Medea, however, 
asks for a guarantee (pistis, 731) – a word which, when applied to the confirma-
tion of a promise, often, but not always, refers to an oath. Aegeus, with some 
surprise and maybe even indignation, asks her whether she does not trust him 
(733); she says she does, but points out that she has powerful enemies (Creon and 
“the house of Pelias”) and that if Aegeus was not bound by an oath they might 
cajole or bully him into complying with a request for her extradition (734‒40). 
Aegeus understands and accepts this argument, and asks her to name the gods he 
should swear by (745); she names the Earth, the Sun (her own grandfather) and 
5 This may be an elliptical form, shortened from “I swear 〈making〉 Zeus 〈a witness〉”; see § 5.1, 
p. 76 n. 2.
6 The punishment prayed for need not fall exclusively, or at all, directly on the swearer him/
herself; but it must always be something that is harmful or hurtful to the swearer. If it is not, the 
oath is a sham – like that of the chorus in Ar. Birds 445–7, who pray that if they keep their promise 
they may win the comic competition by a unanimous verdict but that if they break it they may … 
win by just one vote.
7 The equation of oath and curse is made unusually explicit by Andocides (1.31) in a reference to 
the oath of the jurors (see S&B 69‒80): “you … will cast your votes about me after having taken 
great oaths, and invoked the greatest curses both upon yourselves and upon your children, un-
dertaking to vote justly in my case”. See further ch. 2 below.
8 See further § 2.3 below.
 1 What is an oath?   3
“the whole race of gods” (746‒7). Aegeus then asks what he is to swear to do or 
not do (748); Medea’s answer is “never yourself to expel me from your land, and 
never willingly while you live to give me up to any of my enemies who wishes to 
take me” (749‒51). Aegeus duly swears, using the performative verb and naming 
the gods Medea had specified, “to abide by what I have heard from you” (752‒3). 
But Medea then also asks him to state what he wishes to suffer if he does not abide 
by the oath (754); he replies with the vague but apparently satisfactory formula 
“The things that happen to those who are impious” (755) – and thereupon she 
sends him on his way. She feels completely secure, and rightly so. Not long after-
wards she will turn up on Aegeus’ doorstep in Athens, having murdered Creon, 
his daughter (her ex-partner Jason’s new bride) and her own children, and he will 
have no alternative but to take her in and protect her. Her own (unsworn) promise 
to him, incidentally, she will not keep:9 Aegeus’ son Theseus will have been con-
ceived at Trozen before Aegeus returns to Athens, Aegeus will not even know of 
his existence for many years to come, and when Theseus does come to Athens 
Medea will plot to murder him.
Any utterance that does not contain the three features specified above, explic-
itly or by clear implication, will not in this book be regarded as an oath. There has 
been some tendency in scholarship over the years to use the term loosely; a few 
examples follow.
(1) In most English-speaking countries, the giving of false evidence in court tri-
als can be prosecuted as the crime of “perjury” even if the witness has bound 
him/herself by solemn affirmation rather than by oath. This has created a 
standing temptation to use the same term as a translation of Greek pseudo-
marturion “false testimony”, and even sometimes to take it for granted that 
witnesses in ancient Greek trials were regularly required to swear to the truth 
of their evidence, when in fact, at least at Athens, they were sworn only in 
homicide trials (and others held before the Council of the Areopagus) and in 
certain exceptional circumstances. For a full discussion see S&B 87‒91.
(2) The mere fact that a statement is made when the speaker is in contact with 
a sacred object (such as the entrails of a sacrificial animal) does not in itself 
make the statement into an oath, if no divine witness is explicitly or implicitly 
invoked. When Demaratus of Sparta puts into his mother’s hands the entrails 
from a sacrifice he had made to Zeus, and solemnly beseeches her to tell him 
truthfully who his father was (Hdt. 6.67‒9; see ch. 6, p. 140 n. 31), she clearly 
9 Except in those versions in which she herself bore a son, Medus, to Aegeus. Diodorus Siculus 
(4.56.1) says this story was told in tragedy, but we do not know whether it was already current by 
431 BC when Medea was produced.
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regards herself as being under a specially binding duty to speak the truth, 
but nothing in her 267‒word speech gives any hint that she is under oath. 
The episode is merely a more formal and elaborate version of the common 
formula whereby a question is asked, or a request made, in the name of a god 
(Attic Greek normally uses the preposition pros with genitive, literally “from”, 
e.g. pros Dios “in the name of Zeus”); this formula certainly makes a ques-
tion more difficult to ignore or answer falsely, or a request more difficult to 
disregard, but it cannot of itself subject the addressee to a conditional curse 
unless the addressee him/herself invokes one. However, laying one’s hand 
on the earth can constitute an oath (Bacch. 5.41‒2, 8.19; cf. Iliad 14.270‒6), 
since Earth was herself a goddess; see §5.1, p. 85, and §6.3, p. 143.
(3) In Sophocles, and very occasionally in other texts, a statement or promise 
which, when actually made, did not have the form of an oath, is sometimes 
referred to retrospectively as if it had been an oath; this phenomenon, which 
we call the “Sophoclean oath”, is fully discussed in §5.2. It only occurs in a 
small number of passages (less than one per play, even in Sophocles), and it 
will be shown in §5.2 that on each occasion it serves an identifiable thematic 
function. This does not, therefore, authorize us to treat, for example, any sol-
emn injunction as the exacting of an oath.10
Going in the opposite direction, Polinskaya 2012 claims that it was possible to call 
gods to witness in “situations where no oaths [were] sworn”, and cites a number 
of instances11 in which, she claims (p. 27), gods are invoked “as simple observers, 
10 As Markantonatos (2007, 175) does when, referring to Soph. OC 1530‒2, he says that Oedipus 
“places each and every one of the [future] Athenian rulers under oath”; in fact Oedipus is simply 
giving an instruction that each of these rulers shall not divulge the secret of Oedipus’ tomb to 
anyone but his successor as ruler, and telling Theseus that in this way Athens will be kept safe 
from Theban attack. He does go on to say (1536‒8) that the gods will sooner or later punish any-
one who “abandons religion and turns to madness”, but that follows a mention of hubris (1535); 
in the actual passage about the secret there had been no suggestion that improper divulgement 
of it would be impious, only that it would be imprudent. Similarly Martinez 2012, 49 says that in 
h.Dem. 331‒3 “Demeter ... swears not to go home” when the text has simply ephaske “she said”, 
“she persisted in saying”, with no indication whatever of any added solemnity, much less of a 
divine invocation or a conditional curse.
11 Soph. Trach. 1248; Eur. Med. 619‒20, Hipp. 1451, Supp. 1174‒5; Hdt. 5.92ζ‒5.93.1; Thuc. 2.71.4, 
2.74.2, 4.87.2‒3. Polinskaya (p. 35) adds Xen. Hell. 2.3.55, but in this passage Theramenes is only 
calling on gods (and men) to see what is happening to him; this is not the only place in her 
article where Polinskaya is led astray by the fact that the English word “witness” has two mean-
ings (“one who has seen, heard, etc., some significant event” and “one who bears, or will bear, 
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not as executors of justice”. It is certainly true that in some (not all)12 of these 
passages the main purpose of the invocation is less to certify the truthfulness 
of the speaker’s utterance than to arouse divine anger against those who have 
treated him/her unjustly or (as in Eur. Supp. 1174‒5) against those who may do 
so in future. Since, however, there are many undoubted oaths (from Iliad 3.280 
onwards) in which gods are likewise called to bear witness, it is not clear how the 
deity can be expected to distinguish one kind of calling-to-witness from another. 
It is certain, moreover, that a god will resent it if (s)he is invited to bear witness 
to a falsehood; to issue such an invitation, therefore, itself amounts to invoking 
divine punishment on oneself should one’s statement be untrue.13 We therefore 
continue to hold that when a god is called to witness to the truth of a statement, 
this constitutes an oath even if no (other) oath-language is used.
testimony”) whereas Greek martus and its synonyms are used only in the latter sense (compare 
her definition of “witnessing”, p. 24).
12 In Eur. Hipp. 1451, Hippolytus’ objective is plainly to reassure Theseus as strongly as possible 
that he truly has been freed from the guilt and pollution of having caused Hippolytus’ death; 
and it is fitting that almost the last utterance of Hippolytus’ life should be a straightforward and 
successful oath, after two previous oaths of his which in different ways were disastrous failures – 
the oath of secrecy by which Phaedra’s nurse entrapped him and which Phaedra was convinced 
he would break (cf. Hipp. 612‒13, 689‒92) and the oath of innocence which Theseus would not 
believe (1027‒37, 1055‒9). See further §11.2.
13 At the end of her article (p. 35) Polinskaya says that whereas “oaths demand divine interven-
tion, invitations to witness only ... [submit the inviter] to the discretion of the gods should they 
choose to take an interest” [emphasis mine]. But this is a distinction without a difference: it was 
always a matter for the discretion of the gods whether or not they acted on a human request of 
any kind (except in a few mythical cases like that of Theseus who was granted, and misused, 




There is a proper place for the fear-inspiring  
and for fear to sit high  
in the soul as its overseer:  
it is beneficial  
to learn good sense under the pressure of distress.  
What man that does not at all nourish  
his heart on fear –  
or what community of men, it makes no difference –  
will still revere Justice?  
 Aesch. Eum. 517‒252
But the Zeus in the Council Chamber is of all images of Zeus the one most likely to strike 
terror into the hearts of those who do wrong. His epithet is Oath-god (Horkios), and in each 
hand he holds a thunderbolt. Beside this image it is the custom for athletes, their fathers 
and their brothers, and even their trainers, to swear an oath upon slices of a boar that there 
will commit no misdeed on their part in the competition in the Olympic games…Before the 
feet of the Oath-god is a bronze plate, with elegiac verses inscribed upon it, the object of 
which is to strike fear into those who forswear themselves.  
 Pausanias 5.24.9‒11
The well-known lines sung by the chorus of Erinyes in Aeschylus’ Eumenides 
draw attention to the critical importance of the common human emotion of fear 
for the proper workings of human justice. One dimension of this fear is mani-
fest in the identity of the singers who play the role of agents of retribution in the 
play: all men should nourish in their heart fear of the divine, if they truly want 
to revere justice.3 In a very different context, on his visit to Olympia, Pausanias 
similarly describes the terrifying image of Zeus Horkios, “Zeus of the Oath”, who 
1 I would like to thank Elton Barker, Eftychia Bathrellou and Alan Sommerstein for their invalu-
able comments and suggestions on this chapter. 
2 All translations of Aeschylus and Aristophanes are from A.H. Sommerstein (2008a and 
1980‒2003 respectively) and of Hesiod from G.W. Most (2007). The rest are mine, unless other-
wise indicated. 
3 See esp. Sommerstein 1989, 171‒82 and Parker 2009, 142‒51 for a positive evaluation of the no-
tion of human fear of the divine for the maintenance of a well-ordered society, in the otherwise 
terrifying song by the Erinyes. I am in agreement with those critics who see these lines as already 
alluding to human fear of institutional justice too, as developed in the play with Athena’s foun-
dation of the Areopagus: see e.g. Lebeck 1971, 147‒9; Conacher 1987, 156‒8; Sommerstein loc. cit.
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strikes fear into the heart of the athletes and those who swear in support of them. 
As Burkert has long ago stated, “only fear of the gods provides a guarantee that 
oaths will be kept”.4 In oath-taking practice, this fear underpins the presence 
of the conditional self-curse that differentiates the verbal act of oath from any 
simple promise or assertion (see §1.1). Any divine power(s) could be invoked in 
oath-taking to execute the divine punishment (cf. e.g. §13.1), implied or stated 
explicitly through the self-curse, and activated in the event of oath-breaking. But 
it is certainly not by accident that these two powers, Zeus and the Erinyes, who 
are related so closely to the notion of imposing fear upon mankind, appear in 
literary sources with a broader jurisdiction over the institution of the oath.5
In §1.1 the oath was defined as a conditional self-curse, a definition that 
draws attention to the pervasive presence of (conditional) divine punishment 
looming large over the swearer. A number of anglophone scholars have remarked 
that this religious aspect of the oath can be difficult for us to grasp:6 modern 
cultural parameters do not always leave space for such a perception. The present 
chapter aims to approach archaic and classical Greek sources by examining and 
showing the extent to which the oath was perceived as or identified with the 
self-curse. Scholarly attention to the distinctive symbolism of the self-curse in 
formal oath-rituals in Greek religion has shaped one fruitful avenue for exploring 
its prominence.7 The current study argues for a close-bound interrelation of oath 
and curse by taking a twin approach to the evidence. In §2.1 it builds up a picture 
of how well-known notions of divine and human dikē in archaic and early classi-
cal Greek literature define and represent the nature of the oath as a conditional 
4 Burkert’s (1985, 252) emphasis on fear in oath-taking is expounded further by e.g. Faraone, 
1993, 2002; Berti 2006; Kitts 2005, 114‒87. On the common human emotion of fear of divine anger, 
which can be defined by cultural parameters, cf. e.g. the recent study by Chaniotis (2012) on later 
epigraphic evidence.
5 See §2.1 below, also p. 28 with n. 84.
6 cf. e.g. Stephanie West’s remarks (2003, 438) on our understanding of the religious dimension 
of the oath: “For us nowadays an oath introduces a more formal element into our undertakings…
we need to adjust to earlier assumptions as characteristic of medieval England as of classical 
antiquity. An oath introduced a religious element.” See also Sommerstein 2007a. Their point is 
made in relation to formal oaths. The extent to which the element of divine presence and punish-
ment in oath-taking is culturally determined could be shown through e.g. a comparison between 
English and modern Greek language for oaths. English seems to lack expressions of informal 
oath-taking but in modern Greek informal everyday oaths are frequently used, in which both 
the divine element and the explicit element of the self-curse are prominent, as in the case of “by 
God and the Holy Virgin!”, with, sometimes, the addition of an explicit self-curse “may I die!” for 
extra confirmation of the oath statement. 
7 See pp. 26‒7. 
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self-curse, through the association of the divine personifications of these verbal 
concepts, Horkos and the Erinyes as Curses. In §2.2 the focus shifts to investigat-
ing actual instances of oath-taking: while the conditional self-curse is implied 
behind every oath, the section examines oaths in which individual speakers 
explicitly articulate the element of the conditional self-curse in two different public 
spaces in Athens: (a) scenes of dialogue on the theatrical stage, and (b) litigants’ 
speeches in Athenian law-courts. Individuals’ use and manipulation of these ver-
balized self-curses vary according to the contextual situation and purpose of each 
speaker; improvisation on the self-curse is a recurrent feature in these contexts. 
But the character’s or speaker’s choice to underline the element of the self-curse 
is a clear demonstration of the conscious perception of the oath as a conditional 
divine punishment hanging over the swearers.
2.1 Horkos and Erinyes: oath as a curse
It is commonly acknowledged that personifications of abstract concepts in the 
archaic and classical Greek period often interact with other abstractions or super-
natural entities;8 and that in this interaction, well-known characteristics of the 
latter might sometimes be transferred to the former who share, then, similari-
ties in attributes or areas of activity.9 The present section sketches out the liter-
ary representations of two personified abstractions, Horkos and Arai, Oath and 
Curses. By bringing them together it aims to outline their interchangeable activity 
in contexts of a breach of dikē that implicate oaths and perjury in archaic and 
early classical Greek poetry:10 specifically, in Hesiod, the personified Horkos is 
clearly presented as a curse while in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, the personified Arai, 
Curses, come to prominence in the context of institutional oaths and potential 
perjury. The unifying factor that defines the personification of both abstractions 
8 See Webster 1954; Gombrich 1971; Stafford 2000 (with an emphasis on cult); Stafford 2007, 
71‒81. 
9 Cf. e.g. Persuasion and Aphrodite (Hes. WD 73‒5) and the erotic connotations that the former 
develops in classical period: see Buxton 1982; Stafford 2000, 111‒45. 
10 While Solmsen 1949 remains the classic work on the Aeschylean echoes of Hesiodic percep-
tions of the divine, the representation of divine powers in relation to oaths is limited to Horkos 
and Styx in Hesiod (32‒33). On aspects of these two personifications in relation to oaths and 
perjury, see Hirzel 1902, 142‒9 (on Horkos as divine figure) and recently Fletcher 2012, 62‒6 (on 
the Erinyes/Semnai and oaths); Gagné 2013, 159‒77 (on the divine punishment of exōleia and 
perjury in Hesiod). The emphasis in this section is on their affiliation and interchangeability as 
“the conditional curse” in their Hesiodic and Aeschylean representation. 
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is their association or identification with the divine Erinyes whose relation with 
all forms of cursing extends to oaths.11 The examination of these personifications 
will allow us to map out the forms of divine punishment, which we are going to 
see crystallized as verbalized conditional curses in the second section.
A good starting point for getting a sense of Greek attitudes to conceiving 
the oath as a conditional self-curse is to consider the Ηesiodic representation of 
Horkos. Explaining why “fifth days” should be avoided, Hesiod gives as a reason 
his birth (Hes. WD 802‒4):
Avoid fifth days since they are difficult and dread: for they say that it was on the fifth that 
the Erinyes attended upon Oath [Horkos] as he was born – Oath, whom Strife bore as a woe 
to those who break their oath.12
Here Martin West identifies the Oath as a conditional self-curse: “an oath is by 
origin a curse which a man lays upon himself, to take effect if what he declares 
is false. The god Horkos is the personification of this curse; that is why he is 
attended by the Erinyes…”13 This association of Horkos and the Erinyes makes 
sense when evidence for the latter’s role in archaic poetry is taken into consid-
eration, evidence which links them with two different notions of the verbal act 
of cursing. In their most common role, they are invoked to fulfil revenge curses 
within a family (a role that they famously retain in Greek tragedy).14 Thus, in 
Homer we learn from Phoenix of the time when Althaea beats the earth and calls 
down curses on her son Meleager for killing her brother, and the Erinys hears 
her (Il. 9.568‒72).15 Some lines earlier, Phoenix had also given an account about 
11 The most thorough approaches to the Erinyes, which highlight to varying degrees their con-
nection to revenge cursing or “the curse” of the dead, are offered by Wüst 1956; Visser 1980; 
A.L.Brown 1983, 1984; Sommerstein 1989, 6‒12; Johnston 1992, 1994, 1999, 250‒87; Henrichs 
1994; Bacon 2001; Sewell-Rutter 2007, 78‒109; Labarrière 2006; Easterling 2008; cf. also Sarian 
1986 (LIMC 825‒43); Prag 1985, 44‒51, 117‒20 for iconographic evidence. 
12 In Hes. Thg. 226‒32 the personified Oath is similarly described among a number of negative 
personified concepts (e.g. Lies, Disputes, Lawlessness, etc.) as the one “who indeed brings most 
woe upon human beings on the earth, whenever someone wilfully swears a false oath”. The 
equivalent power in the world of the gods, the power of the river Styx as “the Great oath of the 
gods”, also evolves around its punitive potential in Hes. Thg. 793‒806, for which see §7.3.1. 
13 M.L. West 1966, ad Hes. Thg. 231. 
14 Their area of action regarding revenge cursing is not limited to parental cursing (e.g. Aesch. 
Sept. 720‒5, 866‒9, 886‒7; Aesch. Cho. 924; Soph. OC 1298‒9), but encompasses other relations 
too: curses from children against mothers (Electra against Clytaemestra – and against Aegisthus, 
Soph. El. 110‒6; Hyllus against Deianeira, Soph. Trach. 807‒12), husbands against wives (Eur. 
Med. 1389‒90), comrades-in-arms against their generals (Soph. Aj. 835‒44 [839‒42], 1389‒92).
15 Mentioned as δασπλῆτις Ἐρινύς in Hes. fr. 280.9 M-W (=216.9 Most), which also preserves the 
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how his father Amyntor, on discovering that he had slept with his (Amyntor’s) 
concubine, had cursed him to remain childless and the Erinys fulfilled the wish 
(Il. 9.453‒7). Yet, the Erinyes are also the divine agents who fulfil the conditional 
self-curse of the oath: after the great strife between Agamemnon and Achilles, 
they are among the divine powers who oversee their oath of reconciliation and 
they are mentioned as punishers of perjury (Il. 19.258‒60; cf. Il. 3.279; Alcaeus fr. 
129.13‒4). Thus, this role of the Erinyes is one aspect of their overarching iden-
tity as fulfillers and, more characteristically later, as personifications of verbal 
cursing, which is appropriated by the Hesiodic representation of Horkos who 
becomes “an awe to perjurers”, under their auspices.
The intertwining association between Horkos and the Erinyes in archaic 
poetry also comes to light when we consider the actual content of the self-curse 
(i.e. the form of their divine punishment) specifically. In the case of self-cursing, 
the form of punishment envisaged in Hesiod in the event of perjury targets the 
family/offspring of the swearer (Hes. WD 282‒5):
But whoever wilfully swears a false oath, telling a lie in his testimony, he himself is incur-
ably hurt at the same time as he harms Justice, and in after times his family is left more 
obscure, whereas the family of the man who keeps his oath is better in after times.
This passage has commonly been cited for preserving a fundamental idea of Greek 
culture: the concept of inherited guilt, where the children, themselves innocent 
of any crime, suffer divine punishment because of their parents’ wrongdoing. 
The most recent study on the subject has brought into focus how the concept is 
very much tied to the institution of the oath during the archaic period;16 swearing 
falsely involves serious and regulated repercussions not only for the false swearer 
but also for his or her offspring. The Erinyes themselves are also the fulfillers of 
incident. The gesture itself recalls the sanctifying feature of striking the ground or placing one’s 
hand on the Earth during the oath-taking procedure (Hom. Il. 1.233‒46; 14.273‒82; see §6.3). For 
parental cursing in Homer cf. further Od. 2.135‒6, where Telemachos is fearful of driving his 
mother from the house in case he should incur his mother’s curses and an Erinys act on them. 
Hesiod establishes the relationship of the wronged parent with the Erinyes in the divine domain, 
when in the Theogony the Erinyes are said to be born from the blood of Uranus’ castration at the 
hands of his son Cronus (Thg. 185). Later Rhea demands that the Erinys of her father take revenge 
for the children whom Cronus had swallowed (Thg. 472‒3). 
16 See Gagné 2013, 159‒278 who applies the term “ancestral fault”. The main studies that deal 
with the concept of “inherited guilt” (Glotz 1904; Dodds 1951, 28‒63; Parker 1983, 198‒206; 
Sewell-Rutter 2007, 15‒48) have inevitably all touched upon the concept of cursing either in its 
form as an inherited revenge curse or as an oath. 
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this kind of punishment,17 in a totally different context of archaic oath-taking. 
They are invoked18 in the famous scene of oath-taking between the Trojans and 
the Achaians in the Iliad (see §6.4), which includes an explicit conditional self-
curse targeting not only the swearer but also his family (Il. 3.297‒301):19
… grant that the brains of them who shall first violate their oaths – of them and their chil-
dren – may be shed upon the ground even as this wine, and let their wives become the 
slaves of strangers.
Not limited to archaic times, the utter ruin (exōleia) of those swearing falsely – 
which denotes not only their own death, but can extend to the destruction of 
their offspring and, sometimes, even household – is the main manifestation of 
the explicit form of divine punishment, especially in formal oath-taking in all 
periods. This feature is played out further in the level of divine personifications. 
The well-known personification of Horkos’ nameless, lame son in the story of 
the perjurer-to-be Glaucus in Herodotus enacts the same form of punishment 
against perjurers (Hdt. 6.86; see §10.2). The shift in focus from Horkos to his son in 
Herodotus seems to suggest an interesting assimilation between the divine oath-
enforcers and the punishment that they exact: Horkos and his offspring punish 
the false swearer and his offspring.
The punishment exacted by Horkos or his son can extend over generations. 
Time, thus, plays an important role in the application of this form of punish-
ment which “entails delay, extended temporality, possibly the substitution of one 
victim for another” (Gagné 2013, 177). Yet, in spite of the length of time implied 
by the fact that retribution extends indefinitely to the swearer’s descendants, 
paradoxically Horkos is simultaneously perceived as moving quickly to carry 
out punishment. In Hesiod, Horkos runs in order to punish perjury (WD 219), 
a feature that he preserves in classical literature as well (trag. adesp. 333a) and 
which, again, he shares with his nameless child20 who, “despite having no hands 
or feet, is swift in pursuit” (Hdt. 6.86). In this, too, Horkos share similarities with 
17 The Erinyes’ role as punishers of children is a consequence of parental revenge-cursing too, 
after a wrong suffered, as we saw in the examples above. The punishment of offspring is claimed 
by the Erinyes themselves in Aesch. Eum. 934‒5.
18 The invocation is for “the nether avengers of the underworld” which I take here as a reference 
to the Erinyes: cf. Kirk 1985, ad 3.278‒9.
19 Gagné 2013, 177‒205 highlights this passage as the only attestation of the concept of “ances-
tral fault” in Homer. 
20 The anonymity of Horkos’ son is also shared with the ‘nameless’ goddesses, Erinyes as Eu-
menides in Eur. IT 944, Or. 37, 409, fr. 494.18. For this feature in relation to the latter’s cult, see 
Henrichs 1994. 
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the Erinyes as executors of cursing: the “swift-moving Horkos”, who cannot be 
outrun by perjury (trag. adesp. 333a), is matched by the “swift-running Erinys” 
(kampsipous, Aesch. Seven 791; cf. Soph. Aj. 837, 843) who quickly fulfils the curse 
of a wronged individual. Through this representation, Horkos follows and repro-
duces the model of vengeful gods who speedily execute their divine punishment 
upon individuals and bring to fulfilment a curse (cf. e.g. Il. 1.37‒42, Od. 9.526‒36).
In his role of executing his punishment, Horkos also functions within the 
orbit of the well-known archaic sense of dikē – supervised by Zeus (WD 238‒9) 
– that concerns issues of personal gain and their judicial settlements.21 In his 
advice to his brother Perses to follow Justice (WD 213), Hesiod represents Horkos 
as running alongside the crooked judgements made by bribe-swallowing judges 
(WD 219‒21), who, like Perses, put their personal gain above justice.22 The god, 
again personified as a curse, ensures that whoever has trampled on their oath23 
and committed perjury is punished.24 The Hesiodic presentation of Horkos as the 
curse of the oath goes hand-in-hand with the personified Dike in the same context, 
who “brings evil to those men who drive her out and do not deal straight” (223‒5). 
A breach of human justice in Hesiod can involve intervention and punishment 
from Horkos. This scenario is set in contrast to the fate of men who follow justice. 
Hesiod relates that Zeus guarantees for those who give straight judgments a life 
full of blessings with no war or famine (Hes. WD 225‒9); for them all is fertile 
(Hes. WD 230‒5):
… the Earth bears the means of life in abundance, and on the mountains the oak tree bears 
acorns on its surface, and bees in its centre; their woolly sheep are weighted down by their 
fleeces; and their wives give birth to children who resemble their parents. They bloom with 
good things continuously.
21 See the still valuable discussions of Gagarin 1973, 1974 on the Hesiodic presentation of justice 
tied to the context of economic profit. On this aspect of justice in Hesiod, cf. also, Nelson 1998, 
130‒8. 
22 Cf. WD 190‒4 where the oath finds a place in the breakdown of justice in the Iron Age: “the 
evil man shall harm the good one speaking with crooked lies and swearing an oath…”
23 The actual oath-statement is not given but see M.L. West 1978 ad loc, followed by S&B 7‒8, 
who argue that the oath implied here is one sworn by Perses and not by the judges. 
24 In representing the divine punishment of perjury, Hesiod’s concerns about perjury and pri-
vate profit are picked up in Theognis 197‒202, where the perjurer profits for a short while but be-
comes wretched in the long run (200; cf. also Theognis 1194‒5). Hesiodic resonances for the divine 
punishment of perjury for personal gain appear in Plato’s Laws (916e‒917a), where perjury is 
forbidden by the market laws. There are similarities too between the two authors in the represen-
tation of oath-breaking and divine punishment; cf. Plato Laws 701b‒c, which echoes Hes. WD 
180‒201, and also Rep. 363d (resonances about the continuity of the family). 
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Taking into account both aspects in play, Horkos’ initial potential punishment 
for perjury and injustice, and, on the other hand, the promise of Zeus’ blessings 
in reward for just actions,25 the Hesiodic narrative hints at the double religious 
nature of the oath: the explicit conditional curse in oath-taking was often coupled 
with blessings, as for instance, in the fifth-century oath of Demophantus: “[the 
swearer] is to pray that if he keeps his oath he may have many blessings, but if 
he breaks it he may be utterly destroyed, himself and his descendants” (Andoc. 
1.98).26 Hesiod emphasizes the power of conditional blessing and cursing, with 
an expressed concern for fertility, which explicitly acknowledges the principle 
that the prosperity of the land or city depends on the just or unjust actions of each 
individual, actions overseen by divine powers.27 The same blessings recounted by 
Hesiod are reversed and appear as conditional curses in formal oaths attributed 
to the archaic and early classical periods, as in the oath of Plataea28 or in the oath 
of the Amphictyonic League sworn by Apollo, Artemis, Leto and Athena Pronaea 
(Aeschines 3.111):
…the curse says that their land will produce no fruits/crops, nor will the wives will give birth 
to children that looks like their parents, but to monsters, nor will their livestock produce 
natural offspring; but may they be defeated in war and lawsuits and debates/assemblies 
and may both themselves and their households and their race perish utterly...29
25 Horkos works in accordance with the justice of Zeus. Zeus’s punishment of the unjust (WD 
238‒49), which brings the exact opposite of the previous blessings, is also in accordance with the 
retribution that Horkos exacts upon the unjust perjurers, their family and household.
26 For the oath of Demophantus, which prescribed citizens’ action against anyone who tried to 
subvert democracy, see Shear 2007. For the combination of cursing with blessing cf. further e.g. 
Ar. Lys. 181‒238; SIG iii 921.14‒15 (oath at the Apaturia). See also the variant: ‘if I keep the oath, 
may I have many good things; if I forswear, the opposite’ (IG ii2 1237.74‒113; IG ii2 1196 a 8‒13, b 
5‒22; IG i3 42.4‒6). Faraone 2005 argues that a strong curse precedes the blessing, or appears on 
its own, when a stronger power/authority imposes an oath on a weaker, while more balanced 
forms of curses-blessings appear in oaths among equals. This is not supported by all the evi-
dence, as he himself admits. It is, however, the case that in oaths from democratic Athens there 
seems to be a tendency to have the blessing preceding the curse, probably as a positive incentive 
for the citizens to keep their oath. 
27 On this principle, see Parker 1983, 235‒80; Cole 1996, 230‒6; Pulleyn 1997, 79‒83. 
28 RO 88.39‒46: “if I abide by the terms of my oath may my city be free from illness, and if not 
may it become ill. And may my city be unsacked, and if not, may it be sacked; may my [land] bear 
[fruit], and if not, may it be unfruitful. And may women bear children like to their parents, and if 
not, monsters. And may cattle bear calves like themselves, and if not, monsters”. For the impact 
and authenticity of the oath of Plataia in general, see most recently, S&B, 191‒8 and Cartledge 
2013 (esp. 41‒58 for its religious dimension), with references to previous discussions. For divine 
punishment inflicted upon the same areas, cf. p. 17 n. 41 and Hdt. 3.65.7, 6.139.1; Dem. 25.82. 
29 This conditional curse extends to areas which are not common in oaths – potential defeat 
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On a more general note, this reversal of natural order in cases of perjury reflects 
the reversal of the oath’s power to bring an equilibrium and balance to human 
affairs, a fact that explains its close association with justice as “natural order”.30 
Thus, in this aspect too the conditional self-curse aligns with the Erinyes’ broader 
role in avenging or correcting “an infringement of the normal and proper order 
of things (dikē)”.31 In Hesiod, Horkos as a curse acts especially in relation to one 
specific breach of this dikē, the one related to personal profit. A different branch 
of dikē expressed in relation to the oath as a conditional blessing-cursing appears 
in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, a play in which it is the Erinyes themselves who enact 
the role of the Hesiodic Horkos and personify the conditional self-curses/bless-
ings within the institutional framework of Athens’ law courts.
Oaths feature prominently in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, but it is only recently 
that they have received the full attention of scholars.32 All of them have been 
identified with formal Athenian practices of oath-taking, albeit in a distorted 
form.33 To summarize briefly: there is an oblique allusion to the preliminary pro-
cedure of the oath-challenge presented by the Erinyes to Athena as an argument 
against Orestes’ innocence (425‒32);34 one of the most famous oaths in Athens, 
the dicasts’ oath, is mentioned no fewer than five times (483, 489, 621, 680, 710); 
at the end of the trial the successful litigant, Orestes, takes an oath, like any suc-
cessful litigant in a real-life homicide trial (762‒74) – although his oath is actually 
a promise of alliance between Athens and Argos.35 The aim here is to demon-
not only in wars but also in lawsuits and debates. Perjury will thus incapacitate the culprit from 
taking any effective participation in public spaces. Cf. Plato Laws 842e‒843a where the fury of 
the gods after perjury is said to bring wars. The curse goes on to include the inability to perform 
sacrifices, especially to the gods of Delphi – the protectors of the area of the Amphictyonic coun-
cil – and, thus, denies the transgressor a fundamental role in the religious life of the community: 
see Versnel 1985 for the application of the same formula in curse-tablets. Cf. Sánchez 1997 for an 
approach to this oath as a fourth-century fiction. 
30 On the broader applications of justice as “natural order” in the archaic period, see Lloyd-
Jones 1971; W. Allan 2006. 
31 Sommerstein 1989, 7 on Heracleitus fr. 94 D-K: “if the Sun transgresses his boundaries, the 
Erinyes, helpers of Justice, will seek him out”.
32 See Sommerstein 2010a; Fletcher 2012, 35‒69 for the oath theme in the Oresteia trilogy stud-
ied from the perspective of gender, and esp. 57‒69 for the oaths in Eumenides. 
33 Sommerstein ibid.
34 For the procedure of the oath-challenge here see Mirhady 1991, who identifies the present 
passage as an oath-challenge, and also S&B 101‒8 and cf. 68‒9. For the self-curse in this process 
see §2.4.3. 
35 As scholars have noticed, the oath reflects the current political reality of the alliance between 
Argos and Athens made three years before the performance of the trilogy. See e.g. Quincey 1964; 
Braun 1998, 102‒4; Podlecki 1999, 82‒4; Fletcher 2012, 66‒9. It includes a self-curse and it has 
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strate that in some of these contexts the oath is clearly presented as a conditional 
self-curse; and that its potential threat in cases of perjury persists throughout by 
virtue of the presence and utterances of the Erinyes as personified Curses.
At the beginning of this chapter, we glimpsed the collocation of fear and 
justice embedded in the Erinyes’ song (Eum. 517‒25). This fear acquires a more 
concrete form when approached in the light of the nature and function of the oath 
as a conditional self-curse/blessing. Earlier in the play, the Erinyes had identi-
fied themselves explicitly as Ἀραί, “Curses” (Eum. 417), the Greek word used not 
only for revenge-cursing but also for conditional self-cursing in oath-taking (e.g. 
Aeschines 3.110; Pl. Crit. 119e4‒5).36 Quite clearly, these female deities, terrifying 
in their appearance,37 act as actual personifications of the dead Clytaemestra’s 
curses and enforcers of Zeus’s dikē in their pursuit of the matricide Orestes.38 Yet, 
in the lines immediately before their fearful song, the audience have just wit-
nessed the goddess Athena laying the foundations of Athenian justice; Athena 
not only announces the establishment of the Areopagus Council to judge the 
generally be taken to allude to Orestes’ future capacity as a hero who will impose curses or bless-
ings dependent on whether the states will keep the alliance. I am not in agreement with Fletcher 
ibid., who argues that Orestes replaces the Erinyes in their role as conditional curses (see below). 
The oath by Orestes is the only one uttered on stage. Elsewhere we have only demands for oaths 
(429‒32) or references back to oaths taken offstage (the oath of the judges).
36 The personified ‘Αρά identified with the Erinyes appears to be an Aeschylean invention; evi-
dence for its existence as a personified separate entity outside tragedy is very slim and uncertain. 
Hesychius α6978 mentions an Ἀρᾶς ἱερόν in Athens which was mentioned in Aristophanes’ Horai 
(fr. 585), but for which he adds “some believe that he names the βλάβη”. Cf. EM s.v. ἀρά and 
Plut. Thes. 35.3. Hesychius α6960 also mentions ‘Αραντίδες as a word used by the Macedonians 
instead of the Erinyes. In a grave imprecation of the second century AD from Neocaesareia (SEG 
xviii 561), the personified ‘Αρά is invoked as “the oldest of the daimons”, to punish any potential 
violators of the grave. See Speyer 1969, 1196‒8; Wüst 1956, 86‒7; Corlu 1966, 274‒6; Geisser 2002, 
242‒52. 
37 Cf. their gradual visualization in Aesch. Cho. 924‒1050 and Eum. 46‒178, for which see A.L. 
Brown 1983 and Frontisi-Ducroux 2006, the latter with an emphasis on the audience’s growing 
terror. 
38 In the trilogy the Erinyes had previously been associated with the revenge-curse of Thyes-
tes on the family of Atreus (Ag. 1580). The audience hear also about the Erinyes of the dead 
Agamemnon (Cho. 283, 406) before they see them take shape as the curses of Clytaemestra (Cho. 
925). Once they are invoked in an oath that Clytaemestra swears immediately after the murder 
of Agamemnon (Ag. 1431‒6). In the Eumenides, their power as curses is manifested also in their 
binding song (321‒96) with allusions to the ritual of binding curse-tablets (Faraone 1985). In the 
same song they give a self-referential performance of their identity as “Curses” on stage (Prins 
1991). In the pre-trial scene in Eum. 427‒33 they declare clear support for the institution of the 
oath in opposition to Apollo (see esp. Gagarin 1986, 19‒50). 
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matricide Orestes (Eum. 482‒9); she also twice highlights the distinctive role of 
the dicasts’ oath within that Council (484, 489).39 When the Erinyes sing about 
the necessity of fear, coupled with remarks about the divine punishment of those 
who accept bribes and will not be just (538‒43), the inherent potential of their 
threat can be understood as the punishment that will visit the dicasts should they 
break their oath.40 Through the song and the very identity of the Erinyes, the 
power of the conditional self-curse goes hand-in-hand with the establishment of 
the dicasts’ oath and human justice in the audience’s world.
The same pattern can be seen within the actual trial of Orestes. When Athena 
famously adumbrates the importance of fear for the workings of justice (690‒9) in 
the foundational narrative of the Areopagus Court, she echoes the Erinyes’ song, 
and warns the jurors again about their duty to keep their oath (709‒10). Immedi-
ately after this warning, the Erinyes threaten the Athenian land and substantively 
back her up (Aesch. Eum. 709‒13):
Athena. Now you must rise, deliver your votes, and decide the case,  
 respecting your oath. I have said my say.  
Erinyes. And I advice you strictly to avoid dishonouring us,  
 for we can be dangerous company to this land.
Heard in the shadow of Athena’s remark, their words function as a threat to the 
dicasts should they fail to respect their oaths. The Erinyes repeat this warning 
more elaborately after the trial results in Orestes’ acquittal. Feeling slighted, they 
issue a threat of dire consequences against the Athenian land, and, evoking a 
Hesiodic blend of forms of divine punishment, they promise the destruction of 
the earth and its reproductive powers (810‒17):
And I wretched that I am, am dishonoured, grievously angry,  
releasing poison, poison,  
from my heart to cause grief in revenge  
in this land –ah!–  
a drip falling on the land,  
such that it cannot bear! And from it  
a canker causing leaflessness and childlessness – oh Justice, Justice! –  
sweeping over the soil will fill the land with miasmas fatal to humans.  
39 Sommerstein 2010a argues that the way the trial of Orestes is presented is closer to the or-
dinary court of the Heliaia than to Areopagus trials. In the Heliaia the dicasts’ oath included an 
explicit self-curse: see §2.4.1.
40 The dicasts’ oath included an undertaking not to “accept any gift on account of my service as 
a juror” (Dem. 24.150); see S&B 71, 73‒4. 
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I groan; what shall I do? I am a laughing stock. I have suffered unbearable  
treatment at the hands of the citizens!
As critics have observed, the goddesses feel that, now the jurors have freed the 
matricide Orestes from his blood-guilt, the pollution of the murderer should be 
transferred to the jurors’ own land.41 Yet these threats also relate back to the 
Erinyes’ previous warnings to the dicasts. It can be argued that since the dicasts, 
in the minds of the Erinyes, have made a wrong judgement, they have activated 
the conditional self-curse clause of their oath, personified by the Erinyes them-
selves. Divine punishment will affect their whole city, since one perjurer, like one 
murderer, can bring down divine punishment upon those who share a space with 
him (cf. Eur. El. 1355; Pl. Laws 701b-c).
There is then an additional aspect to the Erinyes’ role in the play – the estab-
lishment of a conditional self-curse as an intrinsic part of the dicasts’ oath, nego-
tiated before and developed during and after the trial. This should be counted 
among those divine functions which the Erinyes maintain when, at the end of the 
play, they are propitiated by Athena and incorporated into the Athenian polis as 
divine agents of justice under the identity of Semnai Theai,42 goddesses with an 
established cult in Athens.43 Their gradual incorporation in Athens is indicated 
by a change in the nature of their speech-acts: they turn from their cursing utter-
ances (778‒93 = 808‒23; 837‒46 = 870‒80) to four symmetrical prayers for bless-
ings (916‒26, 938‒49, 956‒68, 976‒88). Once again, these cover the same areas as 
those in Hesiod (938‒55):
41 Cf. e.g. Parker 2009, 149. For the familiar consequences of pollution, which also constitute 
standard formulas of conditional cursing, see Parker 1983, 114 and 191 with references to Soph. 
OT 269‒72; Aeschines 3.111; Eupolis fr. 99.33‒4; SIG3 360.55, 526.40.7, 527.85‒90. Cf. also Mikalson 
1983, 31‒8. 
42 See Sewell-Rutter 2007, 104‒9 and Easterling 2008, 230‒5, for a summary of approaches to 
the ending of the Eumenides regarding the consistencies and changes between the Erinyes and 
the Semnai Theai. Kitto 1961, 64‒95 and Winnington-Ingram 1954, 1983, 154‒74 place particular 
emphasis upon the Semnai / Erinyes’ continuing menace at the end of the play. The extent to 
which the identification between the two (and also the “Eumenides”) existed in real life or before 
Aeschylus is a matter of some controversy, which cannot be easily solved with the current state 
of evidence. A.L. Brown 1984 claims that Aeschylus was the first to make this identification and 
that it is a literary creation; he is followed by Sommerstein 1989, 9‒12. For the opposite view, see 
Lloyd-Jones 1990; Henrichs 1991, 161‒79 and 1994 (a more balanced approach than that of Lloyd-
Jones); Johnston 1999, 267‒73.
43 For the Athenian cult of the Semnai, cf. Aesch. Eum. 806, 835, 856; Dem. 21.115; Aeschines 
1.188; schol. Soph. OC 489; Philo, Quod omnis probus liber sit 140; IG ii2 112.6‒12. For their sanctu-
ary as a place of asylum, cf. Thuc. 1.126.9‒11, Plut. Sol. 12; Ar. Knights 1311‒12; Ar. Thesm. 224‒5. 
See Parker 1996, 298‒9 and 2005a, 406. 
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Erinyes: I wish that no wind may bring harm to trees – I speak now of my favour – to blow 
the flaming heat that robs plants of their buds; let that not pass the land’s borders; and may 
no grievous disease that destroys crops come upon them; may their flocks flourish and may 
Pan rear them to bear twin young at the appointed time; and may their offspring always 
have riches in their soil, and pay back the lucky find granted them by the gods.
Athena: Do you hear this, you guardians of the city – what these words are accomplishing? 
The sovereign Erinys has great power both among immortals and among those under the 
earth; and in the case of men, it is clear how decisively they effect their will, giving to some 
joyful song, to others a life with eyes dimmed by tears.
Critics have noted that the context would have encouraged the play’s audience 
to associate the Erinyes’ transformation into Semnai with the formal institution 
of the oath in the Areopagus council.44 This is because the Semnai were invoked 
in the oath-taking by litigants before each homicide trial in Athens (Dein. 1.47); 
there is a high probability that they were invoked by the judges as well.45 As 
Judith Fletcher has recently underlined (2012, 61‒6), the specific dramatic devel-
opment of their verbal acts from “curses” to “blessings” may well have reminded 
the Athenian audience of the power of the oath within their own judicial system. 
Even, or especially, if this is true, however, it is important to note not only the 
promise of blessings but also crucially their still conditional nature. When the 
Erinyes/Semnai utter their blessings, it is now Athena’s turn to reply and she, like 
the Erinyes before her, follows up the promise of benefaction with warnings of 
dire consequences for the people of Athens (949‒55; cf. 930‒7, 990‒1).46 Now it is 
Athena who makes it clear that the threatened curse remains in force. Again, the 
blessings are contingent upon the decisions and actions of men: the Athenians’ 
own behaviour towards oaths will determine whether they are truly to receive 
blessings or instead curses from the Erinyes/Semnai. In these terms, honouring 
the deities means also keeping one’s oath. At the same time, the open-endedness 
of this conditional form of blessing-cursing established at the end of the Eumen-
ides does more than facilitate an association with formal oath-taking within the 
court system. Due to the importance given during the play’s dénouement to the 
44 See e.g. Thomson 1946, 284; Henrichs 1994, 45‒6; Fletcher 2012, 61‒6. 
45 For the latter we have no clear attestations but S&B 112 n.167 hold that Deinarchus (1.87) 
provides evidence that the Semnai Theai were also invoked in the oath of the Areopagus council, 
when he states that “the Semnai Theai in Orestes’ trial accepted the verdict of the Areopagus 
council and associated themselves with the truthfulness of this body in the future”.
46 The apostrophe is to the dicasts as “the guardian of the city”, but the dicasts are identified as 
the people of Athens (Eum. 487, 681‒2); cf. Taplin 1977, 394. Many of the apostrophes can be taken 
as referring both to them and also to the audience (e.g. Eum. 775, 807, 854, 927). 
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establishment of justice as a universal condition of a well-balanced society47 the 
emphasis on the conditional blessings/curses also hints at the importance of the 
religious act of swearing as a universal prerequisite for establishing justice and 
order in human affairs.
The examination of the Curses/Erinyes in Eumenides in oath contexts unveils 
their close affiliation with the Hesiodic Horkos in their representation as a poten-
tial curse to be activated in the event of perjury. The over-embracing association 
of the Erinyes with the act of cursing is a defining factor in the personification of 
divine powers associated with oaths and perjury in archaic and classical litera-
ture. When we move from the literary divine personifications to representations 
of actual oath-taking, the nature of the oath as a self-curse is equally attested 
through the prominent presence of explicit self-curses in contexts of oath-taking.
2.2 Explicit self-curse and oath-taking
In the previous section it became apparent that the forms of divine punishment 
brought about by Horkos and the Erinyes (e.g. bringing retribution to one’s off-
spring; making the land, livestock and humans sterile) constitute the main forms 
of verbalized self-cursing in oath-taking practices in archaic and classical Greek 
literature. The present section seeks to address tangible uses of the explicit con-
ditional self-curse in oath-taking scenarios of verbal exchanges among individu-
als. This material supplements approaches to the importance of self-cursing in 
formal interstate or civic oaths, which has already been underlined by scholars 
(see below). The purpose here is to examine when and why individual speak-
ers or dramatic characters openly refer to the element of divine punishment in 
oath-taking circumstances. At the same time, these verbal contexts will help us 
ascertain further the manifestation and perception of the oath as a conditional 
self-curse in Greek sources. Evidence is drawn from two genres that place an onus 
on the performativity of language: drama and oratory. Together they comprise the 
greatest bulk of self-curses, as is evident from the following table, which gathers 
all references to verbalized self-cursing in archaic and classical Greek inscrip-
tions and literature.48
47 See esp. C.W. Macleod 1982.
48 These results include only the actual appearance of verbalized curses within our sources; 
they do not include the many references to oaths known to have included a curse (e.g. the di-
casts’ oath), in which the speaker or narrator does not mention the curse in the specific con-
text. Also not included are (1) the passages discussed in the previous section, though, through 
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Genre or text type Refs. to explicit curses
Inscriptions  2749
Epic poetry (incl. Hymns)  650
Comedy  2351
Tragedy  1652
Satyr Drama  253
Other poetry (lyric) 154
the representation of Horkos and the Erinyes, they help to establish the nature of the self-curse 
and should be taken into account as evidence for explicit self-cursing; (2) passages that include 
oath-rituals but not verbalized self-curses. The symbols stand for: C=Curse, B=Blessing, R=oath-
Ritual; OSC=Other Sanctifying Circumstances. All dates are BC.
49 Alliances: IG i3 75.21‒7 (Athens-Halieis, 424/3; C); IG ii2 97.16‒26 (Athens-Corcyra, 375/4 or 
374/3 or 371; B-C); RO 50, 2‒7 (Macedonians-Chalcidians, 357/6; B-C-R); IG ii2 281.9‒10 (Athens – ?, 
336/5; B); arrangements/regulations: IG ii2 111.58‒73 (Athens on Ceos, 363/2; B-C); IG i3 14.21‒45 
(Athens on Erythrae, 469/452; C-R); IG i3 15.d36‒42 (Athens on Erythrae, 455/445; C-R); IG i3 
40.4‒16 (Athens on Chalcis, 446/423; B); colonization: IG i3 37.38‒55 (Colophon, 447/6 or 427/6; 
C-B), ML 5.7‒11 (Thera-Cyrene 645/625; C-B-R); ML 5.23‒51 (Cyrene [Theran colonists], 399/350; 
C-B-R); synoecism: IPArk 15.53‒72 (Orchomenus-Euaimon, 360/350; B-C); members of the koine of 
Eikadeus: IG ii2 1258.2‒21 (Athens, 324/3; C); Athenian hoplites (Plataean oath): RO 88.23‒46 (4th 
cent. stele; Plataea, 479; C-B-R); euthynoi/paredroi: SEG xxxiii 147.52, 57‒64 (Athens-Thoricus, 
430/375; C-R); euthynoi: IG ii2 1183.8‒13 (Athens-Hagnous or Myrrhinous, 349/325; B-C); lessees: 
IG ii2 1196.a8‒13, b5‒22 (Athens-Aexone, 326/5; B-C); witness for introduction to the phratry: IG 
ii2 1237.74‒113 (396/5; C-B-OSC); tagos: CID i 9 Face A, 1‒18 (Delphi, 424/350; B-C); hieromnemon: 
CID i 10.3‒9 (Delphi, 380/379; C-B); secretaries (?): CID i 10.9‒15 (Delphi, 380/379; B-R); citizens: 
Voutiras & Sismanides 2007 (Dicaea, 365/359; B-C). In courts in Gortyn: plaintiff/witnesses: IC iv 
51. 1‒14 (499/475; C); plaintiff (?), members of his family and witnesses: IC iv 51.1‒14 (499/475; C); 
captor of the defendant and witnesses: IC iv 72 col. ii 36‒45 (450/440; C). Unknown circumstances: 
IC ii, xii.3.2‒3 (Eleutherna, 599/400; C); IG i3 42.4‒6 (Athens, 445/427; B-C (?))
50 Peace-treaty: Iliad 3.245‒301 (C-R); reconciliation Achilles-Agamemnon: Il. 19.175‒275 (C-R); 
voluntary self-curses: Il. 2.257‒64 (C); Il. 5.212‒6 (C); Od. 16. 99‒104 (C); h.Herm. 379‒80 (B).
51 Formal oath in the assembly: Ar. Lys. 181‒238 (411; B-C-R); elicited oath (but explicit self-curse 
offered): Ar. Birds 440‒7 (414; C-B); voluntary self-curses: Ar. Ach. 151‒2, 324, 476‒8 (425; C); Ar. 
Knights 400‒1, 409‒10, 694‒5, 767‒8, 769‒72, 832‒5 (424; C); Ar. Georgoi fr. 107 (424/422; C); Ar. 
Clouds 1255 (423; C); Ar. Wasps 630 (422; C); Ar. Lys. 530‒1, 932‒3 (411; OSC); Ar. Frogs 177, 579, 
586‒8 (405; C); Ar. Eccl. 977 (391/90; C); Eubulus Chrysilla fr. 115.6‒7 (380/330; C); Alexis Man-
dragorizomene fr. 149 (345/322; C); Ephippus Homoioi or Obeliaphoroi fr. 16 (350/30; C).
52 Self-curse in alliance(s): Aesch. Eum. 762‒74 (458; B-C-OSC); Eur. Suppl. 1187‒1204 (?; C-OSC); 
elicited solemn self-curses: Soph. Trach. 1181‒1251 (?; C-OSC); Eur. Med. 735‒55 (431; C-OSC); Eur. 
IT 737‒52 (414; C); voluntary self-curses: Soph. OT 249‒51, 644‒5, 660‒2 (420s?; C); Eur. Alc. 1097 
(438; C); Eur. Hipp. Kalypt. fr. 435 (430s?‒C); Eur. Hipp. 1025‒31, 1191 (428; C-OSC); Eur. Or. 1146‒7 
(408; C); Eur. IA 948‒54, 1006‒7 (405; C); [Eur.] Rhes. 816 (?-C).
53 Eur. Cycl. 253‒61, 270‒2 (?408; C).
54 Alcaeus fr. 129.13‒24 (610/560; C; cf. fr. 306g.9‒11).
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Out of a total of 3,279 formal and informal oaths or discussions about oaths within 
the above genres, there are only 117 instances where self-curses are expressly 
articulated. Undoubtedly, the frequency of the presence of the self-curse as indi-
cated by a single number is not a decisive element for establishing its prominent 
role in circumstances of oath-taking. Studies aiming to reconstruct the oath-ritu-
als of interstate alliances or civic ceremonies have ascertained the symbolism of 
the ritual action in strict relation to the self-curse and divine punishment, even in 
those cases where the self-curse is not always explicitly present in the narratives 
of these rituals.59 These studies have shown in detail how the actual performance 
of the sacrificial ritual enacts the self-curse of the oath. The killing of the animal 
is described in terms that recall the act of killing itself and the blood of the victim: 
terms such as “to slaughter” (sphattein) and “slaughtered bits” (sphagia); and “to 
cut” (temnein) or “cut pieces” (tomia) which indicate that the immolation of the 
victim60 symbolically represent the potential death of the perjurer should they 
55 Dicasts: Andoc. 1.31 (400/399; C); Dem. 24. 148‒51 (353; C-B); Dem. 19.219‒20 (343; C); Ae-
schines, 2.232‒3 (330; C); Lyc. Leocr. 79 (330; C). Prosecutor/defendant: Ant. 5.11‒12 (420/413 
[homicide]; C); [Dem.] 47.70, 73 (diōmosia at Palladium, 357‒353/2; C); [Dem.] 59.10 (homicide; 
343/340; C); Dem. 23.67‒8 (homicide; 352; C-R); Aeschines 2.87 (343; winner of the homicide trial; 
R-C-Blessings for the dicasts). Witnesses: Dem. 57.22, 53 (345; C); Aeschines 1.114‒15 (345; C). Oa-
th-challenges: Lys. 32.13 (400; C), Dem. 29.26, 33, 54 (362/1; C). Self-curses in the courtroom: Dem. 
54.38, 40 (355/341; C), 54.41 (355/341; B-C); 19.172 (343; C). Spontaneous cursing outside the courts: 
Aeschines 3.99 (330; C), Dem. 18.283 (330; C); Dem. 21.119 (347/6; C); [Dem.] 49.66‒7 (362; C); Lys. 
12.10 (403/2; C). Other official oaths with curses unrelated to judicial proceedings: Aeschines 
2.115‒16 (343 [for Amphictyones 1st meeting, 7th cent.(?)]; C); 3.109‒13, 119‒20, 125‒8 (330 [Am-
phictyones 2nd meeting, 595/85]; C); Andoc. 1.96‒8 (400/399 [oath of Demophantus, 410/409]; 
B-C-R); Andoc. 1.126 (witness of the phratry, 400/399; C-OSC); Lyc. 1.79 (archon, ephebes, 330; C).
56 Hdt. 6.86 (490/480; C); Hdt. 1.165 (Phocaeans, ca 540; C-R); Hdt. 4.68‒70 (Scythians, 484/415; 
C-R); Ephorus FGrH 70 F 115 (Aetolians-Argives-Epeians, ?; C).
57 Pl. Phd. 89b‒c (384/379; C); Pl. Crit. 119e‒120c (361/350; C-R), Empedocles fr. 115.1‒12 D-K 
(465/430; C).
58 Hippocratic Oath (425/322; B-C); see ch. 14.
59 See esp. Burkert 1985, 250‒4; Faraone, 1993, 2002; Berti 2006; Kitts 2005, 114‒87; Parker 2011, 
156‒9; S&B 151‒67. 
60 Or the more general terms hiera (IG i3 16; Lyc. Leocr. 20; Isaeus 7.28; Ath.Pol. 1.1.1) and hiera 
teleia (Thuc. 5.47.1; [Dem.] 59.60; Andoc. 1.97‒8; Aeschines 1.114; Ath.Pol. 29.5.4). For the vocabu-
lary of oath-sacrifices and its symbolism see esp. Faraone 1993; and Berti 2006. 
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break their oath (i.e. they represent the potential activation of the self-curse). The 
idea of the animal as a “substitute” for the perjurer61 is also taken to be present in 
instances that show that there was contact between the swearer and the animal 
victim62 or its blood,63 or even between the swearer and a sacrificial altar.64
Other ritual acts, such as pouring libations of wine,65 melting wax images 
(see below) or sinking iron-lumps into the sea,66 all also encourage being read in 
terms whose symbolism point to a context beyond the ritual action itself – pri-
marily the act of making the self-curse and the punishment that one breaking the 
oath could look forward to receiving. It may be true that this analogical relation-
ship drawn between the self-curse and the ritual action has been based upon a 
very few instances where the connection is made explicit, as in the Theran colo-
nists’ oath ritual of melting wax effigies in Cyrene (ML 5.23‒51):67
61 Parker 2013 singles out the oath-sacrifices – along with homicide purifications and pre-battle 
sacrifices – as cases of Greek sacrifice in which a symbolic identification between animal and 
human may be detected, though, as he states, not in the strict sense of “substitution“: it “is not 
the animal’s death substituting for that of the human; on the contrary, the animal’s death prefig-
ures that of the human in the event of perjury” (150). 
62 In Hdt. 6.68.1‒2, the mother of the Spartan Demaratus testifies about his paternity with an 
oath that she swears while holding the innards of a bull sacrificed to Zeus. Cf. also Antiphon 5.12; 
Aeschines 1.114. 
63 Cf. Xen. Anab. 2.2.8‒9; Aesch. Seven 42‒9: the seven warriors slit the throat of a bull (tauro-
sphagountes), catch its blood in a black shield and then dip their fingers in the blood. In Plato’s 
Critias (419e‒420d) the fictional ritual of the oath of the Ten Kings in Atlantis closely aligns the 
element of the verbal curse to the symbolism behind the blood of the victim: the kings slaugh-
tered a bull (esphatton) over the column where the oaths of the Kings are written which are de-
scribed as “great curses”. The blood of the animal victim covers the letters of this oath: in this 
way a “contact” of blood (i.e. animal’s death) with the written conditional self-curse is estab-
lished. Distinctively the blood of the victim is mixed with one clot of the participants’ blood with 
wine, emphasizing further the association between swearer and animal. This mixture forms the 
libation poured over a fire that thus enhances the symbolic destruction of the perjurers.
64 Cf. Andoc. 1.126, where the politician Callias swears by holding the altar of Zeus Phratrios that 
the child of his wife’s mother was not his son.
65 e.g. Hom. Il. 3. 269‒301; Arist. Lys. 181‒238; cf. also S&B 242 for the pouring of peace liba-
tions (spondai): “it seems likely that the connection between libations of red wine and the sworn 
truces was symbolic – truces ended bloodshed, and the libation represents what will happen to 
those who break the oath, i.e. their blood will be spilt”. 
66 Ath.Pol. 23.5 and Plut. Arist. 25.1 (oath of the Delian league); Hdt. 1.165.3 (oath of Phocaeans). 
See esp. Jakobson 1975, 256‒7, and S&B 155‒6. 
67 See Faraone 1993 for the analogy between word and ritual action. The authenticity of this 
particular oath-ritual is debated but most scholars agree that it must be genuine: cf. Faraone 
1993, 60‒2; Graham 1964; 224‒6; Gagné 2013, 357‒62. There are only two other instances in which 
a verbalized self-curse is connected through analogy to ritual: Iliad 3.297‒301 and the Molossian 
 2.2 Explicit self-curse and oath-taking   23
If someone does not abide by that oath and transgresses it, may he melt away and dissolve 
like the images, himself, his seed, and his property.
Yet, despite the limited evidence of this kind of co-existence between word and 
deed, approaches to rituals accompanying oaths have helped to flesh out the 
prominent role of the conditional self-curse, by presenting it as one of the poten-
tial symbols that ritual acts can acquire.
It is clear, however, that the explicit articulation of the self-curse provides 
the most obvious way to confirm the prominent role of divine punishment.68 Its 
limited presence in certain genres seems to be due to narrative choices. Those 
studies that have dealt with formal oath-taking in prose texts have pointed to 
the contrast between historiography and inscriptions. Where inscriptions reveal 
a relatively high frequency of the self-curse, ancient historians tend to omit refer-
ences to explicit curses from their oath narratives. Explicit self-curses are rare in 
Herodotus and completely absent not only from Thucydides, where their absence 
might have been expected given the author’s general avoidance of reference to 
religious practice,69 but also from Xenophon who is renowned for his interest in 
religion and in perjury in particular.70 The evidence confirms that the same ten-
dency to omit the explicit curse appears in the cognate prose genre of philosophy.
By way of contrast, it is in the direct speech of Greek drama and oratory 
that our overwhelming evidence for the appearance of the self-curse lies. These 
genres allow us to examine different contexts and circumstances in which the 
explicit self-curse brings to the fore the element of conditional divine punishment 
in oath-taking, even when it is presented by the speaker in reported oaths – as it 
usually is in forensic speeches. In the following sections we examine drama and 
oratory with the aim of shedding some light on those contexts and the reasons 
why speakers emphasize this verbal element, while they also appropriate or elab-
orate on the standard forms of potential divine punishment in oath-taking.
ceremony described in Prov. Coisl. 57 Gaisford. Bickerman 1976 points to the absence of evidence 
for a generalised application of this analogy in oath-sacrifices.
68 But, as already claimed, certainly not the only one: many other elements can equally increase 
the perception of divine punishment in oath-taking; see e.g. p. 37 n. 117.
69 Cf. Lateiner 2012, 154‒84 for a comparative study on the religious element of the oath in the 
two historians. 
70 For perjury in Xenophon, see S&B 312‒20.
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2.3 The explicit self-curse in Greek drama
Athenian theatre provides the backdrop for the greatest number of verbalized 
self-curses among individuals in Greek sources. Through various representa-
tions, the Greek dramatic genres offer insights into the awareness of the oath 
as a self-curse and the presence of divine punishment in its conditional form in 
verbal exchanges among dramatic characters. We can discern two general types 
of scenarios where explicit conditional self-curses are to be found in drama. First, 
they appear in long oath scenes, where one character elicits a promissory oath 
from another (§2.3.1). As part of this more solemn form of interpersonal oath-
taking, these self-curses have received relatively more critical interest than those 
that form the second group: spontaneous and voluntary conditional self-curses 
offered by a character as an oath, in support of a promissory or assertory state-
ment (§2.3.2). This section will start by examining the form and function of the 
explicit self-curse in the more formal oath-scenes, but it is the latter group that 
it mainly aims to bring into focus, given the relative lack of scholarly attention. 
Spontaneous self-cursing is particularly significant for two reasons: they provide 
our only avenue of exploration for the presence of a colloquial form of self-curs-
ing in Athenian culture; at the same time, this form is our best evidence of the 
oath’s absolute identification with the self-curse.
2.3.1 The self-curse in elicited oaths in Greek tragedy
Following the norms of formal oath-taking in Athenian life, all three solemn oath 
scenes in tragedy,71 in which one speaker elicits a promissory oath from another 
during an intense stichomythic exchange (Eur. Med. 735‒55, IT 735‒58; Soph. 
Trach. 1181‒1251), include a verbalized conditional self-curse (Eur. Med. 754‒5, IT 
750‒2; Soph. Trach. 1189‒90).72 The reasons for soliciting an oath on each occa-
sion relate to the speaker’s anxiety that his or her interlocutor may not keep their 
word, especially since they are about to part company. Aegeus meets Medea by 
chance on his way to Delphi to find a solution to his childlessness; before she lets 
him go, Medea extracts from him an oath promising his (future) support. Simi-
larly, Iphigeneia demands an oath from the stranger Pylades, before he leaves for 
71 There is only one elicited oath in comedy outside a formal framework (Ar.Lys. 181‒238), but 
the self-curse is given voluntarily: Aristophanes Birds 440‒7. 
72 See Fletcher 2012, 182‒8, 194‒202 and 81‒9 respectively, for the function of the oaths in these 
plays, mainly from the perspective of gender. 
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Greece, to deliver her letter to her brother Orestes. On his deathbed Heracles gets 
Hyllus to swear an oath, before revealing his appalling demand: that his son must 
cremate him alive (Soph. Trach. 1193‒1201) and marry his (Heracles’) concubine, 
Iole (1220‒9). In all three instances, the request of a self-curse provides a stronger 
guarantee against the risk of oath-breaking, as the swearer is asked to ponder the 
dire consequences of failing to comply and to keep in mind the unfailing power of 
divine punishment, even after he is left on his own. These three cases are exam-
ined here in parallel in order to unpack the religious import of the explicit self-
curse in dramatic scenes of interpersonal oath-taking.73
Although in these scenes all three elements of the oath-taking procedure are 
elicited as per the official formal oath (invocation, statement, self-curse – see 
§1.1), in none of them does the explicit self-curse take the usual form of intergen-
erational punishment that we typically find in formal oaths. The reason for this 
seems to lie in the personal circumstances of the swearer. As critics have noted, 
the vague form of Aegeus’ curse – “everything that happens to those mortals who 
are impious” – departs from the usual punishment upon one’s offspring in ways 
that make sense in the context: Aegeus is childless, and this becomes the primary 
reason for his agreement to help Medea, since she promises a cure for his misfor-
tune. But this departure from the norm is also apparent in our other two exam-
ples. In the case of Hyllus, Heracles proposes a similarly abstract self-curse that 
his son should “incur calamities” (1189), if he were to depart from the instruc-
tions his father lays down. In the case of Pylades and Iphigeneia, the content of 
their curses reveal their main concern at the moment they are taking the oath, 
which is their return home (Eur. IT 750‒2):74
Iph. And if you abandon your oath and wrong me?  
Py. May I never get home. – And you, if you fail to see me safe?  
Iph. May I never set foot in Argos so long as I live.75
73 In all three plays revenge-cursing also plays a prominent role and, as a dramatic element, 
is linked with the element of the oath. In Soph. Trach. 383‒4, the chorus utters a curse against 
Lichas for lying and perjury, while Lichas later meets his death; in turn Hyllus curses his mother 
Deianeira (808‒9, 819‒20) who becomes a target of Heracles’ curse too (1039‒40). In Eur. Medea, 
Medea constantly curses Jason, his house and Glauce (112‒14, 163‒5, 625‒6, 764‒7, 803‒6) and 
Jason reciprocates after the murder of their children (1329, 1389‒90). For revenge-cursing in Eur. 
IT see n.75 below.
74 See Kyriakou 2006, 253 on 747‒52.
75 The two curses recall the content of a revenge-curse which Iphigeneia had earlier uttered 
against Odysseus: “May he perish and never make the return to his homeland” (IT 535). The same 
curse theme appears in Eur. Hipp. 1025‒31. The inclusion of this self-curse in the letter scene in 
IT resonates with Euripides’ Hippolytus but does so by inversion: here the self-curse is used to 
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In both of these cases, status explains the form of the explicit self-curse: those 
swearing an oath are young and, as yet, unmarried and childless. Therefore, the 
formulation of a self-curse with no reference to offspring or family is appropri-
ate. At the same time, two of the three cases indicate the functionality of vaguer 
and more ambiguous formulations of verbalized self-cursing. In the cases of 
Aegeus and Hyllus, imprecise and open-ended self-curses are used for differ-
ent purposes:76 to avoid spelling out a weighty form of divine punishment, as 
in the case of Aegeus who defines the content of his own self-curse omitting any 
mention of punishment that would include children, which is his preoccupation; 
or to maximise the potential of the divine to impose any kind of punishment, even 
one exceptionally serious, as in the self-curse proposed by Heracles to Hyllus.77
Yet, despite the vagueness of Aegeus’ curse, scholars have noticed that the 
audience’s extra-dramatic knowledge of the punishment hanging over the swear-
er’s offspring deepens the allusive potential of the imprecise form of Aegeus’ self-
curses.78 Jason had given a solemn oath to Medea, which both her nurse (Eur. 
Med. 21‒3, 160‒3, 168‒72), the chorus (208‒10, 439‒40) and Medea herself (492‒5) 
expressly recall during the play; As critics have argued, the oath-scene between 
Medea and Aegeus recalls the long-past one between Medea and Jason; thus, the 
vague formulation of Aegeus’ self-curse serves to remind the audience about the 
punishment that awaits Jason, the “impious” man who broke his oath. We do 
not know the exact form of Jason’s oath (and self-curse): but Medea fulfils the 
element of the self-curse as an “Erinys” (1260), who brings death and destruction 
upon their offspring.
It can be claimed that the audience’s extra-dramatic experience also informs 
their assessment of the vague self-curse in Hyllus’ case, when the latter is met 
by an immediate conditional threat from the dying Heracles (Soph. Trach. 1202):
secure the delivery of the content of Iphigeneia’s letter, whereas Hippolytus uses the same form of 
punishment in an oath in a repetitive attempt to revoke the content of Phaedra’s letter and prove 
that he is not an evil man, as his step-mother had alleged. For the letter-oath combination as a 
common element in the two plays see Fletcher, 2012, 197‒8. For this form of divine punishment 
(“being kept away from one’s homeland”) in verbal cursing, cf. the well-known curse of the Cy-
clops against Odysseus (Hom. Od. 4.551‒60); and, [Eur.] Rhes. 720. 
76 A vague form of self-cursing in oath-taking is also found in the formal oath of the reconcili-
ation between Achilles and Agamemnon in Iliad 19.175‒275, where Talthybius defines the condi-
tional self-curse as “all the misfortunes that gods give to perjurers” (19.264‒5). 
77 For the latter case, cf. Strubbe 1991, 35‒6, who notes a similar function of vague conditional 
curses in inscriptional documents.
78 For the use of oaths in the play in favour of Medea’s position see esp. Boedeker 1991; Kovacs 
1993; Burnett 1998, 192‒224; S.R. West 2003, 443‒4; and Mossman 2011, 42‒5; contra A. Allan 
2007, 113‒24. 
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If you do not (fulfil my demands), I shall remain a grievous curse upon you even below the 
earth!
Heracles’ curse belongs to a common form of revenge-cursing in literary sources 
– that of a dying person, here a dying father directing a curse against his son.79 At 
the same time, however, Heracles presents himself as a conditional curse, to be 
activated should Hyllus fail to keep his promise to prepare his funeral pyre. This 
curse seems to gesture towards Heracles’ future status as a hero/god – potent in 
imposing punishment – in the cult ritual of the audience’s reality, which critics 
have seen being activated or alluded to as the tragedy draws to a close.80 But 
more specifically, it can be taken as one manifestation of the vague self-curse of 
the oath itself and this understanding is backed up by the language of the oath. 
First, Heracles demands that Hyllus take an oath on the “head of Zeus” (1185), an 
invocation used elsewhere only by divinities.81 Second, Heracles’ exchange with 
Hyllus may allude more specifically to his role as an oath-god who fulfils self-
curses: there are no fewer than nineteen invocations to Heracles as the divinity 
overseeing oath-taking, all among males.82 Thus, constructing himself as a con-
ditional curse, Heracles temporarily assumes the role of a divine figure who can 
by himself represent and bring to fulfilment the divine punishment of the oath.83
Within this framework of references to the divine powers and their role in 
self-cursing, it is worth noting that different rhetorical strategies for invoking the 
gods, as an accompaniment to the explicit self-curse, can help bolster the fear of 
79 Cf. Aesch. Cho. 405‒6. For the curse of the dying/dead in tragedy: Soph. Aj. 835‒44 [839‒42], 
1389‒92; Soph. El. 110‒16; Soph. Trach. 807‒12; Eur. Med. 1389. Or instances in which the Eriny(e)
s appear to be activated by a dying/dead person: Aesch. Sept. 574; Soph. OC 1298‒9, 1434; Soph. 
El. 276, 489‒501, 1384‒92; Eur. IT 931‒5, 961‒82, 1439; Eur. Or. 237‒8, 255‒75, 582‒4.
80 I am in agreement with the balanced reading of the ending by Easterling 1981 and 1982, 9‒11 
that there might be a potential allusion to the cult of Heracles in the audience’s reality, but the 
ending is surely not only about Heracles’ apotheosis. In general, spoken curses have been widely 
used to support the argument about the evocation of hero cult and ritual on the tragic stage: see 
eg. Burian 1972, 153 and 1974, 425‒8; Henrichs 1993, 166‒8; Seaford 1994, 123‒39. For dramatic 
self-representations of characters as a conditional curse, cf. Aesch. Eum. 767‒74 for which see p. 
00 [17] n. 35. Also in Eur. IT 778, Iphigeneia claims that if Orestes does not come to take her back 
to Argos, she will become a curse upon him (araia). 
81 Cf. e.g. Iliad.15.36‒46; Sappho fr. 44A and Torrance 2009. See §7.3.
82 In formal oath-taking Heracles is invoked among the 19 powers of the ephebes’ oath (RO 
88.5‒16, SEG xxix 77); but mostly he is present in informal oaths: Ar. Ach. 860, Knights 481, Wasps 
757‒8, Birds 1390‒1, Thesm. 26‒7, Wealth 337‒9; Dem. 18.294; Aeschines 1.88, 3.212. 
83 This is simply an allusion, since a few lines later, in Trachiniae Heracles uses a vaguer invo-
cation for the oath: he invokes “the gods” to fulfil the curse of the oath (1239‒40) and to be his 
witnesses (1248‒51). 
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divine punishment. Both in Euripides’ Medea and Iphigeneia in Tauris, the invo-
cation figures immediately before the utterance of the curse, and not, as we might 
have expected – taking into account the tripartite form of the oath – at the begin-
ning of the oath scene. This combination gives prominence to the god’s power to 
enforce punishment. In the invocation itself, Medea asks Aegeus to take an oath 
in the name of three powers, Zeus, Helios and Gaia (746‒7). As mentioned in the 
introduction, Zeus is the god with broader jurisdiction over the self-curse, a fact 
that becomes clear within the play itself;84 the other two powers are often com-
bined as divine witnesses in oath-taking because they “oversee” everything,85 a 
feature that makes them also ideal avengers, as their presence in revenge-cursing 
confirms too.86 In IΤ the choice is defined by the swearer’s status, which again 
increases the potential of divine punishment: Iphigeneia takes a female oath 
with an explicit self-curse in the name of Artemis whose priestess she is, which 
Pylades can cap only by invoking the ultimate authority of Zeus (748‒9). The 
placement of the self-curse, then, in combination with the naming of well-chosen 
divine powers, emphasizes the religious framework of the oath process.
84 In fact, both Zeus and the Erinyes are presented as possessing a broader power over oath and 
perjury in this play. In lines 160‒2, Medea invokes Themis and Artemis to witness the perjury of 
Jason; but in the choral leader’s repetition of Medea’s words, Zeus “who is the steward of oaths 
for men” replaces Artemis (168‒70). And when Medea fulfills the curse of the oath with the killing 
of her children, as already mentioned, she becomes an Erinys (1260). For the role of Zeus Horkios 
cf. Eur. Hipp. 1025 and Soph. Phil. 1324. 
85 Usually divine epithets or attributive qualifications which are used in oaths aim to please 
the gods, e.g. ἀδμήτα (Artemis: Soph. El. 1239‒42; Athena: Ar. Knights 767‒8), σεμνὴ ... Διὸς κόρη 
(Artemis: Eur. Hipp. 713), Διὶ φίλος (Apollo: Iliad 1.86), or φίλη (Demeter: Antiphanes fr. 26). 
Yet, Euripides’ plays reveal a marked preference for more “vengeful” aspects of the gods, and 
this influences the perception of divine punishment upon the oath-taker. The “archer goddess” 
(τοξόδαμνος) Artemis is called upon by Hippolytus to witness that he is acquitting his father of 
his murder (Eur. Hipp. 1451); some thirty lines before, the goddess on stage said that she would 
give Hippolytus honours in Trozen but also that she would destroy Aphrodite’s favourite (Adonis) 
with her inescapable arrows (Hipp. 1417‒25). In Euripides’ Ion, Creusa calls upon Athena the Gor-
gon slayer (Γοργοφόνα) to witness that she and Apollo are the parents of Ion (Eur. Ion 1478). The 
epithet resonates with the earlier presentation of Athena as the killer of the Gorgon (987‒98); 
as Lee 1997, 310, states, the invocation lends irony to the scene since the poisonous blood of the 
Gorgon almost killed her son. Cf. also the use of epithets such as the “murderous” (φοίνιος) Ares, 
in the invocation of Menοeceus after his decision to sacrifice himself for the sake of Thebes (Eur. 
Phoen. 1006); or the negative image of the “black haired” (μελαγχαίτης) Hades in Eur. Alc. 438.
86 Cf. e.g. Aesch. Ag. 1322‒6; see Strubbe 1991, 70‒1 and n. 49 for the Sun’s association with curs-
ing. For the presence of the same powers in formal oath-taking, cf. e.g. Burkert 1985, 251 and S&B 
160‒7. Of course, in the particular case of Medea, the invocation to the Sun, as her grandfather, 
carries further dramatic implications for the finale of the play. 
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In ch. 6 it will be shown how the presence of various sanctifying features in 
formal oath-taking gives additional weight to the oath and, further, can enhance 
the threat of divine punishment (i.e. the conditional self-curse).87 Here though 
it is worth pointing out a somewhat different means of divine empowerment as 
it appears in one of the above cases, Aegeus’ self-curse, which gives particular 
prominence to the vengeful aspect of the gods. This is the placement of the curse 
within the ritual of supplication enacted by Medea in her role as the suppliant 
to Aegeus. The ritual process in the case of Medea coincides with a point made 
in Plato’s Laws (730a), when the Athenian speaker articulates the connection 
between supplication and the sanctity of the oath, bringing to the fore the god’s 
vengeful role in cases of oath-breaking:
Of wrongs enacted against either strangers or natives, that which concerns 
suppliants is in every case the most grave; for when a suppliant, after invoking a 
god as witness, is cheated of his agreement, the god becomes the special guardian 
of the wronged person, so that he will never be wronged without vengeance being 
taken.
The agreement in favour of the suppliant can be sealed with an oath that 
makes the god a (conditional) avenger against the person supplicated.88 This is 
exactly what happens in the case of Medea: Medea puts herself into the position 
of a suppliant (709‒13), and, once Aegeus promises to offer his help, she asks him 
to swear an oath (719‒55); it is only after he invokes the self-curse upon himself 
that the supplication comes to an end (756).89 Through this process, Medea passes 
from the protection of Zeus Hikesios to the protection of the gods invoked in the 
oath, now ready to fulfil the divine punishment should the oath be broken. This 
pattern with an explicit self-curse is found in other supplication rituals in Greek 
tragedy and the sequel confirms the decisive role that the oath as a conditional 
self-curse can play within the Greek ritual of supplication.90
87 e.g. for the oaths here discussed, Iphigeneia’s is taken in the presence of the statue of Arte-
mis, which increases its religious power, while Hyllus’ oath is marked by the gesture of hand-
clasping (1181) using human contact to lend it greater power. 
88 See Naiden 2006, 122‒36 for betrayal in the “fourth step of supplication” which consists of a 
pledge or oath. He draws attention to Poll. 8.142 where Solon asks the Athenian to swear by Zeus 
Hikesios. 
89 The conditional self-curse of Aegeus balances the suppliant’s – Medea’s – earlier spontane-
ous blessing (714‒15).
90 Cf. Eur. IA 900‒36 where Clytaemestra supplicates Achilles to help her and Achilles, accept-
ing her supplication, takes an oath with a strong curse (948‒54); Eur. IT 1060‒78 where Iphige-
neia asks the women to keep secret her plan with Orestes, the women agree, and Iphigeneia re-
plies with a blessing (1078‒80); and Eur. Suppl. 260‒2 where an oath by the gods, Earth, Demeter 
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2.3.2 Voluntary self-cursing in Greek drama
With the exception of these three relatively formal instances of self-cursing elic-
ited between individuals, the self-curse in Greek drama marks an act of oath-
taking that the swearer himself makes willingly. Befitting its voluntary nature, 
this self-curse is rarely supplemented by an invocation to more than one divine 
power (e.g. Eur. IA 948‒54, Cycl. 262‒9). Similarly, it is not that often that the type 
of ‘informal oath’, with its standard feature of divine invocation (see ch. 13), is 
combined in drama with a self-curse of the type: “by Zeus, may I die! [if I break 
my oath]” (Ar. Lys. 932‒3).91 In the vast majority of cases instead, voluntary con-
ditional self-cursing appears in a plain form of the type: “may I die if I am scared 
of you!” (Ar. Wasps 630) – a form that explicitly marks the nature of the oath as a 
conditional self-curse and is found predominantly in drama.92 Comedy shows a 
particular liking for this form of spontaneous self-cursing (21 out of a total of 32 
in the three dramatic genres), which, along with the high frequency of informal 
oaths more generally, are part of comedy’s arsenal of more impulsive forms of 
expression; they are more sparingly used in the “serious” genre of tragedy (9 out 
of 32).93 In their typical short form, these self-curses simply invoke death upon 
the swearer.94 But, as some of the following examples will show, they can vary in 
form, length and content, depending on the purpose of the swearer. The follow-
ing section will mark some of the contextual circumstances that accommodate 
these voluntary self-curses; it will also show some of the ways through which 
their religious solemnity increases in the context in which they are found.
In two of its occurrences in tragedy the self-curse marks the swearer’s effort 
to convince a highly mistrustful character about the truthfulness of a claim. In 
and the Sun is proposed but not taken after a supplication scene. In Soph. OC 640ff, although 
no oath is demanded after Oedipus’ supplication (650), Theseus speaks later as if he had taken 
it (1760‒7; see §5.2). For an oath with a self-curse in the language of the suppliant see Eur. Or. 
1516‒17.
91 See also Ar. Knights 409‒10, 832‒5; Soph. OT 660‒2; Eubulus fr. 115.6‒7. With only a single 
invocation: Ar. Knights 767‒8; Eur. Hipp. 1191.
92 In other sources, it is found three times in Homer (Il. 2.257‒64, 5.212‒16; Od. 16.99‒104) and 
only once in oratory (Dem. 19.172). For the self-curse as a sole linguistic marker for the oath see 
§5.1.
93 See table pp. 20‒1 with nn. 51‒3 . 
94 In the great majority of the instances the optative has the form of ἀπ-/ἐξ-ολοίμην. In four 
cases we find the form μὴ ζώιην (Ar. Knights 832‒5, Clouds 1255, Lys. 530‒1; Eur. Or. 1146‒7), and 
three times θάνοιμι (Ar. Eccl. 977; Eur. Alc. 1096, IA 1006‒7). 
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Sophocles’ Oedipus the King, first Creon uses this form of cursing as he attempts 
to rebuff Oedipus’ charge of political conspiracy (OT 644‒5):
May I not prosper but may I die accursed,  
if I have done to you any of the things you accuse me!
The chorus back Creon up and try to convince Oedipus to believe his self-curse 
which they clearly identify as an oath (“respect the one who was not previously 
foolish and now he is strong in his oath”, OT 653).95 When in turn they find them-
selves accused of planning the king’s exile and death (658‒9), they reply with a 
much more emphatic self-curse than that used by Creon (OT 662‒4):
No, by the foremost of the gods, the Sun!  
May I perish in the most terrible way, abandoned  
by gods and friends, if I harbour this thought!
Clearly, the more elaborate the formula, the more likely the curse is to have the 
desired effect on the listener. The chorus’ conditional wish for death in isolation 
(“away from gods and friends”) appropriates Oedipus’ fears that they are plan-
ning his exile and death and turns it against themselves. In Euripides’ Hippolytus 
the self-curse is applied in a similar way and context: by invoking destruction 
upon himself, Hippolytus tries to convince his disbelieving father, Theseus, that 
he is not an evil man (Eur. Hipp. 1030‒1), an effort that totally fails in its purpose 
since Theseus’ mind is already made up and all Hippolytus achieves is to anger 
him further (1036‒59). In his case, the self-curse is an actual extension of his 
oath that he has not slept with his stepmother Phaedra (1025‒9).96 Thus, in both 
plays, the self-curse is combined with another self-curse/oath, albeit in different 
ways;97 and in both cases their combination is designed to enforce their recep-
tion as effective religious utterances in an ultimate effort to make the collocutor 
change his mind.
Athenian comedy displays the same tendency towards combined self-curses, 
but here they extend beyond pairing. The comic genre provides the longest and 
95 Cf. also Iocasta’s similar prompting in Soph. OT 647. 
96 There are in fact two oaths in the lines 1025‒30 – which are usually taken as one: 1025‒7 with 
the statement ‘I have never touched your wife’ and another one in 1027‒31 with the statement ‘I 
am not an evil man’. The self-curse is attached to the latter but its positioning facilitates a con-
nection with the former as well. See on this Halleran 1995, 237, ad 1028 and, more generally, Segal 
1972 for the close-bound interrelation of oaths and curses in Hippolytus. 
97 For combination of self-curses with another oath (formal or informal) in the immediate con-
text cf. Ar. Ach. 151‒2; Wasps 630; Clouds 1255; Ar. Knights and Frogs below. 
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most elaborate instances of verbalized self-cursing in all Greek literature, and 
their application is in accordance with its fondness for humorous twists and witty 
turns of phrase. As might be expected, self-cursing becomes the verbal means for 
parodying Athenian individuals. The elaborate combination of self-curses in the 
Homoioi of Ephippus offers one such case (fr. 16):
May I be forced to learn by heart dramas by Dionysius and  
Demophon’s poem about Cotys;  
may Theodorus recite speeches to me over dinner.  
May I live next door to Laches;  
may I have Euripides as a dinner guest  
and supply him with cups.
In this example we get a glimpse of the comic poet’s use of the self-curse against 
contemporaries98 (Laches, Euripides)99 including poets (Dionysius, Demophon) 
and actors (Theodorus). Self-cursing can also serve to underline comedy’s exu-
berance and its practitioners’ flair for one-upmanship.100 In Aristophanes’ Birds 
(440‒7) the chorus’s concern to win the vote in the dramatic competition and 
gain the approval of the audience is expressed through a self-curse, which proves 
not to be one at all.101
Embellished or repetitive self-cursing is not only used for attacks of poetic 
rivalry and competition. It also forms a means of rivalry and verbal competition 
within the drama itself, as is strikingly evident in Aristophanes’ Knights. The use 
of self-curses marks the opening of the verbal contest between its two protago-
nists, Paphlagon/Cleon and the Sausage-Seller, who compete for the attention 
of the personified Athenian Demos. The verbal and emotional framework that 
accommodates these verbal acts there – the expression of faithfulness, love and 
loyalty – is a typical context for self-cursing elsewhere too (Ar. Frogs 579; Eur. Alc. 
1096; Eubulus fr. 115.6‒7; Alexis fr. 149). Paphlagon starts by praying to Athena 
98 See further e.g. the attack on the politician Callimedon, Alexis fr. 149: “if I love any foreign-
ers more than you, may I be turned into an eel and purchased by Callimedon, ‘the Crayfish’”. Cf. 
also the attack on the ‘social group’ women in Eubulus fr. 115.6‒7. 
99 This Euripides is not the poet but a contemporary of Ephippus, who must have been a prom-
inent figure in the symposia of the time, if we are to judge by Ephippus fr. 9 and Anaxandrides 
fr. 33. 
100 The well-known attack on Cratinus in Ar. Knights 400‒1 is given in a form of a self-curse: 
“if I don’t hate you, may I turn into a blanket in Cratinus’ house and be coached to sing in one of 
Morsimus’ tragedies!” 
101 ”... my reward to be, that I shall be victorious by the verdict of all the judges and all the audi-
ence … But should I break my oath, then let me win by just one vote.” 
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(Knights 763‒6)102 that, if he proves to be a worthy servant of Demos, he may enjoy 
free maintenance at public expense. It is as an extension of this prayer that he 
adds a self-curse (767‒8):
But if, Demos, I hate you, if I am not the only man who provides resistance and fights for 
you, then may I perish and be sawn in two and cut up into yoke-leather straps!
Paphlagon’s words prompt the Sausage-seller to reply in kind, only more so 
(769‒72):
And may I, Demos, If I do not love and cherish you, be cut up and boiled with mincemeat! 
And if you don’t believe that, then may I on this table be grated with cheese into a savoury 
mash, and may I be dragged by the balls with my own meat-hook to Cerameicus!
It is because the self-curse is conceived as a powerful verbal act that can exercise 
a strong impact on a third party (here, the naïve Demos) that the second speaker 
feels the need to add his own self-curse. And, precisely because of expectations 
that this initial utterance has clout, his must be greater in number and import 
than the first. This is not the only case where we find competitive conditional 
self-cursing in Greek literature (cf. Eur. Cyclops 262‒72 and Dem. 54.38‒42). 
Within this context, we may also note, along with Sommerstein 1981 (ad loc.), 
that the form of the self-curses derives neatly from each speaker’s professional 
trade, which enhances the idea of competition in trade but, here, with the com-
petitors being in different professional domains.103 Yet the self-curse with which 
the Sausage-seller trumps Paphlagon extends the concept of cursing in another 
way too. His emphasis on “cutting” (katatmētheis), while indicative of his trade 
as a sausage-seller, may also resonate with the sacrificial ritual accompanying 
102 The prayer itself parodies the one in the Athenian Assembly: cf. Th. 331‒51 and Eccl. 171‒2 
and see Horn 1970, 44. For Athena’s epithets in this prayer as despoina and medeousa cf. An-
derson 1995, 16‒22. Athena is one of the few deities receiving cult epithets in oath-taking: Polias 
(SEG li 642.1‒29); Pronaia (Aeschines 3.109‒13, 119‒20); Nike (Eur. Ion 1526); Pallas (Stesichorus 
SLG 102.1). Other deities include: Aphrodite Paphia (Ar. Lys. 554‒6); Apollo Pythios (CID I 10) 
and Paean (Pl. Laws 664c); Hermes Agoraios (Ar. Knights 296‒7); and the comic designation of 
Poseidon as Halykos (Ar. Lys. 403).
103 Each self-curse may comically reverse the application of cursing against competitors, as we 
find it e.g. in the ancient Potter’s Hymn (Life of Homer 32 = Hes. fr. 302 M-W) or in certain curse-
tablets (e.g. DTA 69, 70, 74): here the speakers turn the curse against one’s self and one’s own 
profession. See Eidinow 2007, 191‒204 on curse-tablets in business competition – she warns that 
caution is needed in placing some of them strictly within the domain of business. 
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oath-statements.104 If this is right, then the Sausage-Seller’s association with the 
sacrificial animal “to be cut in pieces” only serves to further underline the power 
of his self-curse.
In spite of the emphatic and elaborate combinations in all the above cases, 
both in comedy and tragedy, in none of them have we encountered the condi-
tional punishment that one’s offspring will suffer, the commonest form of divine 
infliction noted in formal oaths. Its application appears to be far more restricted 
in voluntary acts of self-cursing than in formal oaths; but this does not mean that 
it is not used at all. Indeed, in Aristophanes’ Frogs, its full potential as the stron-
gest form of conditional self-cursing comes to the fore, when it replaces a shorter 
self-curse that had previously failed in its attempt to convince. In their hazardous 
trip to Hades, Dionysus attempts to persuade his servant Xanthias to adopt the 
guise of Heracles, one of the few heroes who made it to the underworld and back. 
At first Dionysus uses a self-curse as a persuasive tool to declare his love (579):
May I perish most miserably, if I don’t love Xanthias!
Since, however, Xanthias remains entirely unconvinced, and for good reason,105 
Dionysus utters another, much stronger self-curse that extends to encompass his 
family (586‒7):
But I swear, if ever I take it away from you again [the Heracles costume], may I perish most 
miserably root and branch, my wife and children too, and bleary Archedemus!
Only now does Xanthias accept Dionysus’ oath (588) and don the lion-skin outfit. 
It is the more extensive self-curse, which extends its dire consequences to the 
whole family, root and branch,106 (including here – the comic twist – the eye-
diseased Archedemus) that manages to convince.107 There is a somewhat differ-
ent take on the threat of punishment against one’s offspring used in voluntary 
oaths in Euripides’ satyr drama Cyclops.108 In an effort to convince the Cyclops 
104 I am grateful to Christopher Faraone who brought to my attention the ‘cut’ words in this 
example in private communication. 
105 Earlier in the play Dionysus had already asked Xanthias to wear Heracles’ costume (494‒7); 
he accepted (498‒500) but was then forced to hand it back to Dionysus after a dinner invitation 
by Persephone (522‒33). 
106 Cf. the use of the phrase “root and branch” in a different kind of conditional cursing by Ajax 
in Soph. Aj. 1178 and also in revenge cursing in Eur. Hipp. 683. 
107 Not, of course, that we are to take his self-curse seriously: see §7.3.7.
108 See §10.1 and Fletcher 2012, 146‒57 for oaths and perjury in this play. 
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that he was not trying to sell the monster’s property to Odysseus, Silenus takes 
an oath invoking death only for his sons – he actually excludes himself from its 
compass (262‒9)! But his sons object: they counter their father’s oath by issuing a 
revenge curse against him (270‒2). No other self-curses extending to the offspring 
are found in interpersonal oath-taking in the dramatic corpus, a fact that shows 
that this form was primarily intended for special and solemn circumstances of 
oath-taking.
When we previously noted religious elements in proximity to dramatic repre-
sentations of the self-curse, such as the prayer to Athena in Aristophanes’ Knights 
or the presence of another oath/self-curse, we observed various enhancements 
with respect to the self-curses’ impact and credibility. But often the self-curse in 
its short form is used voluntarily on its own.109 On these occasions, it can simply 
underline threatening statements (Ar. Knights 832‒5, Clouds 1255; Eur. Or. 1146‒7) 
or make emphatic denials of accusations (Ar. Eccl. 977); and, always, the self-
curse forcefully expresses an emotional state, usually anger or frustration (e.g. 
Ar. Ach. 324; Ar. Lys. 530‒1; Ach. 151‒2), sometimes hate (Ar. Knights 400‒1), but 
also, as we saw above in Aristophanes’ Knights and Frogs, love and loyalty. In the 
majority of these cases, the reaction of the interlocutor is not reported, and so 
we cannot assess whether the self-curse affected the behaviour of the addressee. 
There exists, though, both in comedy and in tragedy, some evidence that the self-
curses could indeed carry a powerful impact. In Euripides’ IA, a self-curse by 
Achilles in his meeting with Clytaemestra expresses his determination not to let 
Iphigeneia be sacrificed (Eur. IA 1006‒7);110 this makes Clytaemestra immediately 
express her gratitude in the form of blessings for the support she receives (1008). 
In Euripides’ Alcestis, Heracles’ insistence that Admetus should remarry leads 
Admetus to utter a self-curse (1096) with which he proclaims his loyalty to Alces-
tis, and Heracles abandons at once the attempt to convince him otherwise. Simi-
larly in comedy, Aristophanes’ Acharnians, a play that shows fondness for this 
form of expression (Ach. 151‒2, 324, 476‒8), provides a case of an anxious reaction 
by the collocutor after the utterance of the curse.111 The men of Acharnae utter 
109 e.g. the formula thanomi “may I die”, whenever it is used, is not related to any other reli-
gious registers. 
110 Admittedly though, this conditional self-curse reinforces a stronger oath with an explicit 
self-curse taken by Achilles that he would not allow Iphigeneia to be sacrificed. However, this 
oath appears not in the immediate context but was uttered 50 lines earlier (IA 948‒54). 
111 The first self-curse is more “religiously loaded” than the others: when the Athenian am-
bassador Theorus claims that Sitalces, the Thracian king, intends to help the Athenians, and 
“proves” this by pointing out that he had poured a libation and taken an oath (141‒50), Dicaeo-
polis counters by swearing his own oath in a form of self-curse: he does not believe anything of 
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a self-curse in order to express their strong rejection of Dicaeopolis’ request to 
present his views about the peace with Sparta; as a result Dicaeopolis is obliged 
to try much harder to appease his antagonists (Ach. 324‒5).112 These instances 
show that the self-curse, no matter how brief or seemingly inconsequential, can 
have a powerful influence on the interlocutor and can change his or her course of 
action accordingly.
The examples considered in this section, relating to volunteered and/or 
spontaneous acts of self-cursing (especially in comedy), are the closest means by 
which we can get a glimpse in to the existence and use of colloquial self-cursing. 
In their shortest form as simple self-curses, they constitute strong evidence of 
the nature of the oath as a conditional self-curse. Their power generally varies 
according to their combination with other religious elements. Nevertheless, while 
they may be perceived as having a stronger or weaker impact for that reason, their 
religious significance is rarely denied. This is clear in the sincerity of the swearer’s 
intention when they are used; even in comedy, where intentional perjury is much 
more frequent than in any other dramatic genre,113 hardly ever are self-curses 
attached to untrue statements or promises. The audience might be suspicious of 
the self-cursing of certain characters, such as the Sausage-Seller in Knights, espe-
cially since he had admitted in the play that he is a perjurer (Ar. Kn. 297‒8; 418‒24; 
1239).114 But, so long as comedy’s twists allow us to judge, when characters con-
sciously invoke the idea of divine punishment in making a conditional self-curse, 
they do not do so for statements that they do not perceive as true.
All of the cases examined above concern explicit self-curses uttered in direct 
speech in dialogue. The next section focuses on lawcourt speeches and exam-
ines the frequency, contexts and purpose of their use, again in the direct speech 
of individual speakers. But as we shall see, it is mainly their appearance as an 
inserted verbal act envisaged in relation to past or future circumstances of oath-
what Theorus said (151‒2). Thus Theorus tries again to win the Assembly over by citing further 
evidence (Sitalces has sent Thracian soldiers to Athens: 153‒4).
112 Pace Olson 2002 ad 323‒5 who takes the view that the first response of Dicaeopolis to this 
curse (“please don’t, Acharnians”) is not related to the self-curse but to the chorus adopting 
a threatening position against him. The effectiveness of cursing is reversed in Ar. Ach. 476‒8: 
Dicaeopolis’ self-curse “may I perish most miserably if I ask you for anything again – except just 
one thing, just this, only this: give me some wild chervil, ‘that as thy mother’s heir thou didst 
acquire’ ” fails to convince Euripides, who takes offence at the slur on his mother’s status.
113 See Sommerstein 2007b and §13.2 below. 
114 Sommerstein 2007b, 137 claims that “there is no clear instance of [the Sausage-Seller] actu-
ally committing perjury during the play itself”. 
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taking that confirms the speakers’ acknowledgement of the religious character of 
the oath.
2.4 The explicit self-curse in law-court speeches
In S&B ch. 5, a thorough analysis of oaths in the judicial sphere showed in detail 
that they were an indispensable part of many procedures in the Athenian legal 
system.115 There it was mentioned in passing that the formal oaths of dicasts, 
litigants and, sometimes, witnesses included explicit conditional self-curses. The 
same verbal feature has also been emphasized in studies on the reconstruction 
and symbolism of formal oath-rituals related to the judicial proceedings, espe-
cially those of homicide trials.116 The last part of this chapter examines some 
applications of the verbalized self-curse in specific rhetorical contexts within the 
Attic oratorical corpus. It does not attempt an exhaustive study of the element 
of fear of the divine in general as an argument in lawcourts, an issue that has 
recently received attention in a full-length study.117 Instead, the main emphasis 
here lies mostly on the variations of the typical form of the self-curse, when it is 
adopted and adapted by litigants in the forensic speeches. More specifically, the 
section aims to bring to focus its persisting presence and application in imagi-
nary scenarios of oath-taking or oath-breaking raised by the speaker in support of 
his case. The appearance of the explicit self-curse in rhetorical speeches, apart 
from confirming the conceptualization of the oath as a self-curse throughout the 
classical period, at the same time demonstrates its function as a verbal element 
that forms, through its manipulation, one of the rhetorical strategies open to liti-
gants in a trial. The following material is organised according to the types of oaths 
related to the court procedures,118 as raised and presented by the speakers them-
selves: the sole focus here is on the explicit self-curse.
115 For all of this, see S&B 58‒118. See also ch. 9 in the present volume.
116 See esp. MacDowell 1963, 90‒100, Faraone 2002. 
117 Martin 2009. Specifically for oaths, in addition to self-curse, a simple mention of perjury, for 
instance, without any reference to the explicit self-curse, or a reference to impiety in a context of 
oath-taking, would certainly have increased the perception of divine intervention and punish-
ment, as Martin’s study makes evident. 
118 Self-curses are further included in formal state or interstate oaths introduced within the 
speeches: Aeschines 3.109‒13, 119‒20, 127 (Amphictyonic oath); Andoc. 1.96‒8 (oath of Demo-
phantus); Andoc. 1.126 (oath for child’s admission to the phratry). 
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2.4.1 Dicasts’ explicit self-cursing
Given the prominence of the Erinyes as Curses in framing the establishment of the 
Areopagus court and defining the activity of the dicasts in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, 
we might expect that the use of the conditional curse in reminding the jurors of 
divine punishment would be widespread in forensic speeches. Yet, so far as we 
can tell from the extant speeches, such admonitions are not that frequent and, 
also, they are limited to the ordinary lawcourts.119 According to Demosthenes’ 
Against Timocrates, which preserves the wording of what is claimed to be the 
heliastic oath (24.149‒51)120 – probably the most prominent oath in Athenian life, 
being taken by some 6000 men every year – this self-curse took the typical form 
of utter destruction and was accompanied by blessings (24.151):121
This is to be sworn by Zeus, Poseidon and Demeter, to invoke utter destruction on [the 
swearer] himself and his house, if he transgresses any of these provisions, but to have many 
blessings if he keeps his oath.
It is highly instructive that among more than one hundred references to this oath 
in surviving oratory, in which the dicasts are constantly being urged to keep 
in mind different parts of their oath-statement,122 there are only four explicit 
reminders specifically pertaining to the self-curse of their oath (Dem. 19. 219‒20, 
Aeschines 3. 233, Andoc. 1.31, Lyc. Leocr. 79). Leaving aside its broader applica-
119 In fact, the Eumenides is our only direct source either for the existence of the judges’ oath in 
the Areopagus’ Council (Eum. 483, 489, 621, 680, 710) or, through the part played by the  Erinyes, 
the existence of a conditional self-curse. But see p. 16 with n. 39 for the distortion of the court 
procedures in Eumenides which are closer to those of the ordinary court. According to S&B 112, 
the fact that speakers in rhetorical speeches never make any direct appeal to the oath of the 
Areopagus Council – nor to its explicit conditional self-curse either – shows that there was “a 
rule of etiquette ... involved”: the Areopagus Council was thought of as too august a body to need 
reminding about its oath.
120 See S&B 69‒80 for a thorough analysis of the different parts of the dicasts’ oath, as pre-
served in Dem. 24.149‒51 and the various arguments about their authenticity (cf. further, Bonner 
and Smith 1930‒8, ii 152‒5; Mirhady 2007; and Martin 2009, 77‒82). 
121 The exact form of the curse varies in the sources. In Andoc. 1.31 the ‘greatest curses’ of the 
dicasts’ oath are said to be again directed against themselves and their children. On the other 
hand, in Lyc. Leocr. 79, the self-curse takes the form of “destruction against oneself, one’s chil-
dren and one’s whole genos“; but, since the orator is making a general statement about the self-
curse of the dicasts, archon and idiōtēs (see n.123 below), he may well not be reproducing the 
precise wording of any of these three oaths. 
122 Mainly “to vote with justice” or “in accordance with the law“; cf. the discussions cited in 
n. 120. 
 2.4 The explicit self-curse in law-court speeches   39
tion in the Lycurgus passage, in the rest of the cases the presence of the self-curse 
has one core function: to remind and warn the dicasts of the divine consequences 
that follow hard upon a wrong decision.123 In Andocides 1 (On the Mysteries) the 
curse is mentioned in a strongly religious context, where the dicasts are iden-
tified as initiates in the Eleusinian Mysteries. The speaker reminds the jurors 
that they have taken the most solemn oaths, invoking the greatest curses to fall 
upon themselves and their children in order to guarantee that they will condemn 
only the impious and save those who have not committed any wrong (1.31). In a 
more direct fashion, in Demosthenes 19 (On the False Embassy), the dicasts are 
warned that, should they vote for Aeschines’ acquittal, they would be committing 
perjury and, as a consequence, take their curse home with them (19.219‒20).124 
In Aeschines 3 (Against Ctesiphon), Horkos, in his well-known personification of 
divine punishment, is said to “haunt and torment” the dicast who took a wrong 
decision (3.233). In all of these cases, the speaker reminds the dicasts of the con-
stant threat of divine punishment that hangs over them, which however, remains 
only at a hypothetical level: as long as they came to a just decision (in favour 
of the speaker, naturally), they would avoid such dire repercussions. Therefore, 
although the explicit self-curse is not as frequently raised as the other parts of the 
dicasts’ oath, it is still employed by the speaker as a “secure” means of applying 
pressure upon the judges.
2.4.2 Litigants’ explicit self-cursing
In contrast to the dicasts’ explicit self-curse, which is found only in ordinary 
trials, self-cursing by litigants is attested exclusively in homicide trials (see S&B 
113‒15). Its special position in the oath-taking by both litigants before the proceed-
ings (diōmosia) and, further, by the winner at the end of the trial,125 has attracted 
attention especially because of its combination with an elaborate ritual. Focusing 
123 Lycurgus (Leocr. 79) mentions the three oaths “that hold democracy together”, the oaths of 
idiōtēs (i.e. the ephebic oath), archon and dicast. Yet, these oaths appear in a context where per-
jury becomes an issue: Lycurgus argues that men are often deceived but no one who has broken 
his oath can deceive the gods and that, if a perjurer does not suffer himself, his children and his 
family will suffer great misfortunes. It is evident that his words form an indirect warning to the 
dicasts in the present trial to avoid perjury. 
124 On this, see Martin 2009, 79‒80 who states that “direct intimidation of this sort cannot be 
found in any other speech of Demosthenes” (80). 
125 In the oath of the winner, the litigant cuts in pieces the sacrificial victim and “invokes 
destruction on himself and his house, but prays that the jurors who voted for him have many 
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only on the rhetoric of our main source for this oath ritual, we can easily discern a 
clear identification of the oath as a conditional self-curse (Dem. 23.67‒8):
On the Areopagus, where the law allows and orders trials for homicide to be held, first the 
man who accuses someone of such a deed will swear an oath invoking destruction on himself 
and his family and his household, and no ordinary oath either, but one which no one swears 
on any other subject, standing over the cut up pieces of a boar, a ram, and a bull which have 
been slaughtered by the right persons on the proper days, so that every religious require-
ment has been fulfilled as regards the time and as regards the executants. (trans. D.M. Mac-
Dowell 1963, 90‒1)
No other part of the actual oath is mentioned here,126 apart from the self-curse: 
the oath is defined not by the content of its statement, but by the actual nature of 
divine punishment, and is further accompanied by a religious ritual. The impor-
tance attached to the litigants’ curse in homicide procedures is evident by the 
fact that speakers raise it in their argumentation within the court, which does 
not happen with the litigants’ self-curse in ordinary trials.127 Yet, the speakers’ 
references to it do not come from the homicide cases themselves128 – although, 
it should be mentioned, homicide speeches include a number of accusations of 
perjury against the opponent, which can be seen as reminding the judges of the 
litigants’ self-curse (e.g. Ant. 6.33, 6.48‒51). Instead, they mainly play a role in the 
speaker’s arguments in ordinary trial speeches, in which references to past homi-
cide trials are inserted (Dem. 23.67‒8; [Dem.] 59.10; [Dem.] 47.70, 73).
Regarding their function in the speaker’s argumentation, Martin (2009) has 
shown that the religious aspect of the oath can come to the fore in the course of 
constructing an accusation of perjury against the opponent;129 yet, the speaker 
himself almost never explicitly refers to his own self-curse in the diōmosia. The 
blessings” (Aeschines 2.87). Scholars (e.g those cited in p. 17 n. 41) have commented upon the 
conscious effort to clear the dicasts of any lingering responsibilities through the blessings. 
126 We know the content of the oath-statement from Ant. 6.16, Lys. 10.11 and [Dem.] 59.10: the 
prosecutor swore that the defendant “had killed” and the defendant swore that he “had not 
killed”. 
127 In ordinary trials, litigants exchanged oaths in the preliminary proceedings, in a process 
called antōmosia; see Pollux 8.55 and cf. S&B 80‒1 and Gagarin 2007. 
128 The one exception, Antiphon 5.12 (cf. 5.88), may be said to prove the rule, since the diōmosia 
is mentioned precisely because it has not been taken, this being a trial held in an ordinary court 
under the procedure of endeixis. 
129 Martin 2009, 225‒6, 261‒4; but see his evaluative remarks on the carefulness with which 
arguments about the offence of perjury are handled within the court. The same intention to prove 
that the litigant is a constant perjurer underlies references made to oaths that were either taken 
or offered by the opponent outside court. In this context, self-cursing is reported in oaths taken 
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sole occasion when we do get a glimpse of the speaker’s own conditional self-
curse involves a hypothetical scenario that never took place: this is in a private 
speech attributed to Demosthenes but most likely written by Apollodorus, Against 
Euergus and Mnesibulus ([Dem.] 47.70, 73), a prosecution for false witnessing. The 
speaker claims in front of the dicasts that he was advised by the exēgētai not to 
bring to court the case of his female ex-servant’s murder committed by his adver-
saries, since he was neither a relative nor the owner and thus he had no legal 
right to institute such an action. He accepted their advice, because ([Dem.] 47.73):
To lie to you and to take a solemn oath myself and have my son and wife do so I would not 
dare to do, although I knew well that I should convict these men. For I do not hate them as 
much as I love myself.
The last sentence here, implying that nobody who loved himself would take such 
an oath, transparently makes reference to the divine punishment that awaits a 
false swearer. But the idea is raised only in the context of a “road not taken”, to 
repudiate the hypothetical possibility of taking an oath that would have disas-
trous consequences for the litigant himself and his family.
2.4.3 Explicit self-cursing in oath-challenges and witnesses’ oaths
A similar use of the explicit self-curse from the speaker’s side and in support 
of his case finds a place quite distinctively in one general application of oaths: 
that of introducing evidence from a third party. In S&B 87‒91 and 101‒6, there are 
extensive studies of oath-challenges and the oaths of witnesses, used, most of the 
time, in support of the speaker’s argument; both processes involved the appear-
ance of an explicit conditional self-curse (Dem. 29.26, 33, 52, 54; Lys. 32.13 for 
oath-challenges; Dem. 57.22, 53 for oaths made by witnesses). As will be shown, 
all of these cases concern oath-taking raised as a possibility but not necessarily 
occurring, and/or contexts of potential perjury avoided by the swearers.
Two speeches against kinsmen on the issue of inheritance include a condi-
tional self-curse that concerns an oath-challenge made by the mother of the liti-
gant.130 In his speech Against Aphobus III, Demosthenes defends Phanus whom 
Aphobus, the legal guardian of the inheritance of Demosthenes’ dead father, has 
voluntarily by the opponent in front of the speaker (Lys. 12.10) or even in public spaces, in front 
of a wider audience (Dem 18.283, 21.119; [Dem.]. 49.66‒7; Aeschines 3.99).
130 Dem. 29.26, 33, 52, 54; Lys. 32.13. See, further, Mirhady 1991; Gagarin 1997; Thür 1996a for the 
process of oath-challenge. 
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brought to court on the accusation of false testimony in a previous trial (where 
Demosthenes himself had sued Aphobus for misappropriation of his property).131 
Before the suit, Aphobus had called upon Demosthenes to surrender his slave 
Milyas to be examined under torture, but Demosthenes stated that Milyas had 
been set free. As evidence for this, Demosthenes presents an oath-offer by his 
mother Cleobule (29.26):
My mother was willing to take an oath on the heads of myself and my sister, her only children, 
for the sake of whom she lived as a widow, and say, with us beside her, that my father freed 
that man when he was dying, and that he was regarded in the family as a free man; and no 
one of you should suppose that she would have wished to swear that on our heads, if she 
did not know for certain that she would be swearing to the truth.
The same scenario is featured in Lysias’ Against Diogeiton (Lys. 32.13). The wife of 
a certain Diodotus is presented as accusing her own father, Diogeiton – brother 
of Diodotus who is dead at the time of the trial – of misusing the fortune of her 
children, which had been entrusted to him by Diodotus before he died. She offers 
to swear an oath in any place her father might name, surrounding herself with her 
children by Diodotus, and calling down destruction on herself and the children she 
has and will come to have that Diogeiton had received a certain amount of money 
from Diodotus. In the same way as Cleobule, she adds that she is not so wretched 
nor does she regard money so highly as to die after committing perjury in the 
name of her children.132 In neither of the two cases are we told that the woman 
finally performed the self-curse.
The prominent place of the self-curse in these cases is surely related to the fact 
that evidence given under oath constituted the only scenario in which women’s 
testimony could be accepted in court;133 the self-curse, mentioned by the litigant, 
provides the gravity needed for the dicasts to take this evidence seriously. The 
application of these curses shows, at the same time, how the litigant can manipu-
late their form to encompass the family of the swearer, in circumstances where 
the family plays a significant role in the proceedings. It is undoubtedly telling 
that in both cases the speaker raises the possibility of extending the curse to the 
131 Dem. 27 and 28. 
132 In the same context in Lys. 32.13, Diogeiton is said “not to have feared the gods”, an obvious 
contrast with his daughter’s willingness to utter a self-curse. 
133 Cf. Just 1989, 33‒9; Mirhady 1991, 82; Foxhall 1996, 143‒9. In the dispute between the sons of 
Mantias (Dem. 39 and 40) we hear of an oath taken by a woman, Plangon, to the effect that she 
will refuse an oath-challenge issued to her (Dem. 40.10‒11, cf. 39.2‒4). This oath is described as 
“the most awesome and the greatest” which is probably meant to imply that it involved a strong 
self-curse. 
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offspring (i.e. the speaker himself) in disputes where inheritance rights within 
the same family are at issue. The use of the exōleia formula finds a place in a 
context where destruction of children can even mean transference of the right of 
inheritance to the other side.
Similarly to the oath-challenge, litigants use explicit self-curses in support 
of cases when evidence of a different kind is introduced: the testimony of wit-
nesses under oath. S&B 87‒100 have shown that witnesses in general were not 
under oath in Athenian trials, with the exception of three scenarios – all of which 
involve an explicit self-curse: in homicide trials, during which they swore an oath 
accompanied by sacrifice (Ant. 5.12); in the procedure of exōmosia, in which they 
could swear out of their role as witnesses;134 and lastly, in a single speech by Dem-
osthenes (Against Euboulides), where there are no fewer than seven references to 
oaths by witnesses – the high frequency alone indicates its unique status. Twice 
during the latter speech the speaker dwells on the religious element of the self-
curse (57.20, 53). The case concerns the decision of a deme assembly to remove 
the speaker Euxitheus from the deme’s citizen register. In response Euxitheus 
brings witnesses to testify to his legitimate citizen birth, of whom he remarks 
(Dem. 57.53):
Surely, it would have been possible for them, if I had been illegitimate or a foreigner, to 
inherit all my property. Do they prefer to get a small payment and put themselves in jeop-
ardy by giving false testimony and to commit perjury rather than to take everything with 
safety and not to invoke any curse upon their own heads? No, this is not the case; but in my 
opinion being my relatives they are doing what is right helping one of their own.
S&B 88 argued that the frequent references to witnesses’ oaths during this trial 
aimed at balancing the solemnity of the formal oath which was taken when a 
citizen’s entry into the deme was reviewed, to the accompaniment of solemn sac-
rifices (καθ’ ἱερῶν, Dem. 57.26). It would appear that this “balancing” took place 
more specifically through underlining the power of the witnesses’ self-curse – 
and doing so not only by explicitly articulating it, but also by repeating it (57.20, 
53) and, thus, emphasizing the role of divine punishment. In this speech, unlike 
those previously discussed, the self-curse concerns an oath that is actually taken 
before the trial. But its specific application in context bears a resemblance to the 
134 According to Lyc. Leocr. 20, in the oath of exōmosia the witness touched a cut piece of a sac-
rificial animal; this is confirmed by Ath.Pol. 55.5 and was most likely accompanied by a self-curse 
– although this is not explicitly attested in the sources. The issue of “avoiding” or “committing” 
perjury in relation to this oath does come up quite a lot in the orators: cf. Dem. 19.176, 29.15, 45.59; 
Isaeus 9.16‒9. For the process of exōmosia see, further, Carey 1995a; Martin 2008. 
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previous instances examined: the litigant raises the potential activation of the 
self-curse only in order to refute it. His witnesses would not have dared to invoke 
destruction upon themselves by taking an oath and so put their lives in danger, 
if they were not speaking the truth.135 The self-curse and avoidance of perjury 
confirm the veracity of the witnesses’ statement.
2.4.4 Litigants’ spontaneous self-cursing inside the courtroom
Up until now, all our instances of self-cursing have concerned reported formal or 
volunteered self-curses, mainly occurring in hypothetical scenarios of oath-tak-
ing or oath-breaking. The last case examined here involves verbal performances 
of explicit self-cursing in the trial itself. Although oaths were frequently uttered 
in direct speech within trials,136 our evidence for verbalized self-cursing in them 
is very scant: there are only two secure cases where a self-curse is pronounced 
spontaneously by a litigant during the trial. One takes the form of a short self-
curse of utter destruction (Dem. 19.172).137 The other case, though, is unique in the 
corpus of oratory by depicting an elaborate case of competitive self-cursing. At the 
end of Demosthenes’ speech Against Conon, Ariston, who is prosecuting Conon 
for battery (aikeia), claims that he has heard from someone that Conon is about 
to perform an exaggerated conditional self-curse in front of the jury (54.38):138
Regarding the most impudent thing of all that I hear he is about to do, I think that it is better 
to warn you in advance. For they say that he will bring his children and, placing them by his 
side, will swear an oath on their heads, imprecating some dread and awful curses of such a 
nature that a person who heard them and reported them to me was amazed.
135 The same emphasis on the curse of a witness appears in Aeschines 1.114‒15, in reference to 
an oath which Timarchus took in relation to the disfranchisement of a certain Philotades whom 
he alleged to be a former slave of his. Fisher 2001 ad loc. takes this oath to be the one that mem-
bers of the deme took at the deme meeting. But according to S&B 88 n. 96, in all probability, it 
is a reference to Timarchus being asked to act as a witness against the citizenship of the slave, 
since Timarchus was not of the same deme and thus could not participate in the deme assembly. 
136 See S&B 86, with reference (n.89) to Gagarin 2007, 45‒6 for the use of these oaths as ‘rhetori-
cal’ ploys. 
137 Demosthenes swears invoking destruction upon himself (ἐξώλης ἀπολοίμην καὶ προώλης) 
that, if he had not promised to bring back money for ransom to certain prisoners, he would not 
have gone with Aeschines and others to receive the oaths of peace from Philip of Macedon in 
346 BC. 
138 The oaths in Dem. 54 are discussed in S&B 86‒7 from a different angle regarding their rhe-
torical manipulation. 
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The practice of having one’s children physically present while one swears by 
them appears in oath-offers outside court, as we saw above. But here the practice 
of cursing is squarely located within the trial itself, where children were brought 
into court to raise the sympathy of the jury, a common practice in Athenian law 
courts.139 The exact content of the imprecations is not given but Ariston obviously 
wants his audience to imagine worse and more dramatic formulations than a 
simple extension of the self-curse to his opponent’s offspring, when he describes 
the surprise of his informer and their “dreadful” and “awful” nature.140 The same 
effect is achieved when he provides immediately afterwards an imaginary com-
parison between one who swears in a “customary way” and Conon’s practices 
of swearing in court by invoking terrible curses with his children present (Dem. 
54.40).141
It comes as something of a surprise, therefore, that, after this claim about the 
dreadful and non-customary oath, Ariston himself performs a ‘non-customary’ 
spontaneous oath in front of the dicasts, one that takes an elaborate form, with an 
explicit blessing and self-curse (Dem. 54.41):
This oath I was at that time ready to take, and now, to convince you and those who stand 
around, I swear by all the gods and goddesses for your sake that I have truly suffered at the 
hands of Conon this wrong for which I am impeaching him, that I was beaten by him and 
that my lip was cut open so that it had to be sewn up, and that it is because of a great harm 
that I am prosecuting him. If I swear truly may I have many blessings, and may I never suffer 
again such an outrage; but if I am forsworn, may I perish utterly, I and all I possess or may in 
the future possess.
In this way Ariston utters his own self-curse as a pre-emptive strike against his 
opponent:142 the explicit self-curse is the speaker’s response to an imagined future 
scenario of oath-taking. Ariston is playing an elaborate game in an attempt to 
139 Carey & Reid 1985, 99‒100. As S&B 87 notes, Conon’s children are involved more specifically 
in the actual trial as well, since they took part in Ariston’s assault and here Ariston finds the 
chance to bring the jury’s attention to them once more.
140 See Martin 2009, 284‒6, for the connection between the oath of Conon and other arguments 
about Conon’s religious acivity used by Ariston in order to undermine Conon’s oath. 
141 “The man who … will take only a customary oath, is more to be believed than one who 
swears by his children or is ready to pass through fire”. Bers 2003, 78 n.36 indicates that the 
phrase “pass through fire” (διὰ τοῦ πυρός) might allude to the ritual of oath-taking which some-
times involved the burning of the animal victims, a fact that would have increased the power of 
the self-curse. 
142 Martin 2009, 258 draws attention to the role of this oath as “anticipating” and “balancing 
out” the oath of the opponent in this speech. 
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forestall his opponent’s use of self-cursing. Initially he maintains an important 
distinction: his oath, so he claims, merely repeats the one that he had previously 
offered to his opponent through the “more regular” process of the oath-challenge. 
Here, we may detect an effort to make it seem “more customary” than Conon’s. 
Furthermore, in his own act of self-cursing, Ariston makes sure to introduce first 
the blessings for himself (which furthermore bring attention to the injury he suf-
fered by Conon), and then the self-curse. The precedence of blessings over curses 
appears in formal oaths in classical Athens, known to all citizens;143 it seems to 
inspire trust and show the speaker’s willingness and confidence that the oath will 
be kept. By these means, Ariston seeks to ingratiate himself with his audience. 
Only once his positive intention is established does Ariston make his own self-
curse, which instead of targeting his family, like Conon’s, takes the more general 
form of targeting everything that he possesses or may possess.144 Ariston’s self-
curse presents a telling case of how spontaneous oaths could develop improvised 
and distinctive forms of self-cursing. Its actual position at the close of the speech, 
just before the dicasts hear the defence speech, confirms the strong belief in the 
impact that the use of an explicit self-curse could have during the judicial pro-
ceedings.
The present section has focused, in particular, on instances of explicit self-
cursing in the corpus of oaths in the orators uttered or, more often, imagined as 
being uttered by the speaker, the judges or those who speak or may speak in support 
of the plaintiff’s case. Explicit self-cursing on these occasions is best accommo-
dated in contexts in which the speaker consciously raises the potential of perjury 
being committed by any of the above, only in order to deny it, by acknowledging 
the inevitability of divine punishment. A good number of these cases are found 
in imaginary or potential scenarios of oath-taking and oath-breaking, embedded 
as arguments in favour of the speaker’s case.145 On the other hand, actual cases 
of performing explicit self-cursing within the trial itself are rare, but still exis-
tent, nonetheless. In all of these instances, we have seen that explicit self-cursing 
is subject to rather detailed and sometimes even unique verbal or performative 
elaboration, in comparison to its customary forms in formal oath taking. Their 
143 See p. 00 [15] n.26.
144 Cf. Lys. 32.13 for a similar extension of time in future regarding the punishment: “I offer to 
swear to the name of my children, both these and those born to me in future”. S&B 87 notes that 
the children are missing in Conon’s curse, most likely “because he has no children”.
145 See Martin 2009, 264 for a similar conclusion about the religious nature of an oath in De-
mosthenes’ private and deliberative speeches, which, as he states, is emphasized mainly in re-
lation to hypothetical oath-challenges or the “unprovoked” oath and less in relation to formal 
procedural oaths. 
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employment betrays each individual’s ability to shape variably the element of 
the self-curse; and it is a clear proof of the speakers’ general familiarity with the 
concept of the oath as a conditional divine punishment upon the swearer(s).
3 Oaths in traditional myth
I.C. Torrance
The malleability of Greek myth has often, and quite rightly, been stressed by schol-
ars.1 It is important to remember, however, that there were certain limits to the 
possibilities of adaptation. Stesichorus in his Palinode and Euripides in his Helen 
may have proposed that it was a phantom created by the gods and not the real 
Helen who caused the Trojan War, but they could not suggest, for example, that 
the Trojan War had not taken place. As Fritz Graf has argued, a myth “transcends 
the text: it is the subject matter, a plot fixed in broad outline and with characters 
no less fixed, which the individual poet is free to alter only within limits.” More-
over, myths “are transmitted from one generation to another, without anyone 
knowing who created them: that is what is meant by traditional”.2 Graf makes 
an important distinction between traditional myth and text, but as Françoise 
Létoublon has observed in her discussion of Homer’s use of myth, we are faced 
with “rather an uncomfortable and paradoxical challenge” in studying early 
Greek myth where we have no direct evidence which predates Homer,3 a point 
often valid for later sources also. In identifying traditional myth we are very much 
limited by the surviving sources, which are invariably textual, especially poetic, 
or artistic. Nevertheless, in studying the corpus of oaths in Greek literature, there 
emerges a category of oaths intricately connected with the fabric of traditional 
myth, insofar as this category of myth is identifiable. For our purposes such 
oaths, which we can call mythological oaths or aetiological oaths, can be defined 
as having a clear and unalterable impact on the course of Greek mythology and 
an explanatory function therein. We can expect that oaths of this sort might be 
referred to in more than one work and across different genres and media. I will 
discuss three examples of sworn oaths, and one example of a broken oath, which 
definitively fix crucial events in Greek mythology. In each case a female figure is 
central to the circumstances of tendering or breaking the relevant oath, a point to 
which we shall return at the end.
1 See e.g. the collection of essays in Woodard 2007, who states in his introduction (1) that “[w]
hat we call “Greek myth” is no featureless monolith, but multifaceted, multifarious and multi-
valent, a fluid phenomenon”. Other recent discussions of variability and innovation in Greek 
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A particularly important example of an aetiological oath is the oath of Helen’s 
suitors, which precipitates the Trojan War, and interestingly is not explicitly men-
tioned in Homer (as discussed below). In an attempt to safeguard the outcome 
of the contest for Helen’s hand, Tyndareos prevents the assembled Greek heroes 
from competing for her until they have sworn an oath to the effect that they will 
support whoever becomes Helen’s husband should someone abduct her from the 
marital home, and will all march against this hypothetical man and sack his city 
with force of arms, be he Greek or Asiatic. The oath is sanctified by the clasping 
of hands, the making of sacrifices, and the pouring of libations.4 This particular 
version is found in Euripides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis (58‒65), but the oath appears in 
the literary tradition as early as the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women (fr. 204.78‒84), 
where each of the suitors swears not to attempt to make Helen his wife without 
Tyndareos’ consent, and to attack anyone who takes her unilaterally by force, 
which has essentially the same impact as the more detailed oath statement of the 
IA. Paris is the one who takes Helen and is attacked as a result.
That the oath of Helen’s suitors is mentioned three times in the first 400 lines 
of the IA, twice in the prologue (58‒65, 78) and once in the first episode (391‒5), 
is noteworthy.5 This play contains more references to this oath than any other 
surviving text. The suitors’ oath is described in the prologue in order to contex-
tualize the situation in Aulis, and to explain why the Greeks have gathered there. 
The oath is, of course, crucial for explaining why all the Greek heroes felt com-
pelled to go to war against Troy, though most had no particular reason to want to 
help Menelaus retrieve his wife.6 The simple fact was that each hero who had 
sworn the oath was compelled to go, bound by it, in spite of the length of time 
that had passed since it was sworn (cf. IA 78‒9).7 The issue of necessity is clearly 
4 See ch. 6, pp. 145, for further discussion of the sanctifying features of this oath.
5 We deal with the text as a whole and will not enter here into debate over issues of Euripid-
ean authenticity. Kovacs (2003) reviews the evidence and argues (81) that lines 49‒105 were part 
of the play’s first performance, and most editors retain 391‒5 (Jouan 1983, Gunther 1988, Stockert 
1992, Kovacs 2002). Diggle 1994 suggests that 391‒5 are probably by Euripides.
6 Cf. Cingano 2005, 124: “the oath provides the seminal motif which accounts for [the] pres-
ence [of the suitors at Troy]”.
7 Cingano 2005, 124‒7, argues that the suitors’ oath actually represents “a prolongation of their 
status as former suitors” (126), a status which brings almost inevitable death to those who com-
pete for, and fail to win, the hand of a princess. Cingano compares the contests for Hippodameia, 
Atalanta, Marpessa, and Penelope, but his statement (n. 30) that Odysseus and Menelaus are 
the only suitors to survive the war is incorrect. The Cretan suitor Idomeneus (fr. 204.56ff.), for 
example, certainly survived the war, though plagued by storms on his return journey; Diomedes, 
Philoctetes and Teucer (listed among the suitors in [Apoll.] Bibl. 3.11.8) survived too, and there 
are other minor suitors whose fates are unclear.
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crucial to the central dilemma that faces Agamemnon in the IA, the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia. In a play characterized by abrupt changes of mind, first in Agamem-
non, then in Menelaus, and finally in Iphigeneia,8 references to the suitors’ oath 
come exclusively during Agamemnon’s changes of mind represented in the 
opening scenes. Having previously sent a letter home luring his daughter to Aulis 
on the pretence of marriage to Achilles in order to offer her as a sacrificial victim 
to Artemis and thus gain fair winds enabling the fleet to sail for Troy, he has now 
regretted it, and attempts to send a second letter warning his wife and daughter 
not to come. When this is intercepted by an angry Menelaus, Agamemnon makes 
some interesting remarks about the suitors’ oath when he addresses his brother. 
He calls those who swore Tyndareos’ oath “ill-witted marriage-loving suitors” (IA 
391‒2), telling Menelaus to take these men to war who “are ready with the folly 
of their minds” (394). Agamemnon then suggests that “divine power is not sense-
less, but can consider when oaths have been fixed wrongfully and taken under 
compulsion” (394a-395).
Agamemnon’s language emphasizes his dilemma. He simultaneously tries to 
distance himself from the suitors who swore Tyndareos’ oath, as if he was not 
one of them, but then tries to create an escape clause for himself by suggesting 
that the gods will not expect someone to keep an oath in certain circumstances, 
thus implicitly acknowledging that he had sworn the oath. It seems to be true 
that Agamemnon was not a suitor per se but our earliest source for the oath lists 
him as swearing it as a proxy for his brother, while he was already married to 
Clytaemestra (Hes. fr. 197.4‒5),9 and Agamemnon’s own suggestion that the oath 
could be invalid demonstrates that he is, in fact, bound by it. In some very rare 
cases, it seems that the Greeks believed that oaths could be broken without divine 
consequences (see §11.1), but Agamemnon’s argument is weak. He implies that he 
took the oath under compulsion but does not state this as fact, and the oblique 
claim is not supported by any evidence. If sacrificing Iphigeneia is the only way 
for the fleet to set sail for Troy – and this is how it has been presented to Agamem-
non – then failing to sacrifice her means not only abandoning the expedition, but 
also breaking his oath. The oath by which Agamemnon is bound thus helps to 
8 On change of mind in this play, see esp. Gibert 1995, 202‒54.
9 Agamemnon acting on behalf of his brother is not as strange as it may first appear. Cin-
gano 2005, 135‒6, notes that it has a parallel in Melampus courting the daughter of Neleus for 
his brother Bias, and that Helen’s mythic tradition is often associated with pairs of males, the 
Dioscuri, Theseus and Peirithous, and here the Atreidae. In the IA Agamemnon and Menelaus 
function as an interdependent unit, on which see Torrance 2013, 85.
 3 Oaths in traditional myth   51
explain his terrible indecisiveness, a characteristic he bears already in the Iliad 
but which is further exaggerated in the IA.10
The ultimate sacrifice of Iphigeneia thus reflects, on some level, Agamemnon 
enabling the fulfillment of his oath, an oath that none of the suitors considers 
breaking. In Sophocles’ Ajax (1111‒14), Teucer reminds Menelaus that Ajax has 
not joined the expedition for the sake of Helen nor for Menelaus’ own sake but 
because of the oath he had sworn. Even Odysseus, who tries to wriggle out of his 
oath, does not break it, and this is one occasion on which Odysseus’ tricks fail 
him, and he proves decidedly less gifted in the skill of “sidestepping” (ch. 10) 
than his grandfather reputedly was.11 In the Cypria he feigns madness in order to 
escape his duty to take part in the Trojan War, but his deceit is discovered by Pala-
medes who puts Telemachus in danger and finds that Odysseus’ wits return with 
great rapidity in order to save his son (Cypria Arg. §5 West). So Odysseus is forced 
to keep his oath and take part in the expedition against Troy, but Odysseus’ rela-
tionship with the suitors’ oath is more complicated than that of the other suitors. 
Although listed as a suitor in the Hesiodic Catalogue, he sent no gifts, anticipat-
ing that his wealth would be no match for that of Menelaus (fr. 198.2‒9), though 
apparently failing to foresee that Tyndareos would demand the oath. In the later 
mythic tradition, Odysseus, having abandoned the idea of courting Helen, is 
himself presented as suggesting the oath to Tyndareos, to help him manage the 
suitors, in exchange for Tyndareos’ help in wooing Penelope ([Apoll.] Bibl. 3.10.9). 
It is unlikely that Odysseus’ role in suggesting the oath was reported in a lacuna 
of the Catalogue,12 since it is at odds with the early tradition of Odysseus trying to 
evade his oath in order to be made exempt from the Trojan expedition. If the oath 
was Odysseus’ idea at a time when he was no longer interested in courting Helen, 
there would be no reason for him to swear the oath at all.
There are two important heroes of the Trojan War, however, who are cer-
tainly not bound by the suitors’ oath. One is Achilles, who had been too young 
to be counted among the suitors,13 and an attempt to thwart his participation in 
the expedition is made by his father Peleus who concealed him on the island of 
10 In his discussion of characterization in the IA, Griffin 1990, 140 notes how Agamemnon in 
the Iliad is “at one moment bullying and overconfident but at others passive and despairing”, 
and gives a persuasive analysis of the “change of mind” motif in the play, suggesting that “strict 
psychological plausibility” is secondary to “pathos, sentiment, and patriotism” (149). See also 
Gibert 1995, 206‒22 and Michelakis 2006, 33‒5.
11 Autolycus was well known as a thief and manipulator of oaths (cf. Odyssey 19.395‒6 and Pl. 
Rep. 334b3).
12 Cingano 2005, 127 suggests this possibility.
13 Hes. fr. 204.87‒93, esp. line 89 where he is described as “being still a boy” (παῖδ᾽ ἔτ᾽ἐόν[τ’]).
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Scyros (Cypria fr. 19 West). The other is Achilles’ son Neoptolemus, who joins the 
Trojan expedition at a later stage. The fact that Achilles and Neoptolemus are not 
bound by the suitors’ oath gives them particular powers during the course of the 
war. The oath does not appear explicitly in Homer, but it possible that Nestor’s 
reference to oaths previously sworn (Iliad 2.339‒41) is an allusion to the suitors’ 
oath.14 Certainly, as we have seen, it features in the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women 
and was clearly part of the epic tradition.15 If there is a latent understanding that 
Achilles’ presence at Troy is not dependent on compulsion, any threat that he will 
withdraw his forces from the war must be taken extremely seriously by the other 
leaders since he is essentially at liberty to decide whether or not to leave. When 
Achilles withdraws from fighting in the Iliad after his quarrel with Agamemnon, 
his absence is sorely felt on the battlefield, but he is still at Troy. When he says 
that he will leave with his men (Il. 9.356‒61), both the audience and the three 
envoys are going to take his threat that much more seriously if he is not bound 
by oath. Indeed, Agamemnon’s insult to Achilles would be a strong incentive for 
Achilles to depart, if we consider that his presence there can be explained as a 
favour to the Atreidae (Paus. 3.24.11). Aristotle, in his Rhetoric (1396b17), finds 
it worthy of particular praise that Achilles took part in the Trojan War although 
he was very young and was not bound by oath. This is listed next to Achilles’ 
achievements in slaying Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus, who pre-
vented all the Greeks from disembarking, as well as Achilles’ invulnerability.16 
The fact that Achilles fought at Troy though he was not bound by oath was clearly 
an important element in defining his persona.
That Achilles’ son Neoptolemus is not bound by the oath of Helen’s suitors is a 
significant issue in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, a play in which we are constantly being 
reminded that Neoptolemus is the son of Achilles.17 After the Greeks have been 
fighting at Troy for ten years and have suffered many losses, including the death 
of Achilles, they are told by the Trojan seer Helenus, whom Odysseus captures 
14 M.L.West 2011, 109, and see §5.2 and ch. 6 for further discussion.
15 Cf. Gomme 1945 on Thuc. 1.9.1 and West 2011, 42, 87, 109.
16 This comes in a discussion of praise where it is argued that figures should be praised in 
respect of their specific achievements or actions, and not in respect of issues which could be 
deemed generic or apply to more than one person. For details of the Cycnus episode, see Ovid, 
Met. 12.64‒168, cf. Pindar Ol. 2.81‒3.
17 Neoptolemus is referred to as his father’s son at 4, 50, 57, 241, 260, 364, 582, 940, 1066, 
1220‒1, 1237, 1298, 1312, 1433. He is so like his father that the Greeks are said to have sworn on 
oath that they are seeing the ghost of his dead father Achilles (357‒8), and although this is part 
of a narrative by Neoptolemus which includes many falsehoods, there is no (other) reason not 
to take this statement as true. For further discussion of oaths in Sophocles’ Philoctetes see §5.2.
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by a ruse, that they will only take Troy with the help of Philoctetes and his bow, 
a sacred gift from Heracles. Originally a member of the Greek fleet, Philoctetes 
had been abandoned on the island of Lemnos en route after he had been bitten 
by a snake. The bite had become infected giving off a putrid odour and causing 
him to utter great cries of pain, which the army decided they could not endure. In 
Philoctetes Odysseus convinces a reluctant Neoptolemus to persuade Philoctetes 
that he has abandoned Troy, having fallen out with the Achaeans over the arms of 
Achilles, and is on his way home (Phil. 54‒64). In this way, Philoctetes will be per-
suaded to board the ship, thinking it bound for home, and will thus be trapped on 
board with his bow to be brought to Troy. The fact that Neoptolemus was not part 
of the original expedition which had abandoned Philoctetes means that he will 
not be the subject of Philoctetes’ anger and resentment, but it is also crucial that 
Neoptolemus is not bound by the suitors’ oath because it means that he can plau-
sibly maintain that he really is homeward bound, something which Odysseus and 
the other suitors cannot do. Odysseus uses this very argument (Phil. 72) to explain 
that only Neoptolemus can credibly persuade Philoctetes that he has abandoned 
the Trojan expedition. Thucydides (1.9.1) doubts the importance of the oath of 
Helen’s suitors in assembling the expedition against Troy, attributing the reason 
instead to Agamemnon’s superior power over the other princes at the time, but 
Thucydides tends to downplay the importance of religious factors throughout his 
work,18 and our other sources show overwhelmingly that the suitors’ oath had an 
important place in traditional Greek myth.
Another mythological hero forced by an oath, a blind oath this time, to 
embark on a military campaign is the Argive seer Amphiaraus. Married to the 
Argive king’s sister, Eriphyle, Amphiaraus swears an oath to the king, Adras-
tus, to the effect that any future differences between them will be arbitrated by 
Eriphyle. When Adrastus backs the military assault of his new son-in-law, the 
exiled Theban prince Polyneices, against Thebes, Amphiaraus refuses to take 
part in the expedition, having the divine foresight which tells him it is doomed to 
failure. Desperate for the campaign to go ahead, Polyneices is said to have bribed 
Eriphyle with a Theban heirloom of divine provenance, the necklace of Harmo-
nia, wife of Thebes’ founder Cadmus, and daughter of Aphrodite and Ares. In 
return for the necklace Eriphyle calls on Amphiaraus to keep his oath and acqui-
esce to her wish that he should join the expedition generally known as that of the 
Seven against Thebes. He fights and dies as do all the attacking chiefs apart from 
Adrastus, although in some versions Amphiaraus is swallowed alive into a chasm 
18 See Hornblower 2011, 25‒53.
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in the earth.19 The oath itself is only explicitly referred to in one fourth-century 
source, by the mythographer Asclepiades (FGrH 12 F 29), but Amphiaraus’ strong 
reluctance to join the campaign is well attested in the earlier tradition. He is an 
unwilling participant in an expedition that he considers evil in Aeschylus’ Seven 
against Thebes (573, 575), and the story of Polyneices bribing Eriphyle – which 
makes little sense without the oath, since it implies that she has the power to 
compel her husband somehow to join the expedition – features in the Odyssey 
(15.247) and was popular in fifth-century vase paintings.20 Moreover Pindar’s 
Nemean 9 describes Adrastus giving Eriphyle as a wife to Amphiaraus “as an oath 
pledge” (9.16: ὅρκιον ὡς ὅτε πιστόν), and since we know that the Greek marriage 
ceremony did not include an oath it is reasonable to see an allusion here to the 
oath sworn by Amphiaraus to Adrastus which Eriphyle had the power to enforce. 
Louis Gernet questioned how Amphiaraus came to be compelled to join the expe-
dition of the Seven, stating that “[o]n this point the legend’s tradition is unclear 
and complicated” and that “[t]he obligation remains unexplained”.21 The oath 
recorded in Asclepiades, however, of whose existence Gernet seems unaware, 
resolves the question entirely.
A third oath of significance for traditional myth is the oath through which 
Hera tricks Zeus into ensuring Eurystheus’ power over Heracles, thus causing the 
labours of Heracles. As it is related in the Iliad (19.107‒13) Hera requests that Zeus 
should confirm on oath his statement that whatever child of his blood was born 
on that day would be lord over his neighbours. Zeus duly swears the oath in antic-
ipation of the birth of Heracles, but Hera delays Heracles’ birth until after that of 
Eurystheus, leading to Eurystheus’ dominance over Heracles against Zeus’ will.22 
19 Amphiaraus’ death is mentioned in Homer (Od. 15.247) and is implicit in Aeschylus’ Seven 
against Thebes (792‒9, cf. 615‒19). The alternative tradition of Amphiaraus’ disappearance into 
the earth features in Pindar (Olymp. 6.13‒14, Nem. 9.24‒7) and in Euripides’ Suppliant Women 
(925‒7).
20 See LIMC III.2 s.v. Eriphyle I, plates 2‒6, 8, 9, 11, 16, with LIMC III.1, 844‒5.
21 Gernet 1981, 84.
22 Later tradition presents Zeus (Jove) fulfilling a blind oath by Styx to Dionysus’ mother Se-
mele, after the interference of Juno, when Semele requests that he show himself to her (Ovid, 
Met. 3.251‒313). This results in Semele’s death and Zeus’ rescue of the unborn Dionysus whom he 
places in his thigh until the time is right for his birth. Earlier sources neither report this oath nor 
exclude it but on balance there is too little support for this as a mythological oath, particularly 
since in Ovid the oath is not requested by either Juno or Semele but is volunteered by Jove (Met. 
3.286‒9). This is not a case of Zeus being tricked by an oath, as we saw with the oath sworn by 
Zeus to Hera, and it may well have been a straightforward request with which Zeus readily com-
plied in the majority of versions, unaware of the impact it would have. Even in Ovid, Juno does 
not anticipate that the tendering of an oath will be necessary for Jove to comply.
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Aristotle discusses this passage and suggests that it is reasonable for Hera to ask 
for an oath because she is afraid that things will not go as she wishes (Arist. fr. 
387 Gigon). Zeus is enraged by the deception. He hurls the goddess Delusion (Atē) 
out of Olympus, swearing a second strong oath that Delusion should never again 
return (Il. 19.125‒31). Interestingly, this is the only place in the entire corpus of our 
archaic and classical sources in which Zeus is presented as swearing oaths (see 
§7.3 for further discussion of oaths sworn by gods). It is fitting then that the main 
oath sworn by Zeus23 has a significant impact on the course of traditional myth 
since it orchestrates the context for, and explains the necessity of, the labours 
of Heracles, a mythological sequence which helped to create a panhellenic hero 
and which could be mined for mythical exempla or used for didactic purposes.24
We find then, that, essentially, there are only three oaths of the mythologi-
cal or aetiological type which appear in our sources from the archaic and clas-
sical periods, as having been sworn and fulfilled: the oath of Helen’s suitors, 
the oath of Amphiaraus, and the oath of Zeus to Hera. But there is another oath 
which may be classed as aetiological, and is sworn but broken, and it is the break-
ing of the oath, this time, which can be seen as having an important impact on 
the course of Greek mythical history. This is the treaty between the Greeks and 
Trojans described in detail in Iliad 3.245‒301. The truce is proposed to the Greeks 
by Hector, at Paris’ suggestion (cf. 3.73‒5), and both armies swear, in an elab-
orate oath ceremony, that they will stop fighting, and that Menelaus and Paris 
will engage in single combat over Helen and her possessions in order to resolve 
the war. However, the treaty is subsequently broken by the Trojan ally Pandarus 
under the influence of Athene. The Iliad is our earliest surviving source which 
refers to this treaty and the impact of it being broken, and all later references can 
be assumed to take the Iliad as their source, but there are hints in the structure 
of the Iliad that the treaty described in Book 3 and broken in Book 4 belongs 
to an older tradition within the Trojan War saga. The Iliad is set at a time when 
the Greeks have been at war with Troy for nine years, yet the proposal of single 
combat to resolve the war is believed by many scholars to belong more logically to 
a time at the beginning of the war. This, combined with the teichoskopia in Book 
3 where Priam strangely requests (after nine years of war) that Helen identify the 
champion Greek warriors in the battlefield, suggests that events in Book 3 prop-
erly belong to an earlier period of the Trojan cycle and have been imported into 
23 The second oath expressed in a rage is made as a result of the first.
24 See Graf 1993, 64 on the myths of Heracles as exempla, and see I.C. Rutherford 2011, 110, 
121‒2 on Pindar’s use of the labours of Heracles. 
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the Iliad’s narrative from earlier epic sources.25 A further point in support of this 
is the lack of continuity between books 2 and 3. In Book 2, Agamemnon had been 
promised (falsely) an immediate victory and might have been expected to reject 
the proposal for a truce which he accepts in Book 3.
The breaking of this oath troubled the philosophers in particular, especially 
the way in which divine intervention is responsible for the breach of contract. The 
Iliad presents a whole divine conspiracy to contrive the breaking of the truce by 
the Trojans. At the opening of Book 4, Hera petitions Zeus who eventually sends 
Athene to effect Hera’s wishes and cause a breach of the truce. In Plato’s Republic 
(379e), the fact that the violation is presented as being brought about by the gods 
makes the story an unacceptable subject for the citizens of the ideal state. Aristo-
tle discusses two different issues concerning the breach of the truce at Troy in his 
Homeric Problems, both to do with the problem of perjury. At fr. 372 (Gigon) Aris-
totle splits hairs over whether the Trojans perjured themselves or simply cursed 
themselves. He argues for the latter, based on Il. 3.298‒301, where the curse for 
perjury is expressed on “whichever group first does harm to the oaths” (3.299: 
ὁππότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια πημήνειαν). So, Aristotle argues, the Trojans did 
not commit perjury but committed the crime of doing harm to their oaths, thus 
bringing a curse upon themselves. Hence, he argues, Hera tries to ensure that 
harm comes to them from their own curse, for it is after they have prayed that 
Hera suggests the violation of the truce (Iliad 4.64‒72). Aristotle’s assertion that 
doing harm to one’s oath is not the same thing as perjuring oneself is a distinction 
that does not really hold water. If the Trojans have acted contrary to their oaths, 
then they have committed perjury, and there is no way around this. Agamemnon 
certainly treats the breach as perjury, stating that the Trojans have “trampled on 
their oaths” (Il. 4.157).26 He rouses the Argives back into battle by reminding them 
that the Trojans have broken their oaths, and listing again the consequences for 
the oath-breakers: vultures will feed on Trojan flesh, and their wives and chil-
dren (at least daughters, cf. Il. 6.57‒60) will be shipped to Greece (Il. 4.237‒9). 
Idomeneus also comments on the fact that the Trojans have broken their oaths 
(Il. 4.269‒70). Even the Trojan Antenor urges the Trojans to give Helen back to the 
Greeks and end the war because the Trojans are fighting in contempt of their oath 
(Il. 7.351‒2). In fact, Aristotle himself, later in the same work (fr. 375 Gigon), reveals 
25 See e.g. Mueller (1984) 66, Edmunds (1987) 188, Silk (1987) 41‒2, M.L. West (2011) 59, 61, 
127‒8, 137‒8.
26 Similar expressions describing the trampling of oaths occur in Hipponax fr.115.15, Alcaeus 
fr. 129.22‒3, and trag. adesp. 188b. For a detailed discussion of the Alcaeus fragment see Bach-
varova 2007. 
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the problem with his own distinction when he returns to this sworn truce and 
does treat its breach as perjury this time, though importantly, he confines his use 
of the term to Pandarus. Here the question is: why does Athene influence Panda-
rus to break the truce rather than speak directly to one of the Trojans (Pandarus is 
technically one of the Trojan allies)? The answer given is that Pandarus was born 
a perjurer because he belongs to a people who are still perjurers (Dardanians). 
In this way, Aristotle attempts to clear the Trojans of the charge of being oath-
breakers, since the oath was technically broken by a non-Trojan.
Philosophical concerns about the breach of this truce are significant for 
strengthening our understanding of the solemnity of an oath. The breaking of 
an oath is still regarded by the philosophers as a serious crime, which is why 
Aristotle is at such pains to clear the Trojans of the taint of perjury. But there is 
also a much deeper philosophical issue behind the unease over this truce and its 
breach. This is the disturbing fact that the breach of a truce sworn in good faith 
by mortals invoking the protection of Zeus and other gods can be caused by the 
very same divine forces who should be protecting the truce. This is clearly such 
an abhorrent notion of divinity to philosophers that Plato can dismiss it with little 
discussion, while Aristotle attempts to rationalize and sanitize this extraordinary 
event, which leads to such serious devastation.27
There are quite a number of cases (some discussed elsewhere in this 
volume)28 in which an oath appears in some versions of a myth, but the scarcity 
of cases in which an oath is fundamental to a mythological tradition confirms 
the intrinsic malleability of that tradition, while at the same time highlighting 
several fixed aspects of its mythological framework. Moreover, the oaths dis-
cussed here share some significant features. All function aetiologically as devices 
of narrative logic which explain how and why mythological characters engage in 
actions which are not in their best interests. The majority of the Greek leaders are 
compelled to remain fighting in Troy in spite of their heavy losses over ten years 
because they are bound by the oath of Helen’s suitors. The possible resolution of 
the war through a sworn truce and the single combat between Paris and Mene-
laus is ruined, not only by Aphrodite saving Paris from death, but more impor-
tantly by the minor ally who is influenced to break the truce. The enforcement of 
an oath compels Amphiaraus to go on a military expedition which he knows is 
doomed, and causes Zeus to be bound to accept his son’s enslavement to Eurys-
theus. Each of these mythological oaths serves a didactic function. In spite of 
being placed in difficult positions, not one of Helen’s suitors, not Amphiaraus, 
27 On divine and human responses to perjury, see further ch. 12.
28 Notably in chapters 2, 4, 8, 11 and 12.
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not even Zeus, dares to break his oath, while the whole of Troy suffers the punish-
ment for one man’s breach of a collective oath – one person’s actions devastating 
the entire community, a model which explains the sentiment expressed at the 
end of Euripides’ Electra (1355) where Castor warns against sailing with perjurers. 
There is very rarely any consideration for extenuating circumstances in commit-
ting perjury (see §11.1), and as we shall see (§10.2) even contemplation of perjury 
could be treated as perjury itself. Oaths in traditional myth thus illustrate the 
correct code of behaviour in relation to oaths and the consequences for perjury.
Finally, we can observe that female figures are central to each of the mytho-
logical oaths we have discussed. The danger of Helen’s beauty and desirability 
is confirmed by the number of suitors who swear the oath and are subsequently 
compelled by it to take part in the expedition against Troy where the eventual 
victory of the Greeks comes only at an extreme human cost.29 Eriphyle too can be 
viewed as one of the many female destroyers of men in Greek myth through her 
part in forcing the expedition against Thebes.30 Moreover, her acceptance of the 
necklace of Harmonia links her role to the category of mythical women associ-
ated with a fatal gift.31 Hera’s actions in exacting an oath from Zeus conform to 
the paradigm of the troublesome jealous or vengeful wife causing problems for 
her unfaithful husband,32 while her ability to influence Zeus to send Athene in 
order to cause the Trojans to break the sworn truce represents the typical female 
gift of persuasion.33 Although all the oaths in question are sworn by males, each 
aetiological oath includes a vital element of female influence which explains how 
29 Helen is blamed for the numerous deaths at Troy in Semonides fr. 7.115‒17 and in Aesch. 
Ag. 687‒90. On the dangers of female beauty, seductiveness, and sexuality articulated in Greek 
myth through the paradigm of Pandora see Vernant 1980, 183‒201 (with Csapo 2005, 254‒63) and 
Zeitlin 1996, 53‒86.
30 A list of women who feature in myth as destroyers of men is given by Gould 2001, 149‒50. 
Gernet 1981, 83 notes that the necklace of Harmonia “brings about men’s deaths”.
31 Gernet 1981, 83 describes the necklace as “the most representative example of the precious 
object’s destructive force.”
32 Such wives often feature in Greek tragedy. Clytaemestra in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon and 
Medea in Euripides’ Medea are prominent examples. Even Deianeira’s misguided actions in 
Sophocles’ Women of Trachis, when she attempts to rekindle Heracles’ desire for her with a love 
potion which turns out to be deadly, are directly linked to Heracles’ affair with a younger woman. 
See Hall (1997) 103‒10 for an overview of women in tragedy, and Foley (2001) for a more detailed 
treatment. On Hera’s characteristics as a female goddess, see also S. Blundell 1995, 32‒5, Lefko-
witz 2007, 14‒15, and Doherty 2001, 156, who notes that the role of the “wicked stepmother” 
among the goddesses is usually played by Hera; cf. also n.21 above.
33 On the association of women with persuasive powers in Greek literature, see e.g. Zeitlin 
1996, 136‒43, and Foley 2001, 272‒99.
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the oath came to be sworn or to be broken. In the context of mythological oaths, 
as elsewhere in Greek myth, female figures are imagined as being both dangerous 
to men and indispensable to their world.34
34 Cf. e.g. Vernant 1980, 201 “no Man without Pandora”, Zeitlin 1996, 85 on the “double prob-
lem of the origin of woman and woman as the origin”, and Gould 2001, 149 on the representation 
of women in mythology as signifying men’s “obsessive fear and revulsion, on the one hand, and 
on the other, an implication of total dependence.” 
4 Friendship and enmity, trust and suspicion
4.1 Oaths between warriors in epic and tragedy
L. A. Kozak
The martial sphere often conjures up extreme models of trust relationships: mili-
tary comrades have colloquial parallels in family, such as the “band of brothers”; 
military enemies are often understood in equally intense terms (“you’re either 
with us or you’re against us”). Yet the reality, even the literary reality, presents us 
with a different picture, where there is a broad spectrum of trust relationships that 
spans the poles between “friends” and “enemies”. Oaths serve as critical focal 
points between these two poles. Oaths create the initial terms of military alliance, 
and ideally render further oaths between military allies redundant. When bonds 
of alliance are strained, or even broken, then oaths serve to re-establish lost trust. 
Oaths can also compensate for other issues within an alliance, and can offset dif-
ferences in status or community between allies. Between “enemies”, oaths serve 
to establish trust, usually temporarily, where there is none: this allows for the 
retrieval of corpses, for individual combats, and any other event that requires a 
temporary truce. This means that oaths between enemies, in establishing trust 
between them, make them friends, at least in a limited sense. At the same time, 
an oath between friends suggests that there was a lack of trust between them 
before, so that in a sense they were enemies. The archaic and classical Greek texts 
that survive portray an amazingly fluid spectrum of war relationships, and oaths 
serve a crucial role (both by their presence and by their absence) in determining 
the status of any relationship along that spectrum.
Oaths that create military alliances are actually fairly rare in epic and tragedy, 
perhaps because these genres tell stories where the alliances depicted have 
already been established in traditional myth. Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes 
provides us with our first example of an alliance within a play, with the descrip-
tion of the oath that binds the eponymous seven men against Thebes, as the men 
swear by Ares and Enyo and by battle-fear (Phobos), slaughtering a bull over a 
shield (Seven 42‒49). This oath is nearly parodied in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, 
where the women, in forming their alliance of sexual abstinence against the men, 
suggest taking their oath on a shield (Lys. 185‒90); they swear by Peitho and the 
Cup of Amity, and eventually, Zeus, with wine instead of blood (191‒5). Euripides’ 
Suppliant Women also focuses on an oath-based alliance, this one between Argos 
and Athens, represented by Adrastus and Theseus respectively; here they slay 
three sheep over a tripod, engrave the tripod with the oath and give it to Delphi, 
while they bury the sacrificial knife in the ground (Supp. 1187‒1232).
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The previous chapter has discussed what stands as perhaps the most famous 
oath of literary alliance, the Oath of Tyndareos, which bound the suitors of Helen 
together against anyone who might take her, so binding the Achaeans against 
Paris and Troy.1 The Iliad itself makes only the vaguest of mentions of oaths 
taken by the Achaeans, and I suspect that these might refer to what were likely a 
series of oaths that took place between the oath of Tyndareos and the events of 
the Iliad: first Odysseus mentions a promise (huposkhesis) taken as the Achaeans 
left Argos to come to Troy (2.286),2 then Nestor is even more obscure when he 
mentions the agreements (sunthesiai) and oaths (horkia) that they have taken, 
with unmixed wine and right hand pledges (2.339‒41).3 The vagaries of these 
references suggest that tradition had established the Achaeans at Troy as bound 
together by oaths of some kind, even when the oath is not specified. These oaths 
hold the military alliance together throughout the campaign.
Oaths between individuals who are already allied are more common in epic 
and tragedy than those that establish military alliances. This is probably due to 
the inherent character drama that arises in conflict between individuals. When 
conflict arises and erodes an individual trust relationship that a military oath-
alliance should firmly bind, then only an oath can bring the two parties back 
to where they need to be. There are several examples of this type of trust-cycle 
within both epic and tragedy, where oaths and their absences play significant 
roles in understanding where a relationship stands. The most notable in epic is 
the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon that is so central to the plot of the 
Iliad. It is a good relationship to examine because it comes from a very early liter-
ary source, yet still provides us with a complex oath-relationship between the two 
Achaean warriors. Achilles did not swear the Oath of Tyndareos, and therefore 
1  Direct references to the Oath of Tyndareos occur in Sophocles’ Ajax (1113) and Philoctetes (72), 
with the most occurring in Euripides’ Iphigeneia in Aulis (58‒65, 78, 391, 395).
2 See §6.3. The Oath Database (remarks on oath #314) suggests that Odysseus’ mention of a 
promise here is “retrospectively upgraded to an oath for rhetorical purposes” in Nestor’s speech 
at 2.284‒8, in an early example of the “Sophoclean Oath” (see §5.2). I believe that Odysseus’ ref-
erence to this promise is actually to oaths taken by the army; the only other time in Homer that 
the formula ὑπόσχεσιν ἥν περ ὑπέστης is used is at Od. 10.483, where Odysseus specifically refers 
to the oath that Circe made to him (also referenced at 10.299‒301, 343‒6, and 381). 
3  Fletcher 2012, 22 suggests that both these references are actually to the oaths at Aulis, rather 
than the oath of Tyndareos, and says (ibid. n. 29) that the “traditional oath of the suitors to 
Tyndareos is not mentioned in Homer”. See §6.3, especially p. 145‒6 with n. 59. As Torrance 
suggests, “Nestor’s mention of “libations of unmixed wine” (Il. 2.341) suggests a formal oath”; 
I am not so certain, however, that “it seems most likely that he is alluding to the oath of Helen’s 
suitors”.
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has no sworn obligation to Agamemnon, or to fight the Trojans.4 Instead, Achil-
les claims to Agamemnon that “for you, O shameless one, and for your pleasure, 
did we follow you to Troy, defending the honour of you, the dog-eyed, and Mene-
laus” (1.158‒60). So even while there was no oath between them, Achilles is still 
deeply offended by Agamemnon’s taking his prize Briseis, because this action 
breaks some unsworn understanding between the two men that exists as a part of 
a larger cultural idea of reciprocity.
While the initial alliance between the two men feels as though it was sworn 
while it was not, the reparative oath between them that comes later in the epic 
feels superfluous. Agamemnon first offers an oath (through Odysseus) in Book 
9 (see 9.132‒4, 274‒6), and Achilles finally accepts the oath in Book 19 (after the 
pleading of Odysseus in public assembly) (19.175‒275). The oath does not guar-
antee a future truce between the two men, but does make amends for a past 
action, as Odysseus asks Agamemnon to swear that he has not slept with Briseis 
(19.175‒6). This oath before the assembly publicly heals the breach between the 
two men and reaffirms their mutual commitment to the war, despite their dis-
parate reasons for wanting the oath: Achilles’ eagerness to rejoin the fighting is 
motivated solely by vengeance for the death of Patroclus, rather than any need to 
reconcile with Agamemnon, while Agamemnon needs Achilles back in the fight 
in order to win. So the most famous example of an individual alliance broken 
and re-forged shows that while oaths are significant to the relationship, it is not 
entirely clear that they are essential.
Sophocles’ Philoctetes portrays a similar cycle of trust within a broken indi-
vidual military alliance as it follows the relationship between Philoctetes and 
Odysseus. Neoptolemus, under the orders of Odysseus, arrives on the island of 
Lemnos where the diseased Philoctetes has been marooned. His orders are to 
get his bow and bring it back to Troy, as this is the only way the Achaeans can 
defeat the Trojans. When Philoctetes hears that Neoptolemus is a Greek, he is 
immediately friendly with him, and assumes that they are allies (he calls Neop-
tolemus philtatos at 234, 237, 242). This relationship is clearly established as 
Philoctetes does not ask for an oath from Neoptolemus at line 811, but takes a 
hand-pledge instead (820), trusting Neoptolemus will take him home without an 
oath.5 But when he learns the truth from Neoptolemus about the young man’s 
mission, Philoctetes accuses him of breaking just such an oath at line 942. While 
4  Cf. Soph. Aj. 1232‒4, where Teucer claims that Aias never swore to Menelaus, but came to Troy 
as his own commander. For more on this “Sophoclean oath”, see §5.2.
5  For discussions of this unsworn oath, see Avery 1965, 281, 288; Belfiore 1994, 123; Fletcher 
2012, 93‒5; Flory 1978, 69; Hamilton 1975, 134 n.14; Scodel 2011, 15‒16; Segal 1977, 145‒7.
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Sophocles frequently uses oath-language ambiguously (see §5.2), it seems logical 
here that, upon learning he has been betrayed by what he thought was a friend, 
Philoctetes would regret the unsworn trust he had placed in Neoptolemus, and re-
imagine the trust that he had put in the young man as a sworn oath. Regardless of 
how Philoctetes sees the trust relationship between himself and Neoptolemus as 
having been forged, it has clearly been broken at this point. When Neoptolemus 
changes his mind and decides to help Philoctetes, Philoctetes does not trust him, 
and Neoptolemus must swear to him that he is not tricking him again (1288f), so 
re-establishing the initial trust between them.
Euripides’ Iphigeneia in Aulis also provides us with an oath that restores a 
relationship between allied warriors. Where Menelaus had said that Agamemnon 
should sacrifice his daughter so that the fleet might sail, he changes his mind, 
and finally agrees with Agamemnon that they should not kill her. Here he swears 
an oath to Agamemnon by Pelops and by Atreus to reassure him (473‒6): this oath 
restores trust between the two men which had been broken, even while it can’t 
prevent the death of Iphigeneia (506‒12), or over-rule the oath of Tyndareos that 
binds them to carry on to Troy.
Other examples from the Iliad of oaths between allies demonstrate the ver-
satility of the oath in restoring friendships or re-establishing trust. The funeral 
games of Book 23 provide an example similar to that between Achilles and 
Agamemnon, but in microcosm, where Menelaus complains against Antilochus 
during the games with an oath-request – that Antilochus should swear that he 
did not cheat in the chariot race (23.581‒5; see S&B 57‒9). Antilochus did cheat, 
and so refuses the oath, apologizes, and offers recompense. Here an oath is used 
indirectly to restore faith between two parties.
The last example in this category of re-establishing an alliance is also from 
the Iliad, and is often seen as an oath that takes place between enemies. When 
Glaucus, a Lycian (one of the Trojans’ allies), and Diomedes, an Achaean, dis-
cover on the battle-field as they are about to fight that they are actually ances-
tral guest-friends, they call an individual truce, swap armour, and clasp hands 
to confirm their alliance. Since they are guest-friends, the relationship between 
the two men is actually pre-existing, and only needs to be reaffirmed upon its 
discovery here on the battlefield. Their individual truce acts as a reminder of a 
permanent relationship, and needs only to be expressed as a pledge here, rather 
than a full oath.6
6  Compare this to the pledge, rather than oath, between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes men-
tioned on p. 97‒8. Diomedes and Glaucus do not swear an oath here, contrary to Fletcher 2012, 
76.
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Oaths can also serve to create trust or buttress a relationship between allies 
that is under strain due to a difference in status. An example of this is the oath 
that Calchas asks for from Achilles (and which Achilles gives) in the Iliad (see 
further §8.1). Calchas is afraid that he might anger Agamemnon with his divina-
tion (that Apollo is angry at the Achaeans because Agamemnon has stolen Chry-
seis, the daughter of his priest), and he asks Achilles to protect him, to which 
Achilles agrees (1.76‒91). This shows that an oath is needed between two men of 
different status in order to assure their cooperation, particularly against a man of 
even higher status.
Another example from the Iliad that shows an oath bridging a status gap 
between two allies is that which takes place in Book 10 between Dolon and 
Hector. When Hector promises the chariot and horses of Achilles to whoever suc-
cessfully spies on the Achaeans for him, Dolon volunteers and asks for an oath to 
back up the promise (10.321‒33). So while Dolon, a man of lower status (an ugly 
son of a herald), might not be able to force Hector to give up the goods if he does 
succeed in his mission, the oath confirms the trust between them and strengthens 
the military hierarchy.
This kind of status oath, which maintains the military hierarchy, is reversed 
in the Odyssey, when Odysseus must obtain an oath from his own crew that they 
will not eat any of the livestock on the island of the Sun (12.298‒307). This is the 
only oath in Homer where a commander must ask for an oath from one of his sub-
ordinates. The natural problem of being a leader on a ship is that one is always 
left open to mutiny, geographically separated from normal societal conventions 
or any other authority that might intervene, and outnumbered by the crew. Odys-
seus’ language confirms this: “Eurylochus, you force me, since I am only one 
man” (12.297) More than the simple numerical truths of life on board a ship, his 
men have already shown themselves to be untrustworthy when they released the 
winds of Aeolus (10.34‒49), and there has been a previous breach of trust between 
Eurylochus and Odysseus over Odysseus’ actions in relation to Circe (10.429‒41). 
In the Odyssey, Odysseus uses oaths to try to maintain his power over his crew, 
and maintain the military hierarchy, but he fails (12.339‒73, cf. 1.7‒8).
These issues of status seem to become slightly different in Sophocles’ 
Philoctetes, perhaps because of its fifth-century Athenian context. The pseudo-
merchant describes how Odysseus and Diomedes are “oathbound” (diōmotoi, 
593) to capture Philoctetes by either force or persuasion, and “all the Achaeans” 
heard him (595).7 While this oath is a fiction invented by the “merchant” to help 
7  Philoctetes himself refers to this oath a short time later, subtly changing it to say only that 
Odysseus swore to persuade him (623).
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Odysseus’ cause, it stands out in our consideration of oaths and status in military 
hierarchy. The Philoctetes frequently has its characters beholden to “the whole 
army”: the whole army is described as an active agent of persuasion and force by 
both Philoctetes and Odysseus in the final exchanges of the play (1225, 1243, 1250, 
1258, 1294). So while this is a fictional oath, it reflects the strikingly democratic 
military hierarchy that the world of the play establishes, where the “whole army” 
tops the hierarchy even above heroes like Odysseus.
So oaths not only create alliances, but reinforce those alliances, particularly 
between individuals who should be allied but who come into conflict. Oaths can 
also overcome differences in status between allies, and can strengthen the mili-
tary order within an allied force.
Oaths between enemies are quite different, because they temporarily create 
trust where there previously was none. In this function, the power of oaths is nec-
essarily limited. The most common use of oaths between enemies is when tem-
porary truces are brokered; these truces usually allow for the retrieval of corpses 
or for a single combat to take place. The Iliad provides us with examples of each 
of these types of oaths. The long oath of Book 3, proposed by Paris to Hector 
at 3.73‒5, then by Hector to the Achaeans at 3.94 and sworn by Agamemnon at 
3.267‒94, is meant to ensure that there will be peace between the Trojans and the 
Achaeans, and that Helen will be awarded to whichever of Paris and Menelaus 
wins in single combat. In Book 7, Agamemnon swears a truce to Priam through the 
herald Idaeus for the retrieval of corpses (7.408‒13). Euripides’ Phoenician Women 
also gives us an example of an oath being sworn for single combat, where a mes-
senger tells us that Eteocles offered to take on Polyneices alone, and peace was 
sworn between the Argives and the Thebans (1223‒41). There is another treaty at 
the beginning of the play, which a servant mentions and which probably refers to 
a temporary truce for the embassy between Polyneices and Eteocles to take place 
(spondas, 97). In all these cases, oaths establish a temporary peace that can be 
trusted between enemies. The only seemingly permanent sworn peace is made 
through the oath that closes the Odyssey, brokered by Athene at the behest of 
Zeus (24.482‒6; 24.546‒8). Zeus says to “let Odysseus be basileus always” (483) 
and that they will make the families of the suitors forget all the violence, so that 
“loving each other,/as before, let there be wealth and peace aplenty” (485f.)
While oaths between enemies can create trust, the absence of oaths between 
enemies can be just as significant, and can signal either a mutual understanding 
where there perhaps shouldn’t be one, or an absence of trust which is simply so 
total that no oath can fill the space or heal the breach. The latter is true in two spe-
cific instances in the Iliad. The first is between Menelaus and Paris, where in the 
oath that we have already seen in Iliad 3, Menelaus refuses to take an oath with 
Paris and demands that Priam come onto the battlefield to take it instead (3.105f.). 
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Menelaus declares that the sons of Priam are apistoi, and their untrustworthiness 
is apparently too great to even be redeemed by oath. This great distrust makes 
sense, of course, if we think of how brutally Paris had betrayed the trust of Mene-
laus with his theft of Helen. The other instance where hatred is too great to be 
bridged by an oath is that between Hector and Achilles. In Book 22, Hector makes 
an oath-proposal to Achilles to give his body proper funeral rites once he has 
fallen (22.254‒9), and Achilles vehemently turns him down (261‒72), famously 
saying that “there can be no trusted oaths between lions and men” (262).8
The absence of oaths between enemies, however, does not always mean a 
rejection of a relationship, or the impossibility of trust. The first example that 
the Iliad provides is the single-combat scene in Book 7. Here Hector proposes 
single combat, and swears that whoever of the combatants should win should 
return the body of the loser to his people for proper burial rites (7.76‒91). While 
the combat does take place eventually, with Ajax standing as Hector’s opponent, 
the oath is never taken by any of the Achaeans. This means that single combat 
takes place during an unsworn temporary truce, under unsworn terms: Hector 
simply trusts that his opponent will do as he has sworn he himself will do, and 
return his corpse should he fall, in what it seems is largely an act of faith. The 
second example from the Iliad is the unsworn truce that Priam and Achilles agree 
to in Book 24 for the sake of Hector’s funeral (24.656‒72). This absent oath serves 
to redeem Hector’s oath-proposal that Achilles had so vehemently rejected, not 
only in its substance, but in its spirit. Where Achilles refused to allow for Hector’s 
body to be returned to his people in Book 22, here he not only gives the body back, 
but allows a full funeral among the Trojan people. Where no oaths were possible 
there because his hatred was too great for Hector, here no oaths are necessary, 
because his empathy is so great for Priam.
So we can see that the absence of oaths lies at both extremes of the spectrum 
of military trust; at one end where no trust is possible, at the other where friend-
ship is implicit, and oaths serve to establish, or re-establish, every degree of trust, 
and every corresponding relationship, in between.
8  For more on this oath, see §8.1. 
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4.2 Oaths in business
A.H. Sommerstein
Business, in its broadest sense – transactions affecting the ownership, posses-
sion and use of property of all kinds – is a sphere from which in general, among 
classical Greeks, the oath is conspicuously absent. At first sight this may be sur-
prising. Business, as we are constantly reminded, often involves great risks; in the 
ancient world this was especially true in the important sphere of maritime trade. 
Consider the case, a very common one, in which A lends money to B to enable B 
to buy a cargo with which he will make a voyage from Peiraeus to some distant 
region – Crimea, say, or Phoenicia – where he will sell the cargo and buy other 
goods which he will sell upon his return.9 If B returns safely he is liable to repay 
the loan to A with appropriate interest (usually at a rather high rate); if the ship 
or the cargo is lost at sea, the debt is to be written off and A loses his money; if B 
fails to make the voyage agreed upon, or fails to ship an adequate return cargo, 
or returns to a different port from the one where he began his voyage, he may be 
liable to penalties enforceable by the courts. It is of the nature of such a contract 
that A risks heavy losses from events over which neither he nor B has any control. 
But he also risks heavy losses from the actions or omissions of B himself. There 
is unlikely to be any means of communication between A and B from the time B 
puts to sea until he returns, which may be several months later. If B breaks his 
agreement, A will not be able to do anything about it unless B returns to Athenian 
territory or A manages to track him down elsewhere. And yet we hear of no case 
in which a lender in such circumstances put the borrower on oath to fulfil his con-
tract. A written agreement, legally enforceable, always sufficed. Why was this so?
The answer, in one word, is trust. To ask for an oath, as we saw earlier in this 
chapter, implied a lack of trust. But if you don’t trust the other party to a deal, why 
are you making a deal with him at all? There is no compulsion; if you have reason 
to think that this particular trader isn’t trustworthy, you will simply not deal with 
him but with someone else. And if he gets a general reputation for unreliability, 
he will be hard put to it to make any deals with anyone. Looking at it the other 
way round, if you are negotiating for a deal and the other man asks you for an 
oath, he is serving notice on you that he doesn’t trust your honesty, and your 
relationship with him is thus starting on the wrong foot; again, you might well be 
better off doing business with someone else who does not advertise himself as a 
9 On loans of this and related types, see E.E. Cohen 1992, 136‒83; Millett 1992, 188‒93; and Mac-
Dowell 2009, 257‒87. For an actual loan contract of this kind see Dem. 35.10‒13.
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suspicious man. It is not surprising to find that even the pathologically mistrust-
ful man (apistos) of Theophrastus, who is hesitant even about lending a friend or 
relative a set of cups for a party without a third-party guarantee,10 is not described 
as demanding an oath from any of his borrowers or debtors.
There are, however, two situations in which we do find undertakings given 
in business transactions being confirmed by oath. One of these is exemplified 
only once in our sources, and then by a fictional case. In Aristophanes’ Clouds 
(1214ff) a character appears who has lent the anti-hero, Strepsiades, twelve minae 
– or, to capture more precisely in modern terms the nature of the transaction, 
judging by the way he describes it (1224‒5), has sold him on credit a horse worth 
this amount.11 He is a member of the same deme (local community) as Strepsia-
des, and he implies that it would have been thought improper for him to refuse 
this favour to a fellow-demesman in financial difficulties.12 He did, however, ask 
Strepsiades to swear that he would repay the advance (1227) – or alternatively 
we may be meant to suppose that Strepsiades himself, perceiving that the seller 
was reluctant to give credit, volunteered an oath. The creditor has recently been 
pressing for payment, and has been met with evasions and delays (1135‒41); he 
has now decided to take legal proceedings, and has come to Strepsiades’ house, 
accompanied by a witness, to issue a summons. Strepsiades, having learned from 
Socrates that the gods either do not exist or have lost their power, blithely denies 
(1225‒6, 1230‒1) that he ever bought the horse or incurred the debt, and equally 
blithely expresses his willingness to swear to his denial by Zeus, Hermes and 
Poseidon, and to do so, if desired, in a sacred place (1232‒6).
This is clearly not a normal business transaction. Rather, the seller was 
extending credit, as a matter of neighbourly duty, to a person whom he knew, and 
who knew himself, to be a poor credit risk with little if any prospect of raising the 
money elsewhere – a beggar who could not be a chooser. In these circumstances 
he was evidently entitled to secure his position as far as he could by demanding 
an oath (or accepting one if it was volunteered). We cannot tell how common an 
occurrence this was. In Clouds it is an important part of the background to the plot 
that Strepsiades, on account of the extravagance of his aristocratic wife and their 
son’s obsession with chariot-racing, has been spending far beyond his resources 
10 Thphr. Char. 18.7. He does demand a third-party guarantee when leaving his cloak at the 
cleaner’s (18.6)!
11 See MacDowell 1978, 138‒9, and E.E. Cohen 2005, 293‒6. MacDowell 2010 gives a detailed 
analysis of the legal aspects of Strepsiades’ loan transactions.
12 He now says (1215‒16) that it would have been better for him to have “refused unblushing-
ly” (aperuthriasai); this verb means “to show no shame in situations in which a normal person 
would feel ashamed” (cf. Men. fr. 750, Apollodorus com. fr. 13.10).
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– but also that, unlike his wife and son, he does not belong by birth or upbringing 
to the leisured and moneyed class and cannot rely on their mutual support net-
works. But for his improbable marriage13 he would never have dreamed of buying 
horses in the first place.
There is also, in principle, another possibility, though nothing in the text of 
Clouds positively warrants us to assume it. This is that this was not the first time 
this man had given credit to Strepsiades, and that the latter had already shown 
himself a bad payer. This brings us to the second situation in which oaths are 
found in business dealings, one which has been well discussed by Carawan 2007. 
It was considered highly desirable, when possible, for two people who had quar-
relled to effect a reconciliation, either by themselves or with the aid of mutual 
friends; often it would be very much in their material interests, too, especially if 
they were facing a common threat from some third party. But in many cases their 
past relations would be such that they would have to be more than human not to 
feel some continuing suspicion, and solemn mutual oaths would be an excellent 
device for disarming such suspicion – second only, perhaps, to a marriage alli-
ance. Several instances of such reconciliations are narrated in surviving lawcourt 
speeches, most often in connection with inheritance disputes. Not surprisingly, 
we usually hear about them only when they break down.
The most detailed narrative we have of a sworn reconciliation is in Demos-
thenes’ speech 48 (Against Olympiodorus), probably delivered in the late 340s. 
What follows is the account given by the speaker, whom I will call Callistratus;14 
it is likely to be very far from the whole truth,15 but it must have been expected 
13 Strepsiades’ wife is the niece of Megacles son of Megacles (Clouds 46) – a member of the 
Alcmeonid family, which for two hundred years or more had been at or close to the very top of 
Athenian society – and yet we are expected to believe that her kinsfolk required the services of 
a matchmaker (promnēstria) to find a husband for her (41‒2) and that the latter thought a hard-
working, leather-jerkined (72) farmer was just the man.
14 He is so named in Libanius’ Hypothesis, though his name is never given in the speech itself. 
Probably some early copies of the speech bore the title For Callistratus as well as, or instead 
of, Against Olympiodorus; there are other speeches (Antiphon 5, Lysias 16, Demosthenes 57) 
for which the name of the client is given in the speech title, the Hypothesis, or in a testimonial 
source, although it never appears in the text of the speech. 
15 Callistratus gives no adequate explanation for agreeing in the first place to share an inheri-
tance with a man whom (he says) he knew from the start to have no genuine claim to it (§6); and 
the part played in the whole affair by his half-brother Callippus (§§10, 20, 22, 29) remains entirely 
obscure. Most of the story Callistratus tells is unsupported by witness evidence; and, very unusu-
ally for an inheritance-related case, the information given about the family relationships of those 
involved is extremely sketchy. See MacDowell 2009, 88‒92.
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to carry conviction with a jury16 (who admittedly, as Lysias is said to have once 
reminded a client, would only have the chance to hear it once).17
Callistratus had married Olympiodorus’ sister, and the two men were appar-
ently accustomed to work closely together. Accordingly, when an elderly, childless 
relative of Callistratus named Comon fell dangerously ill, Callistratus consulted 
his brother-in-law. Comon soon died, and Olympiodorus then claimed that he 
was related to Comon through his mother and had a right to a share of the estate. 
Callistratus (he says) knew that this was a lie and that no one was closer kin to 
Comon than he himself was, and there were high words between the two; eventu-
ally they agreed to thrash the matter out after the funeral (which they apparently 
organized jointly). A meeting was duly held, to which other family members were 
invited.18 There was much wrangling, but eventually the two agreed that they 
should divide the estate equally “and that there should be no further unpleasant-
ness” (§8).
And after this we wrote down an agreement with each other about everything, and swore 
strong oaths to each other to the effect that we would divide the visible assets19 fairly and 
justly, and that neither of us would seek to gain more of what Comon had left than the other, 
and that we would seek out all the other property jointly, and that we would take such 
action as might at any time be needed in consultation with each other (§9).
The agreement was witnessed by “the gods by whom we had sworn to each 
other”, by the family members present,20 and by a mutual friend, Androcleides, 
with whom the written document was deposited.
Callistratus claims to have consistently and conscientiously fulfilled the 
agreement, even when it was much against his interest to do so. In dividing the 
estate, he followed the classic procedure of first splitting it into two shares and 
16 Though it is certainly surprising that Callistratus was thought likely to get away with admit-
ting – indeed asserting – that he had conspired with Olympiodorus to bring collusive lawcourt 
proceedings in which they would pretend to be rivals and in which Olympiodorus was free, if he 
wished, to bring forward false evidence against him (§§28‒31).
17 Plut. Mor. 504c.
18 Callistratus’ half-brother, Callippus, who was expected to put in a claim to all or part of Co-
mon’s estate (§10), was abroad at the time; the agreement seems to have been, at least in part, 
directed against him.
19 The terms “visible” (phanera) and “invisible” (aphanēs), as categories of property, were not 
precisely defined (see A.R.W. Harrison 1968, 228‒35), but they did not give rise to any dispute in 
this case; the actions of both parties show that by “visible” assets they understood simply those 
whose existence was evident without investigation – which proved to mean (i) houses with their 
contents and (ii) the slave workforces of two manufacturing establishments (§12).
20 Curiously, none of these is at any stage called as a witness to the agreement. 
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then asking Olympiodorus to choose between them (§§12‒13). Olympiodorus’ 
share included a slave named Moschion, who was suspected of having stolen and 
secreted some of Comon’s money; the two heirs threatened him with torture, and 
he produced some 600 drachmae which they shared between them. Olympio-
dorus, however, in breach of the agreement, subsequently imprisoned and tor-
tured Moschion himself, and Moschion confessed to having stolen a further 70 
minae (7000 drachmae), all of which he handed over to Olympiodorus (§18). Cal-
listratus learned of this, and after a time asked why he was not being given a 
share, but Olympiodorus procrastinated.
Then, as had been expected, Callistratus’ half-brother Callippus came home 
and laid claim to half the estate, and other claimants also appeared. Callistratus 
and Olympiodorus agreed that the latter should claim the whole estate and Cal-
listratus half of it. Before the date specified for the trial, Olympiodorus had to go 
abroad on campaign. This should have resulted in the postponement of the trial, 
but the other claimants succeeded in persuading the jury that Olympiodorus 
“was absent because of the trial and not on public business” (§25); Olympio-
dorus’ claim was struck out, and Callistratus had to abandon his also (presum-
ably because of the agreement, though he does not at this point mention it). The 
victorious claimants forthwith took possession of the whole estate, “and that,” 
says Callistratus, “was the benefit I reaped from my partnership with this man” 
(§28).
When Olympiodorus returned, the pair agreed to launch separate coun-
ter-suits against the successful claimants – Olympiodorus again claiming the 
whole estate and Callistratus half – with whoever won giving the other his share 
“according to the agreement and the oaths”. Olympiodorus spoke first, and was 
awarded the whole estate – and held on to it all, and to Moschion’s 70 minae 
too. Callistratus mentions some of the justifications he had raised: that he had 
never received any money from Moschion; that anyway Moschion belonged to 
him and therefore the money did too; more seriously, that Callistratus had “vio-
lated the agreement … and persistently spoken and acted in opposition to him”. 
It was common in such reconciliation agreements to provide that future disputes 
should be taken to arbitration, but here it seems to be assumed by both sides (see 
§46) that if the agreement is broken by either side, the other side can treat it as 
null and void. That, of course, begs the question of what constitutes a breach. At 
any rate Callistratus cites his conduct throughout all the past dealings over the 
estate as evidence of the absurdity of the claim that he had persistently opposed 
Olympiodorus. He points out, in particular, that when Olympiodorus’ original 
claim was struck out, he could still have laid claim successfully to a half-share, 
since none of the other claimants were opposing this (§41):
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But if I had done that, I would at once have become a perjurer; for I had sworn and agreed to 
do everything in common with you, consulting as to what seemed best for you and me (§42).
Altogether, Callistratus in this speech refers to “the oaths” about fourteen times. 
He links them closely with the written agreement, and makes that document the 
centrepiece of his case. Androcleides, with whom the agreement had been depos-
ited, has been asked to bring it to court; his witness statement is presented in 
two instalments (§§11, 47), and Callistratus challenges Olympiodorus to allow the 
agreement to be opened and read, because
I want you to hear the agreement and the oaths which this Olympiodorus and I swore to 
each other. And if he agrees, so be it; just listen to the words, whenever he sees fit to have 
them read. If he is not willing to do this, is it not then plain, members of the jury, that he 
is the most shameless man alive, and that you have no justification for taking seriously a 
single thing he says? … He himself is well aware that he is wronging me, that he is wronging 
the gods by whom he swore, and that he is a perjurer (§§51‒52)
Oaths appear again in two other reconciliation agreements in the course of 
inheritance disputes. In Isaeus 2 (On the Estate of Menecles), we hear of a dispute 
between Menecles and his brother over some property claimed by the latter, 
resulting in a lawsuit between them, in which Menecles appears to have been 
advised and assisted by his adopted son. It was eventually agreed to settle the 
dispute by arbitration, and the arbitrators decided
that we [i.e. Menecles and his adopted son, the speaker] should withdraw from the property 
[Menecles’ brother] claimed and make it over to him as a gift; for they did not see any other 
possibility of a settlement, except by [the brother and his son] getting a share of Menecles’ 
property. For the future they ruled that we should treat each other well in word and deed, 
and they compelled us all to swear at the altar to do so; and we did swear to treat each other 
well in future, to the best of our ability, in word and deed (§§31‒2)
Yet now, with Menecles dead, his brother is claiming the whole of his estate by 
challenging the legality of the speaker’s adoption: “this is their idea of treating 
us well” (§33). The speaker emphasizes that Menecles’ brother is violating his 
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oath, and argues that the very fact that he was included in the oath constituted an 
effective recognition of the validity of his adoption (§§38‒40).21
Isaeus 5 (On the Estate of Dicaeogenes) is an episode in a long-running feud 
between Dicaeogenes III – the cousin and, he claims, the adopted son of the long-
dead Dicaeogenes II whose estate is in dispute – and the sons of Dicaeogenes II’s 
sisters. The most recent round of this feud had ended with a last-minute compro-
mise under which Dicaeogenes III agreed to surrender to the nephews two-thirds 
of his cousin’s estate, with two friends, Leochares and Mnesiptolemus, going 
surety for his performance of the agreement (§18). It turned out that little of the 
property survived, much having been sold or mortgaged and much money spent 
on building and repairs, and the nephews are now suing Leochares in his capac-
ity as surety. Before the trial, Leochares and Dicaeogenes III asked for arbitration; 
each side nominated two arbitrators, and both sides swore before the arbitrators 
to abide by whatever decision they gave (§31).22 Here, it will be seen, the oath of 
reconciliation does not form part of the arbitrators’ award but is taken before they 
begin their work – a wise precaution, seeing that the dispute had already lasted 
ten years. In the end the arbitrators were deadlocked and made no decision at all, 
so that the oaths became inoperative.
A sworn reconciliation in rather different circumstances may or may not be 
evidenced in a speech by Isocrates (17) concerning dealings with the famous 
banker Pasion (father of the orator Apollodorus). The speaker is a young noble-
man of the kingdom of Bosporus (Crimea) who is on an extended trading-cum-
tourist visit to Athens. When his father, Sopaeus, fell under suspicion of treason 
and was arrested by King Satyrus, the king ordered those of his subjects who 
resided in Athens to seize the young man’s money and force him to return home. 
In alarm, he consulted his banker, Pasion, with whom he had deposited consider-
able sums, and they agreed to deny the existence of these deposits and concoct 
evidence that the young man was actually in debt to Pasion and others. This was 
all very well for the time being, but presently news arrived that Sopaeus had been 
released and raised to even higher honours – and Pasion (or so the young man 
says) continued to deny the existence of the deposits and even demanded sure-
21 This argument would be a good deal stronger if it were true, as the speaker here claims, that 
Menecles’ brother had been formally reconciled with him “and not with Menecles”, and (this is 
insinuated, not explicitly stated) that he (the speaker) alone had taken the oath; but nothing in 
§§29‒33 indicates that Menecles (the actual owner of the property in dispute!) was not a party to 
the reconciliation and oaths – indeed the speaker generally refers to his own side in the quarrel 
as “we” (i.e. Menecles and himself), not “I”.
22 For another such oath taken by the parties to a private arbitration, see Ath.Agora xix 
L4a.69‒81. On oaths sworn by arbitrators themselves, see S&B §5.13.
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ties for his customer’s alleged debts. The Bosporan, not surprisingly, prepared 
to go to law, and at this point Pasion asked to meet him in a sacred place. They 
met on the Acropolis, and Pasion said that he had acted as he had because he 
was short of money and asked that he be forgiven and his financial position kept 
secret (§18). The Bosporan agreed, provided arrangements were made to ensure 
that he got his money back, and two days later they met a second time, again on 
the Acropolis, and “exchanged pledges” to keep the matter secret (§19). Since the 
content of the pledges is introduced by the particles ē mēn, which normally intro-
duce the terms of an oath, it is possible that we are to understand they swore to 
this; but the speaker never explicitly claims that an oath was taken or that Pasion 
has broken one.23 They also “agreed” (no mention here of a “pledge”) that they 
would travel together to Bosporus, where Pasion would repay the money; that on 
returning to Athens, Pasion could say what he liked about the matter; and that if 
he failed to carry out these terms, King Satyrus was empowered to condemn him 
to pay 150% of the sum claimed. This agreement was put in writing and entrusted 
to Pyron of Pherae, who regularly traded with the Black Sea region, with instruc-
tions to burn it if the parties reached a final settlement, otherwise to deliver it to 
Satyrus (§20).
Whether or not this agreement was sworn to, a degree of sanctity was cer-
tainly conferred on it by the place in which it was made.24 It was never carried 
out in the way originally specified; Pasion refused to make the voyage to which 
he had allegedly agreed, asserted that no agreement at all had been made, and 
demanded that the document deposited with Pyron be opened before witnesses 
– and the document turned out to say that Pasion was released from all claims 
whatsoever on the Bosporan’s part. Of course the Bosporan claims that there had 
been a fraudulent substitution; but while we need not explore the sequel in detail, 
it is worth noting that Pasion did in the end carry out the spirit of the agreement. 
He agreed to travel to Satyrus’ court and submit the dispute to his arbitration; 
and although in the end he did not make the voyage himself, he did send his 
confidential slave Cittus there (§51). Satyrus refused to give a decision, appar-
ently because he might seem to be infringing Athenian jurisdiction, but he wrote 
a letter to the Athenian state in terms friendly to Sopaeus’ son and encouraged 
23 Accordingly this passage has not been included in the Oath project database.
24 If, that is, it was made at all. Pyron, the only third party who, according to the Bosporan’s 
story, knew about the agreement, is never called as a witness. On the other hand, Agyrrhius, 
a leading politician of the day and a friend both of Pasion and of the Bosporan, later testifies 
(§§31‒2) to having asked the latter, on Pasion’s behalf, either to persuade his friend Menexenus 
to withdraw a lawsuit he had brought against Pasion or to annul the agreement, which implies 
that at that time Pasion thought the agreement endangered him.
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Athenian merchants then in his kingdom to support his cause (§52). Sopaeus’ 
son, of course, claims that Satyrus did this because he thought Pasion was in the 
wrong; needless to say, it is just as likely that he was simply doing what he could 
to be kind to the son of his chief minister without pronouncing on the rights and 
wrongs of the matter.
At any rate, the pattern is clear. Normal business transactions are based on 
trust and do not require oaths – indeed, so far as our evidence goes, oaths are 
positively avoided. They may be taken, however, when two parties who have 
quarrelled are trying to resume normal (or at least non-hostile) relations, or when 
someone is extending a favour to a person with whom he would not be willing to 
do business in the ordinary way (and who knows it).
5 The language of oaths
5.1 How oaths are expressed
A.H. Sommerstein
In ancient Greek there are three basic forms of expression that constitute swear-
ing: one makes explicit the act of swearing itself, one makes explicit the curse 
contained in the oath, and one leaves both of these to be understood and instead 
focuses on the god who is to witness and enforce the oath or on the object named 
as Eideshort (§5.3). These are all found in ordinary discourse and in poetry; in 
official oaths, however, a fourth form is usual, in which the statement sworn to is 
first uttered as a simple assertion or promise, and this is followed by words which 
have the effect of making the statement into an oath.
(1) The simplest, most direct form of swearing is effected by the use of the perfor-
mative verb omnumi or omnuō “I swear”, normally governing an infinitive phrase 
specifying the statement that was being sworn to.1 Nearly always the name of the 
witness god is added in the accusative case,2 as in this example from Euripides’ 
Hippolytus (713‒14):
ὄμνυμι σεμνὴν Ἄρτεμιν, Διὸς κόρην,  
μηδὲν κακῶν σῶν εἰς φάος δείξειν ποτέ.
I swear by awesome Artemis, daughter of Zeus,  
that I will never bring to light anything of your afflictions.
This form of oath is not as frequent in our data as one might expect, occurring 
less than thirty times, even if we include those cases in which the statement to 
be sworn to has already been stipulated to the swearer who then merely confirms 
that (s)he does indeed swear to it. It is found in drama3 and in other authors, of 
1 Twice in Xenophon (Cyr. 5.1.28, 5.4.31) the statement forms the main sentence and omnumi is 
inserted parenthetically.
2 Possibly this was not in origin a direct object; it is striking that in the Hippocratic oath the 
accusative is followed, and governed, by ἵστορας ποιεύμενος “making my witnesses”, suggesting 
that a construction like (say) ὄμνυμι τὸν Ποσειδῶνα “I swear (by) Poseidon” may have originated 
as an abbreviation of ὄμνυμι, τὸν Ποσειδῶνα ἵστορα ποιούμενος “I swear, making Poseidon my 
witness”.
3 Soph. Trach. 1188 (where the content of the oath has already been stipulated by the swearee); 
Eur. Med. 752, Hipp. 713‒14 (above), 1025‒7, IA 473‒6, fr. 487 (the content of the oath has not sur-
vived); Ar. Birds 445‒7 (content previously stipulated), Thesm. 272‒4 (ditto).
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poetry and prose, who report conversations – Pindar,4 Herodotus,5 Xenophon6 
and, once, Plato.7 In public oratory it occurs three times, all in Demosthenes (23.5, 
32.31, 54.41), the oath always being “by all the gods” (one speaker adds “and all 
the goddesses”), evidently a particularly solemn and emphatic formula.
The surviving omnumi oaths are all either volunteered, or exacted by private 
individuals for private purposes; oaths of an official character, whether adminis-
tered by the state or by other bodies such as local communities or religious soci-
eties, are hardly ever, to our knowledge, expressed in this way. There is only one 
exception that we know of: the celebrated Hippocratic Oath (see ch. 14), which 
begins thus:
I swear, making my witnesses Apollo the Physician, Asclepius, Hygeia, Panacea, and all the 
gods and goddesses, that I will fulfil, to the best of my ability and judgement, this oath and 
this contract …
the terms of which are then specified.8
(2)  A moderately common form of oath in conversation, again almost always 
volunteered, is that in which the speaker, without using a verb of swearing and 
usually without naming the witness-god, explicitly wishes (with an optative verb, 
either itself in the first person or with a first-person pronoun as direct or indirect 
object) for some evil (usually destruction) to befall him/herself9 if proposition p is 
false – which by definition amounts to swearing that p is true. A simple example 
is this one from Aristophanes’ Frogs (579):
κάκιστ’ ἀπολοίμην, Ξανθίαν εἰ μὴ φιλῶ.
May I perish most miserably if I do not love Xanthias!
4 Pyth. 4.165‒7, Nem. 7.70‒3.
5 1.212, 5.106.
6 Anab. 6.1.31, 6.6.17, 7.6.18‒19, 7.7.40; Oec. 4.24; Symp. 4.11; Cyr. 5.1.28, 5.4.31, 8.4.7; Ages. 5.5.
7 Phdr. 236d‒e.
8 The first, long clause of the oath-statement is in the infinitive; the remaining clauses are in 
the first-person future indicative, as regularly in oaths of type (4) below.
9 The verbs normally used are ὀλοίμην “may I perish” (with its compounds ἀπολοίμην and 
ἐξολοίμην) and its synonym μὴ (or μηκέτι) ζώιην “may I not live (any more)”. For further discus-
sion of oaths of this type, and others that include “explicit self-curses”, see ch. 2 above.
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This oath, uttered by the god Dionysus, actually fails in its objective (which is to 
persuade Dionysus’ slave Xanthias to take over his Heracles costume),10 and he 
has to swear another and much more powerful one (586‒8):
ἀλλ’ ἤν σε τοῦ λοιποῦ ποτ’ ἀφέλωμαι χρόνου,  
πρόρριζος αὐτός, ἡ γυνή, τὰ παιδία,  
κάκιστ’ ἀπολοίμην, κἀρχέδημος ὁ γλάμων.
But if I ever take 〈the costume〉 away from you from now on,11 then may I and my wife and 
my children perish most miserably, root and branch – and bleary-eyed Archedemus12 as 
well!
In our data this form of oath occurs about twenty times, all but one of them in 
drama. The majority are in Aristophanes, where they appear on the lips of a wide 
range of speakers (all male) and accompany a wide range of types of assertion, 
promise and threat; the most common type is the declaration of love, loyalty and/
or sincerity. In one case, in the wrangling-match between two low-life characters 
that dominates Aristophanes’ Knights, the self-imprecation undergoes baroque 
elaborations. The current favourite slave of the personified Athenian People, 
Paphlagon (who represents the politician Cleon), and the Sausage-seller who 
is trying to supplant him, both protest their undying loyalty to him. Paphlagon 
speaks first (Knights 763‒8), and begins by praying to Athena that if he has been 
a worthy servant of the Athenian people he may enjoy, as he does now, free main-
tenance at public expense “for having done nothing” …
εἰ δέ σε μισῶ καὶ μὴ περὶ σοῦ μάχομαι μόνος ἀντιβεβηκώς,  
ἀπολοίμην καὶ διαπρισθείην κατατμηθείην τε λέπαδνα.
But if I hate you, if I am not the only man who stands firm and fights for you, then may I 
perish and be sawn in two and cut up into yoke-straps!
10 A dangerous thing to be wearing in the underworld, where Heracles is a wanted criminal, 
having stolen the dog Cerberus on his last visit there.
11 Xanthias had been induced to wear the Heracles costume in an earlier scene, only to be 
abruptly told to hand it over (521‒33) when “Heracles” received a dinner invitation from Perse-
phone, the queen of the underworld. Even after this oath he continues to fear that Dionysus will 
do the same to him again if he sees any advantage in resuming the Heracles role (598‒600).
12 A contemporary politician. His inclusion in the oath is, from one point of view, merely an ir-
relevant comic twist; but, as Tucker (1906) pointed out, the new oath can be seen as carrying the 
“inducement” that even if Dionysus does break it, Xanthias and the Athenian people will have 
the consolation of getting rid of Archedemus!
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As he does repeatedly throughout the play, the Sausage-seller at once caps 
Paphlagon’s words with more emphatic, more colourful words of his own, here a 
multiple imprecation (769‒72) drawn from his own trade of meat preparation as 
Paphlagon’s was partly drawn from his alleged trade of leather-working:
κἄγωγ’, ὦ Δῆμ’, εἰ μή σε φιλῶ καὶ μὴ στέργω, κατατμηθεὶς  
ἑψοίμην ἐν περικομματίοις· κεί μὴ τούτοισι πέποιθας,  
ἐπὶ ταυτησὶ κατακνησθείην ἐν μυττωτῶι μετὰ τυροῦ  
καὶ τῆι κρεάγραι τῶν ὀρχιπέδων ἑλκοίμην εἰς Κεραμεικόν.
And may I, Demos, if I do not love and cherish you, be cut up and boiled with mincemeat! 
And if you don’t believe that, then may I on this table be grated with cheese into a savoury 
mash, and may I be dragged by the balls with my own meathook to Cerameicus!
One oath of this type survives in a fragment of another comic dramatist, the 
fourth-century author Eubulus (fr. 115.6‒7), where a character strongly denies 
that he wishes to speak evil of women – but presently finds himself doing so just 
the same, because he begins to list the good and bad women of myth and finds 
that he can only think of two (Penelope and Alcestis) in the former category!
In the tragic corpus there are six oaths of this form; they have a particularly 
striking effect because of their rarity in the genre, and on two occasions they 
are paired. One pair occurs in a satyr-drama, Euripides’ Cyclops, in the amusing 
scene (see further §10.2) in which Silenus swears that he did not try to sell the 
Cyclops’ property to Odysseus and his men, and his children the satyrs swear he 
did, each invoking destruction on … the other (Cyclops 262‒72). The second pair 
is in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King (644‒5, 660‒2) when, in the desperate attempt 
to convince Oedipus that he is not the target of a political conspiracy, first Creon 
and then the chorus of elders explicitly invoke destruction on themselves – Creon 
in support of a declaration that he is innocent of the charge made against him, 
the chorus to reinforce their denial that by begging Oedipus to take Creon’s dec-
laration seriously they are seeking the death or exile of Oedipus himself. Oedipus 
is not at all convinced,13 but it is clear that he ought to have been. Another such 
imprecation in tragedy, in Euripides’ Hippolytus (1025‒31), also accompanies a 
declaration of innocence, when Hippolytus denies the charge that he defiled the 
bed of14 his stepmother Phaedra. The remaining one, in Orestes (1147‒8), accom-
13 Although he grants the chorus’s request to spare Creon, he still thinks that by letting him go 
he may be condemning himself to death or exile (669‒70); and even thirty lines later (701) he is 
speaking of Creon’s alleged plot as an established fact.
14 I use this expression (a translation of one used by Theseus in Hipp. 944) because, while the 
allegation made in Phaedra’s suicide note, and repeated by Theseus in Hippolytus’ absence, 
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panies a threat (to murder Helen); the formula “may I not live” seems to be par-
ticularly associated with threats, with which it is coupled in all its three surviving 
occurrences.15
The imprecation-type of oath occurs only once outside drama: in Demos-
thenes’ speech On the False Embassy (19.172), where he swears that he would 
never have gone with Aeschines and others on the embassy to receive the oaths 
of peace from Philip of Macedon in 346, had he not on his previous visit promised 
certain prisoners that he would bring back money for their ransom.
(3) The third type of oath, which – to judge by the writings of Plato, Xenophon 
and the comic dramatists – must have been used by ordinary Greeks many times 
more frequently than all other forms combined, consists simply of an assertion 
or promise reinforced by the naming of a god, or sometimes of an Eideshort, in a 
simple syntactic construction which signals that the speaker is swearing by that 
god or on that object.16 In classical Attic, and in most other dialects, the construc-
tion consists of the name of the god or object in the accusative case,17 preceded by 
one or two words which mark the utterance (i) as an oath and (ii) as affirmative or 
negative as the case may be. In Attic these words are νὴ or ναὶ μὰ for affirmative 
oaths, μὰ or οὐ μὰ for negative ones; in Homer, in most other non-Attic poetry, and 
presumably in the Ionic and Lesbian dialects, only ναὶ μὰ and οὐ μὰ appear;18 in 
was one of forcible rape, Hippolytus himself seems to think he is being charged with consensual 
seduction; see Sommerstein 2006b, 235.
15 The others are at Ar. Knights 833‒6 and Clouds 1255. There is a possible fourth occurrence 
at Lysistrata 530‒1 (“Shall I keep silent for you, a woman with a veil over her face? Then may I 
not live!”), if this is taken to mean “I will not under any circumstances keep silent …”; but the 
speaker may also mean “I will be too ashamed to go on living if a woman forces me to keep si-
lent” – and since he does in fact fall silent after these words, for a space of twenty-four lines, it is 
unlikely that he conceives himself as having just sworn not to do so. 
16 Very occasionally this type of oath is combined with a more formal expression, as in Xen. 
Oec. 20.29 (“By Zeus, I say to you, Ischomachus, and confirm it by oath [ἐπομόσας] that …”).
17 The name is almost always preceded by the definite article, unless the god is Zeus, in which 
case the article is optional. Instead of invoking a specific individual god, the swearer may invoke 
“the gods” in the plural (referring to the entire pantheon) or in the dual (referring to a specific 
pair of deities honoured in his or her cultural milieu – at Athens, where only women used this 
particular form of oath, Demeter and Persephone; at Sparta, Castor and Pollux; at Thebes, Am-
phion and Zethus).
18 Affirmative with ναὶ μὰ: Iliad 1.234; Ananius fr. 4; Theognis 1045; iamb. adesp. 57; Pind. Nem. 
11.24. (A fifth-century inscriptional text from Paphos written in the Cypriot syllabary – ICS 8.6‒7 – 
appears to have the two words in the reverse order, μὰ ναὶ.) Negative with οὐ μὰ: Iliad 1.86, 23.43; 
Odyssey 20.339; Sappho fr. 95.9; Hipponax fr. 155b. Herodotus, strikingly, in his many speeches 
and conversations never has any character use any oath-formula of this general type. This is 
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Doric (including the “Doric” of tragic lyrics), and in Arcadian, we find ναὶ (Arca-
dian νεὶ) and οὐ alone serving the same functions.19 In Boeotian, however, the 
construction is a different one, ἴττω (“let him/her know”, i.e. be witness to my 
statement) with the god as its subject;20 and this construction, with the Ionic-Attic 
form of the same verb (ἴστω), is also found in epic (including the Homeric Hymns) 
and Attic tragedy.21
In conversation, in prose texts, and in the less elevated types of poetry 
(comedy, satyr-drama, elegy and iambus), these oaths generally seem to do little 
more than give emphasis to the statements they accompany; we have given them 
the label “informal oaths”, and they will be discussed in ch. 13 below. In epic, 
melic and tragic poetry, in contrast, oaths of this type can be extremely weighty.
There are, for example, only three μά-oaths in the Iliad; all are uttered by 
Achilles, and all are particularly solemn asseverations – that he will not allow 
anyone, even Agamemnon, to lay hands on Calchas (1.86‒91); that the Achae-
ans will regret dishonouring him when, in his absence, they are falling in great 
numbers at Hector’s hands (1.234‒44);22 and that, bloody from battle as he is, he 
will not wash his face until Patroclus’ funeral has been completed (23.43‒7).
probably a stylistic decision: when another writer might have put an informal oath into a charac-
ter’s mouth, Herodotus merely says that the character said something “with an oath of affirma-
tion/denial” (ἐπομόσας or ἀπομόσας: 6.63.2, 8.5.2).
19 Affirmative with ναὶ/νεὶ: Epicharmus fr. 70 K-A; PMG 960 (probably tragic, see Sommerstein 
2010b); Eur. Ba. 534; Ar. Ach. 730, 742, 774, 779, 798 (Megarian), Wasps 1438 (Sybarite), Peace 214 
(Spartan), Lys. 81 and ten other passages (Spartan); Xen. Hell. 4.4.10 (Spartan). Negative with οὐ: 
Soph. Ant. 758‒9, OT 660, 1088, El. 1063 (all but the first of these passages are lyric); Ar. Lys. 986, 
990, 1171 (Spartan); Xen. Anab. 7.6.39, Ages. 5.5.6 (both Spartan). Both in the same document:  IG 
v(2) 343 = IPArk 15 (Orchomenus).
20 e.g, ἴττω Δεύς “let Zeus know” (= “I swear by Zeus”) (Ar. Ach. 911, Pl. Phd. 62a, Pl. Epist. 
7.345a), ἴττω Ἡρακλῆς (Ar. Ach. 860). Aristophanes also makes his Boeotian swear in the Attic 
manner with a Boeotian accent (νεὶ τὸν Ἰόλαον, Ach. 867; νεὶ τὼ σιώ [θιώ Blaydes], ib. 905); it is 
not clear whether both formula-types existed side by side in the dialect, or whether Aristophanes 
is partly “atticizing” his character’s speech in this respect (as he does in some others: cf. Colvin 
1999, 139, 141‒3, 150, 155, 158, 168, 197‒8, 206, 213, 221‒2, 232, 234, 259‒60, 297‒8).
21 Iliad 10.329, 15.36, 19.258; Odyssey 5.184, 14.158, 17.155, 19.303, 20.230; h.Dem. 259; h.Ap. 84; 
Soph. Trach. 399, Ant. 184, OC 521; Eur. IT 1077, Ion 1478, Phoen. 1677, IA 1413.
22 The first of these two oaths comes at the beginning of the debate in which occurs the great 
quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon; the second near the climax of the quarrel, just after 
Achilles, on the point of killing Agamemnon, has been restrained by Athene; they are linked by 
the phrase ἄριστος (-ον) Ἀχαιῶν “the best of the Achaeans” in the last line of each (in the same 
metrical position), a title claimed both by Agamemnon (91) and by Achilles (244). On Achilles’ 
three μά-oaths see further Griffin 1986, 52.
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Against this background, the one and only μά-oath in the Odyssey (20.339‒42) 
evidently deserves our attention. It relates to what seems to be a matter of second-
ary significance: Telemachus is denying that he is doing anything to hinder his 
mother’s remarriage. What gives it weight, though, is its context. It leads directly 
into the grisly vision and prophecy of Theoclymenus (20.345‒57); it is designedly 
misleading, for Telemachus says (though he does not swear) that his father “is, I 
suppose, either dead or wandering, far from Ithaca” (20.340) when he knows his 
father is actually in the same room with him; and, all unknown to him, in a few 
minutes his mother will in fact be announcing her intention to remarry at once 
(21.63‒79).
In the spoken verse of classical tragedy, as distinct from satyr-drama, there 
are some thirteen μά-oaths,23 and it is striking that none of them is uttered by 
a mature male; in ten cases the speaker is a woman, in two a very young man 
(Menoeceus, son of Creon, and Achilles), and for one passage (Soph. fr. 140) we 
do not know the speaker or the context. Some of these oath-expressions (such 
as Soph. El. 626 or Eur. Andr. 934) are only a little stronger than some of the 
“informal oaths” of comedy or satyr-drama (though the actual phrases used are 
always such as are not found in these genres), but others can be very powerful 
indeed, with the μά-phrase sometimes being extended to two or three lines. Those 
in Euripides’ Medea are discussed elsewhere (§6.1); one may also instance the 
passage (Aesch. Ag. 1431‒7) where Clytaemestra, standing sword in hand over the 
corpses of her husband and his concubine, publicly proclaims her own adultery:
καὶ τήνδ’ ἀκούσηι γ’ ὁρκίων ἐμῶν θέμιν·  
μὰ τὴν τέλειον τῆς ἐμῆς παιδὸς Δίκην  
Ἄτην Ἐρινύν θ’, αἷσι τόνδ’ ἔσφαξ’ ἐγώ,  
οὔ μοι φόβου μέλαθρον ἐλπὶς ἐμπατεῖ,  
ἕως ἂν αἴθηι πῦρ ἐφ’ ἑστίας ἐμῆς  
Αἴγισθος, ὡς τὸ πρόσθεν εὖ φρονῶν ἐμοί·  
οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσπὶς οὐ σμικρὰ θράσους.
You will now also hear this righteous oath I swear: by the fulfilled Justice that was due for 
my child, by Ruin and by the Fury, through whose aid I slew this man, no fearful apprehen-
23 Aesch. Ag. 1432 (Clytaemestra); Soph. El. 626 (Clytaemestra), 881 (Chrysothemis), 1240 (Elec-
tra), fr. 140; Eur. Med. 395, 1059 (both Medea), Hipp. 307 (Nurse), Andr. 934 (Hermione’s women 
friends), Ion 1528 (Creusa), Ph. 1006* (Menoeceus), IA 739* (Clytaemestra), 949 (Achilles). In the 
negative oaths in the two asterisked passages, as often in colloquial Attic, the negative force is 
carried, in an elliptical sentence, by μὰ alone, there being no (other) negative word either in the 
oath-utterance itself or anywhere in the context; this usage is not otherwise found in serious 
poetry.
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sion stalks my house, so long as the fire upon my hearth is kindled by Aegisthus and he 
remains loyal to me as hitherto; for he is an ample shield of confidence for me.
Or young Menoeceus (Eur. Phoen. 1003‒8), who has deceived his father Creon into 
believing that he is going to flee the country, when in fact he intends to commit 
sacrificial suicide in the manner necessary, according to the prophet Teiresias, if 
Thebes is to be saved:
ἐγὼ δέ, πατέρα καὶ κασίγνητον προδοὺς  
πόλιν τ’ ἐμαυτοῦ, δειλὸς ὣς ἔξω χθονὸς  
ἄπειμ’, ὅπου δ’ ἂν ζῶ, κακὸς φανήσομαι;  
μὰ τὸν μετ’ ἄστρων Ζῆν’ Ἄρη τε φοίνιον,  
ὃς τοὺς ὑπερτείλαντας ἐκ γαίας ποτὲ  
Σπαρτοὺς ἄνακτας τῆσδε γῆς ἱδρύσατο..
And shall I betray my father, brother [Haemon] and city by leaving the country like a coward, 
and be base in the eyes of all, wherever I may live? No, by Zeus who dwells among the stars, 
and by bloody Ares who once upon a time caused the Sown Men24 to rise from the ground 
and made them lords of this land!
(4) In oaths prescribed by a state (or other collective body with authority over its 
members) it is a common pattern for the swearer first to make a simple statement 
and then to convert it linguistically into an oath by specifying the god(s) being 
invoked as witnesses25 and/or by adding a self-curse in case of the statement 
being false or the promise broken (sometimes accompanied by a blessing in the 
contrary case). Several of these are quoted in extenso in S&B,26 so we here content 
ourselves with citing one, the oath of the tagoi of the Labyad phratry at Delphi.27 
This begins with a promise:
I will serve as tagos justly, according to the laws of the city and those of the Labyadae 
regarding sacrificial victims for the Apellae and regarding cakes. And I will collect and dis-
burse money for the Labyadae justly, and will not steal or do harm, by any means or device, 
24 The children of the dragon’s teeth, the five survivors of whom joined Cadmus in founding 
Thebes and became the progenitors of its leading families; Creon and his sons were descended 
from one of them.
25 Sometimes the swearer follows up the statement by saying “This is true, by [name(s) of 
god(s)]”, as in IG ii2 97, 1196, 1237.
26 See S&B 10‒11, 13‒22 (the Athenian ephebic oath), 70‒80 (the Athenian dicastic oath), 141‒3 
(a reconciliation oath from Dicaea in Chalcidice).
27 CID i 9, face A, lines 1‒18; between 424 and 350 BC. A few letters are restored in most lines, 
but the text is nowhere in any serious doubt. A later section of the same inscription (face B, lines 
21‒50) prescribes penalties for breaches of the undertaking here given.
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to the property of the Labyadae. And I will impose the oath on the tagoi for next year, as 
prescribed.
This is followed by the word hόρκος “oath”, introducing the words which made 
the promise into a sworn one; these words are:
hυπίσχομαι ποὶ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ πατρώιου· εὐορκέοντι μέμ μοι ἀγαθὰ εἴη, αἰ δ’ ἐφιορκέοιμι 
ϝεκών, τὰ κακὰ ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.
I promise this in the presence of Zeus Patroios. If I keep my oath may I have blessings, but if 
I break it willingly, may I have evils instead of the blessings.
The same pattern is also found in oaths exacted by private individuals. When 
Medea in Euripides’ play makes Aegeus swear never to banish her or surrender 
her to her enemies, and he duly does so (invoking Earth, Sun and “all the gods” 
as witnesses), she then asks him (Med. 754) “What do you pray to suffer, if you 
do not abide by this oath?” to which he replies “The fate that befalls mortals who 
are impious” (see §§1.1, 2.3). Phaedra may be making a similar demand of Hip-
polytus in a fragment of Euripides’ lost Hippolytos Kalyptomenos (Eur. fr. 435).28 
In comedy, the famous oath of sexual abstinence taken by the women in Aristo-
phanes’ Lysistrata (209‒37) is dictated by Lysistrata, line by line, to one of the 
women speaking “on behalf of all” (210), while all lay hands on the cup of wine 
which gives the oath extra sanctity (since Old Comedy assumes that the average 
woman values drink and sex above all other things whatsoever); the promise to 
be made is spelled out over ten lines, and then follow the blessing and curse 
(233‒6):29
ταῦτ’ ἐμπεδοῦσα μὲν πίοιμ’ ἐντευθενί·  
εἰ δὲ παραβαίην, ὕδατος ἐμπλῆιθ’ ἡ κύλιξ.
If I fulfil all this, may I drink from this cup; but if I should transgress it, may the cup be filled 
with water!
Speakers who volunteer oaths do not usually spell out the attached curse, but 
one who does is Ariston, the prosecutor of Conon in Demosthenes 54. He swears 
(Dem. 54.41) an oath of type (1) above “by all the gods and all the goddesses” that 
Conon is guilty of the charge against him and that he (Ariston) had been struck, 
28 The doubts of Zwierlein 2004, i 71‒77 and Hutchinson 2004, 22 as to whether this line does 
come from the exacting of an oath are answered by Talboy & Sommerstein 2006, 260 n.32.
29 Here reduced for simplicity to two lines; in the actual script, each line is spoken first by 
Lysistrata and then repeated by the other woman.
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had been cut in the lip so as to need stitches, and had been the victim of hybris; 
and he follows it with a double prayer of a kind common in official oaths:
καὶ εἰ μὲν εὐορκῶ, πολλά μοι ἀγαθὰ γένοιτο καὶ μηδέποτ’ αὖθις τοιοῦτο μηδὲν πάθοιμι, εἰ δ’ 
ἐπιορκῶ, ἐξώλης ἀπολοίμην αὐτὸς καὶ εἴ τί μοι ἔστιν ἢ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι.
And if I am swearing truthfully, may I have many blessings, and may nothing of the same 
kind ever happen to me again; but if I am swearing falsely, then may I perish in utter destruc-
tion, I and all that I have now or will have in the future.
(5) The regular formulae for swearing tend to be varied considerably in serious 
poetry, and Bacchylides and Pindar in particular, when they make sworn state-
ments in their own names (as they not infrequently do),30 can resort to some 
rather baroque devices to avoid using straightforward expressions that might 
sound prosaic. Thus we find in Pindar expressions like αὐδάσομαι ἐνόρκιον 
λόγον ἀλαθεῖ νόωι “I shall utter a word on oath with truthful heart” (Olymp. 2.92), 
μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμόσσαις τοῦτό γε οἱ σαφέως μαρτυρήσω “I shall swear a great oath 
and testify this much clearly for him” (Olymp. 6.21), or ἀλαθής τέ μοι ἐξορκος 
ἑπέσσεται ... ἁδύγλωσσος βοά “and my truthful, sworn, sweet-tongued cry will be 
added” (Olymp. 13.98‒100); sometimes even the personality of the swearer (the 
“poetic I”) is suppressed, as in Olymp. 11.4‒6:
εἰ δὲ σὺν πόνωι τις εὖ πράσσοι, μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι  
ὑστέρων ἀρχὰ λόγων  
τέλλεται καὶ πιστὸν ὅρκιον μεγάλαις ἀρεταῖς.
If toil should bring a man success, then his great achievements make sweet-voiced songs 
and sworn pledges arise, on which to found his future reputation.
Bacchylides has what seems to be a formula of his own for this purpose: twice 
(5.42, 8.19) he makes a statement about his honorand into an oath by saying that 
he utters it “resting (my hand) on the earth” (cf. Iliad 14.272).
Oaths of all these forms can invoke any god, goddess or (less often) hero, or 
any sacred or cherished object (or even abstraction, like “the sufferings of my 
father” in Odyssey 20.339); for details, see especially §5.3 and ch.13.
30 See MacLachlan 2007. Most of the statements concerned are laudatory ones about the hon-
orand of the ode or his family.
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5.2 The “Sophoclean” oath
I.C. Torrance
Referring to a serious statement as something sworn when it has not been may 
not seem particularly odd to the modern ear, but to the ancient Greeks, as we 
have seen, an oath was a binding and divinely sanctioned contract and the ritual 
language used to take an oath was markedly different from that used in a mere 
assertion, vow, or promise. Within our corpus of sources there are only a handful 
of cases in which an unsworn statement is treated as an oath, and these occur 
almost exclusively in Sophocles. For that reason the term “Sophoclean oath” has 
suggested itself to designate this particular use of oath-language, but this does 
not mean that oaths in their traditional form are not also important in Sophocles. 
We will look briefly at oaths in Sophocles in a general sense in order to contex-
tualize his very particular use of “Sophoclean” oaths in five of his extant plays, 
each of which will then be discussed in turn. In conclusion we will examine the 
only two other examples of “Sophoclean” oath-language I have found in later 
authors, one in Aristophanes, which I argue is a parody of Sophocles’ technique, 
and one in Isocrates where “Sophoclean” oath-language is exploited for rhetori-
cal purposes.31
Referring retroactively to an unsworn agreement or statement as an oath 
adds the implications of a religious contract, with divine penalties for perjury, 
to a previously non-binding agreement. Doing so, then, would not seem particu-
larly desirable for someone referring to their own previous statement. Neverthe-
less, this happens in three Sophoclean plays (Ajax, Antigone, Oedipus at Colonus). 
Moreover in two Sophoclean dramas (Philoctetes and Oedipus at Colonus), it is 
explicitly mentioned that an oath is not required and that a pledge will suffice, 
and yet after the pledge has been made, the agreement is nevertheless referred 
to as an oath. Finally, none of the characters accused by others of swearing an 
oath when none had been sworn (as happens in Ajax, Philoctetes and Women of 
Trachis) denies the erroneous accusation. I will argue that “Sophoclean” oaths 
engage the audience in a process of critical assessment similar to other ambigu-
31 One passage in the Iliad (2.339) where Nestor refers to “oaths” without any clear antecedent 
is the only possible example I have found of a “Sophoclean” oath that would pre-date Sopho-
cles. In the next chapter (pp. 145‒6) I discuss how Nestor might be recasting a “promise” men-
tioned by Odysseus in the previous speech as an oath, in a pattern which would foreshadow the 
“Sophoclean” oath. However, I conclude that the mention of libations in connection with these 
“oaths” strongly suggests a specific reference to the oath of Helen’s suitors, so the passage will 
not feature in our current discussion.
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ous or riddling language in Sophocles. “Sophoclean” oaths work within the fabric 
of the broader language of oaths in each tragedy and contribute to our under-
standing of the characters and the relationships between them.
As elsewhere in Greek literature, characters in Sophocles tend to be careful 
to avoid perjury (the exception, Lichas in Women of Trachis, will be discussed 
below).32 In Sophocles’ Electra, Orestes instructs the paidagōgos to offer an oath 
in reporting his fictitious death in a chariot accident at the Pythian games (El. 
47‒50), but in spite of narrating an elaborate tale of Orestes’ alleged death the 
paidagōgos never offers his oath. Hirzel suggested that the paidagōgos does not 
swear the oath because Clytaemestra readily believes him, and that he might even 
be imagined as swearing the oath off-stage after he has gone into the palace with 
Clytaemestra.33 But these suggestions ignore the fact that it is in the paidagōgos’ 
own interests not to perjure himself. Moreover oaths are important elsewhere in 
Electra and seem especially marked in their language. All sworn oaths in Electra 
are informal, and the play contains the highest number of informal oaths in Greek 
tragedy.34 Clytaemestra swears by Artemis (μὰ τὴν δέσποιναν Ἄρτεμιν) that Electra 
will not escape punishment for her insolence when Aegisthus returns (El. 626‒7). 
Chrysothemis swears by the ancestral hearth (μὰ τὴν πατρώιαν ἑστίαν) that she 
is not mocking when she says that Orestes has returned (El. 881‒2). Electra swears 
by the ever-unwedded goddess, i.e. Artemis, (μὰ τὰν θεὰν τὰν ἀεὶ ἀδμήταν) that 
she is not afraid of those in the house (El. 1239‒42). The informal oath formula οὐ 
+ accusative, used only by Sophocles among the tragedians, also occurs in Electra 
when the chorus swear by the lightning of Zeus and heavenly Themis (El. 1063‒4: 
οὐ τὰν Διὸς ἀστραπὰν | καὶ τὰν ούρανίαν Θέμιν). However, it is the concentra-
tion of examples of the μά formula that suggests that the language is especially 
marked in this play.35 Electra’s oath by Artemis mirrors her mother’s earlier oath 
32 A fragment of Sophocles’ Colchian Women, a play of unknown date, contains one character 
asking another if he swears to do a favour in return (fr. 339). This could have been Medea asking 
Jason for an oath of guarantee, an oath which Jason is repeatedly said to have broken in Eurip-
ides’ Medea. It is impossible to say, however, whether perjury of any kind featured in Colchian 
Women. On clever manipulation of oath-language used to avoid perjury in Greek culture see ch. 
10, and see ch. 12 for examples of perjury and associated punishments. 
33 Hirzel 1902, 72 n.3.
34 Informal oaths are oaths which do not contain a verb of swearing or an explicit imprecation 
but which are nevertheless oath statements, normally introduced by μά or νή. See Sommerstein 
2007b, 125, and ch. 1 and 13 in this volume.
35 The only other example of the μά formula in Sophoclean tragedy comes from Atreus (fr. 140). 
The μά formula features elsewhere in tragedy but never in this concentration (see §5.1, pp. 82‒3).
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invoking the same goddess, as she becomes more and more like Clytaemestra.36 
Overall, there may be an evocation of Homer. Griffin noted that the μά formula is 
used only three times in the Iliad, and always by Achilles, marking “the unique 
intensity of his temperament and his speech”, and that Telemachus’ one use of 
the formula in the Odyssey is modelled on the language and gestures of Achilles.37 
The μά formula in Electra may have been used to suggest a similar intensity of 
purpose in these female characters and certainly demonstrates that there is no 
need for us to imagine characters swearing oaths off-stage.
The meaning of an oath-statement made in Sophocles can sometimes be 
ambiguous, but it tends not to be duplicitous. In Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus 
swears on oath that he endured the worst things willingly (ἑκὼν μέν) but not 
by his own choice (τούτων δ᾽ αὐθαίρετον οὐδέν; OC 521‒3).38 The implication of 
this apparently paradoxical statement seems to be that by not committing suicide 
he “endured” his crimes “willingly”, but that none of those crimes were of his 
own choosing (since he committed them in ignorance). It is conceivable that a 
female character used duplicitous language in an oath and was later discovered 
to have done so in an unidentified Sophoclean play, from which a fragment sur-
vives stating “I write the oaths of a woman in water” (fr. 811), but this is ultimately 
impossible to ascertain. Perhaps the speaker is rejecting a woman’s offer of an 
oath. In any case it is clearly a misogynistic sentiment. The line was remembered 
and parodied by the fourth-century comic poet Xenarchus, exploiting the stereo-
typical comic association of women and wine, with the version “I write the oath 
of a woman in wine” (Xenarchus fr. 6).39
Oaths in Sophocles can also function as a means of reassuring a philos who 
has become potentially hostile. This is particularly apparent in Oedipus Tyran-
nus, where most of the oath references in the play relate to characters attempting 
to appease Oedipus as he grows ever more paranoid. Creon swears (by means 
of self-imprecation) that he has not been plotting against Oedipus (OT 644‒5), 
and Jocasta and the chorus beg Oedipus to take heed of the oath (OT 647, 653). 
36 See Goldhill 2012, 74‒8 on repetition of character from Clytaemestra to Electra in this play. 
37 Griffin 1986, 52 (see also §5.1, p. 82).
38 Jebb 2004 [1900] 90 objected to Bothe’s emendation of ἑκών “willingly” for the metrically 
incorrect ἄκων “unwillingly”, but the complex expression is at home in Sophoclean language 
and ἑκών is adopted by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990, 379. 
39 Cf. also Philonides fr. 7, discussed in ch. 11 (pp. 288‒9), and Catullus 70.3‒4. Women’s oaths 
are untrustworthy in a different context at Sophocles fr. 932. There a woman is said to flee the bit-
ter pain of childbirth through oaths, but gets caught in the same net again, vanquished by desire. 
Presumably this means that the pain of childbirth makes a woman swear off sexual intercourse, 
but she subsequently breaks this oath once the pains have been forgotten.
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The chorus members also swear by self-imprecation that they are not seeking the 
death of Oedipus or his exile from the land (OT 660‒2).40 We will have more to 
say concerning oaths and relationships between friends and enemies when we 
discuss “Sophoclean” oaths in Philoctetes. Certainly it is more common to find 
oaths taken between enemies or disputing parties.41 Such is the case for the oath 
of Helen’s suitors, which (as we saw in ch. 3) can be categorized as a “mythologi-
cal” or “aetiological” oath. Achilles, as we discussed, was one of the leaders in 
the Trojan War who had not sworn the oath and the issue of Achilles’ position 
outside the group of suitors seems to have been important in Sophocles’ Gather-
ing of the Achaeans (Achaiōn Syllogos), where someone conducts a roll-call from 
an inscribed tablet of whoever “swore together” (ξυνώμοσεν) but is not present 
(fr. 144). Sommerstein, who identifies this play with Syndeipnoi, shows that this 
tablet in all likelihood contained a list of suitors, and that the purpose of using 
this for the roll-call was to avoid a public shaming of Achilles, who had not yet 
arrived. Since his name was not on the list, it would not have been called.42 Aristo-
tle finds it worthy of particular praise that Achilles took part in the Trojan expedi-
tion although he was very young and not bound by oath (Rhetoric 1396b17). After 
his death, Achilles is replaced by his son Neoptolemus, who is similarly free from 
compulsion to remain with the expedition. This fact is exploited by Odysseus in 
Sophocles’ Philoctetes when he uses Neoptolemus to persuade Philoctetes that 
he has left Troy and can bring him home. “You sailed under oath to no one, nor 
under compulsion, nor were you part of the first fleet”, says Odysseus to Neop-
tolemus (Phil. 72‒3). The oath of Helen’s suitors is also referenced in Ajax where 
Teucer balks at Menelaus, stressing that Ajax went to Troy not for the sake of 
Menelaus or his wife but “because of the oaths by which he was solemnly bound” 
(1113). Oaths in Sophocles, as we can see, are taken very seriously. The chorus in 
Antigone praise the excellence of the man who upholds “the sworn justice of the 
gods” (Ant. 369: θεῶν τ᾽ ἔνορκον δίκαν), and a character in Sophocles’ Oenomaus 
is careful because an oath has been added to a promise (fr. *472).43 It is striking, 
40 The only other oath in the OT is the oath sworn by Oedipus early in the play (249‒51), stating 
that the killer of Laius is not living in the house with his knowledge, similar to the plaintiff’s 
exculpatory oath in Athenian homicide trials. For a defence of the text and a sensitive analysis of 
its implications and ambiguities, see Carawan 1999. As Carawan points out (206‒7), the qualifi-
cation of knowledge releases Oedipus from the danger of perjury, since the killer of Laius is living 
in his house. Edmunds 2012 highlights the importance of curse language in Oedipus’ speech here 
and demonstrates that it is central to the Oedipus myth.
41 See further ch. 4 in this volume and S&B ch. 10 and 11.
42 See Sommerstein 2006a, 120‒2.
43 Sommerstein and Talboy 2012, 105 argue that these lines are spoken by Hippodameia to Myr-
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then, that Sophocles repeatedly uses oath-language to refer to unsworn state-
ments in a manner unparalleled in any other author.
“Sophoclean” oaths generally occur in tragedies where oaths form an impor-
tant network of language. These oaths therefore function within the broader pat-
terns of oath-language in the relevant plays. We begin our discussion with Women 
of Trachis, since this contains the widest variety of oath-language, including a 
perjury, a probable lie about an oath, and a blind oath, as well as a “Sophoclean” 
oath. Oath-language in Women of Trachis clusters around the figures of Lichas 
and Iole and is directly linked to the deceptions and miscommunications of the 
tragedy. Next we address Philoctetes, another play in which oath-language is con-
nected with deception and miscommunication. In this case the “Sophoclean” 
oath is part of a series of oaths reflecting the shifting relationships of friendship 
and enmity in the drama. The power dynamics between Oedipus and Theseus 
in Oedipus at Colonus are also expressed in part through “Sophoclean” oath-
language. It is remarkable that both these plays (Phil. and OC) refer to unsworn 
statements as oaths in spite of the fact that the person to whom the unsworn 
pledge was made had explicitly stated that an oath is not required. Most peculiar, 
however, is the “Sophoclean” oath of the Guard in Antigone in which he effec-
tively casts himself as a perjurer by referring to an unsworn statement as an oath 
which he has broken. Since oaths in Antigone are all sworn by Creon, however, 
I argue that the Guard’s use of oath-language is designed to make the audience 
reflect on Creon’s. In the final tragedy to be discussed, Ajax, “Sophoclean” oaths 
feature at significant moments rather than being part of a larger nexus of oath-
language. Within each play, “Sophoclean” oaths help to guide audience response 
to important thematic issues.
Oath-language in Women of Trachis revolves to a great extent around the figure 
of Heracles’ herald Lichas, the one actual perjurer in Sophocles. His perjury is 
committed when he swears by Zeus (Trach. 399: ἴστω μέγας Ζεύς) that he will tell 
Deianeira the truth, but then claims that he is unable to say who are the parents 
of the young captive woman (Iole), when their identity is, in fact, well known to 
him. It would just about be possible to argue that “I cannot say” (401: οὐκ ἔχω 
λέγειν) is not strictly speaking a lie if, for example, Heracles had asked Lichas 
not to tell Deianeira about Iole. Lichas does not say “I do not know”, but when 
his lies are exposed by the Messenger, Lichas admits (with an extra metrum ναί) 
that he did announce to the citizens in the middle of the agora that the girl was 
Iole, daughter of Eurytus (419‒24). He tries to make the argument that his state-
tilus, explaining why she is asking him to swear to carry out the plan of sabotaging Oenomaus’ 
chariot and/or to keep it secret.
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ment was based on hearsay, which is not the same as giving a definite account 
(425‒6). However, when the Messenger asks him whether or not he stated on oath 
(ἐπώμοτος λέγων) that he was bringing the girl as a wife for Heracles (427‒8), 
Lichas becomes flustered. “I said wife?” (429) he exclaims in outrage,44 but he 
does not deny that he did so.45 It seems to be the case that Lichas did swear on 
oath that he was bringing Iole as Heracles’ wife, further evidence that he knows 
exactly who she is and who her parents are. More damning still, in relation to 
Lichas’ perjury, is the revelation that Heracles had not asked Lichas to conceal or 
deny his passion for the girl (479‒80). Clearly, then, Lichas’ claim on oath, that he 
“cannot say” who the girl’s parents are, is entirely false.
The Messenger also reveals that Lichas stated, in the same speech, that the 
city of Eurytus was subdued because of Heracles’ desire for the girl (431‒2). This 
casts doubt on Lichas’ earlier report that Heracles attacked the city of Eurytus 
because “he swore solemnly, putting himself under oath” (255: ὅρκον αὑτῷ 
προσβαλὼν διώμοσεν) that he would enslave the man who caused his slavery, as 
well as his wife and child, holding Eurytus responsible (254‒61).46 The reported 
oath is especially strong since it uses the compound verb διόμνυμι “to swear sol-
emnly”, normally used in homicide courts such as the Areopagus, as well as the 
noun ὅρκος “oath”.47 Bruce Heiden, in his careful analysis of this scene, demon-
strates that, if Heracles did swear this oath (and Heiden assumes he did), he actu-
ally fails to fulfill it, since he does not enslave Eurytus but kills him and attacks his 
entire city.48 Heiden also shows, however, that Lichas’ speech is full of ambiguous 
language intended to mask Heracles’ true motivation of capturing Iole, for whom 
he has conceived a desperate passion.49 Given that perjurers are always punished 
with death or the extinction of their family line in Greek tragedy, as discussed 
above, it is unlikely that Heracles swore this oath reported by Lichas, since the 
44 The term is the same used to describe Deianeira as wife of Heracles (406, 650), cf. Segal 1981, 
75.
45 Lichas also uses corrupted marriage language interwoven with language of corrupted sacri-
fice when he addresses Deianeira, see Segal 1981, 66.
46 Heiden 1989, 54‒5 notes that when Lichas says Heracles swore to enslave Eurytus ξὺν παιδὶ 
καὶ γυναικὶ (257), this might refer only to Iole, i.e. “with his child, indeed a woman” rather than 
“with his child and his wife”, depending on whether καί is taken as a conjunction or as an ad-
verb. Cf. Winnington-Ingram 1980, 82, who discusses how Lichas lies about the motive for Hera-
cles’ attack on Eurytus, noting that his lust for Iole is the sole cause of the war.
47 On the diōmosiai, oaths taken by speakers in homicide trials, see S&B, 111‒15. Fletcher 2012, 
82 n.38 observes that Sophocles is the only tragedian to use the verb διόμνυμι.
48 Heiden 1989, 55.
49 Heiden 1989, 54‒7.
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known apotheosis of Heracles after his death is incompatible with divine pun-
ishment for perjury.50 Rather, it seems to be part of Lichas’ manipulation of the 
facts in presenting them to Deianeira. If Heracles had indeed put himself under 
oath, then the campaign against Oechalia is an obligation he must fulfil. If there 
is no oath, however, then Heracles freely chooses to engage in the campaign. The 
latter scenario would wound Deianeira more deeply once she has discovered that 
Heracles’ passion for Iole was the true reason for the campaign, which had con-
tributed to Heracles’ prolonged absence. Lichas says that he feigned ignorance 
of the girl’s identity in order to spare Deianeira’s feelings (Trach. 481‒3). It seems 
that the oath story, too, was fabricated for the same purpose since Lichas’ use of 
oath-language is remarkably lax throughout, and he later admits that a terrible 
desire for Iole came upon Heracles “one day” (476) and that he conquered the city 
“for her sake” (477). This truth seems incompatible with the oath version of com-
pulsion. Fletcher suggests that Lichas only lies about the reasons for Heracles’ 
oath, but the language used by Lichas when he finally reveals the truth does not 
mention an oath at all, which implies that he lied about the oath itself. Fletcher 
is right, however, to stress that lying about an oath is not perjury.51 Nevertheless, 
Lichas is shown first of all to be a liar, and then to be a perjurer in at least one 
instance. In the one unequivocal example of perjury, Lichas had invoked great 
Zeus as his witness (399). He will meet his end fittingly at the sacred grove of Zeus 
at Mount Cenaeum, killed by the son of Zeus, Heracles, who hurls him off the cliff 
face by the ankle after he delivers the poisoned robe from Deianeira (750‒82). His 
brain pours out from his hair and his head is shattered (781‒2).52 Lichas is one of 
the small number of tragic perjurers whose fates can be read as a consequence of 
their perjury.53
50 See §12.1 on divine responses to perjury.
51 Fletcher 2012, 82. 
52 Fletcher 2012, 84 notes the parallel between the description of Lichas’ brain spilling out and 
the fate specified for those who would break the truce between the Trojans and the Greeks in the 
Iliad, namely that their brains be spilled on the ground and those of their sons, and that their 
wives should be the spoil of others (3.300‒1). Heiden 1989, 72 is wrong, I think, to dismiss the 
oath by Zeus as being of “purely rhetorical utility”.
53 Pace Hall 2009, 72 who suggests that Lichas, like Iphitus who suffers a similar death at the 
hands of Heracles, is “guilty of no crimes”, though she is right to stress the parallels between the 
deaths of the two men. The fate of Jason in Euripides’ Medea can similarly be read as resulting 
from his perjury (see pp. 133‒4); see also §12.2, p. 307, on the deaths of Parthenopaeus in Aeschy-
lus’ Seven against Thebes, Capaneus in Euripides’ Suppliant Women, and Eteocles in Phoenician 
Women.
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Charles Segal observed that “Lichas’ lie, the initial source of infection in the 
realm of logos, introduces also the infection in the realm of trust, pistis”,54 and 
that this corruption of pistis “is not entirely made good in the exchange between 
father and son”, because “the boy is taken aback by the need for a formal oath”.55 
In fact he is taken aback by what he perceives to be an “excessive pledge” (Trach. 
1182), even before Heracles demands a blind oath.56 Like Hippolytus in Euripides, 
Hyllus is here tricked into agreeing to unknown courses of action. The oath will 
compel him to follow Heracles’ orders of building a funeral pyre for his father’s 
living body and marrying Iole against his will (1185‒1258). Heracles extracts a 
blind oath because he knows that Hyllus would refuse these requests under any 
other conditions. In spite of his oath, Hyllus is so opposed to his father’s instruc-
tions that Heracles reminds him of the curse that awaits him should he disobey 
(1201‒2, 1239‒40) and reasserts his order concerning Iole with an oath of his own 
(1248).57
We now come to the one oath left out of the discussion so far, the “Sopho-
clean” oath. This too is connected with Lichas’ knowledge of Iole’s identity and 
takes place before his perjury. The identity of the captive women is a concern for 
Deianeira from their first appearance. She asks Lichas who they are (Trach. 242) 
but he does not answer the question. Deianeira then notices Iole, guessing that 
she is noble, and asks Lichas directly who she is and who her parents are (307‒11). 
Lichas replies with a question: “How should I know?” (314). Deianeira persists, 
asking Lichas if she comes from the royal house and whether Eurytus had any 
children (316). Again Lichas claims he does not know. Had Lichas not learned her 




56 Earlier in the play, the term pistis clusters around Deianeira’s decision to send Heracles the 
anointed robe. She wonders whether it is a good idea and the chorus advise her to go ahead “if 
there is trust (pistis) in actions” (Trach. 588), to which she responds that she has trust to the ex-
tent that she believes it (590). As Hall 2009, 70‒1 stresses, the exchange indicates that Deianeira 
has no certain knowledge of how the potion will work. Lichas then gives his “assurance” (pistin) 
that he will bring the robe to Heracles (623). So pistis is very much infected in this drama, as 
Segal suggests.
57 Winnington-Ingram 1980, 84 discusses Heracles’ self-centred and ruthless attitude in his re-
lationships, suggesting that he insists on Hyllus marrying Iole because “he can regard Hyllus in 
no other light than as an extension of his own individuality.” Cf. also Segal 1981, 103 and Heiden 
1989, 70.
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It is clear that Deianeira makes a concerted effort to discover Iole’s iden-
tity from Lichas, to no avail. When the Messenger arrives, revealing that Lichas’ 
report is full of falsehoods, Deianeira realizes that her intuition of Iole’s noble 
blood was correct. In a tone which is “bitterly ironical”,58 she asks (Trach. 378‒9): 
“Nameless, then, is she, as the one who brought her solemnly swore (διώμνυτο), 
she who is so dazzling in face and form?” The question is rhetorical, but the 
Messenger answers nonetheless, revealing that she is the daughter of Eurytus, 
called Iole, adding a sarcastic remark about Lichas’ failure to mention her origins 
“because he had made no inquiries” (382). As Easterling comments, the Mes-
senger’s point is that no one would have needed to inquire since everyone must 
have known who Iole was.59 Deianeira’s language, however, is an example of a 
“Sophoclean” oath, since Lichas had not sworn anything on oath in the earlier 
scene although he had vehemently denied any knowledge of the girl’s identity. 
Fletcher suggests that “Deianeira selects her vocabulary as a rhetorical ploy to 
extract the truth”,60 but Lichas is not present at this point and Deianeira hardly 
has any need to extract the truth from the Messenger, who has already been telling 
her the truth and revealing Lichas’ lies over the course of some forty lines. Rather, 
the oath-language emphasizes the seriousness of Lichas’ deception in Deianeira’s 
eyes. As far as she is concerned, it is as if Lichas had lied on oath. Moreover, the 
suggestion of perjury prefigures Lichas’ actual perjury just twenty lines later,61 
when Lichas proves himself willing to lie on oath regarding Iole’s identity, thus 
validating Deianeira’s assessment of his deception.
Oaths and deception are inextricably linked in the first part of the tragedy, 
not only through Lichas’ own statements but also through his questionable report 
concerning Heracles’ oath to enslave Eurytus and his family. The atmosphere of 
confusion created as a result plays on Deianeira’s mind. She becomes more and 
more concerned that she has lost the love of Heracles until she decides to send 
him the robe laced with a “love” potion, as she believes, realizing only too late 
that it is a potion of death.62 Indeed Iole remains a figure at the centre of oath-lan-
guage even at the end of the tragedy, since the blind oath demanded by the dying 
Heracles from Hyllus binds Hyllus to take Iole as his wife against his own wishes, 
58 Easterling 1982, ad 375‒9.
59 Easterling 1982, ad 381‒2.
60 Fletcher 2012, 82.
61 Also noticed by Fletcher 2012, 83.
62 Hall 2009, 70‒1 shows that Deianeira’s deliberation concerning use of the potion is inter-
rupted by the arrival of Lichas, right at the very moment when the chorus members have advised 
her to test it out before using it.
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and the “Sophoclean” oath about Iole’s identity helps to manipulate audience 
sympathy in favour of Deianeira.
Another tragedy in which different and often conflicting layers of commu-
nication are central to the development of events is Philoctetes, and again oaths 
play an important role in the language of the drama. The tragedy’s setting at a 
“cave with two mouths” (Phil. 16) is emblematic of the dual versions of events 
which transpire during the play,63 where it is unclear, in varying degrees, which 
version of a communication is true.64 A further motif that is central to this play is 
the dichotomy between force and deception in relation to securing the assistance 
of Philoctetes and his bow. Neoptolemus originally wants to take Philoctetes by 
force, not by trickery (Phil. 90‒1). In this respect he is very much his father’s son, 
a point that is emphasized not only with frequent references to him by his patro-
nymic as the son of Achilles,65 but also through the report that the Greek army had 
been so overwhelmed by his likeness to the dead Achilles that they “swore” they 
were seeing him alive again (357‒8).66 Odysseus insists, however, that Philoctetes 
must be taken by deception (101). When Neoptolemus protests that persuading 
Philoctetes would be better than deceiving him (102), Odysseus stands firm: “He 
will not be persuaded; and you cannot take him by force” (103). The difficulty in 
taking him by force is that he has unerring arrows (104‒5). Neoptolemus strongly 
resists using deception, concerned that it is shameful (106‒20), but ultimately 
relents and agrees to Odysseus’ plan (121‒2).
Early in the play, then, Neoptolemus is associated with force and open per-
suasion, and Odysseus with deception and underhanded persuasion. It seems 
Odysseus had told Neoptolemus that completing this mission would make him 
Troy’s conqueror (Phil. 114). Neoptolemus questions him about this after Odys-
seus’ statement that only the arrows from the bow of Philoctetes can take Troy. 
Odysseus argues that Neoptolemus and the arrows are inseparable from each 
other (115) and that by undertaking the task Neoptolemus will win two “prizes”, 
namely being called both wise and noble (119). Neoptolemus thus succumbs to 
63 Cf. Ringer 1998, 104.
64 Cf. Winnington-Ingram 1980, 281: “Information is withheld and released…There are false 
starts and, above all, false endings, so that the audience is kept in a state of uncertainty, never 
quite sure what the characters will do or even in some cases what they are trying to do.” Segal 
1981, 328‒61 discusses the problems of communication in this play, and see also Ringer 1998, 
101‒25 on the tensions between illusion and reality in Philoctetes.
65 Neoptolemus is called the son of Achilles at Phil. 4, 50, 57, 240‒1, 260, 364, 542, 940, 1066, 
1220‒1, 1237, 1298, 1312, 1433.
66 The statement is metaphorically true in the sense that a dead man lives on through his 
children.
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Odysseus’ manipulation. This contrast between Odysseus the deceiver and the 
forceful Neoptolemus becomes confused, however, as the drama progresses. 
Neoptolemus, for example, refers to Odysseus in his exchange with Philoctetes 
with the Homeric phrase Ὀδυσσέως βία “the force of Odysseus” (314, 321), as does 
the False Merchant (592). Moreover, Neoptolemus proves to be rather skilled in 
deceptive rhetoric. On his own initiative, he claims that he has been wounded, 
or more literally “maimed” (330: ἐξελωβήθην), by Odysseus and the Atreidae, 
thus appealing to Philoctetes not only as a fellow enemy of Odysseus but also as 
a fellow cripple, with language which Philoctetes later uses to describe himself 
(1103: λωβατός).67
The issue becomes muddled further in the report of the False Merchant. He is 
sent by Odysseus, since Neoptolemus seemed to be tarrying (Phil. 126‒31), but his 
account does not quite tally with what Odysseus had previously instructed. The 
False Merchant claims that Odysseus and Diomedes solemnly swore (διώμοτοι) 
to bring Philoctetes back to Troy by persuasion or by brute force and that all the 
Achaeans heard Odysseus saying this clearly (592‒6). Odysseus thought he could 
take Philoctetes as a willing accessory (617), but that if Philoctetes refused to 
come with him, he would take him against his will (618). According to the False 
Merchant, he added a self-imprecation, saying that, if he failed, he would allow 
anyone who desired it to cut off his head (618‒21). This self-imprecation is not an 
oath since the punishment invited is human and not divine, but it is nevertheless 
interesting to compare Od. 16.99‒104, where Odysseus makes a similar, though 
more serious, self-imprecation, which does count as an oath. Disguised as the 
Cretan he states that his head should be cut from his shoulders (by an unspeci-
fied power) if he does not become a plague on the suitors. That is a moment in 
which Odysseus unwittingly betrays his true identity and lets the disguise as the 
Cretan slip. Did Sophocles have this passage in mind?68 Is the False Merchant 
reporting Odysseus’ true sentiments and expressions, or is this another deceptive 
fabrication? According to the False Merchant’s account of Helenus’ prophecy, this 
stated only that Philoctetes should be persuaded by speech to come to Troy (Phil. 
612).69
67 Heath 1999, 147 points to a different but connected challenge to the consistency of Odys-
seus’ characterization in this play when he demonstrates that the language Odysseus uses un-
dermines his moral position, thus diluting the nature of Odysseus’ skills of persuasion.
68 Segal 1972, 169 compares the two passages, suggesting that “[b]oth situations are of great 
emotional agitation and dramatic power”.
69 Cf. Winnington-Ingram 1980, 280 “What did the prophet say?”, and 292 “the ‘Merchant’ tells 
lies”, but “the lines sound like a genuine prophecy and stick in the mind….It is preposterous to 
suppose that it is not authentic, being confirmed by Heracles”. 
 5.2 The “Sophoclean” oath   97
If the prophecy stated that Philoctetes should be persuaded, then why do 
Odysseus and Diomedes allegedly swear an oath to take him by persuasion or by 
force? Did Odysseus really think he could take Philoctetes as a willing accessory? 
More significantly, why does Odysseus, at the beginning of the play, propose 
deceit as the only option, adamantly rejecting persuasion and force as means 
to get Philoctetes back to Troy, if these were the very strategies he had sworn to 
implement? There are no easy answers to these questions, but it is quite possible, 
indeed probable, that we should understand the False Merchant to be lying about 
the oaths sworn by Odysseus in order to throw Philoctetes off the scent of deceit. 
It would be strange for Odysseus and Diomedes to swear an oath that did not 
conform to the specific terms of the prophecy. We saw in our discussion above 
how Lichas probably lied about an oath sworn by Heracles in Women of Trachis. 
At the same time, it is also possible that Odysseus fears the deceit has failed and 
sends the False Merchant to plant new suggestions for Neoptolemus to pursue 
his original intentions of overcoming Philoctetes by force or by open persuasion. 
The message essentially becomes to subdue him by any means. In the end, Neop-
tolemus will come clean about the deception (Phil. 896‒926) and will try unsuc-
cessfully to persuade Philoctetes to come to Troy, ultimately agreeing to take him 
home instead (1222‒1407). It will take the appearance of Heracles and a divine 
command to change Philoctetes’ mind about going to Troy (1409‒51), but one 
thing we can say for sure about the False Merchant speech is that it raises ques-
tions about oaths and reported oaths. What was sworn and by whom? Was there 
an oath at all, or is the report of one merely a fabrication? Moreover, the speech as 
a whole is purposely designed to add an additional layer of ambiguity to events.70
Oliver Taplin observed that this “is a play of relationships and communi-
cation, not of great deeds”,71 and it is in the context of communication and the 
developing relationship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus that we should 
understand the “Sophoclean” oath in this tragedy, namely the presentation of an 
unsworn pledge as an oath. Philoctetes, convinced that Neoptolemus is his friend 
and an enemy of Odysseus and the Atreidae, believes early on in their exchange 
that Neoptolemus is offering to bring him home, since he agrees to take him on 
his ship (Phil. 527) and has said he is sailing for Scyros (381). Neoptolemus prays 
ambiguously that their voyage may be prosperous and rapid to wherever god 
thinks right and their mission lies (779‒81), but before they can leave, Philoctetes 
70 Easterling 1983, 218 neatly summarizes the various ambiguities of characters’ motivations in 
this play.
71 Taplin 1971, 26. For Podlecki 1966, 233, the play is “a case study in the failure of communica-
tion”.
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is overcome by a fit of pain. Afraid that Neoptolemus will leave him on the island, 
Philoctetes asks for his word that he will remain. “I do not think it worthy to put 
you under oath”, he says (811); “give me your hand as a pledge” (813). By specifi-
cally not requesting an oath in spite of his vulnerable position, Philoctetes dem-
onstrates that he trusts Neoptolemus. Simon Goldhill discusses the intricacies of 
this scene.72 He notes that the particles μήν and γε indicate that Philoctetes would 
prefer an oath but feels it is inappropriate to ask. Goldhill also draws attention to 
the process of Neoptolemus’ change of heart, marked by the word πάλαι “long 
since”, which “invites an audience to think back over time and re-play Neoptol-
emus’ reactions”.73
Scholars have noted that the hand-clasp between Neoptolemus and 
Philoctetes, a symbol of trust and friendship, comes at the very moment when 
Philoctetes is most deceived.74 Goldhill observes how the dialogue in the play then 
“immediately collapses into a broken pattern of half and third lines, and incoher-
ent miscomprehension and demand (814‒18)”.75 Shortly thereafter, Neoptolemus 
decides he is acting against his nature by deceiving Philoctetes and decides to 
come clean (897ff.) The oathless pledge requested by Philoctetes, and Philoctetes 
trusting Neoptolemus with his bow, are actions that must weigh on Neoptole-
mus’ conscience in the process of his decision to reject deception. Once the truth 
has been revealed, and Neoptolemus refuses to restore his bow, Philoctetes is 
enraged. He appeals to the wilderness around him lamenting his treatment at the 
hands of the son of Achilles who “swore” (ὀμόσας) to bring him home (941) and 
offered his right hand as pledge (942). It is remarkable that Philoctetes charges 
Neoptolemus with having sworn the pledge when the absence of an oath was 
underlined, just 130 lines previously.76 It is also noteworthy that Neoptolemus 
does not defend himself against this unfounded accusation.
The language of oaths has been manipulated in this sequence in order to 
underline Philoctetes’ retrospective reconfiguration of his relationship with Neop-
tolemus. Now that Philoctetes has realized Neoptolemus is his enemy, he treats 
the oathless pledge he received from a friend as the sworn statement he would 
72 Goldhill 2012, 68‒71.
73 Goldhill 2012, 69.
74 Segal 1981, 332, Kaimio 1988, 31, Goldhill 2012, 69, cf. Taplin 1971, 33‒4 and Kosak 1999, 
119‒20.
75 Goldhill 2012, 69.
76 Oddly, Segal 1981, 348 misses this, when he refers to Neoptolemus’ oath to return Philoctetes 
to Malis. In fact, Neoptoelmus has made no such oath, nor had he stated that he would bring 
Philoctetes to Malis.
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have exacted from an enemy.77 Neoptolemus’ silence on the issue demonstrates 
his tacit acknowledgement of the implications of Philoctetes’ claim. Moreover, as 
Neoptolemus tries desperately to regain Philoctetes’ trust, he does so by using 
oaths. He offers Philoctetes back his bow and swears “by the highest reverence 
of holy Zeus” (ἀπώμοσ᾽ ἁγνοῦ Ζηνὸς ὕψιστον σέβας) that Philoctetes is not being 
tricked again (Phil. 1289). At this point of exchange Odysseus also offers an oath 
of his own, calling the gods to witness (ὡς θεοὶ ξυνίστορες) that he forbids the 
handing over of the bow (1293), but the oath is meaningless since it is attached 
to the performative utterance of forbidding which is made true by the very fact 
of being uttered. It demonstrates Odysseus’ loss of control over manipulative 
speech. Neoptolemus again swears by Zeus guarantor of oaths (Zeus Horkios) 
that Philoctetes will only be released from his affliction by going to Troy with his 
bow and joining Neoptolemus in capturing the city (1324‒35). Philoctetes remains 
unmoved, however, and repeats his reproach that Neoptolemus had sworn a 
pact with him (μοι ξυνώμοσας) to bring him home (1367‒8). Once more, Neoptol-
emus does not object, but rather urges Philoctetes to trust in the gods and in his 
words, and stresses that he is Philoctetes’ friend (1373‒5, cf. 1383, 1385). Although 
Neoptolemus fails to persuade Philoctetes to go to Troy, it is clear that he eventu-
ally convinces Philoctetes that he really is his friend. In the final reference to the 
agreement, Philoctetes asks Neoptolemus to do what he had agreed (ἃ δ᾽ᾔνεσας) 
when he clasped his right hand (1398). This redresses the anomaly of his previ-
ous references to the pledge as an oath, and demonstrates that he now considers 
Neoptolemus a friend once more.
The use of oath-language in this play runs parallel to the theme of friend-
ship vs. enmity. Recalling the pledge as an oath coincides with Philoctetes’ dis-
covery that Neoptolemus has been acting as his enemy. It is partly then through 
actual oaths that Neoptolemus persuades his enemy to trust him once again. The 
manipulation of oath-language also goes hand in hand with this play’s manipula-
tion of expectation regarding Odysseus and Neoptolemus. Although it sets up a 
77 Fletcher 2012, 95 suggests, in relation to this problematic passage, that “oaths can formal-
ize friendship”, but the example she gives of Theseus and Perithous simply mentions πίστ᾽ ἀεὶ 
ξυνθήματα “ever-pledged agreements” (OC 1594), and as Fletcher correctly observes (94), a 
pledge is “different from an oath since it invokes no gods”. In some cases pistis does refer to 
a sworn statement, but this is made clear by additional oath-language (e.g. Hdt. 7.145‒8, Dem. 
29.26, and see further ch. 6, pp. 165‒7). Plutarch later treats the pledge between Theseus and 
Peirithous as ἔνορκον ‘sworn’ (Thes. 30), but Sophocles does not. In Philoctetes, the point rather 
seems to be, as I am arguing, that Philoctetes now treats the pledge as sworn because he has 
come to see Neoptolemus as an enemy. On the importance of the friendship vs. enmity theme in 
this play, and in Sophocles, see M.W. Blundell 1989, 184‒225 and passim.
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very clear contrast between the two, the contrast becomes confused and is com-
plicated by the fact that Odysseus is eager to use force against Philoctetes once 
Neoptolemus has possession of his bow, and that Neoptolemus proves himself 
skilled in deceptive persuasion although he is ultimately unwilling to go through 
with the deception. Indeed his only real means of winning over a hostile man 
to his side without deception is by swearing oaths to convince Philoctetes of the 
truth of his statements. As Pat Easterling has observed, central to the Philoctetes 
is “the stress given to the power of persuasion”,78 with Heracles ultimately per-
suading Philoctetes to go to Troy where he will be healed.79 Podlecki has pointed 
to the “critical importance…of speech” in the play,80 an aspect of the tragedy that 
is intimately connected with the theme of persuasion. Oaths and oath-language 
are contributing elements to the drama’s network of speech and persuasion, and 
the “Sophoclean” oath focuses audience attention on the shifting dynamics of the 
relationship between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes.
A similar pattern of language is developed around oaths in Oedipus at 
Colonus, although the relationship between the two characters is very different 
in this case.81 Again here, as in Philoctetes, it is emphasized that an oath is not 
required but later the agreement is treated as a sworn statement. Theseus, king 
of Athens, welcomes Oedipus to Colonus as a suppliant and assures him that he 
will never betray him. “I will not bind you under oath, as if you were base” says 
Oedipus (OC 650). Theseus replies “You would win nothing more than by my 
word” (651). It is clear that there is no need for an oath because Oedipus trusts 
Theseus, and it is notable that Oedipus and Theseus act here as equals in spite of 
Oedipus’ apparent supplicatory status.82 Theseus is true to his word. When Creon 
78 Easterling 1983, 224.
79 Easterling 1983, 223, noting that the Greek peithomai encompasses both obedience and per-
suasion. On the theme of persuasion in Philoctetes see also Buxton 1982, 118‒31.
80 Podlecki 1996, 246 and passim.
81 Markantonatos 2007, 167‒93 discusses oath-language in Oedipus at Colonus in relation to the 
fragile nature of Athenian society at the end of the Peloponnesian War. He suggests that Theseus’ 
reliable oaths embody traditional Athenian piety (171), as a “reconciliation thesis constantly ad-
vanced in the Sophoclean tragedy” (183), but his discussion makes no clear distinction between 
oaths, promises and pledges, terms that he uses interchangeably. This is problematic since prom-
ises and pledges have no religiously binding force. This slippage in language leads to confusion 
as, for example, when he claims (175) that Oedipus “places each and every one of the Athenian 
rulers under oath (1530‒1532)”. In fact, the passage referenced is simply a command with an 
imperative and contains no language of oath, promise or pledge. 
82 Burian 1974, 409 argued that the dramatic form of the play is “an adaptation of the pattern of 
suppliant drama”; cf. Fletcher 2012, 118. Wilson 1997, 29‒61 discusses how Oedipus is not a true 
suppliant in this drama since he repeatedly offers benefits to his host.
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arrives and forces Antigone and Ismene to come away with him, Theseus comes 
to the rescue and retrieves them. When he returns, however, Theseus claims to 
have fulfilled the things which he had sworn to Oedipus (1145). Theseus recasts 
his own oathless promise as a sworn agreement. I suggest that here also, as in 
Philoctetes, an implicit reconfiguration of the relationship between the two char-
acters is occurring. In this case there is no shift between friendship and enmity. 
Rather, Oedipus’ status in relation to Theseus changes over the course of the play 
from suppliant to equal to more powerful, as some scholars have observed.83 The 
shift comes through Oedipus’ anticipated posthumous power to bless the land, 
the reciprocal gift which he has offered Theseus in exchange for his protection 
(576‒82).84 I argue below that the reference to an unsworn pledge as an oath 
reflects this new balance of power.
The oath-language develops as Oedipus’ death draws near and as he becomes 
more like a divine figure. To Oedipus as a fellow mortal, and a pitiable one at that, 
it would be unusual for Theseus to offer an oath. As the play progresses, however, 
reference is repeatedly made to the anticipated power of Oedipus’ posthumous 
presence to bless Athens and Attica through his death. The prophecy has already 
been revealed in the opening scene (88‒95) where Oedipus referred to himself 
as “this wretched phantom of the man Oedipus” (109‒10), on the cusp of death. 
Easterling notes Oedipus’ prediction that his cold corpse will drink the hot blood 
of the Thebans when they invade the land (621‒2),85 an image which aligns him 
with the Erinyes.86 It is in this context of Oedipus’ gradual transformation into a 
83 E.g. Taplin 1971, 36, Kaimio 1988, 27, cf. Knox 1964, 161 who notes that Theseus “recognizes 
[Oedipus] as a true prophet”.
84 Scholars disagree over whether there is an apotheosis of Oedipus at the end of the play. Mar-
kantonatos 2002, 134 and 137 refers to apotheosis, and Fletcher 2012, 121‒2 also speaks of apo-
theosis, but others stress the vague and enigmatic nature of Oedipus’ death as a burial in the 
earth, e.g. Buxton 1982, 144, Easterling 2006, 138. Calame 1998, 345 argues that Oedipus’ fate 
shares features of both an apotheosis and a burial, and cf. Kamerbeek 1984 ad 1653‒5 who points 
out that Theseus salutes both Chthonian and Olympian powers at Oedipus’ disappearance, also 
referenced by Bernard 2001, 156‒7. At the very least, the final scenes are “suggestive of a miracle” 
(Easterling 2006, 140).
85 Easterling 2006, 138. Knox 1964, 153 comments that these lines stem “from the growth of 
some new force and knowledge within himself”, and that Oedipus’ anger towards Polyneices is 
“superhuman” (160). Cf. Segal 1981, 375 “Oedipus becomes increasingly sure of his power and 
his destiny during the middle portion of the play”. Knox 1964, 149 observes that Oedipus’ humil-
ity as a beggar vanishes very early in the play when he refuses to move (OC 45). 
86 Numerous scholars have noted the parallels between the polluted avenging Oedipus becom-
ing a benefit to Athens and the transformation of the Furies into Eumenides who will bless Ath-
ens at the end of Aeschylus’ Oresteia, and at whose sacred grove the action of Oedipus at Colonus 
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divine force that the agreement becomes retrospectively reconfigured as an oath. 
The oath reference thus helps to confirm the transition of Oedipus from pitiable 
mortal wretch to powerful divine force.
In Women of Trachis, the imminent apotheosis of Heracles is underlined with 
oath-language, when Heracles asks his son to swear an oath invoking the “head 
of Zeus” in a formula otherwise restricted to oaths uttered by divinities.87 Hyllus 
ultimately invokes Zeus, but does not use the formula suggested by his soon-
to-be-divine father. In Oedipus at Colonus oath-language is also manipulated 
(though in a different way) to underline Oedipus’ transformation into a godlike 
power. The end of the drama emphasizes this transformation as the thunder and 
storm of Zeus are heard (1460, 1500‒4, 1514‒15). Antigone treats Oedipus as a 
prophet (1428: ἐθέσπισεν), as does Theseus (1516‒17: πολλὰ γάρ σε θεσπίζονθ᾽ 
ὁρῶ), and Oedipus himself acts like a deus ex machina in prescribing the future 
(1518‒55) with the opening phrase “I will explain”, or more literally “I will teach” 
(ἐγὼ διδάξω).88 Oedipus asks Theseus not to reveal to any human being where his 
burial place is (OC 1522‒3). Later, we are told by the Messenger that Oedipus asks 
Theseus to give the pledge of a handclasp to his daughters promising not to betray 
them (1631‒2). The manuscripts read ὦ φίλον κάρα, | δός μοι χερὸς σῆς πίστιν 
ἀρχαίαν τέκνοις “O dear friend, give the time-honoured pledge of your hand to my 
children”. Jebb follows the emendation ὁρκίαν “oath” (Papageorgiou), i.e. “oath-
pledge”, for ἀρχαίαν “time-honoured”, but it is unlikely that Oedipus should 
ask Theseus for an oath when his word had sufficed earlier in the play, and it 
was made clear that to ask for an oath would have been an insult. Theseus has 
already proven that he will be true to his word, and is here referred to by Oedipus 
as a dear friend, all factors which suggest that Oedipus did not request an oath. 
Indeed the emendation probably suggested itself from the subsequent report, a 
few lines later, that Theseus agreed on oath to accomplish these things for his 
guest-friend (1637: κατήινεσεν τάδ᾽ ὅρκιος δράσειν ξένῳ).
takes place. See e.g. Méautis 1940, 41‒2, Winnington-Ingram 1980, 215‒16, 266‒9, Segal 1981, 
375‒6, Seaford 1994, 132‒4, Edmunds 1996, 138‒42, Tilg 2004, 407‒15, Kelly 2009, 71‒5, Fletcher 
2012, 120.
87 Torrance 2009, 4 and passim.
88 See further Easterling 2006 on the accumulation of portents and signs of divine intervention 
from this point until the end of the play. Parker 1999, 12 observes that the signs “create just as 
palpable a sense of divine presence as if a god had appeared on stage.” See also Budelmann 
2000, 42‒5 on the kind of manipulation of language that helps to develop our understanding of 
Oedipus’ mysterious posthumous powers. Kelly 2009, 122‒3 discusses the development of the 
teaching theme in relation to Oedipus’ latent power over the course of the play, and cf. Easterling 
1999, 105 who treats Oedipus’ earlier speech at OC 607‒28 as a “didactic speech”. 
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Lloyd-Jones and Wilson retain ἀρχαίαν “time-honoured”, and the manuscript 
reading mirrors the previous pattern where an oathless pledge is later referred to 
as a sworn agreement. The report makes it difficult to tell exactly what happened, 
but it seems that although he is not asked to give an oath Theseus gives one all 
the same. This confirms the developing imbalance in status between the two 
men. The divine voice which addresses Oedipus and urges him towards his fate 
(OC 1627‒8) is marked by an unusually polite register for a divine power address-
ing a mortal, denoting Oedipus’ special status.89 It is in a similar vein, then, that 
Theseus offers an oath in recognition of their unequal relationship. Theseus is 
referred to as a “noble man” (1636: ἀνὴρ γενναῖος) in making the “promise on 
oath”, implicitly drawing a contrast between the mortal man and the divine force 
of Oedipus. Ultimately, Theseus’ oath serves an additional dramatic function as 
he is able to defer to it in order to prevent Oedipus’ daughters from seeing the 
location of their father’s burial place when he states that Horkos (Oath personi-
fied), the servant of Zeus, heard his agreement (1767). The complex development 
of oath-language between Oedipus and Theseus thus reflects the changing nature 
of the relationship between the two figures, and demonstrates Theseus’ conscious 
awareness of that relationship.
Oath-language in Antigone clusters around Creon. He swears the first oath 
of the play, and it is an oath which marks the position he will maintain through-
out the drama. He calls “Zeus who sees all things ever” to witness that he would 
never be silent if he saw ruin coming upon his citizens, nor would he make a 
friend out of the enemy of his land (Ant. 184‒8). This oath determines the fact that 
Creon will be unwavering in his decision to leave Polyneices, whom he counts 
as an enemy, unburied, and anticipates that he will also regard Antigone as an 
enemy for attempting to bury him. When the guards discover that the corpse has 
been covered with dust, they suspect that one of their number has committed 
the deed (259‒63), but they were all ready to hold red-hot iron in their hands and 
go through fire and swear by the gods that they had neither committed the deed 
nor knew who had planned or executed it (Ant. 264‒7). So they were none the 
wiser concerning the identity of the transgressor, and drew lots to determine who 
would bring Creon the news, this falling to the Guard (268‒77). Creon is enraged 
by the report and swears a second oath (ὅρκιος δέ σοι λέγω), also invoking Zeus, 
telling the Guard that if he does not find the perpetrator of the burial rite and 
bring him before Creon, all the guards will be hung up alive (304‒12). The oath 
again marks Creon’s implacability. Similarly the last oath of the play is sworn by 
89 See M. Lloyd 2006, 225‒8; cf. Knox 1964, 161, and Parker 1999, 12 who remarks that the divine 
voice “ennobles Oedipus by associating him with itself in a first person plural”.
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Creon as a threat against his son, where he swears by Olympus90 that Haemon 
will not continue to insult him with impunity (758‒9). The oath formula used in 
this case is the Doric or Arcadian οὐ + accusative, not normally used in Attic. 
In tragedy the formula is found only in Sophocles and normally in lyrics (cf. OT 
660‒1, 1088, El. 1063‒5). Creon’s oath is the only example of this formula used in 
iambics, which may reflect the extremity of his anger.91
Creon is the only character to swear oaths in Antigone. The guards were 
reportedly “ready” to swear (Ant. 264), but there is no evidence that they actually 
did so. Moreover Creon does not “interweave the laws of the land with the sworn 
justice of the gods” as should the man of civic excellence described by the chorus 
in the Ode to Man (368‒70).92 Teiresias will later name Creon as the cause of the 
city’s disease (1015), urging him to bury Polyneices, while Creon will respond that 
Polyneices will not be buried, not even if the eagles of Zeus carry his body aloft 
to their master (1039‒44). As Fletcher remarks, this “outrageous impiety casts 
a shadow on Creon’s attempts to guarantee his power in the name of Zeus”,93 
whom he invokes in two out of his three oaths. Creon ignores the sworn justice 
of the gods and suffers great grief as a consequence. Oaths function to underline 
Creon’s extremism throughout the play.
It is in the context of catching the perpetrator of the burial act that the 
“Sophoclean” oath occurs in this play. The Guard returns having caught Antigone 
in the act and addresses Creon with the opening words “Lord, as far as mortals 
are concerned, nothing can be denied on oath” (Ant. 388: ἄναξ, βροτοῖσιν οὐδέν 
ἐστ᾽ ἀπώμοτον). There is a gnomic sentiment in this expression, but there is also 
a very specific context here. The Guard explains that he hardly thought he would 
have returned because he feared Creon’s (sworn) threats, but he has come nev-
ertheless (389‒94), he says, “although I solemnly denied through oaths that I 
90 Literally “this Olympus” (τὸνδ᾽ Ὄλυμπον) at 758, i.e. “by Heaven” (see Griffith 1999 ad 758‒9), 
pace Fletcher 2012, 109 who renders ‘the “Olympi[a]n” (i.e. Zeus)’. 
91 So Sommerstein, Bayliss and Torrance (2007) in the remarks for this entry (#1978). Sourvi-
nou-Inwood 1989 argued in an influential article that the Athenians would have sympathized 
with Creon, and not with Antigone, making the case that Creon is not presented as a despotic 
tyrant. However, Harris 2004 has demonstrated persuasively that, for the Athenians, the written 
laws of the polis were designed to support rather than oppose the unwritten laws of the gods, so 
that Creon’s order would not have had the force of law, and the sympathies of the Athenians must 
have been mostly with Antigone.
92 Cf. Segal 1981, 169 “Creon’s dike…becomes…increasingly distant from the “oath-bound jus-
tice of the gods” praised in the Ode on Man (369).”
93 Fletcher 2012, 110. Segal 1981, 174‒5 also comments on the “staggering hybris” of this senti-
ment, although he mistakenly refers to Creon’s threat to punish Antigone at Ant. 486‒7 as an 
oath.
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would” (394: δι᾽ ὅρκων καίπερ ὢν ἀπώμοτος). The Guard had earlier claimed that 
he would never come back to the palace of Creon, whether or not the criminal was 
found (327‒9), but he never swore this on oath. Why is it then, that just 65 lines 
later, the Guard treats his earlier unsworn statement as an oath he has broken, 
effectively casting himself as a perjurer? This is a remarkable “Sophoclean” oath. 
Hirzel implied that we are to imagine that the Guard had sworn the oath, but 
this is hardly satisfactory.94 Mikalson similarly argues that “the guard had sworn, 
surely to himself”, making him ‘tragedy’s one character who swears a false oath 
and gets off unscathed”. But such “casual taking and breaking of the oath” sug-
gested by Mikalson is without parallel in tragedy.95 Nor would it sit well with the 
serious development of oath-language surrounding Creon in the play. Fletcher 
disagrees with Mikalson suggesting that this is “yet another degradation of the 
authority of horkos” in the play.96 She quite rightly points out that Creon “is …
given to using oaths to validate his own power”,97 and that his sworn threat of 
punishment for the guard is “vicious”,98 but it is not clear that the authority of 
oaths is “degraded” in Antigone. It is not at all unusual for a person to attempt 
to assert their will through oaths. In Sophocles alone, there are several relevant 
examples. Heracles uses oaths to force his will upon Hyllus in Women of Trachis, 
as we have seen. Clytaemestra in Electra swears that Electra will not escape pun-
ishment for her insolence (626‒7). In Philoctetes, Odysseus swears (fruitlessly) 
that he forbids Neoptolemus from handing back the bow to Philoctetes (1293).
It is evident that scholars have struggled to make sense of the Guard’s use 
of oath-language, but it is unreasonable to suppose that the audience should 
imagine characters swearing oaths out of earshot or to themselves, when they 
have clearly delivered the relevant lines on stage and without an oath. In other 
cases where a character refers to his own previous and unsworn statement as an 
oath, the oath-language gives meaning to the character’s situation. In Oedipus 
at Colonus, Theseus’ reference to an unsworn pledge as an oath coincided with a 
shift in his status in relation to Oedipus who was on the point of becoming divine, 
as was argued above. In Ajax, as we shall see below, the suggestion of overcom-
ing an oath, an essentially impossible task, implies that Ajax plans to commit 
suicide in spite of his deceptive speech. One of the main functions of the Guard 
in Antigone is to act as a foil for Creon’s actions and behaviour. As Mark Griffith 
94 Hirzel 1902, 72‒3 n.3.
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comments, “the Guard’s self-protective verbal smoke-screens amount almost to a 
parody of Kreon’s own autocratic mannerisms”.99 The Guard’s “Sophoclean” oath 
in Antigone can also be read in this light. It seems to function as a reflection on 
the character of Creon and his aggressive use of oaths.
Had the Guard actually sworn that he would not return, he would indeed 
have become a perjurer, but the audience will recognize that the oath-language 
he uses is a gross exaggeration of his recent statement. Creon, by contrast, has 
already sworn two oaths expressing extremely obstinate sentiments. He will not 
need to fulfil his threat against the guards, since the criminal has been found, 
but Creon’s first oath can be read as encapsulating the root of his problem. His 
absolute determination to regard Polyneices as an enemy of the land, and to 
deny his burial as a result, causes the pollution on the city which brings with it 
the gods’ displeasure, as Teiresias explains. Creon’s oath is part of what causes 
his downfall. This can be compared with the Guard’s use of oath-language. He 
reports that the guards are ready to swear defensive oaths to prove their inno-
cence, an implicit but marked contrast to Creon’s aggressive oaths. The Guard’s 
“Sophoclean” oath will prompt an audience to realize the serious nature of oath-
language and of the oath bond. Indeed it comes shortly after the chorus’ praise 
of a man who upholds the laws of the land and the sworn justice of the gods (Ant. 
368‒70), a justice which Creon ignores until it is too late. Creon’s oaths are thus 
cast into sharp relief as exceptionally aggressive and unwise in the context of 
the Guard’s observations concerning the inability of mortals to deny anything on 
oath. Creon’s subsequent oath threatening Haemon (758‒9) demonstrates that he 
still has not learned to quell his exploitation of oaths as a language of attack nor 
recognized the danger of swearing over-zealous oaths.
The situation in Ajax is somewhat different, but as with the other Sophoclean 
plays, paying attention to the exploitation of oath-language reveals that it is used 
carefully and with dramatic purpose. There are two examples of non-oaths being 
referred to as oaths in this play. The first comes after Tecmessa has apparently 
persuaded Ajax against going to the death he had been determined to seek earlier 
in the play. He begins his deception speech with the following generalization: 
“All obscure things long and immeasurable time brings forth and hides them 
again when they have been revealed; nothing is beyond expectation, but dread 
oath and obstinate minds are conquered” (Ajax 646‒9). Ajax goes on to explain 
that he has been softened by Tecmessa’s words and that he pities the plight she 
would have as a widow amongst his enemies and his son as an orphan (650‒3). 
99 Griffith 1999, 37.
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He claims that he will go and bury Hector’s sword in the ground (657‒60). There is 
much room for interpretation in Ajax’s words throughout his speech, and schol-
ars have debated whether Ajax has actually changed his mind or not, but several 
persuasive analyses have shown that Ajax deliberately uses ambiguous language 
to suggest that he will not commit suicide but without actually saying so.100 Gold-
hill has also discussed how the “image of a critical observer”, developed in the 
previous scene, “offers a model for the audience in the theater, faced as they will 
be by Ajax’ deception speech”.101 I would further suggest that the mention of 
“dread oath” (δεινὸς ὅρκος) provides a clue for the critical observers in the audi-
ence to expect Ajax’s suicide.
The generalization with which Ajax opened his speech stressed the universal-
ity of change,102 and the reference to obstinate minds being conquered creates a 
transition to his specific situation.103 Malcolm Heath observes that both the oath 
and obstinate minds “are things that one might expect to be unchanging”, and 
disagrees with Knox’s suggestion that we are meant to think here of the oath of 
Helen’s suitors.104 Knox argues that the oath has been broken by Ajax’s attempted 
murder of the Atreidae.105 I agree with Heath that this is unlikely in the context.106 
It is only much later that the oath of Helen’s suitors is mentioned (Ajax 1113). 
Moreover Athena’s intervention has prevented Ajax from actually perpetrating 
the crimes so the oath is technically unbroken. However, the reference to “dread 
oath” easily functions as an example of a “Sophoclean” oath, with Ajax treating 
his previous determination to find death, although unsworn, as an oath which 
has now allegedly been conquered along with his obstinate mind.107 Finglass 
comments that “Ajax has taken no oath, but his attitude was so determined that 
it is scarcely an exaggeration to speak in such terms.”108 Certainly this is an exag-
100 Garvie 1998, 185‒6 and Hesk 2003, 74‒95 give overviews of various scholarly positions. The 
ambiguity of the language in Ajax’ deception speech is stressed by e.g. Heath 1987, 186‒7, Garvie 
1998, 186, Lardinois 2006, Finglass 2011 ad 646‒92. Segal 1981, 114 sums up the fact that “he does 
not utter a word of literal falsehood.”
101 Goldhill 2009, 31.
102 Change rather than time is emphasized by the word order, see Heath 1987, 186 and cf. Fin-
glass 2011 ad 646‒7.
103 Kamerbeek 1953 ad 648, 649.
104 Heath 1987, 186.
105 Knox 1979, 138.
106 Cf. also Garvie 1998 ad 648‒9 “Ajax is thinking of oaths in general, not a specific oath sworn 
by himself to the sons of Atreus or (1113) to Tyndareos”.
107 See Lardinois 2006, 217 on how Ajax’s language at Ajax 650‒1 shows that he applies the 
generalization of the oath to himself.
108 Finglass 2011 ad 648‒9.
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geration, but it is also a misapplication of ritual language whose function is to 
raise doubt in the minds of the audience regarding Ajax’s true intentions. If he 
considers his earlier decision to be a dread oath, then he presents his change 
of mind as a breach of that “oath”. It implies that Ajax has not really changed 
his mind, since tragic characters so infrequently break their oaths. Recasting his 
earlier determination as a “dread oath” binds Ajax to his original decision, just as 
other language in the deception speech suggests that Ajax has strengthened his 
resolve.109 Tecmessa will later realize that Ajax had not changed his mind (807‒8, 
891).
The reference to conquering an oath thus functions within the specific context 
of the play and also on a general gnomic level. The expression recalls Archilo-
chus fr. 122.1,110 χρημάτων ἄελπτον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἀπώμοτον | οὐδὲ θαυμάσιον 
“No event is unexpected nor can be declared false on oath nor is miraculous”. 
There Zeus had made day into night (fr. 122.2‒3) during the solar eclipse of 648 
BC, but as Ajax continues his deception speech, he lists night yielding to day as 
one of the images describing his “submission” to the Atreidae (Ajax 672‒3).111 This 
weakens the parallel with the Archilochus poem. Theognis too warns in general 
terms against swearing that something will never happen because humans 
cannot predict divine intervention (Thgn. 659‒60), and Pindar also warns that 
the power of the gods can easily bring to pass what one would swear impossible 
(Olymp. 13.83‒4), 112 but these parallels ultimately stress the “Sophoclean” nature 
of Ajax’s oath reference since there has been no oath sworn.
The second “Sophoclean” oath in Ajax occurs when Agamemnon accuses 
Teucer, saying “You solemnly swore (διωμόσω) that we (i.e. Agamemnon and 
Menelaus) did not come as generals and admirals of the Achaeans, but that Ajax 
sailed as his own commander, as you claim” (1233‒4). Agamemnon refers to 
Teucer’s argument with Menelaus, where Menelaus had forbidden the burial of 
Ajax (1089‒90). Teucer certainly argued that Ajax sailed as his own commander 
and that Menelaus has no authority over Ajax’s men, reminding Menelaus that 
109 Lardinois 2006, 218 discusses the image of Ajax bathing himself in the sea (Ajax 654‒5) as a 
metaphor for a heated sword being hardened in cold water.
110 Kamerbeek 1953 ad 648, 649.
111 “Submission” because each of the images evoked, winter yielding to summer, night to day, 
storm to calm, sleep to waking, requires the extinction of the “yielding” element, so that Ajax’s 
plan to take his own life as “submission” before the Atreidae is implicitly suggested. See Heath 
1987, 187‒8, Finglass 2011 ad 646‒92.
112 An inverse parallel is Eupolis fr. 234 where a character asks τί δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ Ἀθηναίοισι πρᾶγμ´ 
ἀπώμοτον; “What deed is sworn impossible for Athenians?”, a suggestion that there is no deed 
the Athenians cannot accomplish.
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Ajax was as much commander of his own men as Menelaus is over his Spartans 
(1097‒1104). Teucer also reminds him that Ajax embarked on the expedition 
because of the oaths by which he was solemnly bound, and not for Menelaus’ 
sake (1113‒14). So reference to an oath was made, but Teucer never swore what 
Agamemnon claims he did. Moreover, he never claimed that the Atreidae did not 
have command over the Greek army. Agamemnon associates Teucer’s allegedly 
slanderous oath with his status as the son of a war captive (1228‒31), calling him a 
slave (Ajax 1235) and imagining that he would have been speaking loftily (ὑψήλ’) 
had he been reared by a noble woman (1229). The emptiness of Agamemnon’s 
invective against Teucer is underlined by the fact that we know his allegation 
concerning the oath to be false. Teucer will rebut the charge of being a low-born 
barbarian (cf. 1063) by reminding Agamemnon that his mother was, in fact, a 
princess (1301‒2) while Agamemnon’s ancestry includes Atreus who served his 
brother’s children to him at a banquet, Atreus’ adulterous Cretan wife, and his 
father the Phrygian barbarian Pelops (1291‒8).
In this instance, then, the “Sophoclean” oath-reference is an attempt to abase 
the character against whom it is alleged. It could not reasonably be sworn on oath 
that Agamemnon and Menelaus are not generals over the Achaeans, so Agamem-
non essentially accuses Teucer of having sworn a falsehood, and of being a per-
jurer. Since the audience knows this to be a lie, however, the rhetoric only suc-
ceeds in revealing the weakness of Agamemnon’s argument. The two examples of 
“Sophoclean” oaths in Ajax perform very different functions, but they also create 
a parallel between the brothers Ajax and Teucer, both of whom are associated 
with having sworn a “Sophoclean” oath.
The presence of what we have called the “Sophoclean” oath in so many of 
Sophocles’ extant plays, and virtually nowhere else in contemporary Greek 
literature, demonstrates that Sophocles developed a new and distinctive trope 
for allowing oaths to contain an ambiguous or riddling quality. Aristophanes’ 
Frogs, produced shortly after Sophocles’ death, contains one of only two other 
“Sophoclean” oaths which I have found in subsequent classical Greek literature, 
the other being a passage in Isocrates where a “Sophoclean” oath is used as a 
rhetorical ploy.113 By way of conclusion, I will look at the “Sophoclean” oath 
113 In Panathenaicus (12.103‒4), Isocrates describes how the Spartans had promised (ὑπισχνού-
μενοι) to liberate Athens’ allies if they revolted, and then states that they reduced to slavery those 
whom they had sworn (ὤμοσαν) to set free. The summary of events contains many inaccuracies 
and it is probable that Sparta’s alleged promise to liberate Athens’ allies, subequently treated 
as an oath, is another point of misinformation. It is also likely that the implication of Spartan 
perjury was a rhetorical technique aimed at criticizing Sparta, since the goal of this work by 
Isocrates is to glorify Athens by contrasting her past actions with those of Sparta (12.35‒41). Even 
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in Aristophanes, and I will argue that it can be read as a deliberate parody of a 
recognizable aspect of Sophocles’ style, thus lending further justification to the 
term “Sophoclean” oath.
At the end of the Frogs, Euripides urges Dionysus to remember the gods by 
whom he swore (ὤμοσας) to bring him back to Athens (1469‒71). In fact, Dionysus 
had never sworn to bring Euripides back, although he had expressed a strong 
desire to do so early in the play (59‒70). Euripides could not logically have known 
this, but the audience might well recall that no oath was used since Dionysus’ 
desire for Euripides was expressed with an emphatic joke about a craving for 
pea soup. As Matthew Wright has shown, “pea soup” was probably a metaliter-
ary comic metaphor for a boring old joke.114 Wright also observes that the word 
for “pea-soup” (ἔτνος) “appears three times in this short exchange”,115 marking 
the joke as particularly pointed. The joke directly precedes Heracles’ reference to 
Sophocles’ son Iophon and his suggestion that Dionysus should rather retrieve 
Sophocles from Hades, since he is a better poet than Euripides (73‒9). The absence 
of Sophocles from Frogs has long been noted by scholars. He is referred to only 
briefly in passages which may well have been added after the original script had 
been completed (76‒82, 786‒94, 1515‒19), and it seems likely that Sophocles died 
shortly before Frogs was produced forcing Aristophanes somewhat awkwardly to 
acknowledge his presence in Hades.116 It is noteworthy, then, that both parts of 
the “Sophoclean” oath occur within a few lines of two of the passages referencing 
Sophocles.
The point of this “Sophoclean” oath soon becomes clear. By accusing Dio-
nysus of having sworn to bring him back to Athens, Euripides unwittingly 
sets himself up to be defeated by one of his own infamous lines. As Dionysus 
announces his decision to choose Aeschylus, he responds to Euripides, saying 
“‘twas but my tongue that swore” (Frogs 1471: ἡ γλῶττ᾽ ὀμώμοκ’) in a parody of 
Hippolytus 612 (on which see further § 11.2). Having previously called Euripides 
“Palamedes” (1451), Dionysus now delivers the verbal blow which destroys Eurip-
ides with his own creation, just as his Palamedes had been destroyed through 
the Spartan sympathizer in the epilogue (12.200‒70) is shown making incorrect judgments so 
that “[t]he conclusion points to the error of the sympathizer and the innocent fools he misled” 
(Gray 1994, 267). In spite of the stereotype of Spartans as perjurers, they were in fact very careful 
about keeping their oaths, as discussed by Bayliss 2009 and in S&B 212‒34, 249‒55, 266‒79. The 
“Sophoclean” oath in Isocrates, then, is a rhetorical ploy based on an Athenian stereotype about 
Spartans.
114 M.E. Wright 2012, 93‒7.
115 M.E. Wright 2012, 93, Wright’s italics.
116 See Dover 1993, 8‒9, Sommerstein 1996, 20 with n.92, and ad 71‒88.
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his own invention (writing) in Euripides’ Palamedes.117 Once Aeschylus has been 
chosen, he hands over the Chair of Tragedy to Sophocles for safe-keeping in the 
play’s final reference to Sophocles. Given the complexity of allusion in this scene, 
and indeed in Frogs more generally, it seems possible, at least, that Aristophanes 
is parodying the trope of the “Sophoclean” oath in addition to the famous line 
from Hippolytus. The poets of old comedy were capable of developing extraodi-
narily complex networks of allusion which included elaborate metaphors and 
quotations from other poets, but also references to and parodies of perceived 
poetic styles. If we confine ourselves to Aristophanes, we see that the poetry of 
Theognis is “cold” (Th. 138‒40, cf. Ach. 136‒40), the dithyrambs of Cinesias are 
“airy” (Birds 1375‒91), the comedy of Cratinus is a flood (Knights 526‒8), Eurip-
ides’ poetry is “tangle-fleeced” (fr. 682). The weighing of poetic lines in Frogs pres-
ents the poetry of Aeschylus as weighty and that of Euripides as lightweight, and, 
of course, the Euripidean recognition scene is parodied extensively in Women at 
the Thesmophoria.118 In extant Aristophanes, Aeschylus (mostly thanks to the 
Frogs) and especially Euripides feature more prominently as targets of allusion 
than does Sophocles, but references to the poetry of Sophocles do occur in Aris-
tophanic comedy,119 and it has recently been argued that Sophocles’ Oedipus at 
Colonus was an important model for Aristophanes’ Wealth.120 The Aristophanic 
parody of a “Sophoclean” oath would thus help to confirm that it was recognized 
as a distinctive stylistic device.
5.3 “Of cabbages and kings”: the Eideshort phenomenon
I.C. Torrance
The defining feature of an oath is the invocation of one or more superhuman 
powers, normally gods or cult-heroes, to witness the oath statement in order to 
guarantee its validity and to punish the would-be perjurer.121 It is noteworthy, 
117 See Torrance 2013, 142‒6.
118 See M.E. Wright 2012 for an insightful discussion of all these issues, esp. 103‒40 on parodies 
and metaphors of style, and 156‒62 on the parody of Euripidean style in Women at the Thesmo-
phoria. On Euripidean poetry as “tangle-fleeced”, see also Torrance 2013, 299‒301.
119 Rau (1967) 185‒212 lists the following quotations and references to the plays of Sophocles: 
Ach. 27?, 75, Eq. 83, 498‒500?, 1099, Nu. 257, 583, 1154‒5, Av. 100‒1, 275, 851‒2, 857, 1240, 1337‒9, 
Lys. 139, 450?, Th. 21, 870, Ra. 357, 664‒5, Ec. 80‒1, Pl. 541, 635‒6, 806, 1151, Gerytades fr. [175 K-A], 
Kokalos, Holkades fr. [427 K-A]. 
120 Compton-Engle (2013).
121 See Ch. 1 in this volume, S&B § 1.1, and cf. Sommerstein 2007a, 2.
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then, that a significant group of oaths exists in Greek literature where ostensibly 
non-divine entities are invoked as sanctifying witnesses. Such entities have nor-
mally been referred to in scholarly discussions as sacred oath-objects, sometimes 
designated by the German term Eideshorte.122 This notion of an object clearly stems 
from the Homeric paradigm of Achilles’ oath in Iliad 1 (233‒46) which invokes 
only Agamemnon’s sceptre, a significant symbol of kingly power (studded with 
golden nails, 246) yet also an inert and lifeless object as emphasized by Achilles’ 
description of the sceptre never again bearing leaf nor blossoming (234‒7). The 
fact that Achilles flings the sceptre to the ground after swearing his oath, a prom-
issory threat that the day will come when the Achaeans will long for him, has 
been seen as a gesture of “dramatic confirmation of his oath”,123 and we might 
well read the gesture alongside several other oaths which are accompanied by 
contact with the earth.124 However, Aristotle describes monarchs in the heroic age 
as swearing oaths with the raising up of the sceptre (Pol. 1285b12: τοῦ σκήπτρου 
ἐπανάτασις), a situation illustrated twice in the Iliad accompanying an oath by 
Zeus.125 This highlights the unusual nature of Achilles’ oath by the sceptre alone 
as oath-object and of the gesture of hurling it to the ground.126
Taken as a whole, however, our sources show a remarkably more diverse 
range of apparently non-divine oath entities than the term “object” suggests, for 
which reason I have tended to avoid the expression “oath-object” in the discus-
sion which follows. As my title indicates, the line from Lewis Carroll’s famous 
poem The Walrus and the Carpenter captures the two extremes of this range with 
an uncanny precision. On the apparently more bizarre end of the spectrum is a 
group of comic and iambic oaths invoking cabbages and other plants, while at 
the more traditional end we find a variety of oaths invoking kings or inanimate 
symbols of power such as the aforementioned oath of Achilles. Non-divine enti-
ties are sometimes added to lists of recognizable deities or invoked in response to 
oaths by actual gods. Abstract concepts can be treated as oath-witnesses. In other 
122 Fletcher 2012, 5, S&B 4 n.3.
123 Kirk 1985 ad 245‒6; Griffin 1980, 11‒12 discusses the gesture as a rejection of the community. 
124 Iliad 14.272, Bacchylides 5.41‒5, 8.19‒21, h.Ap. 331‒9.
125 In Iliad 7.408‒13 Agamemnon swears an oath by Zeus to Idaeus and raises his sceptre in 
agreement to allow the Trojans to collect and burn the corpses of their dead. Similarly in Iliad 
10.321‒32 Hector responds to a request from Dolon to raise his sceptre and swear to give him the 
horses, invoking Zeus as his oath witness. 
126 Nagy 1979, 179‒80 reads the sceptre as symbolizing the transformation of nature into cul-
ture; Kitts 2005, 104 connects the lifelessness of the sceptre to the threat of death against the 
Achaeans, and also posits that it fulfills the same symbolic function as that of the oath-sacrifice. 
See further ch. 6, pp. 143‒7, on significant gestures in oath-taking.
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cases inanimate objects or entities not normally considered divine by the ancient 
Greeks become appropriate symbols of divinity in alternative comic universes. 
The presence of non-divine entities in Greek oaths is thus rather complex, and it 
is not always easy to decide whether a particular oath-witness could be conceived 
of as divine or not. I will argue that many unusual and apparently non-divine 
forces invoked in oaths could, in fact, be imagined as divine and that, in most 
cases, even unequivocally non-divine entities could, at the very least, be under-
stood as being imbued with an autonomous power appropriate to the context in 
which they were invoked.
5.3.1 Recognizable gods, abstract concepts, and non-divine entities
The Athenian ephebic oath includes one of the most impressive lists of oath-wit-
nesses of any recorded Greek oath. These range from Olympian gods, cult heroes, 
and abstractions to territorial boundaries and common plants. Since it combines 
non-divine entities with abstract concepts and recognizable gods in its formula-
tion, this oath will provide a useful framework for discussing the nature and func-
tion of non-divine oath-guarantors. The oath was one of military service sworn by 
young Athenian males (ephebes), essentially amounting to a citizenship oath. In 
summary, the ephebes swore not to bring shame upon their sacred weapons, not 
to desert the man beside them, to fight for the defence and increased prosperity of 
the fatherland, to obey those who exercise power reasonably, to obey and defend 
the laws, and to honour the ancestral religion.127 Swearers invoked Aglaurus, 
Hestia, Enyo, Enyalios, Ares, Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Her-
acles, the boundaries of their fatherland, Wheat, Barley, Vines, Olives, and Figs. 
Andrew Bayliss has shown how the divinities invoked are directly associated with 
the specific nature of the ephebic oath.128 The mythical Athenian maiden Aglau-
rus, the daughter of Erechtheus who voluntarily sacrificed her life to save the city 
when Athens was under attack, is named first as an inspiration for the young 
men, and several sources state that the oath was sworn in her sanctuary.129 The 
invocation of Hestia, goddess of the hearth, suggests the stability of the home-
land. Enyo, Enyalios, Ares, and Athena Areia are all war divinities. Zeus is the 
most powerful of the gods and the official overseer of oaths. Thallo, Auxo and 
127 See S&B § 2.3 for a detailed discussion of the nature and function of the ephebic oath.
128 S&B 16‒21.
129 Sourvinou-Inwood 2011, 28 n.14 lists RO 88.5‒20, Dem. 19.303, Philoch. FGrH 328 F 105, Plut. 
Alc. 15.7‒8, and Poll. 8. 105‒6 s.v. περίπολοι.
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Hegemone are rather obscure female forces. The first two are essentially abstrac-
tions, meaning “Sprouting” and “Growth”, while the third means “Leader”, but 
there is some evidence that these were recognized as divinities in Athens.130 Cer-
tainly they have an obvious relevance to the ideas of increasing the prosperity of 
Athens and obeying leadership. Heracles too is an appropriate figure to invoke 
as an example of heroic male physical prowess for young men of military age. 
Parker suggests that, since Heracles is the last divinity named in the list, Aglaurus 
functions “as a feminine influence, in counterpoise to the aggressively masculine 
ideal set before the ephebes by Heracles.”131 Aglaurus is named by Parker as “an 
oath goddess for women only”,132 presumably based on Aristophanes’ Women at 
the Thesmophoria 533 where a female character (Mica) invokes Aglaurus and the 
accompanying scholium suggests that this was a gendered oath.133 However, as 
Sourvinou-Inwood observes Aglaurus’ “involvement with the ephebes was correl-
ative with a role as kourotrophos, ‘rearer of young men/women’.”134 Moreover, the 
passage from Women at the Thesmophoria is our only other example of an oath by 
Aglaurus from the archaic or classical period, so that the suggestion that she was 
primarily a deity invoked in women’s oaths cannot be demonstrated. Regardless 
of her gender Aglaurus was the main oath-witness to the ephebic oath.
Before turning to the final non-divine section of the list, we should consider 
the place of abstract concepts in oath-taking, since any abstraction could be per-
sonified and treated as an instant deity in Greek thought.135 In Plato’s Philebus the 
personification of pleasure, Hedone, is invoked indirectly by Philebus in an oath 
calling to witness “the very goddess” (αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν) whom they are discuss-
ing. We see that it is beyond question here that the swearer, Philebus, consid-
ers the abstraction to be a divinity since he specifically uses the term “goddess” 
in suggesting that Hedone is the proper name for Aphrodite (12b1‒2), although 
Socrates is not convinced. In other cases too a divine aspect to the abstraction 
can be clearly demonstrated, although in each of our following examples the 
abstraction is qualified with a personal or context-specific criterion. In Odyssey 
130 See Siewert 1977, 109, S&B 20. Burkert 1985, 251 reads Thallo and Auxo as “protecting powers 
over adolescents.”
131 Parker 2005a, 434. Mikalson 2010, 142 suggests a different reason for the presence of Hera-
cles, namely that he “is relevant both as one who wards off evil and because these young men 
had, at their Apatouria, each made an offering of wine to him before the cutting of their hair.”
132 Parker 2005a, 434.
133 See further Sourvinou-Inwood 2011, 28 with n.12.
134 Sourvinou-Inwood 2011, 29, emphasis added.
135 On personification in Greek religion see Stafford 2000 and collected essays in Stafford and 
Herrin 2005.
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20.339‒42, Telemachus swears an oath invoking Zeus and the sufferings of his 
father (ἄλγεα πατρός), stating that he is not delaying his mother’s marriage but 
urges her to marry whomever she wishes and offers them countless gifts. This 
oath combines the powerful Olympian Zeus with an abstract divine force.136 The 
fact that Telemachus invokes the sufferings of his father at this point in the narra-
tive reminds the listener or reader that Telemachus is aware of his father’s experi-
ences and disguised presence. Richard Rutherford finds the oath-statement oddly 
insincere,137 but the oath is clearly serious invoking both Zeus and Algea, and we 
should rather read it as a manipulation of oath-language. Telemachus urges his 
mother to marry “whomever she wishes” (20.341: ᾧ κ᾽ ἐθέλῃ) knowing both that 
the only husband Penelope desires is Odysseus and that Odysseus is present. So 
although Telemachus appears to be encouraging Penelope to choose one of the 
suitors, this is not what he actually says. He is careful also, as Eustathius saw,138 
in using the indefinite enclitic που, meaning effectively “I do not know if this 
statement is true”,139 when he describes his father as one “who has either per-
ished or wanders somewhere far from Ithaca” (20.340). Finally, Jasper Griffin has 
shown that Telemachus’ use of the μά oath formula in this passage, which occurs 
only here in the Odyssey, is designed to give Telemachus a more heroic posture 
by recalling Achilles’ use of the same formula in the Iliad (1.86, 1.234, 23.43).140 
So the oath by Zeus and his father’s sufferings amounts to a powerful and mature 
exploitation of the oath ritual, drawing a dramatic contrast between Telemachus’ 
knowledge, prudence and effective use of language and the witlessness of the 
suitors who respond to the oath by laughing at Telemachus in a divinely-induced 
mania.
When the ghost of Miltiades swears an oath “by my battle of Marathon” in 
Eupolis’ Demes (fr. 106.1 K-A: οὐ γὰρ μὰ τήν Μαραθῶνι τὴν ἐμὴν μάχην), we have 
the same pattern we have just seen in the Odyssey. An abstraction is personal-
ized for the purpose of the oath.141 Miltiades’ oath states that no one will rejoice 
at grieving his heart (fr. 106.2 K-A), and invoking the battle of Marathon lends a 
severity to his threat since those who grieved his heart in that case (the Persians) 
were thoroughly defeated under his command. Similarly, in Aristotle’s Constitu-
136 Tearful Sufferings (Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα) are named among the children of Eris (Strife) in He-
siod’s Theogony (227), who also engenders Oath (Thg. 231).
137 R.B. Rutherford 1992, ad 341‒2.
138 Comm. ad Od. 2.240.
139 Compare the practice of exōmosia in Athenian litigation, where witnesses were required to 
swear that they did not know a particular statement to be true; see S&B 91‒100.
140 Griffin 1986, 52. See also §5.1, pp. 81‒2.
141 Battles (Μάχαι), like Sufferings, are the children of Eris according to Hesiod (Thg. 229).
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tion of the Samians (fr. 593.1 Gigon) darkness (skotos) is personified,142 adding a 
layer of solemnity to an oath through its association with a terrible battle which 
had taken place in Priene at a place called Oak (Drys) in the time of Bias, one of 
the Seven Sages. Many Prienians were killed by Milesians and Prienian women 
are said to swear by the darkness of the Oak (τὸ περὶ Δρῦν σκότος). The death of 
the men in battle is thus symbolized by the darkness invoked as an oath-curse. A 
brighter personification occurs in Aristophanes’ Women at the Assembly, where 
Praxagora swears “by the approaching day” (νὴ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν) that the 
women are undertaking the great venture of infiltrating the assembly in order to 
see if they can succeed in taking over the city and in doing some good (105‒8). 
The oath formula is unique and it stresses the contextual significance of the fol-
lowing day in implementing the plan.143 Our final two examples are abstract 
nouns. Philia, “Love” or “Friendship” is invoked in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Once 
more, the force is qualified by a significant personal criterion. The royal couple 
from Susa, Abradatas and Pantheia, have been reunited in the camp of Cyrus 
when Pantheia swears to her husband by their mutual philia (6.4.6. ἐπομνύω σοι 
τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ σὴν φιλίαν) that she would rather die with him proven noble than 
live with him disgraced. Lastly, cowardice (deilia) is personified in a fragment of 
Sophocles’ Atreus (fr. 140) where a character swears by the cowardice that feeds 
a certain man who is feminine, but has male enemies (μὰ τὴν ἐκείνου δειλίαν, ᾗ 
βόσκεται, | θῆλυς μὲν αὐτός, ἄρσενας δ᾽ἐχθροὺς ἔχων). Unfortunately we have no 
firm context for the fragment, but it is likely that the tragedy dealt with the quarrel 
between Atreus and Thyestes, and it is tempting to see the speaker as Atreus 
enraged by the discovery that his brother Thyestes has had sexual relations with 
his wife. The cowardice and effeminacy associated with Thyestes would reflect 
the qualities which Aeschylus attributed to Thyestes’ only surviving son Aegis-
thus in Agamemnon, where he has committed adultery with the wife of his cousin 
and is called a “strengthless lion” (Ag. 1224) and a “woman” (Ag. 1625).144
These cases show how uncommon divine personifications are made specifi-
cally relevant to the swearer through the introduction of non-divine but mean-
ingful qualifications. Telemachus invokes the sufferings of his father, Miltiades 
names a personal battle-victory, the women of Priene recall a specific battle, 
142 Skotos is named as father of the Eumenides in Sophocles (OC 40).
143 Sommerstein 1998, ad 105, notes that the oath is unusual, and that Day (Ἡμέρη) is the 
daughter of Night in Hesiod (Thg. 124).
144 Adulterers were associated with effeminacy in Greek thought. In Libation Bearers (304), Or-
estes says that Argos is subject to ‘two women’. Garvie 1989 noted, ad loc., that θῆλυς μὲν αὐτός 
in S. fr. 140 ‘may possibly refer to Aegisthus’ father Thyestes.’ See also S. El. 302 where Aegisthus 
‘makes his battles among women’.
 5.3 “Of cabbages and kings”: the Eideshort phenomenon   117
Praxagora calls to witness the particular day on which her plan will be set in 
motion, Pantheia uses the powerful love-bond she has with her husband as oath-
guarantor, and the character in Atreus insults an enemy by invoking his cow-
ardice. The degree of personal and contextual qualifications present in oaths by 
abstractions demonstrates that these are certainly more serious than they might 
appear at first glance. Indeed I would argue that these are more solemn than 
general invocations of Zeus by virtue of the swearer’s intimate relationship with 
the personification, since although Zeus is overseer of oaths, his name is used so 
often in sworn statements (particularly in Old Comedy) that it does not have the 
subjective force of the abstractions discussed here.145 Indeed, Zeus can even be 
invoked by individuals who do not believe in him, from Socrates in Clouds (331, 
693) to Josephus in Against Apion 1.254‒5.146
We can now turn our attention to the final group of forces invoked in the 
ephebic oath: the boundaries of the fatherland, Wheat, Barley, Vines, Olives 
and Figs. It is clear that these are all non-divine entities, but scholars disagree 
as to how they should be interpreted. Mikalson suggests that they “are invoked, 
not as gods, but, in this context, as revered objects these young men are obliged 
to defend and protect.”147 However, this does not really explain their presence 
as apparent oath-witnesses alongside actual deities. Bayliss proposes a link 
between the symbolism of these elements as representative of the fruitful earth148 
and the oath-gesture of placing the hand on the ground as a means of invoking 
the gods of the Underworld (as at Iliad 14.272),149 but the crucial gesture itself is 
missing from the equation here and there is no obvious connection between the 
plants mentioned and the divinities who dwell in Hades. I would suggest that the 
main point to consider is the function of oath-witnesses. These are the forces that 
will pursue and punish the would-be perjurer, in which case the non-divine enti-
ties listed in the ephebic oath constitute a formidable threat. By implication, the 
ephebe who perjured himself would be excluded from the territory of Athens and 
would experience crop failure (cf. Ar. Clouds 1121‒5). Although these elements are 
not divine, they are imagined as autonomous for the purposes of the oath so that 
their presence in the list adds a specific rejection from Athenian land and pros-
perity on the would-be perjurer.
145 Of the 3700+ oath references in Sommerstein, Bayliss and Torrance 2007, 1430 contain in-
vocations of Zeus. The relative weakness of oaths which invoke Zeus alone is discussed in §13.2.
146 Cf. ch. 9, pp. 237‒8, on oaths in oratory and rhetoric.
147 Mikalson 2010, 143.
148 Noted by Burkert 1985, 251.
149 S&B 21 and see further §5.1, p. 85.
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A humorous parallel presents itself in an oath sworn by Silenus in Eurip-
ides’ Cyclops (262‒9). He swears to the Cyclops that he is not selling the Cyclops’ 
property to the strangers. He invokes Poseidon, as Polyphemus’ father, great 
Triton, Nereus, Calypso, Nereus’ daughters, the sacred waves and the whole race 
of fish (μὰ θαἰερὰ κύματ᾽ ἰχθύων τε πᾶν γένος). All the named figures in the list 
are recognizable sea-deities. The waves are called sacred (cf. Aesch. fr. 192.1‒2, 
Eur. Hipp. 1206‒7), adding an aspect of solemnity to a force that could be consid-
ered divine, but is less obviously so than the forces previously named. The fish, 
however, represent a staple of the Athenian diet in much the same way as does 
the produce invoked in the ephebic oath. As Fletcher notes, “the whole race of 
fish” is “a humorous revision of the standard ‘all the gods together.’”150 In this 
case, the image of Silenus being pursued by the whole race of fish in addition 
to being battered by the waves and hounded by the sea-deities mentioned has a 
comic purpose in a satyr-drama which, as a genre, deals with the sufferings of the 
satyrs. Indeed there is some ambiguity in this scene as to whether or not Silenus is 
lying under oath, which might provoke an audience to imagine the consequences 
of his perjury all the more.151 The Cyclops believes Silenus, although his sons 
counter his oath with an oath of their own accusing him of lying (Cyc. 270‒2), 
and the joke is further developed when it is revealed that this Cyclops cares not a 
jot for the worship or power of his father Poseidon, or any of the other gods, but 
worships wealth instead and sacrifices only to his own belly as the greatest of 
divinities (316‒46). The Cyclops in Euripides is thus presented as blasphemous 
and shameless.152
Humorous shamelessness is also the central issue in a scene from Aris-
tophanes’ Knights, where non-divine entities are invoked in an oath as a 
direct response to (rather than in addition to) an oath by a recognizable divin-
ity. Paphlagon and the Sausage-seller engage in a contest of shamelessness to 
determine who is more suitable, as the greater rogue and villain, to be leader 
of Athens. In a moment of frustration, Paphlagon swears by Poseidon that the 
Sausage-seller will not surpass him in shamelessness with exclusion from future 
public speaking specified as punishment for breach of the oath (Knights 409‒10). 
150 Fletcher 2012, 150.
151 Fletcher 2005 argues that Silenus is lying and that he is raped by the Cyclops as punishment 
(cf. Fletcher 2012, 146‒57), but see §10.2 for further discussion. 
152 Several scholars have seen specific parallels between Polyphemus’ world-view and that of 
Callicles, a wealthy aristocrat with oligarchic connections (and hostile to the democracy) who 
features in Plato’s Gorgias. See e.g. Duchemin 1945, 118, Seaford 1984, 52‒5, Kovacs 1994, 56. 
O’Sullivan 2005 argues that it is tyranny that links the philosophical positions of Callicles and 
Polyphemus.
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It seems that Paphlagon’s invocation of Poseidon here is an attempt to take a par-
ticularly determined stand. Sommerstein has shown how the Sausage-seller wins 
an exchange of oaths with Paphlagon shortly before this by substituting Poseidon 
for Zeus in his determination not to yield (336‒9).153 However, the Sausage-seller 
wins again in our passage, since the oath-witnesses invoked in his counter-oath 
once again cap the oath witness of Paphlagon’s statement. He swears that he 
thinks he will surpass Paphlagon in the contest (411‒13), invoking the knuckles 
whose blows he has often endured since childhood (τοὺς κονδύλους, οὓς πολλὰ 
δὴ ᾽πὶ πολλοῖς | ἠνεσχόμην ἐκ παιδίου), and the slashes of butchers’ cleavers 
(μαχαιρίδων τε πληγάς). These non-divine oath witnesses are meaningful to the 
persona of the Sausage-seller, and the prospect of being subjected to attacks with 
a butcher’s cleaver seems appropriately frightening as an oath guarantee. The 
Sausage-seller has previously boasted on oath, invoking Hermes, that he is a thief 
who can steal in front of witnesses and then perjure himself to deny the theft 
(297‒8, cf. 1239), and he reminds us of this shortly after his oath invoking fists 
and cleavers (418‒28). It could be argued that the non-divine oath-witnesses indi-
cate shamelessness in oath-taking by a self-avowed perjurer, but, as Sommerstein 
shows, there is no evidence in the play that the Sausage-seller actually is a perjur-
er.154 It is uniquely in his interests to make such a claim as he attempts to prove 
himself more villainous than Paphlagon. It is perhaps most significant that the 
Sausage-seller invokes forces germane to his own situation. When he swears on 
oath that he is a thief, he invokes Hermes, patron of thieves and arch-manipulator 
of oath-language.155 When he swears to his belief that he is more shameful than 
Paphlagon, he invokes blows of which he has long experience and cleavers which 
are the tools of his trade and which he has in his possession. The knuckles and 
cleavers are specific to the Sausage-seller in much the same way as the Athenian 
crops listed in the ephebic oath are specific to Athenian citizens. We should not 
conclude, then, that the forces invoked by the Sausage-seller are in themselves an 
indicator of shamelessness. Rather, they conform to the pattern evident through-




155 On Hermes’ powers of manipulating oath-language, see Fletcher 2008.
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5.3.2 Alternative “gods”
Crops and cleavers cannot be considered divine in the aforementioned cases. 
However, there are examples from Old Comedy in which the establishment of 
alternative world-views enables entities not normally considered divine to take on 
divine force. For example, in Aristophanes’ Birds Tereus, in the form of a hoopoe, 
swears “by earth, by traps, by snares, by nets” (194: μὰ γῆν μὰ παγίδας μά νεφέλας 
μὰ δίκτυα) that he has never heard a better idea than getting tribute from the gods 
for allowing the aroma of sacrificial meat to pass through the realm of the birds 
on its way to Olympus. Earth is a genuine divine power, but the rest are clearly 
inanimate objects with no ostensible divine connection. For birds, however, nets, 
traps and snares, like earth, represent danger and potential death,156 as is spelled 
out later in the play (525‒38). They are, therefore, awe-inspiring symbols. Com-
mentators note that the oath is probably a parody of the metrically equivalent 
oath “by earth, by springs, by rivers, by streams” (μὰ γῆν μὰ κρήνας μά ποταμοὺς 
μὰ νάματα).157 This is a compelling suggestion, but we should also note that earth 
and snares must represent for the birds the equivalent of dangerous chthonic and 
underworld powers in human oaths.
There is a disturbing aspect to invoking intrinsically destructive forces in 
oaths. In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Clytaemestra, after murdering Agamemnon, 
swears an oath by the Justice accomplished for her daughter, by Atē, and by 
Erinys that she will not be afraid while Aegisthus lights her hearth (1431‒6). Atē, 
the divine delusion that leads men to ruin, and Erinys, the avenging Fury, are 
formidably destructive forces. Indeed this is the only example of the goddess 
Atē (Ruin) being invoked in an oath in archaic and classical Greek literature.158 
Clytaemestra may believe her oath when she swears it, but the negative forces 
of delusion and vengeance will turn against her in Libation Bearers where her 
dreams frighten her and her son avenges his father’s death. In Aeschylus’ Seven 
against Thebes (42‒8), the attackers against Thebes swear an oath by Ares, Enyo 
and blood-loving Terror (Phobos) to sack Thebes or die in the attempt. The exclu-
sive appeal to these terrifying divinities, uniquely invoked here together in an 
oath, similarly seems to foreshadow the doom of the attackers. These oaths, like 
that of Tereus, are attempts by the swearers to coopt to their side, and against 
an enemy, forces which could well prove destructive to them. The plan which 
156 Cf. Dunbar 1995, ad 194.
157 Sommerstein 1991, ad 194; Dunbar 1995, ad 194. Birds also contains a parody of a peace 
treaty oath at 630‒5, on which see Sommerstein 1991, ad 631, 632 and Dunbar 1995, ad 631, 632. 
158 See Sommerstein 2013, 8 for further discussion of this use of Atē.
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delights Tereus involves tricking (or trapping) the gods into payment of a tribute. 
In a tragic context the invocation of destructive divine forces can be linked to the 
destruction of the tragic characters who appeal to them, but comedy can present 
the gods as ridiculous and suffering defeat and this is precisely what happens in 
Birds where the birds wrest power from the gods.
Oaths by birds are part of the new world system and discussions of oaths 
by birds feature twice in the play. The first instance occurs when Peisetaerus is 
attempting to convince the birds to found their own city. He claims that in the 
olden days humans would not swear by a god, but they all swore by birds, his 
point being that birds once held power in the universe but had lost it by allowing 
the gods to usurp their position. He throws in an example naming Lampon, a con-
temporary diviner (mantis), as someone who swears by “goose” when he is being 
deceitful (Birds 520‒1). The oath by “goose” (τὸν χῆνα) was a deformation of the 
common oath by Zeus (τὸν Ζῆνα). In a real-life Athenian context oaths by the 
goose, like oaths by the dog (τὸν κύνα), are not seriously binding religious oaths, 
as will be discussed below, but Aristophanes here exploits a known expression 
for the sake of his comic argument, namely that birds once held religious power. 
In the second discussion of oaths by birds, Peisetaerus suggests to Poseidon that 
leaving birds in power will be beneficial to the gods for catching perjurers. So, 
he claims, when humans have taken oaths by the Raven and by Zeus, the raven 
will swoop down and peck out the perjurer’s eye (1608‒13). This is part of Peise-
taerus’ deceptive offer that the birds should share power with the gods, and he 
fools dim-witted Poseidon who responds enthusiastically with a ridiculous oath 
by Poseidon (himself!) exclaiming that this is a marvellous idea (1614). In keeping 
with “the new divine order”159 Peisetaerus swears an oath by the kestrels (μὰ τὰς 
κερχνῇδας) in the final third of the play. He states that he will not check himself 
from abusing Manes for his slowness (1335‒6), and kestrels are appropriate to 
the context as birds of prey. Oaths by Zeus and other deities continue to be made 
throughout the play, but the insertion of unusual oaths and discussions of oaths 
specifically related to birds underlines the novelty of this alternative comic uni-
verse.
A similar situation arises in Clouds. New gods Air, Aether, Clouds, Chaos and 
Tongue are recognized by Socrates and later by Strepsiades (264‒5, 424). Socrates 
swears one oath by Breath, Chaos and Air (627‒9) while Strepsiades swears one 
oath by Air (667) and one by Mist (814) after his conversion. Although these forces 
could be understood as divine by a Greek audience,160 rejecting the Olympian 
159 Dunbar 1995, ad 1335‒6.
160 Aether is the daughter of Night (Thg. 124); Chaos is the great void of Hesiod’s primordial 
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gods in their favour is problematic. In Women at the Thesmophoria, for example, 
the character Euripides first of all swears an oath “by the Aether, the dwelling-
place of Zeus” (272), but the Inlaw feels that this is not a serious enough invoca-
tion and Euripides then swears “by all the gods, the whole lot!” (274). A line from 
Euripides’ Melanippe the Wise (fr. 487), usually attributed to Melanippe, also con-
tains an oath by “sacred Aether, the dwelling of Zeus”, which seems to confirm 
Melanippe’s character as someone who questions traditional divine cosmology 
(e.g. fr. 506), and whose attitude seems to display the influence of new philo-
sophical teachings. The expression is parodied in Frogs as “aether, the bedroom 
(δωμάτιον) of Zeus” (100, 311). In Clouds as in Birds, it is true that the propo-
nents of the new divine order swear oaths far more frequently by traditional gods 
than by the new gods,161 since informal oaths of this kind are an intrinsic part of 
the language of comedy.162 Nevertheless, the oaths by the new gods are striking 
intrusions which mark the revolutionary nature of the new order, and swearing 
oaths by the new gods seems to be the one lesson that the rather unintelligent 
Strepsiades comprehends.163 Indeed, Sommerstein has argued that Strepsiades’ 
dim overall understanding of the phrontistērion’s new concepts is underlined by 
his continued invocations of traditional gods “at a time when he should logically 
not have been invoking them at all.”164
It is remarkable that Aristophanes never makes Socrates swear “by the dog”, 
since the Platonic dialogues show this to be an idiosyncratic Socratic expres-
sion.165 Altogether the Platonic corpus contains thirteen examples of Socrates 
invoking “the dog” in informal oath statements.166 If invoking “the dog” consti-
tuted an instance of impiety, it would surely be inconceivable for Plato to incorpo-
rate it, as he does, in Socrates’ defence-speech against that very charge (Apol. 22a). 
Patzer argues that Socrates’ oath by the dog has a serious religious dimension, 
world (Thg. 116); Tongue might be linked to the Hesiodic Logoi (Thg. 229) since both embody 
the notion of persuasive speech; Air, Clouds and Mist are all natural phenomena which might 
be associated with Aether and Sky (Ouranos); Breath is a life-giving force. Dillon 1995, 151 n.41 
observes that the opening of Pythagoras’ On Nature as recorded by Diogenes Laertius (8.6) is an 
oath invoking “the air that I breathe”.
161 Socrates in three out of four cases, Strepsiades in twenty-three out of twenty-five cases both 
before and after his indoctrination; cf. Sommerstein 2007b, 127.
162 On informal oaths in comedy see Dillon 1995, Sommerstein 2007b, and ch. 13 below.
163 Fletcher 2012, 166.
164 Sommerstein 2007b, 127. Fletcher 2012, 172 calls the oath “an irrepressible force” in Clouds.
165 Socrates also swears by Hera far more commonly than any other speaker in our sources; see 
Sommerstein 2008b and Appendix to ch. 13 below.
166 Apol. 22a, Charm. 172d‒e, Crat. 411b3‒4, Gorg. 461a7‒b2, 466c3‒5, 482b4‒6, Hipp. Maj. 
287e5‒6, 298b5‒9, Lys. 211e6‒8, Phd. 98e‒99a, Rep. 399e5, 567d‒e, 592a.
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both because it occurs in addition to oaths by other gods and because a passage 
from Plato’s Gorgias (482b5) identifies the dog as the Egyptian deity Anubis.167 A 
fragment from Cratinus’ Cheirons (fr. 249), however, explicitly contrasts oaths by 
dog and by goose with oaths by gods, explaining that those who swore by dog 
and goose were silent concerning the gods (θεοὺς δ᾽ ἐσίγων). This is apparently a 
reference to the “oath of Rhadamanthys”, the famously righteous mythical ruler 
of Crete, who allegedly forbade all swearing by gods and ordered the substitution 
of these alternative expressions.168 Patzer suggests that Socrates’ use of both gods 
and dogs in his oaths demonstrates that the original intention of the Rhadaman-
thine oath is no longer known or recognized.169 It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that Socrates’ oaths by dogs have religious solemnity simply because he 
swears by gods on other occasions. Dillon is surely right in following Dodds who 
reads the oath by the dog Anubis as a playful allusion without serious religious 
significance.170 The harmless expression would be equivalent to the English “By 
Gum!” as a substitute for “By God!”171 As we saw above, the oath by goose was 
attributed to Lampon (appropriately in Birds) as an underhanded charlatan, pre-
sumably since perjury would only incur, at worst, the wrath of a goose!
The fact that Aristophanes nowhere presents Socrates swearing by the dog, 
although Socrates is frequently parodied in his comedies for having untraditional 
and novel views, further points to the conclusion that the oath by dog is not par-
ticularly controversial.172 Indeed Socrates’ oath by the dog is rather different from 
167 Patzer 2003, 98‒9.
168 As reported in the scholia on Pl. Rep. 399e and Phdr. 228b, where Socrates swears “by the 
dog”; for a detailed discussion of the legendary role of Rhadamanthys in oaths, see Hirzel 1902, 
90‒108.
169 Patzer 2003, 98.
170 Dillon 1995, 147 and Dodds 1959 ad Gorg. 482b5. Dodds compares the “light-hearted” oath 
by Zethus at Gorg. 489e2. This is the only oath by Zethus in archaic and classical sources, and 
Socrates invokes him specifically as the very person whom Callicles has just used to speak ironi-
cally against him. Still the fact remains that Zethus is a hero and so has an undeniable divine 
aspect. Patzer 2003, 94, compares the oath by the plane tree in Phaedrus, but this is also rather 
different as discussed below.
171 A small selection of other examples found in (various forms of) English: crikey, Christmas, 
crumbs, dash it, gee, golly, gosh, great Scott, heck, holy cow, holy smoke, jeebus, what the deuce. 
An American friend of Alan Sommerstein’s was fond of holy Toledo, and a British one of Hamlet.
172 Pace Patzer 2003, 102, whose thesis concerning the divinity of the dog leads him to suggest 
that Aristophanes omits oaths by the dog in Clouds in order to characterize Socrates as an athe-
ist. This argument is problematic not least because Socrates is not presented as an atheist. Rather 
he believes in the Cloud-goddesses (who acknowledge the realm of Zeus) and in other natural 
(divine) phenomena.
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the rest of the oaths in our discussion since it is used repeatedly by the same 
person and does not appear to have any context-specific relevance, though it is 
possible that the expression marks moments of particular importance in the Pla-
tonic dialogues.173 This contrasts with the only other example of an oath “by the 
dog”, which occurs in Aristophanes’ Wasps. The expression is used by the slave 
Sosias in the opening scene (Wasps 83). It might seem random at first glance, but 
since dogs become such an important feature in the drama, with the Athenian 
politician Cleon represented on stage in a debased state as a dog, the invoca-
tion of a dog has (at the very least) a loose thematic significance, comparable 
to the report of Lampon swearing by the goose in Birds. In Wasps, the unusual 
oath by the dog occurs while Sosias is attempting to guess what malady afflicts 
the master of the house. It turns out that the illness is a compulsion to perform 
jury-duty and that the man’s name is “Cleon-lover” (Philocleon). An early con-
nection is thus created between the image of a dog and the person of Cleon, and 
is ready to be developed later in the play. Moreover, we know that the comparison 
between Cleon and a dog had already been made in Knights by the Cleon figure 
himself (Paphlagon, Knights 1014‒24), and it seems to have been based on an 
actual self-characterization by Cleon as “the People’s watchdog”.174
5.3.3 Kings, ancestors, and symbols of power or status
From the absurd we return to the serious in our next group of oaths where mortal 
ancestors and kings are invoked as witnesses. We have seen throughout how dif-
ficult it is to posit a complete lack of divine association with many of the unusual 
oath witnesses invoked. This is also the case here because the Greeks believed the 
dead to have certain supernatural powers, particularly if they received worship 
as heroes.175 In Euripides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis, Menelaus invokes the mythological 
kings Pelops and Atreus as shared ancestors in his oath to Agamemnon where he 
swears that he will tell him clearly what is in his heart (IA 473‒6). Pelops, who 
was worshipped at Olympia, is a recognizable quasi-divine force and is also the 
grandfather of Agamemnon and Menelaus. Their father Atreus is not known to 
173 For example: the argument that psychology cannot be reduced to physiology (Phd. 
98e‒99a), that one must not leave a flawed or inconsistent proposition untested (Hipp. Maj. 298b, 
Gorg. 482b), or (at the climax of the main discussion of the Republic) that the philosopher will be 
willing to practise politics only in “his own city”, meaning the ideal city (Rep. 592a). 
174 See Sommerstein 1981, ad 1017.
175 See e.g. Johnston 1999.
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have been worshipped, but he nevertheless functions as an appropriate oath-wit-
ness here alongside Pelops at a moment when Menelaus is expressing solidarity 
with his brother’s position (or so he thinks).
More general is Demosthenes’ invocation in On the Crown (18.208) of the 
Athenians’ ancestors who faced danger at Marathon, those who stood in the bat-
tle-line at Plataea, those who fought at Salamis and Artemisium and those who 
lie in public tombs, meaning those who fell in Athens’ other wars. These oath-wit-
nesses are listed as guarantors of his statement that the Athenians cannot have 
been wrong when they took upon themselves the peril of war for the freedom and 
salvation of all. Commentators observe the surprising and memorable nature of 
these oath-witnesses. Usher suggests that “[t]he very ghosts of these past heroes, 
thus invoked, seem to come to [Demosthenes’] aid.”176 Once again, we see a 
unique set of forces named for its special connection to the circumstance, here 
the content of the oath. The issue of the divinity of the war-dead is addressed 
by Demosthenes himself in his Funeral Speech (Dem. 60.33‒34), where he argues 
that one could reasonably consider the war-dead to be sitting beside (paredroi) 
the gods below. Moreover Robert Parker notes that the honours conferred on the 
war-dead in Athens were “indistinguishable from those of heroes, since no sharp 
divide separated funerary from heroic cult.”177 It may be noteworthy that the 
Athenian general Lamachus, who was killed in battle in Sicily, is called a hero in 
Aristophanes’ Frogs (1039), and it seems clear that the ancestral war-dead could 
be understood as having the kind of divine aspect normally required in a sanctify-
ing oath-witness.
Weapons of war feature occasionally in our sources as non-divine oath guar-
antors. For Parthenopaeus in Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes, the invocation 
of his spear, which he is said to value more than a god and more than his eyes 
(i.e. his life), signals only his doom, since he does not sack the city of Thebes as 
he swears to do here (Seven 529‒32) but rather dies in the attempt. In Euripides’ 
Phoenician Women (1677) Antigone names as oath-witness the iron of Polyneices’ 
sword when she swears that her marriage night will make her one of the Danaids 
(i.e. she will murder her husband) if Creon forces her to marry his son.178 The oath 
176 Usher 1993, ad 208, and compare Johnston 1999, vii, on the relationship between the living 
and the dead: “The living … can expect the dead’s cooperation, so long as they keep the dead 
happy.” Yunis 2001, ad 208 also notes that the oath is unexpected and unusual, and MacDowell 
2009, 392 observes that the oath is “remarkably elaborate” and gives “extraordinary emphasis” 
to the assertion.
177 Parker 1996, 137.
178 I follow Mastronarde 1994, ad 1677, in presuming that Antigone is still bent over the body 
of Polyneices at this point, and that the expression σίδηρος ὅρκιόν τέ μοι ξίφος is an example 
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is forceful enough to persuade Creon to relent on this issue. In these two cases the 
weapon invoked as oath-guarantor is directly related to the context. Partheno-
paeus will do battle with his spear and Antigone threatens to commit murder. The 
contextual relevance of the invocation in Apollo’s oath to Hermes in the Homeric 
Hymn to Hermes is a little different but ultimately comparable. Apollo swears by 
“this cornel-wood javelin” (460: τόδε κρανέϊνον ἀκόντιον) that Hermes will enjoy 
prosperity among the gods, and that he will never be deceived by Apollo (461‒2). 
This latter part of the oath creates a pointed contrast between Apollo and the 
deceitful trickster Hermes. Moreover, as noted by Judith Fletcher, it is Apollo who 
binds himself with the first completed oath in the narrative.179 Hermes, mean-
while, has been manipulating oath-language to achieve his deceitful aims. He 
volunteered to swear (using the future tense ὀμοῦμαι) that he was not responsible 
for stealing Apollo’s cattle (although this was untrue) and invoked the head of 
Zeus as witness, but he carefully uses the verb “promise” (ὑπίσχομαι) rather than 
swear when he makes the actual statement, thus avoiding perjury (274‒6). He 
had then sworn that he would not pay compensation for the theft (383‒5), but 
without ever admitting that he had stolen the cattle. There is no threat of violence 
involved in the exchange between Apollo and Hermes so that the unusual oath-
witness invoked by Apollo seems linked to the solidity of his sworn statement 
and to his divine skill as an archer. The term ἀκόντιον is normally translated as 
“javelin”180 or “spear”181. However, as a diminutive of ἄκων, which LSJ describe 
as a javelin or dart “smaller and lighter than ἔγχος”, it seems to refer here to an 
arrow, particularly since the wood of the cornelian cherry is associated with the 
bow in Euripides (fr. 785).182 The demonstrative τόδε “this” also implies that the 
weapon is in Apollo’s possession so that an arrow again seems most likely. The 
arrow thus represents a particularly personal guarantee from Apollo, while its 
material substance lends further weight to the oath since the density of the wood 
from the cornelian cherry tree (Cornus mas) was recognized in antiquity as ideal 
of hendiadys, so that iron is “not invoked in the abstract, but its malevolent magical qualities….
are suggested.”
179 Fletcher 2008, 25.
180 M.L. West 2003, 149, Richardson 2010, ad 460, Vergados 2012, ad 460. 
181 Fletcher 2008, 25.
182 = Phaethon fr. 4 Diggle; see Diggle 1970 ad loc. Vergados 2012, ad 460 states that there is 
no diminutive sense to the term ἀκόντιον here, and that it refers to the cowherd’s staff, but it 
is entirely unclear how Vergados comes to this conclusion. He cites examples from Herodotus 
(1.34) and Thucydides (4.32) where ἀκόντια are “javelins” in each case, and a javelin can easily 
be understood as a lighter (and thus diminutive) version of a spear.
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for constructing weapons.183 To capture the playfulness of the term, however, we 
might also translate “mini-spear”.
Related to such symbols of power are symbols of status in oaths invoking 
non-divine entities. These too have a specific connection to the swearer or oath 
content. So in Aristophanes’ Knights, Paphlagon swears by the proedria that Pylos 
won for him (702) that he will destroy the Sausage-seller. The honour of privileged 
seating (proedria) in the theatre and at other public spectacles had been conferred 
on Cleon (caricatured here through the figure of Paphlagon) after the victory of 
Sphacteria in 425 BC.184 Invoking proedria as oath-witness demonstrates how 
dear such public recognition is to Paphlagon, while the Sausage-seller gleefully 
looks forward to Paphlagon’s loss of status (Knights 703‒4). More common in our 
sources, however, are symbols of hospitality and friendship. In a fragment attack-
ing Lycambes, Archilochus accuses him of having forsaken his great oath “by 
salt and table” (fr.173.2: ἅλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν), ostensibly referring to Lycambes 
reneging on the marriage arranged between his daughter and Archilochus. This 
provoked Archilochus’ savage invective against the family which allegedly caused 
their suicide. Renaud Gagné has shown how the oath is of crucial structural and 
thematic importance to the various fragments dealing with this episode, where 
the fate of Lycambes’ family should be associated directly with the consequences 
of perjury.185 There is no doubt that the oath and its breach should be regarded 
as extremely serious even though no identifiable deities are mentioned as wit-
nessing the oath. Salt and table cannot be seen as divine in themselves, but in 
these circumstances they must represent the divinely protected ritual of Greek 
reciprocal friendship (xenia). They function to emphasize the shocking nature of 
Lycambes’ treachery since they imply that Archilochus and Lycambes had shared 
meals together and had cultivated a friendship.186
183 Markle 1977, 324.
184 Sommerstein 1981, ad 575.
185 Gagné 2009.
186 Aeschines claims (3.224) that Demosthenes caused an outcry in the Assembly by saying that 
he valued the city’s salt above the shared table of hospitality when charged with putting to death 
a man who had previously been his guest. In another of Aeschines’ speeches (2.22) salt and table 
are simultaneous symbols of hospitality where he mocks Demosthenes’ concern with these by 
alleging that Demosthenes is a foreigner (and so should not be bothered with issues of hospital-
ity at Athens). This suggests that the distinction apparently made by Demosthenes (at 3.224) was 
shocking, in part at least, because it is rhetorically deceptive. If the city’s salt and the table of 
hospitality are both equally valid symbols of hospitality then claiming to value one above the 
other is an entirely vacuous proposition. Aeschines continues by alleging further deceptions on 
Demosthenes’ part, namely that he forged letters and tortured individuals on the basis of ficti-
tious charges (3.225).
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That the shared experience of feasting or drinking is symbolic of a binding 
friendship is further evidenced by the oath of sexual abstinence sworn by all the 
women in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. There Lysistrata calls upon the goddess Per-
suasion and the wine-cup of friendship (κύλιξ φιλοτησία) to receive their sacri-
fice (203‒4), the “sacrifice” being a “slaughtered” wineskin. The appeal to the 
wine-cup of friendship is clearly meant to create solidarity among the women,187 
although the ritual itself is unrelated to the kind of guest-host friendship implied 
by the salt and table of Archilochus and the “table of xenia” in Homer. The latter 
is explicitly named as witness in three oaths from the Odyssey as part of the trio 
“Zeus, first among the gods, the table of xenia, and the hearth of blameless Odys-
seus” (Ζεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν ξενίη τε τράπεζα | ἱστίη τ’ Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος). The dis-
guised Odysseus twice swears oaths invoking these forces when predicting that 
Odysseus will return to Ithaca. The first passage (Od. 14.151‒73) coincides with 
Odysseus’ attempts to receive hospitality from Eumaeus, particularly in the form 
of clothing, so that the invocation of the table of xenia is entirely appropriate to 
the context. The same oath formula is used later by the disguised Odysseus to 
encourage the loyal herdsman Philoetius (20.227‒34). The similarity in language 
thus creates a parallel between Odysseus’ exchanges with both loyal herdsmen. 
The final example occurs in book 17. The same oath-witnesses are invoked and 
the oath-statement relates once more to the predicted return of Odysseus, here 
said to be already in Ithaca (17.155‒9). The speaker is the wandering prophet 
Theoclymenus who had come back to Ithaca with Telemachus as he returned 
from searching for news of his father. A minor figure in the Odyssey, whose func-
tion has been debated, Theoclymenus may well have been introduced from an 
alternative version of the saga in which Odysseus himself returns to Ithaca with 
Telemachus disguised as a prophet. This would help to explain why Theocly-
menus’ situation and speech patterns so closely resemble those of Odysseus.188 
It is the first passage, then, in which the table of xenia is most obviously relevant 
to the immediate context, while its invocation in subsequent passages serves to 
underline the trustworthiness of the information being relayed.
5.3.4 Cabbages and other plants
Finally we turn to cabbages and other plants: four oaths by cabbages, one by 
the almond tree, one by a plane tree, and one by the poppy leaf, most of which 
187 Cf. Sommerstein 1990, ad 203.
188 See further Reece 1994 and Steiner 2010, ad 53.
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come from comic or iambic fragments. The fragmentary nature of the works in 
which these oaths feature makes it extremely difficult to analyze their potential 
thematic relevance, but the fact that a whole group of oaths by cabbages survives 
implies that these oaths, at least, were probably not context-specific. A fragment 
from the sixth century iambic poet Ananius (fr. 4) contains a person asserting by 
the cabbage (ναὶ μὰ τὴν κράμβην) that they love the addressee by far the most of 
all humankind. The early Sicilian comic poet Epicharmus also has a character 
swearing an affirmative oath by the cabbage in his drama Land and Sea (fr. 22 K-A: 
ναὶ μὰ τὰν κράμβαν).189 It is possible, in this case, that an oath by cabbages was 
specifically linked to the subject matter of the drama since the fragments suggest 
that food was a primary concern.190 The fact that the earliest instances of this oath 
are singular may point to it being a comic deformation of ναὶ μὰ τὰν Κόραν “yes 
by Persephone” (as at Αr. Wasps 1438‒40). That would suggest that this oath was 
originally confined to women,191 and our passages neither prove nor refute this. 
Such a restriction might have lapsed when the expression migrated to Athens and 
became plural.
We have no clear context for the passage from Telecleides’ Prytaneis (fr. 29) 
which reads ναὶ μὰ τὰς κράμβας “yes by the cabbages” (in the plural). A charac-
ter’s use of exactly the same oath in Eupolis’ Baptai (fr. 84.2) accompanies a state-
ment that the addressee’s suffering is just, and may be related to a caricature of 
Alcibiades, but this is not certain,192 nor is there any indication of why cabbages 
would be an appropriate invocation here other than for the creation of humour. 
Oaths by cabbages, then, would seem to exemplify a low comic register,193 without 
much seriousness or significance attached to them. Unusually, the sanctifying 
oath witness is entirely consumable and that the severest punishment one might 
expect for committing perjury would be a comically appropriate stomach-ache!
Eupolis’ Baptai also contains an oath by the almond tree, where a character 
swears to another “you’ll be the death of me, yes by the almond tree” (Baptai fr. 
189 In fact, all the oaths by cabbage or cabbages in the plural are affirmative and follow the 
same formula.
190 Cf. Rusten et al. 2011, 63. The fragments mention porridge (fr. 20), vines (fr. 21), flat-cake (fr. 
23), parsnip (fr. 24), sea-fish (fr. 25), gruntfish and whitebait (fr. 26), lobster (fr. 27) and star-gazer 
fish (fr. 29).
191 On the oath by Kore (Persephone) as a woman’s oath see MacDowell 1971 ad 1438, and see 
also §7.1 below for further discussion of gendered oaths.
192 See Storey 2003, 104‒5.
193 The cabbage is associated with a low-class character in Hipponax (fr. 104), as observed by 
M.L. West 1974, 145, where someone invokes the seven-leafed cabbage given to Pandora at the 
Thargelia.
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79 K-A ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαπολεῖς με ναὶ μὰ τὴν ἀμυγδαλῆν). This invocation is unique in our 
sources, and is certainly to be treated more seriously than the oath by cabbages. 
Baptai probably involved the transfer to Athens of Thracian orgiastic rites associ-
ated with the worship of the goddess Kotyto,194 and the almond tree was sacred to 
another foreign deity, the Phrygian god of vegetation Attis.195 We cannot doubt the 
serious nature of the oath invoking the plane tree in Plato’s Phaedrus (236e-237a), 
the very tree at which the dialogue takes place in a location sacred to the Nymphs 
(230b). Phaedrus swears that he will never again report a speech by any author 
unless Socrates delivers his speech in the presence of the plane tree, and the oath 
persuades Socrates to comply. Our final oath by a plant, like our first example, 
comes from an iambic fragment and also suggests a lack of seriousness. Someone 
swears “yes yes by the poppy leaf” (adesp. iamb. 57 West: ναὶ ναὶ μὰ μήκωνος 
χλόην). The Suda, which cites the expression twice (μ125, ν100), says it is an oath 
uttered in mockery, and the invocation of the opium poppy certainly corroborates 
a scenario in which the swearer has lost control of their wits, although once again 
we are hampered in our understanding of the passage by a lack of context.
5.3.5 Conclusions
Scholars engaging with isolated instances of oaths invoking non-divine entities 
have returned various verdicts regarding their nature and function. Achilles’ oath 
by the sceptre in the Iliad is unanimously treated with seriousness. Socrates’ oath 
by the dog is deemed light-hearted by some, sacred by others. The list of plants 
in the ephebic oath has caused some confusion. Abstractions have been taken 
as signs of impiety in Aristophanic comedy. Our analysis of the whole corpus of 
oaths by non-divine entities has demonstrated a far more regular pattern of use 
than can be revealed by individual cases. Notwithstanding the fact that some 
oaths include both non-divine and major divine powers while others contain 
only invocations of apparently non-divine entities, we find that a divine, or at 
least serious, aspect can be attributed to the seemingly non-divine forces in an 
overwhelming number of cases. Moreover unusual oath-witnesses almost invari-
ably function to add solemnity to an oath either because they give it a deeply 
personal tie to the swearer, or because they are specifically relevant to the context 
194 Storey 2003, 98‒9, with 99 n.10 who suggests that the Thracian rites would have been 
known to the Athenian audience from Aeschylus’ Lykourgeia which may have been re-performed 
in the early 410s.
195 Paus. 7.17.11, noted by Storey 2003, 99 n.11.
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or content of the oath, or because the swearer believes them to be divine. Only 
two groups of oaths do not properly conform to this pattern: Socrates’ oath by the 
dog and the oaths by cabbages. The very fact that there are groups of these oaths 
demonstrates that they are not context-specific. Oaths by cabbages do not seem 
to be serious, and it is telling that they appear in comedy or invective. Socrates’ 
oath by the dog, on the other hand, seems to be a formula of “swearing without 
swearing” so to speak, giving the semblance of the force and emphasis conveyed 
by the oath but without running the risk of divine punishment for falsehood.
6 Ways to give oaths extra sanctity
I.C. Torrance
There were various ways in which the solemnity of an oath could be increased. 
The most common include the invocation of one or more particularly appropri-
ate deities to witness the oath, the swearing of an oath in a location of religious 
significance (such as in a temple, at an altar, or in front of a god’s statue), and the 
performance of an oath-sacrifice. The pouring of libations must also have accom-
panied oaths frequently since, although there are, relatively speaking, not a large 
number of references to libations being added to oaths in our sources, one of 
the commonest Greek words for a sworn treaty or alliance, spondai, also means 
“libations”.1 Interstate treaties were often inscribed on stone and displayed in 
the vicinity of an important temple, as Andrew Bayliss has discussed.2 Gestures 
could also add solemnity to an oath. Raising the hands or a sceptre to heaven, 
striking the ground, clasping hands and drawing blood all occur in our texts. 
Rarely an unusual ritual is added as a representation of the oath-curse on the 
would-be perjurer, such as the burning of wax images or the sinking of lumps 
of iron in the sea. These function as engineered reminders of the punishments 
for oath-breaking, and in some cases consequences for perjury are spelled out in 
human terms. This too was a way of adding solemnity to an oath, and the issue 
will be touched on briefly here but will be discussed in more detail in §12.2. Some 
particularly elaborate oaths contain numerous sanctifying features, and we will 
turn our attention to these in the final section of this chapter.
6.1 Sanctifying witnesses and significant locations
One of the most basic ways of adding solemnity to an oath was to invoke as sanc-
tifying witness a deity, or even a non-divine entity,3 with a special connection to 
the context, content, or swearer of the oath. Invoking “Zeus” or “the gods” obvi-
ously constitutes a serious oath, but oaths in which Zeus is invoked either with an 
epithet emphasizing a particular attribute, or in combination with other relevant 
deities, seem to have held more weight than those in which he is invoked alone. 
In Demosthenes, speakers often invoke Zeus and “all the gods” to add force to 
1 See S&B 151, 153, 242‒4, and cf. Burkert 1985, 71.
2 S&B 158‒60; see also Steiner 1994, 66‒7. 
3 On the potential of non-divine entities to add to the seriousness of an oath, see §5.3.
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important assertions (Dem. 8.49, 10.7, 25, 23.188, 25.13, 35.40, 36.61),4 and an invo-
cation of all the gods or all the gods and goddesses sometimes concludes a list 
of more specific oath-witnesses (cf. Il. 3.245‒301, Eur. Med. 735‒55, the League 
of Corinth treaty RO 76, the Hippocratic Oath). In interstate oaths, Zeus is com-
monly invoked along with other important deities,5 but informal oaths by Zeus 
alone tend to be weak oaths.6 Where Zeus has a specific function as patron of a 
particular cause or institution, an accompanying epithet is normally important. 
Oaths taken by Athenian men introducing their sons to the phratry, for example, 
invoked Zeus Phratrios (IG ii2 1237.74‒113), and seem to have included touching 
the altar of Zeus since the issue of Callias’ oath to the members of the phratry as 
he was “grasping the altar” (λαβόμενος τοῦ βωμοῦ) is brought up in Andocides’ 
On the Mysteries (126).
An invocation of “the gods” alone constitutes a rather weak oath. The issue 
is well illustrated by a comparison of the oaths of Jason and Medea in Euripides’ 
Medea. Jason swears two oaths during the course of the play, in both cases invok-
ing “the gods” (daimones) as sanctifying witnesses. He first calls them to witness 
that he wishes to help Medea and the children (619‒20), and uses essentially the 
same formula later when he states that Medea is preventing him from burying his 
children (1408‒14). These oaths do not help Jason’s cause in any way. The first 
merely enrages Medea further, while the second yields Jason no support from 
any source. In fact, Jason is cast throughout the play as an oath-breaker (Med. 
20‒2, 161, 492‒5, 1392), and Medea can be read as the avenging spirit meting 
out his punishment for perjury.7 Jason’s invocations of unspecific daimones 
show that his oaths are weak in comparison with Medea’s. The oath-witnesses 
Medea invokes become more specific as the play progresses and as her position 
becomes more powerful. Her first oath, reported by the Nurse in the prologue, 
calls the gods (theoi) to witness that she is being mistreated by Jason (22). In the 
second, Medea invokes Hecate, as the goddess dwelling in the innermost part of 
4 In one variation Demosthenes swears an oath invoking Heracles and all the gods, as a measure 
of added emphasis in claiming that it was men like Aeschines and not like himself who were to 
blame for the loss of the war to Philip (Dem. 18.294). See ch. 9 for further discussion of oaths in 
oratory.
5 See S&B 160‒7.
6 On informal oaths, see ch. 13.
7 See Burnett 1973, 13, and cf. Fletcher 2012, 181 with n. 6. A. Allan 2007 argues that there was 
no oath, and thus no perjury, since its terms are never revealed, but Jason never denies that he 
broke an oath and other scholars have shown that perjury is an issue of central importance in 
the play. See Burnett 1973, esp. 13‒20, Boedeker 1991, Kovacs 1993, Burnett 1998, 196‒207, S.R. 
West 2003, 442‒3. 
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her hearth, whom she claims to choose as her “ally” (395‒8). Hecate was nor-
mally associated with crossroads and outside spaces. The seemingly paradoxical 
description of Hecate as dwelling by Medea’s hearth “virtually in displacement 
of Hestia, conveys … a special personal intimacy”,8 and the gods appear to be 
on Medea’s side in this tragedy, in spite of her crimes. In Medea’s final oath the 
nether spirits of vengeance who dwell in Hades are invoked in her statement that 
she will not leave her children for her enemies to treat shamefully (1059‒61). The 
oath marks the moment of Medea’s decision to kill her children, although the 
specific identity of the “nether spirits of vengeance” (nerterous alastoras) has 
been debated.9 Is Medea referring to the avenging spirits for Jason’s perjury, to 
avenging spirits for her previous crimes, or to the avenging spirits for her immi-
nent crimes?10 I would argue that the avenging spirits invoked here by Medea are 
precisely those associated with Jason’s perjury. It is because Jason has broken 
his oath, abandoning her and the children, that her children can now be treated 
shamefully by her enemies. Moreover, since she remains convinced that her 
crimes are necessary and escapes unpunished, it would be strange indeed for her 
to invoke a spirit of vengeance to pursue her in the name of her victims. Mossman 
is concerned by the lack of parallels for an alastor as a punisher of perjury,11 but 
the truce between the Trojans and the Greeks in Iliad 3 includes the invocation of 
“those in the nether world who punish dead men who have sworn false oaths” (Il. 
3.279‒80). There are some textual issues with these lines,12 but the reference to 
“nether” powers (hoi hupenerthe), which is unproblematic, is similar to Medea’s 
description of the alastores as “nether” figures (nerterous), so that the concept 
of a nether spirit as an avenger for perjury is not entirely without parallel. In any 
case it is clear that Medea’s oaths are far more powerful and effective than Jason’s 
and that their strength comes, in part, from her invocations of deities specifically 
chosen as patrons of her cause.
In several dramas, as in real life, elements of spatial context and location, 
coupled with the identity of the divinity invoked, can add further solemnity to 
oaths. Euripides’ Hippolytus contains two oaths invoking Artemis sworn in the 
8 Mastronarde 2002, ad 397.
9 The authenticity of the entire speech has also been debated. Lloyd-Jones 1980 argues that 
1059‒63 may be a fourth-century interpolation, Diggle 1984 deletes 1056‒80, Kovacs 1986 de-
letes 1056‒64; cf. also Seidensticker 1990 for further discussion. Among editors, Page 1938, Van 
Looy 1992, and Mastronarde 2002 retain the oath passage (1059‒61). Mossman 2011, 314‒32, has 
a detailed discussion of all the major issues, favouring deletion of 1056‒63.
10 See Mossman 2011, ad 1059 for a summary of the possibilities.
11 Mossman 2011, ad 1059.
12 See Kirk 1985 ad 278‒9.
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presence of her statue. Epithets are important in both oaths. When the chorus 
of local women swear an oath to keep Phaedra’s secret, they swear by “august 
Artemis, daughter of Zeus” (713) emphasizing both their reverence for the 
goddess (who is a patron of women) and her connection to the all-powerful Zeus. 
At the end of the play, however, when the dying Hippolytus gives his father an 
oath absolving him of guilt for causing his death, he calls to witness “Artemis of 
the conquering bow” (1451). Here Artemis’ special connection to Hippolytus as 
goddess of the hunt is stressed by her devotee. A statue of Artemis the Archeress 
was present in the real setting of the divorced wife’s oath of denial recorded in 
the Gortyn code (IC iv 72 col. iii, II.5‒12). If a divorced wife swore by Artemis in the 
presence of the statue in the Amyclaean temple that she had not taken property 
that belonged to her ex-husband, the latter was forbidden to take anything from 
her. Here, Artemis is again the patron of women, and the fact of taking the oath in 
the sacred location and in the presence of her statue clearly added enough solem-
nity to the oath for the judge to adjudicate in the woman’s favour.13 The temple 
of Artemis, in front of which Euripides’ Iphigeneia among the Taurians is set, is 
important too for Iphigeneia’s oath. She invokes Artemis in whose temple she 
holds office (737), emphasizing her personal connection to this goddess. Pylades, 
by contrast, swears his reciprocal oath by “the lord of heaven, august Zeus” (738). 
As lord of heaven, Zeus would presumably oversee from above Pylades’ safe 
return to Greece.
The worlds of drama and reality overlap elsewhere. Oaths invoking Diony-
sus (the god of drama) in plays which were performed at festivals in honour of 
Dionysus, and so in spaces sacred to him, have the potential to be especially 
emphatic in a metatheatrical way. Two passages from Aristophanes contain refer-
ences to the persona of Aristophanes swearing “by Dionysus” that his first pro-
duction of Clouds was an excellent comedy (Wasps 1046‒7, Clouds 518‒24).14 The 
first Clouds, performed at the City Dionysia in 423, had been ranked third and 
last, and while our extant Clouds was never performed, the similarity between the 
sentiment expressed in Clouds 518‒24 and Wasps 1046‒7 (which was performed) 
demonstrates that including such oaths in a comedy was both a legitimate and 
a particularly emphatic tactic. Naturally enough, holding offices connected with 
the dramatic festivals also seems to have involved invocations of Dionysus and 
sanctifying features related to the god. The choregos’ oath in the deme of Icaria, 
for example, required the swearer to place a hand on the cult statue of Dionysus 
13 On other notable oaths in the Gortyn code, see S&B, 62‒7, and on the Gortyn laws more gener-
ally, see Gagarin 2008, 145‒75, Gagarin 2010.
14 See further ch. 13a on authors swearing in their own person.
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(IG i3 254.10‒24). Taking office as one of the Gerarai (older women who served as 
priestesses of Dionysus in Athens) similarly involved an oath taken in the sanctu-
ary of Dionysus, in the presence of his altar, and it also included the touching of 
the sacrificial victims ([Dem.] 59.78, cf. 59.73).
Swearing an oath in a sacred location, then, was a one clear way of adding 
solemnity, and there are a very great number of oaths in which a sacred location 
functions as part of the context. In the case of drama, where plays were often 
performed in front of a fictional but identifiable sacred space, oaths sworn in 
these spaces had the potential to be especially serious or emphatic. The statue 
of Athena, present on stage in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, in addition to the figure 
of Athena herself, along with the Areopagus setting, will have strengthened the 
significance of Orestes’ oath of alliance (Eum. 287‒91, 671, 762‒4). In Ion, it is note-
worthy that Athena is invoked in the only two oaths of that play, although the 
drama is set at the temple of Apollo in Delphi. Creusa calls “the Gorgon-slayer” to 
witness that Ion was born after Phoebus lay with her in secret union (Ion 1478‒87). 
Later, she swears again by Athena Nike that Apollo is Ion’s father (1528‒31). The 
choice of deity and epithets are both important. Athena will soon appear ex 
machina, claiming to have been sent by an embarrassed Apollo (1555‒9), who 
might properly have been expected to tie up the action, so her invocation in these 
oaths prepares an audience for her arrival. “Gorgon-slayer” is an appropriate 
epithet for Athena at a moment when Creusa is stressing Ion’s identity as her son. 
She had previously planned to kill him with a drop of Gorgon’s blood, unaware 
that he was her son (998‒1019), but rejected the plan as soon as she realized Ion’s 
true identity. The Gorgon’s potential to harm seems counteracted by the invoca-
tion of the Gorgon-slayer. Similarly the invocation of Athena as “Nike” stresses 
Creusa’s hopes for a victory in being reconciled with her son, and the epithet 
gains extra-dramatic sanctity from the fact that the temple of Athena Nike was a 
stone’s throw from the theatre.15
The oath of alliance between Athens and Argos described in Euripides’ Sup-
pliant Women is to be recorded on a tripod, which will be displayed at Delphi, and 
is discussed below (pp. 149‒50). It is beyond the scope of the present analysis to 
explore the potential for additional sanctity of the numerous oaths sworn in a 
variety of ritual contexts represented or reported on stage,16 but evidence from 
15 The temple is likely to have been completed several years before the production of Ion. See 
Lee 1997, ad 457.
16 Other examples from tragedy include the oath of Andromache taken in front of Thetis’ shrine 
(Andr. 37‒8), the oath of Orestes in the temple of Apollo at Delphi (IT 974), Theseus’ oath to Adras-
tus in front of the temple of Demeter at Eleusis (E. Supp. 1174‒5), Oedipus’ oath in the sacred 
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the orators shows that the sacred space in which an oath was sworn was a signifi-
cant aspect of the oath and was worth stressing. The prosecutor in Deinarchus’ 
Against Philocles argues that Philocles had broken the oath which he had sworn 
“between the sacred statue (hedos) and the table (trapeza)” (Dein. 3.2), presum-
ably somewhere on the Acropolis.17 Euphiletus’ brother in Isaeus’ On Behalf of 
Euphiletus emphasizes, in relation to Euphiletus’ rights as a citizen, that Euphi-
letus’ mother (who his opponents admit is a citizen) had been willing to swear 
in the sanctuary of Delphinian Apollo that Euphiletus was the son of herself and 
Hegesippus (Isaeus 12.9). Similarly, it is stressed in Isaeus’ On the Estate of Mene-
cles that the arbitrators in the dispute swore to adjudicate for the common good 
of the disputants at the altar of Aphrodite at Cephale (Isaeus 2.31), and that they 
further compelled both parties to swear at the altar that they would behave in a 
proper manner towards each other in the future (2.32).
Several sources refer to oaths being taken at the “stone” (lithos) in the agora, 
where a variety of official oaths were administered, such as the oaths of witnesses 
and arbitrators in litigation (Dem. 54.26, Arist. Ath. Pol. 55.5), and the oath of office 
of the archons (Arist. Ath. Pol. 55.5, cf. 7.1). Other important oaths were often sworn 
in temples and sanctuaries. The athlothetai, who were responsible for overseeing 
the games, swore an oath in the temple at Marathon confirming that they were 
eligible and were over thirty years old (IG i3 3.6‒10). In Plato’s Magnesia, where 
oaths are only used if perjury is unlikely to bring gain to the perjurer (see ch. 15), 
the rulers were to swear an oath in the temple when they chose judges, stating 
that the judges they chose would be the men (one from each group of leaders) 
whom they deemed most likely to decide lawsuits in the best and holiest way 
(Laws 757c-d).18 The reconciliation oath for citizens sworn in Dicaea ca. 365‒359 
was taken in three of the most sacred sanctuaries and a copy was set up in the 
grove of the Eumenides (S. OC 521‒3). Various Aristophanic comedies, which contain numerous 
informal oaths, are set either entirely or in part in locations of ritual importance. Lysistrata is set 
at the Acropolis, Women at the Thesmophoria takes place mostly in front of the temple of Deme-
ter Thesmophoros, Peace includes the palace of the gods as a location. Ritual paraphernalia are 
on stage when many oaths are uttered (e.g. Ach. 730, Birds 860‒1, 954‒5, Lys. 193‒4, 206, 207‒8, 
Peace 962‒3, 978‒9, 979‒87, 1046, 1096‒8, 1117, Thes. 72‒3, 86). Boegehold 1999, 71‒3 makes the 
interesting suggestion that in some oaths from Aristophanes “a gesture can supply the punish-
ment [the speaker] asks for if he does not fulfill his oath” (72).
17 It is unclear precisely what is meant by trapeza. Accompanying comments and notes in 
Worthington 1992 and in Nouhaud & Dors-Méary 1990 do not discuss the issue. Commonly mean-
ing “table”, the term also designated the money-changers’ counters in the agora (Pl. Apol. 17c), 
which may be significant here since Philocles has been accused of taking bribes (Dein. 3.2).
18 See also pp. 152‒5 below on the oaths of the kings of Atlantis described in Plato’s Critias, 
sworn in the temple of Poseidon.
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sanctuary of Athena (Voutiras & Sismanides 2007, 255‒74). Here repetition of the 
oath in three different locations seems to be an important element in giving the 
oath additional solemnity. The oath of the archons was apparently sworn twice, 
once in the Stoa of the Basileus and once on the Acropolis (Ath. Pol. 55.5), and 
we have one literary example of an oath sworn three times for added effect. This 
occurs in Aristophanes’ Frogs (303‒6) where Xanthias swears three informal 
oaths to Dionysus confirming that the terrifying Empusa is gone. Slightly differ-
ent was the practice of renewing an oath at regular intervals which is recorded in 
some instances (Thuc. 5.23.4, Pl. Critias 119d).
An individual requesting an oath could specify a location in which the oath 
should be sworn. Protagoras reportedly challenged those who were unwilling to 
pay his tuition fee to swear an oath in the temple stating how much they believed 
his teachings were worth (Pl. Prot. 328c1‒2). Similarly in Aristophanes’ Clouds 
(1232‒4) the First Creditor challenges Strespsiades to swear, in a location to be 
chosen by the Creditor, that he does not owe him any money. The Creditor further 
specifies that the gods Zeus, Hermes and Poseidon be invoked in the oath. A vol-
unteered oath could also be accompanied by a willingness to swear in any loca-
tion. In the dispute over the inheritance of her children, Diogeiton’s daughter is 
willing to swear, wherever her father should choose, that her husband had given 
him five talents for safe keeping when he left to serve in the military (Lys. 32.13).
6.2 Oath-sacrifices
Oaths of office, oaths sworn during litigation, and treaties or alliances sworn in 
times of war were often accompanied by an oath-sacrifice as a way of increas-
ing the binding power of the oath. Oath-sacrifices are associated with the offices 
of dikastai (Arist. Ath. Pol. 1.1), archons (Arist. Ath. Pol. 55.5), arbitrators and 
witnesses in legal cases (ibid.), those bringing homicide cases to court (Dem. 
23.67‒8), those responsible for registering new members in a deme (Isaeus 7.28), 
and men chosen to draw up the register of the Five Thousand (Arist. Ath. Pol. 
29.5). The altar at which some of these oaths were sworn (e.g. the oaths of archons 
and of litigants), the lithos, was also the location where the sacrifice took place 
and was cut into pieces (ta tomia, Arist. Ath. Pol. 55.5).
The discarding of the sacrificial victim is the crucial difference between the 
oath-sacrifice and normal animal sacrifice. The oath-sacrifice was not consumed 
since it represented the oath-curse of death or extinction of the family line for 
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the would-be perjurer.19 So, when sacrificing the boar in his oath to Achilles at 
Iliad 19, Agamemnon trims the hairs of the animal with a knife (19.252‒4, cf. Il. 
3.273), and slits its throat (19.266), but the boar is then hurled into the sea by 
Talthybius to feed the fishes (19.267‒8). The hair of the animal, which is nor-
mally thrown into the sacrificial fire as a first offering, is distributed amongst the 
princes at Iliad 3.274 because there is no fire in Homeric oath-sacrifice.20 In Iliad 3, 
Priam loads the sacrificed sheep on to his chariot before returning to Troy where 
he will presumably dispose of them (Il. 3.310), possibly by burying them or by 
burning them.21 Later texts suggest that burning became the common method of 
discarding the oath-sacrifice.22 The type of animal sacrificed varied. An inscrip-
tion from Ephesus, probably relating to the oath of a witness at trial claiming 
exemption from testifying (exōmosia), also records the sacrifice of a boar (IEphe-
sos 1678B.1‒5), which is to be provided by the plaintiff, and Pausanias claims that 
oaths between Heracles and the sons of Neleus as well as the oaths taken by ath-
letes and their families at Olympia included a boar as sacrificial victim.23 Sheep 
are sacrificed in the truce between the Greeks and the Trojans in the Iliad (3.292) 
and in the alliance between Athens and Argos described in Euripides’ Suppliants 
(1201),24 a bull is sacrificed in the war pact of the Seven against Thebes (A. Seven 
42‒8) and by the kings of Atlantis (Pl. Critias 119e-120a), and the possibility of 
sacrificing a horse is raised (though rejected) in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata (191‒3).25 
In the peace treaty forged after the battle of Cunaxa a wolf is sacrificed in addition 
to a bull, a wild boar and a ram (Xen. Anab. 2.2.9).26 What was important was that 
the sacrificial victims be teleia (Andoc. 1.97, [Dem.] 59.60), and teleia seems to 
mean both “unblemished” and “full-grown”.27
19 Cole 1996, 243 n.16 observes that “sacrifices performed in the phratry of the Demotionidai 
were accompanied by an oath, but the meat of other animals sacrificed was distributed to the 
phratry” (emphasis added). The relevant inscription is IG ii2 1237, 34‒8, 108‒13. See also Parker 
1983, 283 n.11 on the inedibility of purificatory sacrifices and on the probability that a separate 
animal was sacrificed for consumption in some cases.
20 Kirk 1985 ad 273‒4, cf. Edwards 1991, ad 19.252‒5. 
21 See Kirk 1985 ad 3.310, who also suggests that Priam takes only the carcasses of the two sheep 
provided by the Trojans while the Achaeans dispose of the third sheep.
22 IG i3 15d37, Eur. IA 59, and Pl. Critias 120a all mention burning oath-sacrifices.
23 Pausanias 3.20.9 and 5.24.11, discussed by Karavites 1992, 62‒3.
24 See further p. 151 below on these.
25 According to Pausanias (3.20.9) the oath of Helen’s suitors included the sacrifice of a horse.
26 The wolf is omitted in one important manuscript but as noted by Parker 2004, 137 n.17 “the 
addition of the wolf by a scribe has no obvious motive”.
27 LSJ s.v. τέλειος; see Cole 1996, 231‒2 and 244 n.33 on adult victims in oath-sacrifices and 
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The slaughter of more than one sacrificial victim marked an oath as par-
ticularly solemn. A fragmentary inscription dating from the early fourth century 
records a hecatomb accompanying an oath of office sworn to the hieromnēmones, 
possibly by the secretaries (CID I 10.9‒15), although we cannot say how many sac-
rificial victims there were.28 Three sacrificial victims are recorded in several cases. 
The truce between the Greeks and the Trojans includes the sacrifice of three sheep 
(Il. 3.103‒4) as does the alliance described in Euripides’ Suppliant Women (1201), 
and the wolf sacrificed at the battle of Cunaxa may have been a Persian addition 
to a more usual Greek triad (bull, boar, ram).29 In relation to the diōmosiai oaths 
sworn during homicide trials, Demosthenes also refers to the sacrifice of a boar, 
a ram and a bull and gives the details that these must have been slaughtered by 
the appropriate officers on the appointed days for the requirement of solemnity to 
have been met (Dem. 23.68).30 A particular feature of oaths in homicide trials was 
that the swearer was required to come into contact with the tomia “cut pieces”. 
Demosthenes refers to “standing over the tomia” (23.68); Antiphon mentions 
“touching the slaughtered victims” (sphagia, 5.12).31 Stengel’s argument that the 
tomia were genitals has been influential.32 The verb temnein can mean “to cas-
trate”, and castration would be symbolic of death for the perjurer, as Stengel sug-
gests.33 However, the identification of tomia as genitals seems far from certain. 
cf. Parker 2011, 157. The arne sacrificed in the Iliadic truce (Il. 3.103, 247) are sheep rather than 
lambs; see LSJ s.v. ἀρήν II, quoting Iliad 3.103.
28 The text was previously published as IG ii2 1126.
29 Parker 2004, 137 n.17 observes that the Persians offer wolf’s blood to “Areimanios” (i.e. Angra 
Mainyu, the spirit of evil and destruction) in Plut. Mor. 369e.
30 On oaths in homicide trials see further S&B 111‒15.
31 The example from Herodotus (6.67‒9), in which Demaratus’ mother recounts the truth con-
cerning his father’s identity with the entrails (splankhna) of a sacrificial ox in her hand is not, 
in fact, an oath, although her story contains the report of one. The passage is erroneously refer-
enced by several scholars (myself included, unfortunately) as an example of an oath taken while 
holding the entrails of a sacrificial victim (cf. Stengel 1914, 98; Burkert 1983, 36 n.9; Burkert 1985, 
252 with 446 n.22; Faraone 1993, 66; id. 2005, 149; Berti 2006, 195; Parker 2011, 157 with n.128; 
Fletcher 2012, 9; Torrance 2012, 310). Demaratus begs his mother by all the gods to tell him the 
truth after putting the entrails in her hand (Hdt. 6.68), and she proceeds to tell him the truth 
(Hdt. 6.69), but holding the entrails does not in itself constitute an oath since there is no appeal 
to a sanctifying witness, and the oath referred to was sworn in the past (κατωμνύμην). See ch. 1 
for further discussion of what constitutes an oath and what does not.
32 Stengel 1910, 78‒85, and Stengel 1914, followed by Nilsson 1955, 140; Burkert 1983, 36; Som-
merstein 1990, ad 186; Karavites 1992, 64; Fletcher 2005, 59 and 2008, 38; cf. Carastro 2012, 86 
with n.38. Less influential have been Rudhardt 1958, 283‒4, who suggested that the tomia were 
entrails, and Casabona 1966, 220‒5, 323‒6, who took them to be dismembered limbs. 
33 Stengel 1910, 82‒3.
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Stengel admits that the ancients do not explain the nature of the tomia,34 which 
rather implies that the term retains its straightforward meaning of “cut pieces”, 
no less powerful than castration in representing death for the potential perjurer. 
Since we know that the sacrifice was not eaten, it is not necessarily the case that 
the cut pieces were offal. Karavites argues that the phrase horkia temnein “to cut 
oaths”, which is a common Homeric expression where the oath-sacrifices embody 
the oath (which is “cut”),35 “reflected the ancient practice of standing upon the 
animal’s genitals (tomia) or passing through the severed parts”.36 However there 
is no evidence whatsoever in Homer that the sacrificial victims in oath rituals 
were cut into pieces.37 Rather they seem to have been discarded whole (Il. 3.310, 
19.267‒8). More recent scholarship has questioned the assumption that the tomia 
are genitals.38
The example from Aristophanes’ Lysistrata (191), where it is suggested that 
the women should cut up a white stallion as a tomion “cut sacrifice”, may well 
have been a joke relating to the phallus of a stallion. This would suit the comic 
genre, but the expression (with tomion in the singular) is unusual, the sugges-
tion is rejected, and reference to the stallion alone is enough to make a phallus 
joke.39 Similarly odd is Lysistrata’s earlier request for someone to bring her the 
tomia before an animal is sacrificed over a shield (Lys. 185‒9). In that case there 
is no indication that the tomia will be genitals and this idea too is abandoned. 
In fact, it is unclear how important the severed pieces of oath-sacrifices were in 
classical Athens, outside the homicide court. Aristotle describes the archons as 
mounting the stone altar (lithos) on which the tomia have been placed in order to 
take their oath of office (Ath. Pol. 55.5), but otherwise there are few specific refer-
ences to tomia. During exōmosiai, the swearers would “take hold of the sacrifice” 
(Lyc. Leocr. 20: λαβόντας τὰ ἱερά), and possibly also during antōmosiai, taken 
at preliminary hearings,40 but it is not clear whether or not the victims were in 
34 Stengel 1910, 78.
35 E.g. Il. 2.124; 3.73, 94, 105, 252, 356; 4.155; 19.191; 24.483.
36 Karavites 1992, 64.
37 Cf. Kirk 1985, ad 295‒301.
38 Faraone 1993, 68 n.37 sees no reason to associate the tomia with castration, and is followed 
by Berti 2006, 194; Cole 1996, 233 is cautious; Parker 2011, 157 n.125 stresses that the exact nature 
of the tomia “is never made explicit and may have varied.”
39 Cf. Stengel 1914, 92.
40 Aeschines 1.114 seems to be a reference to such an oath ritual. See comments in Sommerstein, 
Bayliss and Torrance 2007 no. 2568. On antōmosiai, see S&B §5.5. 
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severed pieces. Faraone suggests that oaths were sworn on tomia by those who 
were believed to be prone to the temptations of cheating and bribery.41
Sacrifices performed in wartime oaths sometimes incorporated shields 
or weapons into the oath ritual. The Oath of Plataea inscription records that it 
was sworn with shields covering the sacrifices (RO 88.46‒7).42 After the battle of 
Cunaxa, the Greeks and the Persians perform the sacrifices accompanying their 
sworn alliance over a shield. The Greeks dipped a sword into the blood, and 
the Persians dipped in a spear (Xen. Anab. 2.2.9).43 In Aeschylus’ Seven against 
Thebes (42‒8), the seven war leaders attacking Thebes swear an oath to sack the 
city or die in the attempt. The oath is sealed with the sacrifice of a bull over a 
shield and the participants dip their hands in the blood. The latter detail makes 
the ritual extremely solemn,44 and it was remarkable enough to be parodied in 
Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. Lysistrata calls for a shield to be placed on the ground 
to receive the oath-sacrifice so that they can swear an oath as in Aeschylus by 
slaughtering a beast into a shield (Lys. 185‒9). The “shield” in this case is prob-
ably a wine bowl,45 and the tomia requested by Lysistrata never appear because 
Calonice argues quite reasonably that an oath related to peace (i.e. the women’s 
sex strike) should not be taken over a shield. Lysistrata decides that they should 
“slaughter” a jar of Thasian wine into a large cup (Lys. 195‒6). The “sacrificial 
victim” is then referred to as a “boar” (Lys. 202) maintaining the pretence of a real 
sacrifice, and as Judith Fletcher has observed the oath ritual is unique in that the 
“sacrificial victim” is meant to be consumed,46 although it never is (nor could it be 
because of the dramatic convention of wearing a mask).47
41 Faraone 1993, 78‒9.
42 On the oath of Plataea, see further Kozak in S&B §9.2.
43 Herodotus records that the Scythians dipped weapons into a mixture of wine and blood 
drawn from the swearing parties when taking oaths (4.70). The Lydians and Medians are similar-
ly represented as cutting the skin of their arms and licking the blood when they take oaths (1.74). 
On the oath rituals of foreigners reported in Greek sources, see further Torrance 2012, 310‒12. 
44 See Torrance 2007, 48‒51 on this oath.
45 Sommerstein 1990, ad 184.
46 Fletcher 2012, 231. 
47 Burkert 1983, 36, mysteriously states that “They” (i.e. “Those who swear an oath”, the subject 
of the previous sentence) “must eat the meat of the victim as well, or at least the σπλάγχνα”. 
The original (Burkert 1972, 47) reads “wird vom Fleisch gekostet, zumindest von dem σπλάγχνα” 
(“some of the flesh was tasted, at least some of the entrails”). The passages quoted in the ac-
companying note (n.9 in both cases) indicate that the sentence should refer to holding the victim 
rather than eating it. Burkert 1985, 252, also refers to the “eating of the splanchna” in oath rituals, 
and the accompanying note (446 n.23) leads circuitously back to Burkert 1983, 36f. It is unclear 
how this error occurred in Burkert’s work.
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6.3 Gestures, libations, and unusual sanctifying features
We have seen that coming into contact with the sacrificial victim occurs in par-
ticularly solemn oaths. Other gestures of contact could be used to add sanctity to 
an oath. When Hestia swears her oath of chastity to Zeus in the Homeric Hymn to 
Aphrodite, she is touching his head (27), and when Hera swears an oath to Hypnos 
in Iliad 14, she places one hand on the earth and one on the sea (Il. 14.272‒3, 
278).48 The very act of placing a hand on the earth can, in itself, represent oath-
taking, as in two passages of Bacchylides where the author makes statements in 
his own person. In these examples, “leaning” (episkēptōn) a hand on the earth is 
tantamount to invoking the earth as sanctifying witness (Bacch. 5.41‒5, 8.19‒21).49 
The concept of placing a hand on an item of symbolic importance while swearing 
one’s oath occurs elsewhere. In order to resolve the dispute over who won the 
chariot race at Patroclus’ funeral games in the Iliad, Menelaus requests an oath 
from Antilochus. He should stand in front of his chariot and horses and swear by 
the earth-mover and earth-shaker (i.e. Poseidon, the patron of horses, and Antilo-
chus’ ancestor) that he did not cheat in the race, and he should take up the horse-
whip in his hand and touch the horses while he swears (Il. 23.581‒5).50 The oath is 
declined by Antilochus who offers Menelaus restitution. This suggests that Anti-
lochus had cheated and was thus unwilling to swear the solemn oath requested.
A more frequent sanctifying gesture of contact in the Iliad is the clasping of a 
sceptre. Achilles famously strikes the ground with the sceptre by which he swears 
that the Achaeans will long for him some day (Il. 1.233‒46). The emphasis on the 
“dead” nature of the sceptre, which will never again bear leaves nor bloom (Il. 
1.234‒7) is seen by Kitts as associating it with the oath-victim, and she consid-
ers the sceptre to be a “perverted symbol”.51 However the sceptre here functions 
as sanctifying witness to the oath (cf. §5.3), not as sacrificial victim.52 Moreover, 
the sceptre is used elsewhere to formalize oaths in the Iliad so that there is no 
48 On the oaths of the gods, see further §7.3.
49 These passages are discussed by MacLachlan 2007, 92‒3; see also §5.1 and ch. 13a. Earth is 
an important deity in oath-taking. Burkert 1985, 71 observes that she is imagined as drinking the 
oath libations in truces. See also S&B 242.
50 N.J. Richardson 1993 ad 23.582‒5 comments that the solemnity of the proposed oath “is in-
dicated by the lengthy and complex prescription, with its various parenthetic and subordinate 
clauses.” For further discussion of this oath see S&B 57‒9.
51 Kitts 2005, at 104 and 105.
52 Kirk 1985 ad 234‒9 comments sensibly that the “oath is made even more impressive by asso-
ciating the staff with the idea of inevitability: just as it will never sprout leaves again, so will this 
oath be fulfilled.” Cf. Kirk 1990 ad 7.412 on the potency of the sceptre in oaths.
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reason to see it as a “perverted symbol”. It is raised in Agamemnon’s oath to 
Idaeus when he swears that he will not prevent the Trojans from collecting their 
dead (Il. 7.408‒13), and in Hector’s oath to Dolon concerning the horses of Achil-
les (Il. 10.321‒32, 328). Aristotle comments that raising the sceptre was a feature 
of oath-taking among kings in the heroic age (Politics 1285b12). Raising hands to 
heaven or laying them on the earth could similarly add solemnity to an oath. So 
the goddess Lachesis raises her hands when she swears to Helios that the island 
of Rhodes will belong to him (Pindar Ol. 7. 64‒8), and Gadatas stretches up his 
hands to the sky as a means of emphasizing his oath to Cyrus that he had not 
been influenced by Hystaspas (Xen. Cyr. 6.1.3). We have already noted that Hera 
places one hand on the earth in her oath to Hypnos, and Herodotus reports that 
the Nasamones, a Libyan tribe, touch the graves of the men reputed to have been 
the most just and good among them and swear by those men (Hdt. 4.172).
A gesture that could accompany interstate oaths was the handclasp, dexiōsis 
(specifically the clasping of right hands), a ritual that is recorded in some depic-
tions as well as in some texts.53 However, there are relatively few instances of 
the handclasp accompanying oaths in our sources, and the evidence suggests 
that dexiōsis was essentially an indication of friendship.54 Since oaths were more 
often than not sworn between disputing parties, we should not be surprised 
that dexiōsis is mentioned infrequently. The sworn truce between the Greek and 
the Trojans in Iliad 3 is repeatedly referred to as “oaths of friendship and faith” 
(φιλότητα καὶ ὅρκια πιστά: Il. 3.73, 94, 256, 323), and Menelaus later discusses 
how the Trojans have violated the oaths “and the right hands that we trusted” (Il. 
4.159).55 Nevertheless, given the detail in which the oath ritual is related in Iliad 3, 
it is odd that the exchange of right hands is not mentioned during the ceremony 
itself and it is possible that Menelaus adds this gesture to the equation retrospec-
tively in order to stress the betrayal of the Trojans in particularly negative terms. 
Kirk suggests that the “trustworthy right hands” are perhaps metaphorical, both 
here and at Il. 2.341 (discussed below).56
A passage from Sophocles’ Philoctetes suggests that where there is trust a 
handclasp suffices instead of an oath. So Philoctetes says to Neoptolemus (whom 
53 The evidence is gathered and discussed by Bayliss in S&B 156‒8, and see also Herman 1987, 
37, 50‒2, 134, and Cole 1996, 240‒1.
54 Herman 1987, 59 notes that oaths (along with feasting) were not a necessary part of conclud-
ing a pact of friendship. He also discusses (at 71) how a formal friendship could be dissolved by 
a duplicitous oath.
55 See further Kitts 2005, 79‒84 on the importance of the handclasp in a variety of Iliadic situ-
ations.
56 Kirk 1985 ad 3.158‒9.
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he trusts at this point): “I do not think it is right for me to place you under oath, 
son….Give me your hand as a pledge” (Soph. Phil. 811‒13). Although the pledge is 
retrospectively treated by Philoctetes as the oath he would have demanded from 
an enemy when he discovers that Neoptolemus is, in fact, deceiving him, it is clear 
that a handclasp normally represents the type of agreement between friends that 
does not require an oath. Similarly in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus 
asks Theseus for the pledge of his hand addressing him as “dear friend” (philon 
kara) and requesting that he “agree” (kataineson) to look out for his daughters’ 
interests (OC 1631‒5). Theseus is said to agree with an oath (1637: katēinesen … 
horkios) even though one is not requested. These uses of oath-language are impor-
tant for dramatic reasons, as I discuss in §5.2. In Sophocles’ Women of Trachis, 
the dying Heracles compels his son Hyllus to agree to his wishes first by asking 
him for his right hand as a pledge (1181) and then by requesting that he swear a 
blind oath to do what his father commands (1185‒90). The handclasp is clearly 
the lesser of the two requests, designed to draw Hyllus into an agreement that will 
not be to his liking. In each of these cases, agreements are made between parties 
on friendly terms with each other. An oath is added in the latter two examples for 
reasons of security.57
Oaths featuring handclasps, then, are either taken by parties on friendly 
terms with each other (where an oath would not normally be required, but is given 
nonetheless because of a particular circumstance), or they appear on occasions 
when friendship or a betrayal of friendship is stressed. To the former category 
belongs the oath of Helen’s suitors, who swore to support her husband should 
any man take her from his house, marching against the abductor with force of 
arms to sack his city (E. IA 58‒65). According to Euripides, the suitors’ oaths were 
formalized with the clasping of right hands, libations, and burnt sacrifices (IA 
58‒60). Hesiod confirms the libations (fr. 204.78‒84),58 and a passage from Iliad 
2 which may also refer to the oath of Helen’s suitors includes reference to a clasp 
of the right hand and libations as sanctifying features (Iliad 2.341). In the rel-
evant scene, Nestor reproaches the Achaeans for wanting to leave Troy, asking 
“Whither then shall our oaths and agreements go?” (Il. 2.339). It is not entirely 
clear what “oaths” are meant here. The parallel in sanctifying features between 
these oaths and those of Helen’s suitors is suggestive, though not conclusive. 
Nestor is addressing the entire Achaean army, not just the leaders (and suitors). 
However, Achilles, who was not one of Helen’s suitors, is notably absent and it 
57 See §5.2 for a more detailed discussion of these and other examples of oath-language used 
in Sophocles.
58 No details are given in Stesichorus PMG 190.
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could reasonably be assumed that the men will follow their leaders’ decisions. 
Nestor, of course, was not one of the suitors either, but the designation of “our” 
oaths could have the general meaning of “the oaths of the Greeks”. Another possi-
bility is that Nestor is alluding to the “promise” (huposkhesis) the Achaeans made 
to go home only after Agamemnon had sacked Troy. Odysseus had referred to this 
in the previous speech (Il. 2.284‒8), and Nestor may be retroactively upgrading 
the “promise” to an “oath” for rhetorical purposes.59 If so, this would be the only 
pre-Sophoclean example of a “Sophoclean” oath (on which see § 5.2). However, 
Nestor’s mention of “libations of unmixed wine” (Il. 2.341) suggests a formal oath, 
so it seems most likely that he is alluding to the oath of Helen’s suitors. The pres-
ence of the handclasp implies that the suitors, although rivals for Helen’s hand, 
are not enemies as such but are, generally speaking, on friendly terms with each 
other. The successful suitor, Menelaus, is presented by Euripides as swearing a 
suicide pact with his wife, after the Trojan war, if their plan to escape from Egypt 
fails. The exchange of oaths also includes a handclasp (Eur. Hel. 835‒44). Again, 
the formalization of the oaths with the handclasp underlines that the pair have a 
close and positive relationship.
The same cannot be said for the oath reported in Demosthenes’ Against 
Meidias. It is claimed there that Meidias denounced Aristarchus in the boulē as 
a murderer, but later swore to Aristarchus, having taken his right hand, that he 
had made no such allegation. Demosthenes accuses Meidias of perjury and calls 
witnesses to confirm what he had done (21.119‒21). The handclasp seems to rep-
resent a duplicitous gesture of friendship, all while Meidias allegedly perjures 
himself. There are two possible explanations for this scenario. Demosthenes and 
his witnesses may have been casting Meidias unfairly as a perjurer. It is possible 
that he merely stated rather than swore that he had not accused Aristarchus of 
murder, and that the statement is treated as an oath for rhetorical effect. Alterna-
tively, Demosthenes’ allegation is true, in which case Meidias, by feigning friend-
ship with a handclasp, is guilty of a particularly deceptive perjury. This would be 
comparable to the perjury of the villainous Persian Tissaphernes. According to 
Xenophon, Tissaphernes was a shameless perjurer, who broke his oaths without 
compunction. If the handclasp represents friendship in oath-taking, as I am 
arguing, then Xenophon’s inclusion of the right-hand pledge in his references to 
the oaths of Tissaphernes (Anab. 2.3.28, 2.4.7, 2.5.3, 3.2.4) casts him as a special 
kind of charlatan – and Xenophon seems to have been keen to represent Tissa-
59 M.L. West 2011, 109 notes the two possibilities. The oaths either belong to a narrative relating 
to Aulis or to the betrothal of Helen.
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phernes as negatively as possible.60 The hero of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, Cyrus, 
is conversely portrayed as giving his right hand as a gesture of friendship in the 
formalization of sworn alliances which were not betrayed, such as the alliances 
with the Assyrian Gobryas (Cyr. 4.6.8‒10) and with the Hyrcanians (Cyr. 4.2.7‒8, 
5.1.22.2). As a means of adding extra sanctity to an oath, then, the handclasp is 
weak since it represents a human agreement of friendship and does not possess 
the solemnity of divine retributive forces.
Dexiōsis as a ritual has “little to do with sympathetic magic”.61 Libations on 
the other hand do seem to represent a divine element of the oath-curse.62 The 
sworn truce between the Greeks and the Trojans in the Iliad is explicit in specify-
ing that the brains of perjurers should be spilled on the ground just as the wine 
libation is spilled (Il. 3.300). The wine, of course, like blood, is dark red so that the 
visual parallel is explicit, and although the libation is poured from a mixing bowl 
(Il. 3.295), the wine itself is unmixed (Il. 4.195).63 At Iliad 3.295, the subject changes 
from the third person singular (as at 3.292‒3), referring to Agamemnon’s role in 
sacrificing the sheep, to third person plural, indicating that all the princes draw 
wine from the mixing bowl with their cups and pour a libation. The oath, which 
states that the Greeks and the Trojans will stop fighting and that Menelaus and 
Paris will engage in single combat over Helen and her possessions (Il. 3.281‒7), is 
used as a model for the truce between the Argives and the Thebans in Euripides’ 
Phoenician Women where “they poured libations…and joined in oaths” (1240‒1) 
agreeing that the war should be decided by single combat between Eteocles and 
Polyneices. As we noted above, libations were an important feature of interstate 
truces and treaties, often called spondai, meaning “libations”.64 In Aristophanes’ 
Acharnians (147‒50), libations are poured as part of the Thracian Sitalces’ oath 
to help Athens with an army so great that it would resemble a swarm of locusts.
It is only rarely that libations are mentioned in non-political oaths. When 
they are, it seems that they are added for particular emphasis to convince an 
audience of the truth of the statement being made. So in Wasps (1046‒7), it is said 
that Aristophanes is “pouring many upon many libations” while swearing that 
no one had ever heard better comic poetry than in his previous year’s comedy 
(i.e. Clouds), which had been ranked third and last. Similarly the fictional oath 
60 See Hirsch 1985, 25‒32.
61 S&B 156.
62 Cf. Carastro 2012, 85.
63 That is the wine is undiluted with water, and various portions of wine are mixed in the mixing 
bowl as explained by Kirk ad 2.341 and ad 3.269‒70.
64 See further S&B 242‒4.
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reported by Odysseus disguised as the “Cretan” in the Odyssey is meant to con-
vince his listeners of Odysseus’ return. He tells Eumaeus that the king of Thes-
protia swore to him as he poured a libation (apospendōn) that the ship and crew 
were ready to bring Odysseus home (Od. 14.331‒3). Hoekstra comments that the 
“emphatic character of the expression is far more strongly motivated by Odys-
seus’ desire to impress Eumaeus than by the actual circumstances as described 
in his tale.”65 Odysseus later tells the same story to Penelope (Od. 19.287‒90) with 
a similar purpose. The libation is a solemn sanctifying element in an oath, either 
poured onto the earth (as in Iliad 3.300) or over the sacrificial fire (as in Plato, 
Critias 120a). Even the oaths of the gods are said to include a libation, not of 
wine, but of water from the Styx (Hes. Thg. 782‒95), although in actual fact none 
of our examples of gods swearing oaths does include a libation (see §7.3 on the 
oaths of the gods). Notably the attributes of the Styx imply that a libation from 
her would similarly represent the curse element on would-be divine perjurers. 
She is described as a branch of Ocean, specifically the tenth portion, while Ocean 
whirls nine portions around the earth (Thg. 789‒92). The punishment for perjury 
among the gods is then described as exclusion for nine years and reintegration 
in the tenth (Thg. 793‒804). Where a libation of wine for mortals represents the 
potential loss of blood and the loss of life, the libation from Styx for the immortals 
would seem to represent the separation of nine years, just as Styx flows separated 
from nine other portions of the sea, and return in the tenth as symbolized by Styx 
herself, the tenth portion.
Other unusual sanctifying features also represent the fate of the perjurer. An 
early fourth-century inscription (ML 5.7‒11) records a citizenship oath taken by 
Theran residents in Cyrene (c. 635 BC) in which waxen images were made and 
burnt as the oath-curse was expressed. The person who did not abide by the oath 
would melt away and dissolve like the images, himself, his descendants, and his 
property.66 Although this precise use of sympathetic magic is uncommon in Greek 
sources it has significant Egyptian and Near Eastern parallels.67 The connection 
between ritual and curse is not so explicit in the Delian League oath, where lumps 
of iron were dropped into the sea to sink after the oaths had been sworn (Arist. 
Ath. Pol. 23.5), but the act must surely have fulfilled the same function. In an oath 
involving maritime nations, the representation of sinking would be a power-
ful image of potential death for the perjurer. Herodotus reports a similar ritual 
(sinking a mass of iron into the sea) also performed in an oath taken by seafarers, 
65 In Heubeck & Hoekstra 1989, ad 14.331.
66 For further discussion of this oath, see Faraone 1993; Fletcher 2012, 242; S&B 29‒31.
67 See Faraone 1993, 62‒5.
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the Phocaeans leaving their homeland (Hdt. 1.165). They swore never to return 
before the iron resurfaced, a sentiment suggestive of permanence as indeed is 
the iron material itself. The ritual thus has a double function of representation 
by sympathetic magic and binding by permanence,68 although in this case of the 
Phocaeans a majority broke their oaths and went home apparently without pun-
ishment.69
6.4 Multiple sanctifying features
For ensuring permanence, or at least durability, recording an oath by means 
of a public inscription was an act of great significance.70 In the literary corpus, 
only two oaths are described as being written down, and in both cases elaborate 
rituals accompany the oath. The first comes from Euripides’ Suppliant Women 
and concerns the alliance between Athens (Theseus) and Argos (Adrastus) that 
is made at the end of the play. Athena appears ex machina and exhorts Theseus 
to exact an oath from Adrastus swearing that Argos will never bring a force of 
arms against Athens and that if others do, she will impede them with her spear. 
The oath is to be ratified with the sacrifice of three sheep over the tripod that 
Heracles had given to Theseus. The sacrificial knife is to be buried at Eleusis, by 
the funeral pyres of the leaders who left Argos to attack Thebes. The location of 
the burial71 is to be shown in the future to inspire fear in those who would come 
against Athens, causing them an evil homecoming. The oath is to be inscribed 
on the tripod, which is to be brought to Apollo’s temple in Delphi to be displayed 
there (Supp. 1187‒1204).
The oath is remarkable in several ways. Although ostensibly an oath of alli-
ance, it is to be sworn unilaterally by the Argives. Athens is to gain all the ben-
efits without having to agree to anything in return, which is not the way mili-
tary alliances normally worked. It is, of course, true that Theseus has already 
come to Argos’ aid by putting military pressure on Thebes to return the bodies 
of the Argives, but he is not bound to any future military aid by the oath. In fact, 
68 Scholars have disagreed over the significance of the ritual as either symbolic of permanence 
(Burkert, 1985, 250; Steiner 1994, 68) or representative of the curse (Jacobson 1975, 256‒7; Fara-
one 1993, 79 n.74; Berti 2006, 197). Bayliss sensibly argues for both in S&B 156‒7. For further 
discussion of the ritual aspects associated with this oath, see also Carastro 2012, 95‒100, Faraone 
2005 and 2012, 128‒30.
69 See §12.1 for further discussion of this perjury.
70 See S&B 158‒60.
71 Presumably, rather than the knife itself; see Morwood 2007 ad 1209.
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the only oath that Theseus swears simply suggests that the Argives have been 
well treated by him (Supp. 1174‒5). In this respect the alliance demands compari-
son to that made between Argos and Athens at the end of the Oresteia. There 
again a representative of Argos (Orestes) had sworn unilaterally on behalf of all 
present and future Argives that no helmsman of his land would ever bring war 
against Athens (Eum. 762‒74). Athens is not bound by any corresponding oath, 
and it seems that the trial acquitting Orestes of matricide has been enough to 
ensure Argos’ eternal support.72 The obvious parallel between the two alliances 
also highlights some significant differences. Both alliances are represented as 
having taken place in mythical history, but the relationship between Athens and 
Argos in the fifth century BC was a significant political issue. The fact that an 
Athenian-Argive alliance had been ratified in 461 BC, not long before the pro-
duction of Aeschylus’ Oresteia (in 458 BC), means that the Aeschylean alliance 
must have had contemporary political resonances.73 Unfortunately, we cannot 
say for certain whether or not Euripides’ Suppliant Women was produced after 
the second Athenian-Argive alliance of 421 BC, but Collard argues persuasively 
for a date close to 424,74 and comparison of the terms of the alliance with those 
in Aeschylus would also suggest that Athens and Argos were not on good terms 
when Suppliant Women was produced. Orestes in Aeschylus simply swears that 
Argos will never bring war to Athens (Eum. 765‒6). This conveniently exculpates 
Argos from their capitulation to the Persians and their support of Aegina against 
Athens in 491 BC and from their neutrality in 480 BC as the Athenians once again 
fought off the Persians. By adding the stipulation that if others bring war against 
Athens, Argos will impede them with a military force, Euripides effectively casts 
the Argives as perjurers given their history of inaction when Athens was being 
attacked.
We observed above the importance of the spatial context for adding solem-
nity to Orestes’ oath of alliance in Eumenides. However, the oath is devoid of 
further sanctifying features and is thus significantly different from the oath in 
Euripides which is brimming with ritual elements. Moreover, although the tripod 
is to be displayed in Delphi (for the entire Greek world to see), the rituals dictated 
in Euripides associate the power of the oath specifically with Athens and Eleusis. 
The tripod over which the sacrifices will be made is a symbol of the friendship 
72 See further Quincey 1964 on the unusual nature of this oath of alliance. 
73 See e.g. Quincey 1964; Sommerstein 1989, 30‒2; Podlecki 1999, 82‒3.
74 Suggested dates for Euripides’ Suppliant Women range from 424 BC to 416 BC. See Collard 
1975, 8‒14 and Morwood 2007, 26‒30, for further discussion.
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between the Athenian king Theseus and the Panhellenic hero Heracles.75 The 
sacrifice itself will take place in the Athenian deme of Eleusis. The number three, 
repeated when Athena gives the instruction to cut three throats of three sheep 
(Supp. 1201), gives the sacrifice added religious significance.76 It may also be 
designed to recall the Iliadic truce, and thus appeal to the ritual authority of epic, 
since this is the only other recorded oath where three sheep are sacrificed. The 
sacrificial knife in Euripides is to be buried at Eleusis by the funeral pyres of the 
dead warriors who had attacked Thebes, and this place will forever be a reminder 
to the Argives of their oaths (Supp. 1205‒8). In terms of sympathetic magic, the 
implication is that any Argives who break the oath will die, both like the sacri-
ficial victims of the knife and like the dead warriors by whose pyres the knife is 
located. The inscription of the oath also seems to be imagined as taking place in 
Eleusis (Supp. 1202), since the command to take the tripod to Delphi happens only 
“after that” (Supp. 1203: kāpeita).77
Writing is associated with authority and accessibility in this tragedy.78 The 
inscription of the oath and the elaborate details of ritual are clearly meant 
to emphasize the serious and binding nature of the alliance. Euripides often 
engages with and responds to Aeschylean models in his tragedies,79 and although 
his Suppliant Women reworks the same mythic episode as Aeschylus’ Eleusinians, 
the sworn alliance in Aeschylus’ Eumenides seems to be an important model for 
understanding the oath of alliance at the end of Euripides’ Suppliant Women. Par-
ticularly the unusually high number of sanctifying features, and the additional 
clause regarding the Argives’ agreement to aid Athens if she is attacked, seem 
designed to cast the contemporary fifth-century Argives as serious perjurers and 
as enemies of Athens. Of course it is highly unlikely that the tripod existed, but 
the notion that it might still exist, somewhere among the numerous tripods dedi-
cated at Delphi, would have been enough to lend authority to this aetiological 
myth.80
The same cannot be said for the inscribed oath of the mythical kings of Atlan-
tis, whose island (according to Plato) had long been lost in the depths of the sea. 
75 On the theme of Panhellenism in this play, see Morwood 2007, 3, 8, 13, and ad 133, 163‒4, 
188‒9, 220‒1, 277, 286‒364, 311‒13, 340‒1, 526‒7, 538, 561‒3, 671‒2, 714‒7.
76 Cf. Morwood 2007, ad 1202‒3. Cole 1996, 231, suggests that the “most formal type of oath-
sacrifice required three adult male victims.”
77 Steiner 1994, 64 with n.10 suggests that the knife used for the sacrifice may also have been 
used for making the inscription.
78 See Torrance 2013, 166‒74.
79 See Torrance 2013, 13‒62, 69‒75, 94‒133, 152‒74.
80 For my views on Euripidean aetiologies, see Torrance 2013, 38.
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The oath in this case was the oath of office of the ten kings taken in the temple of 
Poseidon, located in the centre of the island. The oath was inscribed on a column 
in the temple along with their laws. The inscription, as noted by Steiner, “looks 
toward actual historical practice.”81 The kings swore to give judgment according 
to those laws, to punish any who transgressed them, and not to transgress the 
laws. The oath was sworn at intervals of four and five years alternately, before the 
kings adjudicated. They hunted a bull, which was sacrificed to Poseidon, and its 
blood was allowed to run on the inscribed column. A libation of wine was mixed 
with one blood clot for each man and poured over the sacrificial fire in golden 
cups. Each man drank and dedicated his cup in the god’s sanctuary.82 This is 
essentially the end of the oath ritual proper, after which the kings have supper, 
don blue robes (which are also later dedicated in the sanctuary), extinguish the 
sacrificial fire and give judgments which they record on a golden tablet (Critias 
119d-120c).
Plato tells us that there is something “foreign”, “barbarian” (barbarikon), 
about the temple of Poseidon in Atlantis, which was decorated with gold, silver, 
ivory and the shining metal orichalc (Critias 116d). Athens had apparently been 
engaged in a great war against Atlantis in the distant mythical past (nine thou-
sand years earlier, Critias 108e). Some of the details of the oath ritual reflect that 
“barbarian” identity of Atlantis. As in other cases of foreigners’ taking oaths, the 
basic ritual is the same as that practised by Greeks but the details add a sense 
of the exotic. The mixture of wine and blood recalls the oaths of the Scythians 
(Hdt. 4.70), and the pouring of sacrificial blood down a temple column echoes 
the bloodied columns in Artemis’ temple of human sacrifice among the Scythian 
tribe of Taurians (E. IT 403‒6). As a precious metal, gold was often associated 
with foreigners in classical Greece, particularly with Trojans and with Persians, 
since the Greek homeland had no gold mines.83 Metal itself seems to be a sig-
nificant element in elaborate oath rituals. Both the golden cups dedicated by the 
kings of Atlantis and the bronze tripod dedicated by the Athenians at Delphi sym-
bolize permanence.
We have seen above that oaths of office in classical Athens were particularly 
solemn and often accompanied by an oath-sacrifice.84 Cast into the distant past 
81 Steiner 1994, 70.
82 Mezzadri 2009 argues that the blood which is added to the wine represents an internalization 
and oralization of what is written on the column as a means of casting suspicion on the writing 
itself, and that it can be read in light of attitudes to writing elsewhere in Plato (notably in the 
Phaedrus).
83 On the associations of gold with Persia and Troy, see Hall 1989, 80‒1 and 127.
84 On oaths of office see further S&B ch. 3.
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and in a mythical world, the solemnity of the oath of office in Atlantis is increased 
by the large number of rituals. The kings who swear this oath still have some con-
nection to their divine heritage as descendants of the original ten kings who were 
sons of Poseidon. As their divinity becomes diluted, however, and their mortal 
part becomes greater and greater, one generation after the next becomes “full 
of lust for wrongdoing and power” (Critias 121b). Zeus decides to intervene, and 
that is where the unfinished text ends abruptly. Plato does not say explicitly that 
the kings become perjurers, but given that he associates perjury with greed for 
gain in the Laws (948d-949a),85 there is an implication that the oath of the kings 
became tainted through their development into “shameful people” (Critias 121b: 
aiskhroi).
Perjury is certainly an issue in what is arguably the most important and 
paradigmatic oath in Greek literature, the sworn truce between the Greeks and 
the Trojans in Iliad 3.86 The ethnic associations of ritual metal items used in this 
oath conform to the pattern we have seen elsewhere. Golden cups (here used for 
pouring libations of wine) and the shining mixing bowl are brought by Priam’s 
herald Idaeus (3.248). The bronze sacrificial knife, on the other hand, is Greek and 
belongs to Agamemnon (3.292). Several preliminary oath rituals are conducted by 
the heralds. They lead the sacrificial victims to the location of the truce, they mix 
the wine in a great wine-bowl, and they wash the hands of the princes with water 
(3.268‒70). Two sheep are provided by the Trojans, one white for Helios, and a 
black one for Earth,87 and a third is provided by the Greeks for Zeus (3.103‒4). 
Agamemnon then cuts off hairs from the sacrificial victims with his knife and the 
heralds distribute these among the princes of both sides (3.271‒4). This is tan-
tamount to touching the sacrificial victim and so binds the princes to the oath-
sacrifice.88 Agamemnon raises his hands, and invokes a long list of sanctifying 
witnesses to the oath: Zeus the Father, who watches from Ida, most high, most 
honoured; Helios, who sees all things, who hears all things; Earth; Rivers; the 
nether avengers of dead perjurers (3.276‒80). Agamemnon makes a declaration 
of the oath statement and its terms (3.281‒91),89 and then cuts the throats of the 
sheep (3.292‒4). It is noteworthy that Agamemnon himself performs the sacrifice, 
particularly since his role in sacrificing his daughter Iphigeneia is suppressed in 
85 See further ch. 15.
86 Burkert 1985, 250 calls this an “exemplary description of an oath-sacrifice”; Berti 2006, 189 
suggests that it is a “perfect example” of an oath and “characteristic” of Greek oaths.
87 Kirk 1985, ad 103‒4 notes that “the order is reversed in the chiastic Greek construction”.
88 Cf. also Berti 2006 187‒8.
89 The oath is first proposed at Iliad 3.73‒5, cf. 90‒110.
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the Iliad.90 Kirk notes that the deaths of the sacrificial victims are described in 
terms normally applied to human deaths in the Iliad. They fall “gasping for want 
of their life breath” (3.293‒4),91 and Berti notes that this “creates a metaphori-
cal parallel between the death of the sacrificial animals and the destiny of the 
perjurers.”92
Once the sheep have been killed, all the princes draw wine from the mixing 
bowl in cups and pour libations (3.295), and all seem to express the oath-curse. 
“They prayed to the gods who live forever, and thus was any man heard saying 
among both the Achaeans and the Trojans” (3.296‒7).93 The formula “thus was 
any man heard saying among both the Achaeans and the Trojans” is repeated 
later when all the warriors hope that the war will be resolved by the single 
combat between Menelaus and Paris, and they hope that their oaths will hold 
firm (3.319‒23). In the oath ceremony proper, they invoke Zeus as exalted and 
mightiest and the other immortals to let the brains of those who first do wrong to 
the oaths be spilled on the ground as the wine is spilled, theirs and their sons’, 
and to let their wives be the spoil of others (3.298‒301). Priam’s presence at the 
oath ceremony, as a trustworthy king, had been essential for the Greeks (3.105‒6), 
but it is not long before the gods plan to make the Trojans break the truce. In Iliad 
4, Hera convinces Zeus to send Athene to rekindle the war with the objective of 
making the Trojans break their oaths if possible (4.64‒72). Athene is successful, 
and the truce is broken (4.86‒147).94
Clearly oaths with numerous sanctifying features such as the three discussed 
here were to be imagined as particularly solemn, so that their breach is especially 
significant. Indeed it seems reasonable to suggest that the wide variety of sanc-
tifying features is stressed in each case in order to highlight the terribly serious 
nature of related perjuries. Troy’s destruction can be read as a direct result of 
the breach of the truce. The Trojans suffer the fate specified for perjurers. The 
90 Kirk 1985, ad 1.108 comments that “Homer does not mention Iphigeneia by name, but that 
does not mean that the tale was post-Homeric”; cf. M.L. West 2011, 86, 217‒18. Aeschines 2.87 
makes reference to the fact that winners in homicide cases must cut the sacrificial victim into 
pieces (temnonta ta tomia) and swear a solemn oath (affirming that justice had been done), 
which suggests that oath-takers were expected to cut (and perhaps kill) their own sacrificial vic-
tims.
91 See Kirk 1985, ad 3.293‒4.
92 Berti 2006, 187.
93 Carastro 2012, 86 notes that the group of warriors present at the sacrifice are not simply 
onlookers and Faraone 2012, 126 also observes that “the entire group recites the automatic curse 
connected with the wine”.
94 See further ch. 3, pp. 55‒7, on the perjury of the Trojans.
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relationship between Athens and Atlantis described in Plato’s Critias is in some 
ways comparable to the relationship between the Homeric Greeks and Trojans. 
Athens and Atlantis are involved in a war with each other in the long-distant 
past. The culture of Atlantis is foreign to Athenians in the sense that its people 
are wealthy in gold and other valuables, just as the Trojans are wealthy in rela-
tion to the Greeks. At the same time, both Atlantis and Troy have the protection 
of identifiable Greek gods and are cultures respected by the Greeks, with many 
similar rituals (such as oath-taking, for example). The Athenians manage to 
repel an invasion of Atlanteans, even after their allies abandon them (Pl. Tim. 
25c), but the inhabitants of Atlantis become ungodly (Critias 121a-b) and their 
island is destroyed by violent earthquakes and floods (Tim. 25c-d), the portents 
of an angry Poseidon (original founder of Atlantis). There are echoes here of the 
Persian Wars in Athens managing to fend off a powerful aggressor without the 
support of some of the major Greek states,95 but the Trojan model remains impor-
tant. Just as Poseidon created the landscape of Atlantis (Critias 113e) and seems 
to have caused its destruction, so also he had built the walls of Troy, along with 
Apollo, but when Laomedon refused to pay the agreed wage, Poseidon sent a sea-
monster to destroy the people and their crops. Hellanicus records this version in 
which the Trojan king Laomedon is a perjurer (FGrH 4 F 26b).96
Perjury is in Troy’s legacy, although it is unacceptable to Plato that the gods 
had orchestrated this (Rep. 379e3). In his mythical city of Atlantis, it is the dilu-
tion of divinity that causes the mortals themselves to abandon auspicious prac-
tices and to become greedy for material gain. The motivation for the betrayal of 
an oath ritual is thus placed by Plato into human hands. Regardless of motiva-
tion, however, both societies (Trojan and Atlantean) are destroyed as a result of 
godless behaviour. The elaborate oath rituals in Euripides’ Suppliant Women are 
similarly designed to mark a momentous occasion, and although the ritual is set 
in the mythical past, and also seems to allude to the Iliadic truce, it has impli-
cations of contemporary political perjury as argued above. Perjury, then, seems 
to link these three unusually complex literary oath ceremonies, created by their 
authors to emphasize the disgraceful nature and outcome of flouting divinely 
sanctioned rituals.
95 Although the analogy is far from straightforward. See Vidal-Naquet 1986, 263‒84 for further 
discussion.
96 See §12.1.1 for further discussion of this perjury.
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7.1 Women and oaths
Judith Fletcher
It is hardly surprising that substantially more oaths sworn by men than by women 
survive from the ancient Greek world. Treaties, civic oaths and other covenants 
performed in public, often with animal sacrifices, were important components 
of the military, political and commercial life of antiquity, which were primarily 
male activities.1 Less than 10 percent of the oaths recorded in the Nottingham 
Database are attributed to women; even fewer were sworn to women. Of the 291 
inscriptions of public oaths in the Database, only 9 feature women oath-swearers, 
usually as part of a group that included men. There are 541 references to oaths in 
the historiographers (including Ctesias, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon): 
of the 17 attributed to women in this group, most can be labeled as “fictional,” in 
that they occur in a mythical past or have a folktale character. Thucydides does 
not record a single oath by or to a woman, and given his focus on political and 
military matters this silence is to be expected. Athenian forensic oratory indicates 
that it would not have been out of the question for women to swear oaths in a 
legal context (see S&B §5.11), although on closer inspection it seems that male 
citizens usually only claimed that their mothers were willing to swear on their 
behalf, not that the oath was actually taken. The paucity of female oath-takers in 
historical sources is reflected in poetry and drama, in which women’s oaths are 
rare and often problematic.
The infrequency of women’s oaths in public rituals does not mean, however, 
that women were unable to swear oaths in more private situations. There are 
indeed references to such oaths, and although few records bother to mention that 
women swore covenants among themselves, we do hear about oaths to close male 
associates. Unless these verbal contracts, promises or testimonials were repeated 
in a public setting such as a court – which is to say, unless they impinged on 
the lives of men in some way – we have no way of knowing the circumstances in 
which women would take oaths. Again fictional representations of such private 
oaths acknowledge the possibility that women could make promises or assertions 
guaranteed by oaths to each other. These scenarios often tell us more about the 
1 The disparity was observed by Cole 1996 and 2004, 120‒21. Also see Dillon 2002, 248 on 
women’s absence from public life as a reason for the infrequency of their oaths. 
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anxieties of the men who imagined them and those of their audiences than they 
reveal any genuine social practice.
Evidence for women’s oaths is admittedly scant. Nonetheless there were no 
explicit formal restrictions that prevented women from swearing oaths in any 
Greek polis during the archaic and classical periods. What can we deduce from 
the limited reports of women engaging in ceremonial promises? This section 
surveys the types of oaths that women took, the reasons for those oaths, the ways 
in which women’s oaths were recorded, and the nature of oaths sworn to and 
among women. The following discussion examines correspondences between 
historical records and fictional representations in an attempt to reconstruct the 
reality of women’s oaths. The intersection between these different genres and 
sources reveals much about how the collective cultural imagination of the ancient 
Greeks employed women’s oaths as a mean of negotiating the concept of female 
agency in a male-dominated world.
7.1.1 Oaths in a religious context
Religious activity was one area of public life where women did have status and 
visibility. Although the evidence is limited, it is in cult and ritual that we find the 
few surviving examples of real women swearing oaths. To flesh out the picture we 
need to extend our gaze beyond the temporal scope of the Nottingham Database 
to include two inscriptions from the Hellenistic period. This epigraphic evidence 
corroborates classical sources to show that women swore oaths defining their role 
as priestesses or their obligations to cultic activity.
Sadly few records of such oaths exist, perhaps because many religious rituals 
were not to be spoken about, or simply because male record-keepers had little 
interest in them. A famous speech in the Demosthenic corpus records one of them, 
apparently inscribed on an ancient stele in an isolated location within the sanctu-
ary of Dionysus in the Marshes ([Dem.] 59.76) that was only open once a year. In 
Against Neaira (73‒8), speaking on behalf of the prosecution, Apollodorus refers 
to the oath of the fourteen Gerarai (or “Venerable Women”), attendants of the 
Basilinna, wife of the Archon Basileus, a woman who allegedly, in this particular 
instance, was unsuitable for the position because she was the daughter of a pros-
titute. Her priestess attendants swore their oath “on their baskets” to the Basi-
linna at the festival of the Anthesteria “in front of the altar before they touched 
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the victims”(78).2 The terms of the oath were introduced as evidence provided by 
the herald who was present at the sacrifice:
I live a holy life and am pure and unstained by all else that is not pure and by intercourse 
with a man, and I will celebrate the feast of the wine god and the Bacchic rites in honour of 
Dionysus according to tradition and at the appointed times.
Celibacy, albeit temporary, was often a requirement for priestesses and other reli-
gious functionaries, although this is the only example of a chastity oath for such 
personnel.3 There is much that remains obscure here including the question of 
how long the Gerarai had to remain celibate.
Missing from our exiguous data are any suggestions that women swore oaths 
committing them to permanent chastity, although there are certainly sources to 
indicate women remained celibate for fixed periods of time. There are, however, 
divine prototypes for oaths of sexual renunciation that reveal what is at stake in 
ritual chastity and the limitations of mortal women’s celibacy. Compare the oath 
that Hestia swore according to the Hymn to Aphrodite (26‒8) and Artemis’ oath 
of perpetual virginity recorded in a fragment ascribed to Sappho (fr. 44A.4‒7). 
These goddesses were awarded the divine privilege of perpetual virginity: Hestia 
presumably because she represented the inviolability of the hearth and corre-
spondingly the security of the home; Artemis because she presided over puberty, 
remained unwed and was under no male’s control. But while the virgin god-
desses were permanently chaste and thus independent, mortal women could 
only abstain from sex for short periods of time. Their valuable fertility was too 
essential for the perpetuation of the oikos (and the human race) to be withheld 
for long. In all likelihood then, vows of lifelong celibacy for women must have 
been extremely rare.
Would female celebrants or functionaries have to swear an oath of celibacy in 
all cases? Dillon concludes that “the Greeks did not think that gods required vows 
of virginity.”4 The women who performed the rituals of the Thesmophoria were 
required to abstain from sex with their husbands prior to the festival, but there is 
no evidence that they swore an oath to this effect. On the other hand, since the 
rites of this women’s festival were shrouded in secrecy, it may well be that they 
did swear such an oath. Apollodorus emphasizes that the sacred rites in which 
the Gerarai participated were “not to be spoken of” (arrēta hiera, [Dem.] 59.72) 
2 Robertson 1993, 208‒11 provides further discussion. The oath is introduced as evidence, 
which raises the possibility that it is a later supplement.
3 The most notable would be the Pythia; see Connelly 2007, 17‒18 and 49 for other examples. 
4 Dillon 2004, 77.
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to reinforce his argument that this inappropriate Basilinna had witnessed sacro-
sanct activities. The concept of secret rituals was by no means foreign to Athenian 
religion, and we can only speculate that oaths of celibacy, while not necessarily 
uncommon, were not often discussed either.
A surviving example of the requirement for ritual chastity falls outside the 
time-frame of the Nottingham Database. This is an oath prescribed by the sacred 
law of the Andanian mysteries from Messene that survives as an inscription dated 
to 91 BC. Gawlinski observes that although both male and female initiates took 
an oath, the women’s oath is distinguished by a declaration that they had lived a 
“pure married life,” (i.e. that they were faithful to their husbands).5 Nonetheless 
it is significant that male initiates took an oath of temporary celibacy as well, an 
important detail indicating that ritual abstinence was not restricted to women.
The Gerarai also swore to perform certain functions in honour of Dionysus. 
Otherwise the only surviving example of an oath taken by priestesses regarding 
their responsibilities is found on a public inscription from late fourth-century Cos 
(ICos 386.4). The stone indicates that women chosen by lot would become priest-
esses of Demeter upon swearing an oath. Although it is entirely likely that such 
inaugural oaths were common practice in the induction of religious functionar-
ies, no other records have survived.
7.1.2 Sacrifice and women’s oaths
Two other oaths in a religious context pertain to women’s responsibility to 
provide sacrifices, but this is not a situation unique to females. An oath recorded 
on a public inscription from Miletus (LSAM 45.14‒17, dated around 380 BC) chal-
lenges men and women accused of failing to provide gifts or sacrifices to Artemis 
to swear that they had fulfilled this religious duty before the Boule or to suffer 
consequences. A further example beyond the time covered by the Nottingham 
Database supplements the idea that women might use an oath to guarantee 
their obligations to provide sacrifices. A fragmentary Coan inscription from the 
early third century BC (ED 178A (a)) records a public decree that required all free 
women to sacrifice to Aphrodite Pandamos within a year of their marriage. The 
value of the sacrifice seems to have been on a sliding scale depending on indi-
vidual means, and the inscription records that newly married women swore an 
oath (eisōmosias) probably to the effect that the sacrifice was proportionate to 
5 Gawlinski 2012, 101.
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their wealth (chrēmatistheisas).6 This oath covers a situation similar to the Mile-
sian oath (although men were part of that ceremony), but the Coan oath appears 
to be promissory while the Milesian inscription prescribes the oath as a guarantee 
after the sacrifice.
The inscriptions say nothing about the exact nature of the women’s sacrifices 
to Aphrodite and Artemis. Since the topic is somewhat controversial, however, 
this would be an appropriate point to consider how women’s oaths were related 
to sacrifice. Animal sacrifice was the fundamental ritual of oath ceremonies; 
indeed the term horkos can often mean “oath-sacrifice.” The slaughter of the 
victim symbolized the fate of a potential perjurer, but any oath-taker symboli-
cally offered his or her body as a guarantee of trustworthiness. Even so not all 
oaths were validated by the immolation of expensive victims; the symbolism was 
implicit and not necessarily enacted. Certainly numerous important public oaths 
in Athens and other states were supplemented by blood sacrifice: for example 
the Argive Alliance sworn around 420 BC (IG i3 83.26‒28) was sanctified by “full-
grown victims.” While many inscriptions attest that the immolation of animal 
victims was a component of public oaths, none of these records indicate that 
women swore oaths guaranteed by animal sacrifice when men were not present.
Although some scholars have disputed the reality of women performing 
blood sacrifice, there is no practical reason to doubt that the sacrifices mentioned 
in the Milesian and Coan inscriptions involved such offerings.7 Then again the 
lack of any reference to women’s oath-sacrifices in historical sources and inscrip-
tions adds weight to the argument that women’s oaths were not guaranteed by 
the immolation of victims. Of course women seldom participated in the kinds of 
public oaths that were guaranteed by costly immolations. They might have sworn 
oaths in temples in the presence of a cult statue of a goddess, for example that of 
Artemis in the Amyclean temple in Gortyn (IC iv 72 col. III.5‒12), and often their 
oaths would be reinforced by the invocation of a particular deity.
Although the Milesian and Coan inscriptions suggest that women were 
responsible for financing certain sacrifices, they did not necessarily sanctify their 
own oaths with victims. There were several alternatives, as we know: liquids, pre-
cious objects, textiles, etc. On the other hand there is little doubt that women 
6 Lines 18‒19. Dillon (1999, 67) suggests that the new brides swore that they sacrificed accord-
ing to their means rather than the bare minimum. See his discussion of the use of the participle 
eisomosias for which the editors of SEG suggested exōmosias with reference to Pollux 8.55. It is 
better, I think, to understand eisōmosias as the opposite of exōmosias, i.e. that the women were 
prepared to testify that they had made the sacrifices. 
7 Detienne’s suggestion (1989) that women did not perform cultic butchery has been disputed 
by Osborne (1993), Dillon (2002, 115‒16) and Connelly (2007, 179). 
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sacrificed piglets at the Thesmophoria, so the claim that women did not partici-
pate in sacrifice requires special pleading (e.g. that male functionaries performed 
the sacrifice). Nonetheless epigraphic and historical sources provide no evidence 
that women made animal sacrifices to guarantee their oaths. The unique allusion 
to this possibility in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata may not offer empirical evidence for 
women’s oath-sacrifices, but even so it deserves a closer look.
7.1.3 Representing women’s oaths: Lysistrata
For obvious practical reasons it would be difficult, if not impossible, to actually 
enact an animal sacrifice during any dramatic production. References to offstage 
oath-sacrifices do exist in tragedy; for example, Athena prescribes an oath-sac-
rifice to cement a treaty between Athens and Argos at the end of Euripides’ Sup-
pliant Women. But no oath-sacrifice described in any dramatic text, other than 
Lysistrata, involves women, a phenomenon that accords with the lack of histori-
cal evidence for women’s oath-sacrifices. In extant Athenian drama Aristophanes’ 
Lysistrata is the only oath-sacrifice performed in the theatre, but this hardly pro-
vides the evidence we need to make any pronouncement about women’s oaths 
and their sacrificial guarantees.
In the prologue of this comedy Lysistrata, apparently modelled on a priest-
ess of Athena Polias named Lysimache, compels her cohort of Greek wives to 
swear to abstain from sex with their husbands.8 Aristophanes’ inspiration for 
the Greek wives’ pledge may be the oath of celibacy sworn by the Gerarai (men-
tioned above) to another Athenian priestess, the Basilinna, at the Anthesteria. Of 
course, if Aristophanes expected his audience to recognize this allusion, perhaps 
the rituals involving the Gerarai and Basilinna were not as secret as Apollodorus 
would claim several decades later. Since the Anthesteria was a wine festival, the 
women’s pledge over a wine-jug is humorously appropriate. Lysistrata insists on 
referring to this stamnos as a sacrificial beast (196‒204). Provocative as the pre-
tence may be, it unfortunately provides no firm grasp on the question of women’s 
oath-sacrifices. Does this scene indeed suggest that women could participate in 
blood sacrifices? Or is part of the joke that women generally did not swear oaths 
validated by blood sacrifice, as other evidence seems to suggest? The oath is a 
complex parody, alluding (in addition to the oath of the Gerarai) to treaty oaths 
ratified by wine sacrifices, an analogy for blood, which men would swear in his-
8 The identification was posited by Lewis 1955 based on inscriptional evidence. Also see Con-
nelly 2007, 59‒63.
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torical reality, and actually do negotiate at the end of Lysistrata. The humour 
resides in how the women’s oath juxtaposes a recognizable ritual, associated 
with women’s cultic roles, and formulaic treaty oaths in which women did not 
participate.
There are, however, certain features of the women’s oath that do not align 
with historical wine oaths: the women actually drink the oath-sacrifice them-
selves, a deviation from interstate protocol in which wine sacrifices were poured 
on the ground. If we accept the fantasy that the wine jug is a sacrificial animal, 
the consumption of the horkos is still a violation of standard practices: an oath-
sacrifice stood for the body of the potential perjurer, and unlike other sacrifices 
was not consumed.9 Of course Aristophanes exploits the wine sacrifice for 
humorous effect by alluding to women’s reputation for bibulousness, but the joke 
operates very effectively on multiple levels.10
The women are seeking to achieve peace: the gambit is successful in the play, 
although it would not become a reality for another decade and then only in the 
face of defeat. In order to accomplish their goal they form a conspiracy to take 
over the Acropolis. The oath sworn by the women might also remind audiences of 
conspiratorial oaths (see S&B ch. 6), especially in light of current fears of oligar-
chic revolution. The Athenians who watched this play in 411 BC were well aware 
of conspiratorial sunōmotai, although the fictional idea of women swearing oaths 
together recurs in other dramas discussed later in this chapter. In the final analy-
sis there are so many allusions and parodies fused together in the prologue of 
Lysistrata that it is very difficult to glean any historical information about how 
women actually did swear oaths in ancient Athens.
7.1.4 Civic or political oaths
The parodic oath that Lysistrata and her cohort of Greek wives perform is inspired 
by formulaic treaty oaths, an amusing imitation of alliances that normally did 
not involve women. The singular historical example of a female power-holder 
swearing an oath of alliance, although in tandem with her co-regent, from the 
mid-fourth century unfortunately tells us nothing about typical women’s access 
to power. If the usual restoration of the inscription is correct, Artemisia II of 
Caria swore an oath in concert with her husband/brother Mausolus to honour 
an agreement with the Lycian city of Phaselis, although her name is absent from 
9 Paus. 5.24.10; S&B 154.
10 See further remarks at Fletcher 2012, 220‒40.
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the remaining text of the agreement. 11 Only inscriptional evidence attests to 
Artemisia sharing the rule with Mausolus, although as Carney speculates she 
probably did not have an authority equal to his. After his death, she was briefly 
(353‒350 BC) sole ruler of Caria, but there is no evidence of her involvement in 
interstate politics during this period.
Otherwise there are a few situations in which women did swear oaths in a 
civic or political context, albeit rare occurrences arising from special circum-
stances. Women (and children) were among the Theran colonists who founded 
the city of Cyrene in the seventh century BC, and they were also among the subse-
quent citizens who repeated the oath in the fourth century. The “founders’ oath” 
is paraphrased and preserved in a fourth-century inscription (ML 5) which most 
scholars believe is a genuine reproduction of the original.12 Faraone argues that 
the presence of “ancillary participants” (i.e. women and children) who lacked 
the “political rights needed to make a legally binding agreement” is typical of 
such oaths; their attendance is necessary to maximize the effects of the condi-
tional curse, and to publicize the terrible consequences of perjury.13 This might 
have been the impetus behind a treaty oath preserved in an inscription (SEG li 
642.1‒29) dating ca. 430 BC: although fragmentary, the text indicates that Locrian 
and Messenian men and women swore to abide by a treaty between Naupactus 
and Messene.
As these examples suggest, on very rare occasions women did participate in 
public oaths – although never without men, and probably as potential victims of 
the curse that would be visited on perjurers and their families. Although a relief 
decorating the inscription of a treaty sworn between Athens and Argos depicts 
two female figures clasping hands, it is most likely that they symbolize the tute-
lary deities of the two cities (Athena and Hera).14 It is only in the dim past or in 
myth that a woman participates alone in a treaty oath. Ctesias writes of a peace 
treaty sworn between Zarina, the Sacian queen, who led a rebellion by Scyth-
ians and Parthians, and Astibarus (probably Herodotus’ Cyaxares), king of the 
Medes (FGrH 688 F 5.34.2). Plutarch (Thes. 19) cites the fourth-century Atthidog-
rapher Cleidemus (FGrH 323 F 17 [5]) who wrote that a treaty was formed between 
Athens and Crete when Theseus swore a wine oath (speisamenos) with Ariadne 
11 The inscription (TAM ii (1‒3) 1183.1‒7) records that Artemisia and Mausolus swear to honour 
the agreement “guilelessly and innocently.” See Carney 2005, 71.
12 See Faraone’s summary (1993, 61n. 4 and 5) of the controversy regarding the authenticity 
of the inscription.
13 Faraone 1993, 72.
14 IG i3 86; see Bayliss’s discussion, S&B 157.
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who had inherited the city of Knossos. The oath established friendship and peace 
between the Athenians and Cretans. In the distant heroic past Crete is envisioned 
as a state where women attended athletic games, inherited sovereignty and made 
interstate alliances (although Ariadne was apparently moved to do so because 
she fancied her new ally). Nothing in the extant corpus of oaths suggests that this 
autonomous political authority existed for real Greek women.
7.1.5 Oaths in a legal setting
We find more extensive evidence for women’s oaths in legal contexts. It is in the 
Dorian city of Gortyn that women enjoyed a certain legal agency, or at least legal 
visibility. There are several well-preserved inscriptions dating from the sixth and 
fifth centuries that would have been displayed on the sides of public buildings or 
later on stone stelai. While the “Great Code” (IC iv 72) and various fragmentary 
smaller codes, including the so-called “Lesser Code,” are by no means compre-
hensive (for example the inscriptions do not deal with homicide cases), they are 
informative about the legal status of women in this community.
As these inscriptions suggest, citizen women of Gortyn possessed more legal 
rights and financial independence than women of Athens: for instance, they were 
able to inherit and own property without some of the encumbrances faced by 
Athenian citizen women. These details are consistent with other evidence sug-
gesting that women of this city-state had more public presence than female citi-
zens in other communities. Aristotle (Pol. 1272a21) relates that they dined with 
men at public communal feasts, and there are other indications of their mobility 
and rights.15 It is important to note, however, that our sources only give informa-
tion about the legal rights of women, and never any specific instances of their 
exercise. The comparatively liberal legal rights of female citizens of Gortyn are 
suggested by the regulation regarding the disposition of property after a divorce 
(IC iv 72.ii.45): in the event of a dispute the woman could swear an oath by Artemis 
in the Amyclean temple, before a statue of the goddess, denying the accusation 
that she had stolen from her husband, although the statement had to be sworn 
within twenty days of the judge’s demand for the oath. If the former husband took 
back any portion of the property after her oath of denial, he was obliged to return 
the goods and pay a monetary penalty to the woman.16
15 For further details on the legal and economic status of Gortynian women see Sealey 1990, 
50‒81.
16 See the discussion of the oath-taking practices of Gortyn in S&B 62‒7.
 7.1 Women and oaths   165
Oaths were also an essential element of the legal sphere of ancient Athens, 
from the dicastic oath sworn by the massive juries to the oaths of litigants, defen-
dants, and possibly witnesses (see S&B 67‒115). If women contributed testimony 
to these proceedings, it could only have been by means of oaths sworn before the 
trial, although examples of this procedure actually being completed are very rare. 
In many respects the social position of female citizens in Athens was quite differ-
ent from that of women in Gortyn. They did not swear oaths that represented their 
own interests in disputes against men, but were cited more obliquely in contexts 
that lent support to their male relatives. The orators provide several glimpses of 
situations in which women would swear oaths, whether officially or unofficially. 
We begin with the former type since they provide a picture, albeit not entirely 
reliable, of how Athenian women might have used oaths in private or non-legal 
contexts. In most cases the oaths are cited to support the agenda of an Athenian 
male citizen and may never have actually taken place. The greatest value of these 
examples is how they reveal some of the stereotypes associated with women’s 
oaths in classical Athens.
7.1.5.1 Unofficial oaths in Athens
The first example, a slave woman extracting a promise from an Athenian citizen, 
is not explicitly an oath (horkos) but a pledge (pistis), which may or may not 
have been an oath. The vignette is useful for its insights into the complexities 
of gender, status, and promise-making. Euphiletus, the speaker of Lysias 1, 
defended himself in a dikē phonou (a suit for murder) by claiming that the man he 
killed was making love to his wife, a cause, he maintains, for justifiable homicide. 
The evidence for this defence is an archaic law (not preserved in this speech but 
in Dem. 23.53) from which we can deduce that Euphiletus was permitted to kill 
the adulterer without penalty (though certainly not obliged to do so, as he tries 
to insinuate) if and only if he could demonstrate that the victim was caught in 
flagrante.
Euphiletus is able to provide witnesses who saw Eratosthenes naked in bed 
with his wife, but the supporting details are perhaps intentionally vague. The 
defence needs to create a background story to enhance the tale of seduction and 
deceit, and also to mitigate any suggestion of entrapment, which must have been 
the prosecution’s argument. Accordingly he narrates how he discovered that his 
wife was having an affair with an experienced seducer, Eratosthenes, identified 
to him by the maid of the adulterer’s former mistress (16‒17). Following the advice 
of this unnamed woman Euphiletus takes his own slave-girl to a neighbour’s 
house for interrogation. Earlier Euphiletus had disingenuously revealed that his 
wife suspected him of having sex with this slave (13), an apparently superflu-
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ous detail that would account for a failure to offer her up for torture (basanos). 
The slave-girl’s testimony could have provided crucial evidence about the affair 
between Eratosthenes and his wife, but if Euphiletus used her to summon Era-
tosthenes to his house her testimony might also prove the plaintiff’s argument of 
entrapment.17 Euphiletus claims that he threatened the girl before she revealed 
any details about the affair, and that she supplicated Euphiletus to make him 
promise that she would suffer no harm (19‒20). Presumably this would include 
the basanos, the only way to admit her evidence in court.
There are aspects of this scene that recall oaths featured in Greek drama. These 
similarities do not mean that the entire speech is a fiction or rhetorical exercise, 
but rather that Lysias knew how to create an engaging story to divert the jury’s 
attention away from the brute facts of the homicide.18 The pledge that Euphile-
tus gives to his suppliant slave is a pistis. This is precisely the same word that 
Medea uses when she supplicates Aegeus (Eur. Med. 731), but the oath that Medea 
tenders is a powerful, formal horkos guaranteed by the Sun, other divinities, and 
a curse. Like Medea, Euphiletus’ maid supplicates a powerful man and extracts 
a promise; the supplication provides a ritual backdrop to the pistis, although we 
have no further details of the promise-making. By giving his word that the slave 
would come to no harm, Euphiletus lost his opportunity to prove that Eratosthe-
nes had regularly visited his wife. On the other hand, had the slave been tortured 
she might have revealed details that would diminish Euphiletus’ case.
There was, as Euphiletus’ jury knew, a tragic precedent for a naïve young 
man swearing an oath to a slave woman. In fact so well known was this precedent 
that a citizen named Hygiaenon referred to it in an antidosis case against Eurip-
ides.19 In Hippolytus Phaedra’s nurse extracts an oath of silence from the young 
man who then finds that he is prevented from testifying against charges of rape. 
As Mirhady observes, it was inappropriate for Hippolytus to swear an oath to a 
low-status woman, and we could say the same about Euphiletus.20 Lysias has 
chosen his client’s words carefully to avoid the culturally loaded term horkos; he 
17 Carawan (1998, 294‒6) reconstructs the argument for entrapment: the slave-girl’s role would 
have been to lure Eratosthenes to the house by pretending to bear a message from her mistress. 
18 See Porter’s discussions (1997 and 2007) of how the speech reflects elements of New Com-
edy. Gagarin 2003 responds: “The fact that we can find mythical or literary elements in these 
stories does not mean either that they are literary exercises, or that as court speeches they are 
fictitious tales. It simply means that their authors (like any good litigating attorney today) knew 
something of the art of storytelling and have done their job well.” 
19 According to Aristotle (Rhet. 1416a28‒35) Hygiaenon intimated that Euripides was impious 
because Hippolytus (612) claimed “My tongue swore, not my mind.”  See further §11.3.
20 Mirhady 2003, 21.
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avoids making Euphiletus look as though he is abusing a sacred promise-giving 
ritual by swearing an oath to a slave. At the same time Euphiletus has something 
to gain by implying he is keeping his pistis. Compare his apparent gullibility with 
that of his tragic counterpart, Hippolytus. In the final moments of the drama, 
Artemis praises Hippolytus for keeping his oath, although this nobility led to his 
own catastrophe. This may be a side effect of Euphiletus’ narration of his promise 
to his wife’s maid. He runs a risk of seeming gullible when he swears to a slave 
woman, but appearing to be a gullible cuckold who keeps his word is better than 
looking like a calculating killer. As it is Euphiletus does not have to produce the 
slave for torture, but can insert her putative evidence into his speech and end up 
seeming to be, like Aegeus and Hippolytus, a decent man who honours his oath.
Two other examples from oratory prove to be equally illusory and potentially 
fabricated; these oaths, sworn by women to men, exemplify a common mistrust 
of women’s agency. Both are from Hypereides, and survive as papyrus fragments. 
Although they are mentioned in a legal setting, they are not evidentiary oaths, 
but informal promises allegedly sworn in private settings and repeated by the 
speakers, one a defendant in an adultery trial, the other a prosecutor in a suit for 
damages. The first oath has been used as evidence against the accused Lycophron 
who recounts how his prosecutors claimed that his alleged mistress, a married 
woman, had sworn an oath of fidelity to him, and that he was overheard remind-
ing her to keep this oath on her wedding day. In his defence speech Lycophron 
scoffs at the accusation and wonders why Dioxippus, the aggrieved husband, 
would have married the woman had he known about this oath.
Although Lycophron is denying the existence of any such promise, the signif-
icant point is that the plaintiff expects the jury to believe that an Athenian woman 
could swear an oath of fidelity to her lover. Obviously lovers’ pledges were within 
the realm of possibility, even though some sources claim that they were not as 
binding as other types of oaths (e.g. Hes. fr. 124.1; see §11.2). The putative oath 
of the wife of Dioxippus lifts the veil momentarily on the private life and per-
sonal choices of real Athenian female citizens who, as the plaintiffs acknowledge, 
could have desires of their own that were not necessarily in accord with those of 
family members who arranged their marriages.
A second report of a woman’s informal oath occurs in Hypereides’ Against 
Athenogenes, a fragmentary prosecution speech probably for a dikē blabēs (suit 
for damages) written in the late fourth century. The beginning of the speech is 
lost, but it is clear from what remains that Epicrates is trying to void a contract 
of sale by claiming that he was the target of a fraud perpetrated by Athenogenes, 
the vendor, and a courtesan named Antigone. The woman had brokered the deal 
in a private home, probably her own, and apparently in the absence of any legal 
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witnesses.21 The fragment begins with Epicrates narrating how the deal was ini-
tially jeopardized by a disagreement between him and Athenogenes. Antigone 
intervened to reconcile the two men, reassuring Epicrates that Athenogenes was a 
decent sort by “swearing the greatest oaths” (§2). Encouraged by her commenda-
tion Epicrates purchased a slave and his two sons along with the perfumery that 
they managed, but he was misled about the amount of debt associated with the 
sale. Epicrates portrays himself as eager to complete the deal because of his erotic 
interest in one of the sons, and for this reason he was incautious about the enter-
prise. The calculating and dishonest Athenogenes and Antigone take advantage 
of this lapse in judgment. In particular the plaintiff claims that he was “persuaded 
by the hetaira of Athenogenes” (§18). His strategy is to draw parallels between his 
situation and Solon’s law about the influence of women on wills to suggest that 
he was swayed by Antigone’s intervention. He claims that he became the victim 
of fraud because he trusted “the greatest oaths” sworn by Antigone about the 
character of Athenogenes. And yet his gullibility is not due to his own foolishness 
as much as it is to the wiles of a devious courtesan. She was the “most skilled 
hetaira of her day” (§3) who now plies her trade as a madam, having ruined the 
household of a citizen from the deme of Cholleidae.
Antigone was evidently a shrewd businesswoman who pocketed a consid-
erable sum for brokering this deal. The speech gives the impression that she 
would stoop to anything, including swearing falsely about the character of an 
utter scoundrel. Antigone’s assurances, despite Epicrates’ claim that these were 
“the greatest oaths,” were certainly not formal oaths in a legal setting, and not 
part of court evidence – indeed they are little more than a strong reassurance of 
goodwill. Epicrates bolsters his case for conspiracy by suggesting that Antigone 
would invoke the gods as a guarantee of her deception, and of course given her 
social status she cannot give evidence to the contrary. There are some stereotypes 
operating here, which are nicely summed up by a Sophoclean fragment (fr. 811) in 
which an unidentified character remarks that “I write a woman’s oath on water,” 
an opinion later repeated by the fourth century comic poet Xenarchus (fr. 6 K-A) 
who substituted “wine” for “water.”22 Women’s oaths were not to be trusted, as 
Antigone (or at least Epicrates’ portrayal of her) demonstrates.
But another stereotype is also being invoked beyond that of a perfidious 
woman, and that is the conventional representation of prostitutes in Attic oratory. 
21 The case is discussed in detail by Phillips 2009 who observes that Antigone would not qual-
ify as a witness.
22 Cf. Callimachus (Epigr. 25.3‒4) where the broken oaths are in an erotic context. The frag-
ments of Sophocles and Xenarchus may also have referred to lovers’ oaths. 
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Glazebrook argues that prosecutors often use the figure of the hetaira to diminish 
the credibility of their opponents.23 She speculates that these depictions of disso-
lute, scheming, and dishonest prostitutes are a rhetorical convention used to cast 
doubt on the integrity of the speaker’s opponents. Indeed the events described, 
and even the women themselves, may be fictions created to prey upon the fears of 
an Athenian citizen jury whose collective masculinity is jeopardized by the influ-
ence of immoral women on susceptible members of the citizen body. Antigone, 
who had already ruined an entire household in Cholleidae, is obviously being 
typecast as one of these cunning hetairai. Her close association with Atheno-
genes, the target of this litigation, is an implicit denunciation of his honesty. The 
stereotype is exacerbated by the allegation that she swore a false oath; although it 
is an informal promise and not sworn in the presence of witnesses, it contributes 
to the characterization of Antigone as a con artist.
All three of these examples involve unsubstantiated claims regarding oaths 
– one sworn to a woman, the other two sworn by women. In each case allusions 
to these oaths support the agenda of male citizens by exploiting a cultural bias 
that holds women to be manipulative, immoral or deceptive. Dioxippus used the 
report of his wife’s oath to her lover – unsubstantiated but powerfully resonant – 
to support his adultery prosecution. Euphiletus and Epicrates present themselves 
as susceptible dupes who allow women to compromise their legal agency: one 
by making a promise to a slave woman, another by believing a prostitute’s oaths. 
Let us turn now to more positive examples of women’s use of oaths, although the 
sources for these are almost equally opaque.
7.1.5.2 Mothers’ oaths
The oaths discussed above are unofficial, sworn in private settings, but dis-
closed in the law courts. In this section we examine oaths attributed to women 
in Athens in a more formal situation, specifically oaths that women allegedly 
offered to swear as evidence in dikai (private cases). While surviving examples of 
Athenian oaths in a legal context are overwhelmingly those of men, the logogra-
phers refer to the possibility that women’s testimony could be offered as an oath 
sworn before the trial occurred and cited as evidence. Unlike women in Gortyn 
who were apparently able to swear oaths that supported their own financial inter-
ests, the oaths of Athenian citizen women, if sworn at all, were meant to bolster 
the claims of their families, especially their sons. We read that certain women of 
citizen status were willing to offer testimony by oath, although their oaths are 
23 Glazebrook 2006.
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never actually sworn, with one notable exception. It is a rhetorical strategy that 
allows plaintiffs or defendants to insert the testimony of their female kin without 
actually going through with the ritual.
Foxhall notes that although women were not litigants in court cases, they 
were often stakeholders in disputes that ended up in court. The oath-challenge 
gave citizen women a voice in the public venue of the courts, but it is difficult 
to determine if one of these putative offers was not in reality an act of ventril-
oquism. The daughter of Diogeiton, according to the speaker of Lysias’ Against 
Diogeiton (Lys. 32.13), offered to swear on the heads of her children in support of 
her sons’ financial claims on her father’s estate. In Gagarin’s opinion, the sophis-
ticated rhetorical structure of the woman’s speech, reported in direct discourse, 
suggests that Lysias had manufactured this mini-oration; the actual speech of 
the woman, and her unsubstantiated offer to swear the oath, are simply a rhe-
torical device.24 Although it is possible that Lysias shaped the woman’s speech 
so that it conformed to the conventions of forensic oratory – a rather unlikely 
strategy for the orator known for his ēthopoiia – the scenario more likely dem-
onstrates the extreme anxiety of Diodotus’ grandsons, who are ready to pounce 
on any morsel of evidence that might bolster their claim to his property.25 In all 
likelihood, as Foxhall observes, the woman was too weak-willed to intervene on 
their behalf. Desperate for justice, and the patrimony to which they were legally 
entitled, the sons reported that their mother was willing to swear an oath, an 
unprovable assertion that probably bore little weight. As recently noted, men can 
refer to oaths that women took in a private context (evidence which the women 
could not dispute) to support their litigation. Now we encounter a situation in 
which a woman’s more official oaths are only a murky possibility, albeit one that 
contributes to the agenda of a male litigant.
Indeed, the case also suggests that reports of women being willing to swear 
an oath could in fact be specious. That said, forensic oratory suggests a particu-
larly close bond between Athenian citizen women and their sons, which allowed 
mothers some authority or at least influence in the retention of family property; 
their willingness to swear oaths to support their sons’ property disputes is one 
aspect of family solidarity.26 This was probably the case with Demosthenes’ 
mother Cleobule, who must have been the impetus behind her son’s litigation 
(Dem. 27‒30) to retrieve his inheritance from unscrupulous guardians, since he 
24 See Gagarin 2001, 162‒67. Foxhall 1996, 149 similarly notes the scripted quality of the oath.
25 The prosecutor or sunēgoros in this case is the uncle of the sons of Diodotus’ daughter, who 
is the niece and wife of Diogeiton. 
26 Hunter 1989, 47; Johnstone 2003, 271.
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would have depended on her evidence about the matter. After the death of her 
husband, Cleobule remained unwed, apparently by her own choice, and as a 
widow, had a certain de facto control of her own household economy. Foxhall 
speculates that Cleobule would have “nagged and primed” her young son, Dem-
osthenes, until he was of age to bring her concerns to court.27 The target of this 
litigation, Aphobus, according to the terms of Demosthenes’ father’s will, was 
supposed to marry Cleobule, but the marriage did not take place, perhaps due to 
Cleobule’s resistance. He did, nonetheless, retain control of some of her property. 
Her determination to bring the property back under her control involved an offer 
to swear oaths on the matter (29.26, 33, 56): one to the effect that a household 
slave had been freed by her husband on his deathbed (26, repeated at 56); and 
another (on the heads of Demosthenes and his sister) that Aphobus had received 
a dowry for Cleobule (33). It is by offering these oaths that Cleobule is able to 
insert her evidence in her son’s speech.
As these examples illustrate, Athenian juries were expected to believe that 
women could offer oaths in some sanctified place (usually in the Delphinium) on 
behalf of their male relatives. It appears, however, that these oaths were seldom, 
if ever, actually sworn (a phenomenon that applies equally to men’s oath-chal-
lenges as well). Another example appears in Demosthenes’ Against Callicles, 
written for an Athenian citizen involved in a dispute with a neighbour claiming 
damages due to a wall that had diverted flood water. The wall had been built by 
the defendant’s father, and Demosthenes’ client relates a history of neighbourly 
good-will now dissipated by the sykophantic intentions of the plaintiff. Accord-
ing to the defendant’s mother the damage actually sustained was much less than 
Callicles claimed. The defendant explains that he tendered an oath to the neigh-
bour’s mother, and challenged the neighbour to tender a corresponding oath to 
his own mother (Dem. 55.27), that Callicles had or had not narrowed the road by 
throwing rubble on to it. It is easy enough to imagine two neighbouring women 
who had once been friends now engaged in a feud to which they had contributed. 
Although their oaths never took place, the challenge itself is read out to the jury, 
and thus the women’s testimony becomes part of the proceedings.
Both speeches of Demosthenes allow us to reconstruct plausible situations 
with women operating behind the scenes, as it were. Denied an opportunity of 
presenting evidence in their own voices, they satisfy the desideratum of a silent 
female citizen while nonetheless inserting their opinions in the form of unsworn 
oaths, and perhaps even orchestrating legal action themselves.
27 Foxhall 1996, 144. 
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7.1.5.3 Paternity oaths
When women are prepared to swear oaths as evidence, or at least when their male 
relatives claim that they are, it is invariably to support the rights and claims of 
their sons.28 The most significant form of this practice is the “paternity oath,” in 
which a woman confirms the parentage of her son. An Athenian citizen’s member-
ship in his phratry and deme was formally established by the oaths of his father 
or guardian sworn at the Apaturia, first when he was an infant, and again when 
he was an adolescent.29 A similar procedure occurred on the island of Tenos: 
according to an inscription dating from the fourth century, not only did male rela-
tives swear to the paternity of a child, but its mother swore as well.30 There is no 
evidence that mothers swore oaths to affirm their sons’ paternity at other family-
oriented rituals, and the Athenian reticence about having their wives speak out in 
public suggests that mothers did not give oaths at the Apaturia.
In cases of disputed citizenship status or inheritance rights, however, the 
question of paternity becomes crucial. Accordingly women might be asked to give 
oaths to establish their sons’ paternity. In Isaeus 12, dating from the mid fourth 
century when there was particular anxiety and scrutiny regarding deme member-
ship, the speaker argues on behalf of his disfranchised brother, Euphiletus, who 
could no longer represent himself in court. Euphiletus had been voted out of the 
deme of Erchia, and this speech is an attempt to get him reinstated. In addition to 
offering his own oath and that of his father, the brother claims that their mother, 
whose citizenship status is affirmed (she is astē, 9), is willing to swear an oath at 
the Delphinium that Euphiletus was her son by Hegesippus (9‒10). “For who is 
more suitable to know than she?” asks the speaker, summing up the efficacy of 
such oaths.
A literary instance of this same phenomenon is represented in Euripides’ Ion 
when Creusa swears to Ion by “the Gorgon-slayer” (1478) that Apollo is the father 
of the son with whom she has just been reunited. Her account of Ion’s parentage 
is framed by this first oath and then by a more complete oath “by Athena Nike 
who once raised her shield against the Giants in her chariot beside Zeus,” that Ion 
is the son of no mortal father but of Apollo himself (1528). The oath of Euphiletus’ 
mother mentioned above, had it actually been sworn, would have taken place 
28 As Allen notes (2000, 103) oath-challenges are always initiated by a male request, and the 
actual testimony (i.e. the content of a sworn oath) of women seldom reaches the court.
29 These are discussed in S&B 11‒12.
30 The public inscription (IG xii Suppl. 303.6‒8) does not specify what the mother swore, but 
the remainder of the document indicates that the child’s father and male relatives swore to its 
paternity, so it is likely that the mother swore a similar oath.
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in the Delphinium (temple of Apollo “of the womb”). Creusa is not in a court of 
law, but the location at the Delphic temple of Apollo is even more authoritative; 
furthermore, she is swearing that that god, whose temple in Athens is the location 
of mothers’ paternity oaths, is in fact the father of her son.
It is not difficult to imagine other circumstances in which mothers were asked 
to verify the paternity of their sons by an oath, especially in Athens where the 
stakes were so high and the perquisites of citizenship guarded so assiduously. A 
mother’s oath, or willingness to swear one, was the equivalent of modern DNA 
testing. Euphiletus’ brother can say that their mother was willing to swear an 
oath of paternity, but the expectation always seems to be that the oath would not 
be needed. The only example of such an oath actually being completed is one 
where a mother was supposed to refuse the challenge.
Demosthenes wrote Against Boeotus (39) for Mantitheus in a legal dispute 
involving the paternity of his half-brother Boeotus, and his right to use the name 
Mantitheus as well. Boeotus claimed to be the son of Mantitheus’ father, Mantias 
of Thoricus, but by a different mother, Plangon. This dispute is recorded in two 
speeches by Demosthenes for Mantitheus, the second (40) involving a complex 
financial matter related to the two mothers’ dowries. Apparently, both women 
had been married successively to Mantias, who had divorced Plangon, the mother 
of Boeotus, possibly because he did not want to be implicated in her father’s 
debts. Mantias married another much wealthier woman, who became the mother 
of Mantitheus.31 Whatever precipitated the divorce, his affection for Plangon 
was strong enough for Mantias to sustain a relationship with her even after he 
remarried, and he continued to support her household. The full details of this 
triangle are not entirely clear: apparently Mantias had registered Mantitheus as 
his legitimate son in his deme, but not Plangon’s sons, whom her brothers offered 
to adopt. With Plangon’s assistance, Boeotus successfully sought membership in 
Thoricus and the right to call himself Mantitheus as well.
How did this come to pass? At some point Mantias offered Plangon a sub-
stantial sum of money to refuse an oath-challenge that Boeotus and his younger 
brother Pamphilus were his sons. For whatever reason Plangon (whose family 
had been plagued by financial problems for years) accepted the payment, but 
then she actually took the oath in the Delphinium and swore that Mantias was 
indeed the father of both sons. Mantitheus mentions Plangon’s oath in both 
31 It is a matter of debate whether Plangon was legally married to Mantias or was a citizen 
concubine, or even if Mantias was a bigamist. Humphreys (1989, 182) speculates that Plangon 
had been married to Mantias, but the couple divorced around the time of Boeotus’ birth and that 
of his half-brother Manitheus.
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speeches (39.3‒4; 40.10‒11), representing it as an underhanded trick by a devious 
woman. Paradoxically, the very act of accepting the oath challenge purportedly 
breaks a previous oath that Plangon swore to Mantias (39.3) not to take the chal-
lenge. The second time Mantitheus refers to this oath the imputation of deceit is 
even stronger: Plangon, he maintains, “deceived” his father by “the strongest and 
most fearful” oath (40.10).
Although she has citizen status, the “kept woman” Plangon falls into Gla-
zebrook’s category of the disruptive hetaira. Like Antigone, she uses an oath to 
entice her victim into her trap. Given the limitations of Plangon’s situation, whose 
natal family’s financial problems forced her to accept an extramarital relation-
ship with her former husband, she seems to have worked the system to her sons’ 
best possible advantage. According to the terms of the oath-challenge, Mantias 
had to accept Plangon’s sons as his own. As Virginia Hunter put it:
Resourceful, she moved beyond kin and family to one of the few public institutions open 
to women. It took some maneuvering and some deception as well, but eventually Mantias 
was persuaded to challenge her to swear an oath in the Delphinium, the sanctuary of Apollo 
Delphinius, as to the identity of her children’s father. By that act, she ensured that the two 
were recognized as his legitimate sons. Surely here is an instance where tenacity and strata-
gems won out.32
The final example of a paternity oath occurs in Sparta, although not in a legal 
context. Herodotus’ story of Demaratus’ mother has a decidedly folktale quality 
(6.63‒9), but nonetheless exemplifies the importance of a mother’s oath. The tale 
involves the Spartan king Ariston’s wife, the mother of Demaratus, in an account 
that complicates the convention of having a woman swear an oath identifying her 
son’s father.33 The stages of the episode are marked by a series of oaths begin-
ning when Ariston tricked a friend into swearing a blind oath that obliged him to 
give up his beautiful wife to Ariston. Seven months later the woman gave birth 
to Demaratus, but Ariston, believing that the boy was the child of his wife’s first 
husband, repudiated him by oath, an inversion of the legitimating oaths sworn 
by fathers at various rituals throughout Greece. Ariston later regretted this oath, 
although he did not recant it. After he died Demaratus became king, but the other 
king, Cleomenes, used Ariston’s oath to depose Demaratus in favor of Leotychi-
das. Provoked by an insult impugning his lineage, Demaratus confronted his 
mother. Holding the splanchna of his sacrifice to Zeus Herkeios, which indicated 
that she was swearing an oath (and a unique example of a sacrifice accompany-
32 Hunter 1994, 42. 
33 For further discussion see Fletcher 2012, 31‒33; Lateiner 2012, 165‒67; Faraone 2002, 80.
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ing a woman’s oath), she told him the story of his conception: two men visited 
her on one evening, both of whom she believed to be the same man, her husband. 
The first visitor apparently was a trickster daemon impersonating her husband, 
and he had left garlands on her bed. When Ariston asked where the flowers came 
from, she swore an oath that he had set them there. A consultation with the seers 
revealed that she had been visited first by the hero-trickster Astrabacus. The 
oath that Demaratus’ mother gave him regarding his paternity was therefore not 
conclusive, since it suggested that Demaratus could have had one of two fathers. 
Thus a conventional way of proving a man’s paternity – a mother’s oath – is ironi-
cally confounded.
7.1.6 Mothers’ vengeance oaths
It is as mothers that Greek women swore the most potent oaths, especially when 
they were in support of their sons. A variation on this theme is the oath of Tomyris 
in Herodotus’ Histories (1.201‒14). There are several accounts of the demise of 
Cyrus, says Herodotus, but this is the one that he finds “most credible” (1.214). 
Tomyris is the widowed queen of the Massagetae, a stalwart tribe that held out 
against Cyrus’ conquests. Conceptually the pastoral-nomadic Massagetae exist 
on the edges of civilization: for example they eat the corpses of dead elders, and 
drink only milk, a signifier of primitiveness. They were, however, a force to be 
reckoned with, and as the tale of Tomyris reveals, their queen was a resolute and 
astute leader. When Tomyris rejects Cyrus’ proposal of marriage (realizing that 
he meant to enslave her kingdom), he starts his campaign against her. One of 
his tactics is to lure some of the Massagetae into killing a group of his men at 
their feast. The Massagetae, who are unfamiliar with wine, finish off the banquet 
and fall into a drunken stupor. The Persians kill many of them and take others 
captives including Tomyris’ son, the general Spargapises. Rather than begging or 
bargaining for his release she sends a message that includes an oath by the Sun 
that she “will give Cyrus his fill of blood” if he does not release her son (1.212). 
When Spargapises gets sober he feels such regret that he commits suicide, thus 
activating his mother’s oath. Cyrus subsequently dies during battle with the Mas-
sagetae, and the Persians are defeated. Tomyris finds the corpse of Cyrus, puts 
his head in a skin full of human blood, and thus claims that she has fulfilled her 
oath.
Scholars offer different interpretations of this episode. Gould, for example, 
suggests that Tomyris exceeds even Cyrus and the Persians in violence, and is 
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thus a negative example of female potency.34 But it bears noting that the queen 
swears her oath in an attempt to preserve her son’s life. She is a fierce protec-
tive mother, in addition to being an independent and intelligent ruler. Like the 
mothers whose (usually unsworn) oaths were invoked in Athenian courts, she 
uses a powerful form of speech in the interests of her son.35 Tomyris is also dis-
tinctly different from those silent mothers behind the scenes of Athenian litiga-
tion: she is an autonomous woman in charge of a nation, and prepared to do 
battle with the most powerful man of her time. Her oath is really a threat, which 
she is obliged to carry out after her son’s suicide. For Herodotus’ Greek audience 
she is no threat, however, for her army kills Cyrus whose rapidly growing empire 
would develop into their most dangerous enemy. Fittingly he is dispatched by an 
army under the control of a woman – an oblique disparagement of his mascu-
linity.36 Still, there is something askew about this barbarian queen’s oath: her 
milk-drinking warriors are laid low by wine, the liquid used in peace oaths as 
an analogy for blood. Tomyris is explicit about the connection when she scorns 
Cyrus both for his insatiable blood lust and intemperate behavior under the influ-
ence of wine.
For a more invidious maternal oath of vengeance we turn to Aeschylus’ Cly-
taemestra. There are similarities and differences between Tomyris and Clytaemes-
tra. After killing his mother and Aegisthus, Orestes alludes to an oath sworn by 
the couple to kill his father and die together (Cho. 977‒80). The murderers each 
had their own reasons for committing this act of retribution: Aegisthus kills to 
fulfil his father’s curse against the house of Atreus; Clytaemestra kills in revenge 
for the sacrifice of her daughter, Iphigeneia. The audience never hears her make 
this oath, although she may allude to it when she reveals the bodies of Agamem-
non and Cassandra (ὁρκίων ἐμῶν θέμιν, Ag. 1431). Unlike Tomyris, Clytaemestra 
makes her oath after the death of her child, but both mothers’ oaths are moti-
vated by anger. Of course there are more substantial differences, most notably 
that Clytaemestra is killing her own husband, not a rejected suitor and enemy 
invader. Tomyris is safely displaced in the East, and her oath results in the defeat 
of Greece’s enemy. Clytaemestra incarnates the more dangerous concept of an 
autonomous Greek woman who kills a Greek king. But like the vow of Tomyris 
fulfilled by defiling the corpse of Cyrus, there is a certain perversity about Cly-
taemestra’s occult pronouncement over the corpse of her husband. In keeping 
34 Gould 1989,131.
35 As Hazewindus (2004, 173) notes, the decisive factor is not political, but maternal, i.e. Cyrus 
ignored her request to release her son. 
36 Dewald 1981, 19‒20. 
 7.1 Women and oaths   177
with Zeitlin’s identification of the theme of perverted sacrifice, we might ask if 
Agamemnon is a delayed version of an oath-sacrifice.37
7.1.7 Agency and abstinence
As the preceding discussion has argued, oaths are associated with women’s 
agency in the literary sources of ancient Greece. Tomyris and Clytaemestra are 
extreme manifestations of this tendency. Their oaths are signifiers of a violent 
autonomy, but literature also represents oaths as means of containing women’s 
activity or intervention.  We have already explored oaths of celibacy in a religious 
context, with a brief excursus on the literary representation of the women’s oath 
of celibacy in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. Oaths of sexual renunciation are a subset 
of what can be categorized more broadly as oaths of abstinence. With the excep-
tion of the two vows of ritual celibacy discussed earlier, abstinence oaths only 
occur in fiction. This is not to say that real women did not take vows to abstain 
from food, sex, speech or other pleasures, but only that these promises have not 
been recorded for posterity. Counted among the fictional oaths of abstinence are 
those of the Carian women of Miletus who, according to Herodotus (1.146) swore 
not to eat with their husbands or call them by name because these Athenian men 
had slaughtered all their male relatives. The horrific circumstances of their forced 
marriages were imprinted on the cultural memory of their descendants who simi-
larly abstained from dining with or naming their husbands.  As this legend illus-
trates, even oaths not to do something can enhance women’s self-determination.
Another group of abstinence oaths in literary sources are oaths of silence. 
There are certainly instances when these vows aid and abet male characters. 
Eurycleia, whose chastity is emphasized (1.433), is a paragon of self-control in 
the Odyssey. Unlike the talkative and licentious maids (who reveal Penelope’s 
unravelling trick to their lovers, the suitors), Odysseus’ old nurse keeps important 
information to herself at critical points in the poem. Telemachus is preparing for 
his first journey abroad, an event that signifies his new coming of age, and one 
that has been prescribed for him by Athene in the guise of Mentor. Since he is 
trying to avoid the notice of the suitors and his mother, he completes his prepa-
rations in secret, but he cannot avoid Eurycleia, whose duties include watching 
over the door of the storeroom, and who assists Telemachus as he gathers sup-
37 Zeitlin 1965, 474. The usual meaning of horkia, the word (in the genitive plural) that Cly-
taemestra uses as she stands over her husband’s corpse, is “oath-sacrifices”. See further Lebeck 
1971, 49 and Fletcher 2012, 48‒50.
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plies for his voyage. Telemachus asks the old woman to swear an oath not to “tell 
these things to my mother” until the “eleventh or twelfth day” (2.373‒4); Eury-
cleia “swears the great oath of the gods” and she keeps her word.
The oath of Eurycleia is necessary for pragmatic reasons: it gives her a plau-
sible excuse for not revealing the departure of Telemachus to Penelope until he 
is safely at sea. When Telemachus visits Helen and Menelaus at Sparta, Helen 
tells a story about recognizing Odysseus when he sneaked into Troy. She bathed 
and anointed him, and says that she swore a mighty oath (4.252‒56) not to reveal 
Odysseus until he got safely beyond the city walls and back to the ships. Helen 
is an artful story-teller, who chooses and perhaps manipulates an episode that 
makes her look good in Telemachus’ eyes, but conventionally her self-restraint is 
symbolized by an oath.
In Euripides’ Iphigeneia among the Taurians, a play whose recognition scene 
is facilitated by an extensive scene in which Iphigeneia and Pylades exchange 
oaths, the Chorus of captive Greek maidens also swears an oath of silence (1077) 
to keep quiet about Iphigeneia’s escape plan.38 By refusing to reveal the plan 
to Theoclymenus, the Chorus enables Orestes, Pylades and Iphigeneia a safe 
passage back to Greece.
In all three cases women’s oaths of silence are essential to ensure the safe 
journey of the protagonists of the story. More problematic is the oath of silence 
sworn by the Chorus of Troezenian women in Euripides’ Hippolytus. In response 
to Phaedra’s request that they keep silent about her passion for Hippolytus, the 
women swear by Artemis “to remain silent about these things” (713‒14). Rather 
than shielding the hero of the tale, their oath prevents an innocent youth from 
speaking out when Theseus, believing Phaedra’s letter accusing Hippolytus of 
rape, condemns his son to exile.
7.1.8 Conclusions
A reconstruction of women’s use of oaths in the ancient Greek world encounters 
the familiar problem of recovering women’s voices from an androcentric tradi-
tion. The Sophoclean character who claimed that a woman’s oath is “written on 
water” probably meant it as a slur against female trustworthiness. But women’s 
oaths were written on water in a different sense, because they were seldom 
recorded by historians, inscribed on stone, or mentioned in court unless they 
were in support of a man’s legal agenda. Our historical sources’ focus on military, 
38 For further discussion of the oaths of Iphigeneia and Pylades, see Fletcher 2012, 194‒202.
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political, civic, legal and commercial issues leave major gaps in our knowledge of 
women’s lives. There must have been numerous occasions when women needed 
or wanted to guarantee a promise by invoking a god, and even times when they 
managed to compel a man to swear an oath to them. In the public world of male 
endeavour these promises were seldom important enough to be noticed unless 
they had some consequences for men’s own lives. Apollodorus ([Dem.] 59.76) 
spoke of a weathered stone at a sanctuary of Dionysus: its ancient inscription, 
barely legible, prescribed the oath of the Gerarai. No doubt there were other 
such inscriptions that specified the roles of priestesses. We know of this one only 
because it was useful to a litigious Athenian in a long-standing contest of political 
one-upmanship.
We follow a vaporous trail in search of women’s formal promises. Oaths in 
poetry, drama, and the fables of Herodotus provide insight into the perceptions 
about women’s use of horkos. Because the oath bound one party to certain behav-
iour, there is naturally an issue of power and control involved in oath-swearing 
that becomes especially pronounced and problematic when women are involved. 
According to one ancient source,39 Aeschylus’ Hypsipyle featured an oath sworn 
by the Argonauts to have sex with the women of Lemnos if they were allowed to 
come to shore. Whatever the ritual aetiology for this legend might be,40 it suc-
cinctly reveals the dynamics of gender and agency implicit in horkos.
7.2 Servile swearing
A.J. Bayliss
Slaves and non-free labourers were not only the bedrock of ancient Greek society; 
they also made up a significant proportion – between 15% and 40% – of the 
population.41 Given their numbers, it would be natural to assume that slaves 
would appear prominently in the literary and epigraphic records of oaths from 
archaic and classical Greece. But a search of the Nottingham database reveals 
only 110 oaths sworn by “chattel-slaves” and 2 by those of “semi-servile” status. 
This represents less than 3% of the entries in the database, which is to say the 
least disproportionate to the ratio of slaves to free in ancient Greece. But if this 
39 The plot is described in a scholium on Ap.Rh. Arg. 1.769‒73.
40 Burkert 1970, 9 suggests some form of aischrologia associated with the festival of the New 
Fire of Lemnos. 
41 For a recent survey of modern scholarship on the numbers of slaves in Ancient Greece see 
Rihll 2011, 49.
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figure seems disproportionately low, it is truly arresting to probe deeper. For if 
we exclude the informal oaths discussed in ch. 13 we find only nineteen oaths 
sworn by those of unfree status. This means that we have up to 40% of the popu-
lation swearing less than 1% of the formal oaths recorded in Greek literature and 
inscriptions. The unfree are just as poorly represented as the recipients of oaths, 
with only 18 recorded formal oaths sworn to slaves and four sworn to those of 
semi-servile status. Again these numbers are not at all in keeping with the rela-
tively high numbers of unfree individuals in the ancient Greek world.
Taken together, these statistics suggest that slaves and other unfree individ-
uals did not frequently swear or receive oaths in the ancient Greek world. This 
is not surprising: generally speaking, slaves simply lacked the opportunity to 
swear oaths given the roles they played in society. Slaves were kinless, stateless, 
property,42 and spent their days labouring for their owners. They lacked many of 
the basic rights accorded to the free, and as Fisher notes, “slaves were not seen 
as legally significant persons” in the Greek world.43 A slave’s sub-citizen status 
meant that the average slave lacked a citizen’s opportunities for oath-swearing, 
and in particular lacked the kinds of opportunities that have an impact on our 
sources. Slaves swore no oaths of citizenship like the Athenian ephebic oath 
(unless of course they had ceased to be slaves). Slaves could not hold general-
ships, magistracies, or serve on councils, and therefore would swear no oaths of 
office, and they certainly could not swear oaths on behalf of the state, for they 
had no state to represent! Nor could they bring lawsuits in their own right, or 
testify as witnesses. In the Athenian courts their statements could only be submit-
ted in writing after torture.44 Even where slaves had legal significance – many 
slaves were employed in business – oaths were not typically required (see ch. 4). 
But in order to consider these issues further it will serve us well to examine what 
little evidence we have for oaths that slaves did swear and receive.
42 Garnsey 1996, 1.
43 Fisher 2010, 335.
44 This is not the time and place to argue the case for or against judicial torture (basanos) in 
Athens, but it seems safe to say that if it did not take place, the number of references to basanos 
in legal speeches seems odd and surely counterproductive to the cases in question. For the mod-
ern debate see Hunter 1994, Gagarin 1996, Mirhady 1996, 2000, Thür 1996b, Todd 1993.
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7.2.1 In what contexts did slaves swear oaths?
The nineteen references to oaths sworn by slaves and semi-servile individuals 
from archaic and classical Greek sources represent in reality a total of fifteen dif-
ferent oaths. Table 1 provides details of these oaths. The oaths sworn by slaves 
can be divided into three groups:
(1) Assertory oaths: e.g. Silenus’ oath that he was not selling his master’s prop-
erty (#9), Andromache’s oath that she has not shared Neoptolemus’ bed will-
ingly (#7), and various oaths intended to demonstrate that the swearers are 
telling the truth (#4, #5, #7, #8, #10, #13);
(2) Promissory oaths to maintain silence (#3, #6);
(3) Anomalous cases where the swearers are not really slaves at all, including the 
characters Nicias, Demosthenes, and Cleon (in his guise as Paphlagon) who 
are cast as “slaves” to the people (Demos) in Aristophanes’ Knights (#11, #12), 
a man who is attempting to prove that he is not a slave but rather a citizen 
(#14), and a purely hypothetical oath by a prisoner of war (#15).45
All but four of these references come from fictive genres (epic, tragedy, or 
comedy), and only one of the historical references concerns a genuine slave. This 
means that slaves had very little impact indeed on the historical record when it 
comes to oaths. This cannot be because slaves were deemed incapable of swear-
ing oaths properly, because the vast majority of these oaths are true and trusted 
by the swearee(s), e.g. Andromache’s oath to the world at large (#7), or the oaths 
of silence sworn by Eurycleia to Telemachus (#3), or the Chorus to Iphigeneia 
(#6). Not only are these oaths of silence maintained, their silence is central to the 
plot, and without the oath the free swearee’s plans would come to nothing.
Even an oath by the loathsome Paphlagon in Aristophanes’ Knights (#12) 
holds full weight. When vying with the free (but low-class) Sausage-Seller for 
Demos’ favour, Paphlagon swears to Demos that he does not hate Demos and that 
he is the only man who stands firm and fights for Demos. The fact that Paphlagon’s 
oath prompts the Sausage-Seller to swear a counter-oath that he loves and cher-
ishes Demos, with a growing list of self-curses, suggests that Paphlagon’s sworn 
statement was persuasive. Whereas Paphlagon curses himself to perish and be 
sawn in two and cut into yoke-straps if he breaks this oath, the Sausage-Seller 
begins by cursing himself “to be cut up and boiled with mincemeat”, then moves 
45 In fact, the vast majority of slaves swearing oaths in our sources are not typical chattel 
slaves, e.g. the ‘noble’ slaves of tragedy, the ‘family’ slaves of Homer, and immortals such as 
Silenus and Heracles.
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on to “be grated with cheese into savoury mash”, and finally to “be dragged by 
the balls on my own meathook to Cerameicus”. This extended list of curses is 
presumably intended to trump that of Paphlagon, which implies that Paphlag-
on’s oath needed to be topped despite the fact that he is merely a slave and the 
Sausage-Seller is a free man. But this does not necessarily mean that oaths by 
slaves would normally hold as much or more weight than those of the free. After 
all, Paphlagon is a highly trusted slave, whereas Demos and the Sausage-Seller 
have known each other for about ten minutes. The Sausage-Seller is also prone to 
perjury and proud of it (Knights 298, 1239; see §10.2).
It is striking then that the only “historical” oath by a slave in the Nottingham 
oath database, which comes from the Gortyn law-code (#1), appears to suggest 
that the sworn testimony of a slave could be deemed more trustworthy than that 
of a free man. The text indicates that if a man rapes a slave-woman he must pay 
a fine, and “the slave-woman shall be deemed oathier” (ὁρκιοτέραν δ’ ἔμεν τὰν 
δόλαν). The situation envisaged here must be that both parties were challenged to 
swear to the truth of their respective positions, and that whoever refused to swear 
lost the case by default. It has been argued that this text means that in the event 
of both the accuser (the slave-woman) and the accused (the free man) swearing 
the accuser is to be deemed “oathier” i.e. believed.46 This would mean that the 
sworn testimony of the slave would be more powerful than the sworn testimony of 
a free man. But it is more likely that this is what Parker calls an “action-deciding 
oath”,47 whereby only one of the two was required to swear. In this scenario the 
judge would direct the woman making a complaint to swear an oath, and that 
the accused would be found guilty if and only if she swore. If she did not swear, 
the accused would probably not be asked to swear at all (S&B, 64‒5). Therefore, 
rather than demonstrating that the oath of the slave was more powerful than 
that of the free, the sworn word of the slave was deemed more powerful than the 
unsworn testimony of the accused.
In stark contrast to Athens where slave testimony was not admissible in court 
except via torture, the Gortyn law-code also allows for serfs who had semi-ser-
vile status to swear in court (#2). When a serf captured a free man in the act of 
adultery he was permitted to testify in court along with his master and one other 
witness. They would all swear that “they took the defendant in adultery and not 
by subterfuge”, invoking solemn curses upon themselves. Again, the intention 
of this oath – albeit not the actual wording – is to assert that the semi-servile 
46 Gagarin 1997, 126. Austin &Vidal-Naquet (1977, 260) describe this legislation as “a remark-
able rule which would have been inconceivable in a state based on chattel-slavery”.
47 Parker 2005b, 72.
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swearer is telling the truth. The fact that the male serf needs his master in court 
with him makes the situation in Gortyn seem more like Athens than an initial 
reading of these texts suggests.
But while the majority of oaths sworn by slaves are valid and seen to be so 
by the recipients, several are so ambiguous that they give us pause for thought. 
Silenus’ oath to his master the Cyclops when he has been accused of selling the 
Cyclops’ property to Odysseus (#9) is a case in point. This oath is sworn in response 
to Odysseus swearing to the Cyclops that he and his men came from their ships 
wishing to buy food and that Silenus was selling them sheep in exchange for a cup 
of wine, and that there was no violence involved. Odysseus’ oath compels Silenus 
to respond with a counter-oath in order to defend himself. But instead of making 
a simple denial Silenus swears that he is not currently selling the property. As will 
be discussed below (§§10.1, 10.2), this oath is ambiguous to say the least, because 
Silenus’ use of the present infinitive could be construed to mean either that he is 
not currently selling the property, or (corresponding to the imperfect indicative) 
that he had not been selling the property. If it was the former, Silenus’ oath is true 
because he is not now engaged in selling property to Odysseus. But if the latter, 
his oath is manifestly false. Furthermore, Silenus’ dubious oath prompts another 
counter-oath, this time by the chorus of satyrs (#10) who swear that they have 
seen Silenus in the act of selling his master’s property. But if Silenus’ dubious 
oath tempts us to think that the sworn testimony of slaves was not necessarily 
trustworthy, the fact that the oath of the Chorus is manifestly true should give us 
pause. Yet the Cyclops accuses them of lying rather than Silenus, which perhaps 
brings us back to square one!
The oath sworn by the Phrygian slave in Euripides’ Orestes (#8) is also dubious. 
Orestes’ encounter with the slave takes place after he has slain Helen and her Phry-
gian slave has fled from him in terror. When Orestes accuses the slave of calling out 
to Menelaus to come to the rescue, the slave claims that he was shouting to help 
Orestes because he was more deserving. But we know that he has already reported 
(out of Orestes’ hearing) that “with a loud cry from the house we battered down 
with bars the doors and doorposts where we had been, and ran to her assistance 
from every direction” (Or. 1474‒6). Orestes – rightly – does not believe the slave 
and demands to know whether he believes that Helen died justly. The slave claims 
that he believes so, but Orestes still does not believe him, claiming, “Your coward-
ice makes you glib; this is not what you really think” (1514). When the Phrygian 
repeats his belief that Helen deservedly died because she destroyed Hellas and the 
Phrygians, Orestes still does not believe him and demands that the slave swear that 
he is not saying so merely to humour him, threatening to kill him if he refuses to 
swear. The Phrygian responds, “I swear by my life, an oath I would keep!” (1517). 
But even then Orestes seems unconvinced, and demands of the Phrygian whether 
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“every Phrygian in Troy showed the same terror of steel as you do?”. Although it is 
not absolutely clear that his oath is false,48 the Phrygian’s “flamboyant effeminacy” 
does not inspire confidence in Orestes or presumably the audience.
When it comes to assessing the trustworthiness of slaves vis-à-vis oaths 
perhaps the most significant oath is the one that is not sworn (#4). At the opening 
of Sophocles’ Electra (47‒50) Orestes orders his faithful old paidagōgos to swear a 
false oath that Orestes had been killed at the Pythian games.49 But the paidagōgos 
is not prepared to go as far as Orestes would like. Instead he merely says that 
Orestes is dead, rejecting what Finglass calls Orestes’ “cavalier approach to 
perjury”.50 Blundell sees the demand that his slave swear a false oath as showing 
the audience just how far Orestes is prepared to go to exact revenge.51 On the 
other hand Finglass argues that “by the Paedagogus’ next entry the minds of the 
spectators will not be on whether the Paedagogus is following Orestes’ instruc-
tions to the letter”.52 But it is highly tempting to think that this was part of Sopho-
cles’ plan. How better to show that Orestes is desperate than to show even a slave 
recognising that it would be wrong to carry out his plan to the letter? But again we 
have a moral mixed message. Is the slave’s recognition that Orestes is demanding 
something that is wrong a signal that the Greeks believed that slaves normally 
knew the value of an oath? Or does the story have greater impact because the 
average Greek would have believed that slaves would not normally do so?
7.2.2 In what contexts did slaves receive oaths?
Another angle we can take to help assess Greek attitudes to slaves and oaths is to 
analyse the meagre evidence we have for oaths sworn to slaves and semi-servile 
individuals. Table 2 details these 13 different oaths from archaic and classical 
Greek sources.53 These oaths can be divided into three rough groups:
48 Fletcher 2012, 393.
49 The fact that the old slave tells his story of Orestes’ “death” in elaborate fashion has led 
some modern commentators to emend Orestes’ order to tell his story “adding an oath” (horkon) 
to read “in lofty style” (onkon), e.g. Batchelder 1995, 30; Jebb 1894; Kells 1973; Kamerbeek 1974 
to name but a few. But there is no need to doubt that Orestes insists on an oath, or that the 
paidagōgos refuses to swear it.
50 Finglass 2007, 106. See L. Macleod 2001, 35 n33.
51 M.W. Blundell 1989, 173.
52 Finglass 2007, 106‒7.
53 This total excludes references to the oaths sworn to each other by the “slaves” Nicias and 
Demosthenes in Aristophanes’ Knights.
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(1) Assertory oaths designed to convince, reassure, or cajole a slave (#5, #8, #10, 
#11);
(2) Promissory oaths guaranteeing that the unfree individual will not be harmed 
(#3), or that some good will occur (#1, #2, #4, #6, #12), and Hippolytus’ noto-
rious oath of silence (#9);
(3) Sworn truces between the Spartans and rebellious Messenian helots (#7, #13);
As with oaths sworn by slaves, the vast majority of these references come from 
epic, tragedy and comedy, with only three (#6, #7, #13) coming from historical 
texts. Similar to oaths sworn by slaves, these oaths are true and/or kept. This 
suggests that the free were just as careful with oaths sworn to slaves as they were 
with oaths sworn to the free on the rare occasions they swore oaths to them. This 
should come as no surprise, because keeping or breaking an oath had nothing to 
do with the status of the swearee. The gods could punish the free man for violat-
ing an oath to a slave just as easily as they could punish him for violating an oath 
to a free man. It would be the name of the god – not that of the slave – that would 
be taken in vain by the perjurer.
Although these oaths are uniformly true, it is surely significant that not all 
are believed by the slaves who receive them, and one is even rejected before it 
is sworn. Three of these examples are promissory oaths sworn by Odysseus to 
his slaves Eumaeus and Philoetius while in his guise as the Cretan beggar. Odys-
seus swears two oaths to Eumaeus the swineherd (#1, #2) in order to test his 
loyalty. The first oath is to the effect that Odysseus is coming home and will be 
back some time during that year and will take his vengeance upon anyone who 
dishonours his wife and son. Eumaeus rejects the oath, presumably because in 
his guise as the Cretan Odysseus appears unable to deliver on his promise. If 
Eumaeus knew what we as the audience know, things would surely have been 
different. Eumaeus’ rejection of the oath prompts the second, that if Odysseus 
does not return Eumaeus can kill the beggar, but if Odysseus does return he shall 
be given a tunic and a mantle and sent on his way to Dulichium. Odysseus thus 
places Eumaeus in an impossible position. If, as he expects, Odysseus does not 
return, he will have to choose between a violation of the oath and a violation of 
the laws of hospitality, with divine punishment a certainty either way. From Odys-
seus’ point of view, of course, that makes the oath a very handy device for testing 
Eumaeus’ loyalty. Odysseus goes on to swear an oath to Philoetius the cowherd 
(#4) which is extremely similar to that which he swore to Eumaeus, namely that 
Odysseus will return while he is still there. Like Eumaeus, Philoetius rejects the 
oath. Again, this is presumably because the Cretan lacks credibility. But Philo-
etius’ response, “if only the son of Cronus would fulfil this word!” demonstrates 
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his loyalty to Odysseus, which was surely Odysseus’ purpose in swearing the oath 
in the first place.
In Aristophanes’ Frogs (#11) Dionysus’ slave Xanthias likewise rejects an oath 
from his master. Dionysus swears that he loves Xanthias in order to convince 
Xanthias to swap clothes with him, but Xanthias is so unimpressed by Dionysus’ 
oath professing his love that he only agrees to a swap on condition that Diony-
sus swears an additional oath (#12) that he won’t take the gear back. Dionysus 
does indeed swear that oath, and Xanthias accepts the exchange. But the fact 
that the curse condemns not only himself to a wretched death (not possible for a 
god) but also promises the destruction of his wife and children (presumably long 
dead) and Archedemus (the unpopular architect of the Arginusae trial) reduces 
the impact of the oath (see §7.3.2). One could see Xanthias’ refusal to believe Dio-
nysus as a signal that slaves did not necessarily trust their master’s sworn word, 
but it could also be that the scene was merely designed for comic effect.
It is tempting to see these oaths sworn to slaves as somewhat anomalous 
given that the majority of the swearers are individuals of liminal status. For 
example, Orestes is a returning exile planning to murder his mother; Hippoly-
tus is an illegitimate son tangling with his father’s new and legitimate wife;54 
Atossa, Helen, and Creusa are women in trouble, and in Helen’s case a refugee 
to boot; while Odysseus has liminal status in that he is swearing in his guise as 
an itinerant beggar rather than his true self. Even Dionysus has dubious status 
in that he is being portrayed, for comic effect, as extraordinarily cowardly for a 
god. Given that there are so few oaths sworn to slaves, one could argue that their 
liminal status suggests that it was not entirely normal for free men and women to 
swear oaths to slaves.
The case of Hippolytus is crucial in this sense. Hippolytus has been seen as 
out of step with the rest of society in swearing his oath of silence to the slave 
woman. Mirhady argues that “the Nurse, as a slave, was not qualified to swear 
oaths; she should not have demanded one from Hippolytus”.55 In a similar vein 
Fletcher argues that Hippolytus’ oath to the nurse disrupts the status quo. She 
equates Hippolytus’ oath with that of Jason to Medea, and argues that “there was 
a certain anxiety about women using oaths to obtain power over men”.56 Given 
the dearth of evidence for oaths sworn to slaves it seems doubtful that a typical 
Athenian teenager – particularly one who was as sure as Hippolytus was that all 
women were wicked – would have considered swearing an oath to his mother’s or 
54 Fletcher (2012, 127) calls Hippolytus “a problematic liminal figure”.
55 Mirhady 2004, 31.
56 Fletcher 2012, 178.
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stepmother’s nurse as Hippolytus did. Perhaps that was Euripides’ point in retell-
ing the story that way. Given that Hippolytus’ oath will cost him his very life it is 
tempting to think that Euripides’ Athenian audience was meant to see Hippolytus 
as a fool to swear his oath to the nurse in the first place.
7.2.3 Were slaves normally considered unworthy of swearing and receiving 
oaths?
Was Hippolytus wrong to swear an oath to a slave? Would a more authoritative 
figure have behaved differently? The manner in which Hippolytus surrenders 
control to the slave woman by swearing an oath of silence stands in strong con-
trast to the way in which Telemachus shows his dominance over Eurycleia by 
demanding an oath of silence from her. This would seem to confirm our suspi-
cions. But while Telemachus can be seen as stronger than Hippolytus, one can 
also see Telemachus as weak in demanding an oath of silence from Eurycleia, 
because an oath exchange implies a degree of autonomy on the part of both 
swearer and swearee.57 Thus, when Telemachus demands an oath of Eurycleia 
he is effectively admitting that the nurse has some freedom of action. Karavites 
explains the apparent anomaly by arguing that Telemachus needed to demand 
this oath because of Eurycleia’s loyalty to Penelope.58 But it is worth bearing in 
mind that his father Odysseus allows Eurycleia no such latitude when he requires 
her silence after she discovers his true identity in book 19. Rather than requiring 
an oath of silence from her in the way that his young son did, her real master 
grabs Eurycleia around the throat and threatens to kill her if she reveals his iden-
tity.
Odysseus’ style of dealing with his slave is very much in keeping with that 
of the speaker of Lysias’ speech On the Murder of Eratosthenes. When Euphile-
tus learns that his wife has been seduced by another man, he grabs hold of his 
slave girl and gives her a blunt choice: (1) to be whipped and then sold to work 
in a mill or (2) to tell the truth about his wife’s adultery.59 It is surely telling that 
Euphiletus does not demand an oath to back up her story, but rather threatens to 
57 Karavites (1992, 79) argues that “the demand of an oath to be taken by an inferior in class 
or authority is predicated by the asker himself on the assumption that the inferior party enjoys 
some degree of autonomy”.
58 Karavites 1992, 79.
59 Euphiletus’ threats also match the suggestion of the slave belonging to Eratosthenes’ aban-
doned lover to “take” the girl and to “torture” her in order to gain the truth (Lys. 1.16).
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torture the girl as if evidence were being gathered for a court case. It cannot be 
that Euphiletus did not require oaths because he trusted the girl; why else would 
he threaten her with violence? Furthermore, Euphiletus makes it clear that he 
places little value in her words, when he bluntly informs her “I require that you 
show me their guilt in the very act; I want no words, but manifestation of the fact, 
if it really is so”.60 Thus, it seems more likely that Euphiletus did not demand 
an oath because he considered it inappropriate to do so. The obvious explana-
tion would be that he did not want to allow the girl the autonomy an oath would 
imply. This could also explain why when the girl begs him to guarantee her safety 
Euphiletus merely pledges to protect her rather than offer her an oath. Moreover, 
having refused to swear an oath to his slave, Euphiletus once again passes up an 
opportunity for the girl to add an oath to reinforce the agreement, despite the fact 
that he makes it clear that silence is vital to his cause. Rather, Euphiletus adds a 
catch to his pledge – only if the girl keeps the whole affair secret will their “agree-
ment” be binding. Euphiletus is thus able to assert his authority over his slave by 
not swearing oaths himself, and by denying her the opportunity to do so. It may 
also be that Euphiletus felt that it was unwise to swear to protect her in case it 
proved necessary to allow her to be tortured to provide “evidence” later.61 Euphi-
letus could therefore be seen as scrupulous in not over-committing himself to his 
slave. One wonders, however, how an Athenian jury would have interpreted his 
promise instead of an oath. Would they have approved of his scruples? Or would 
even a promise have seemed weak in comparison to Odysseus’ rough handling of 
Eurycleia? Unfortunately the dearth of evidence leaves us in the dark so to speak.
7.2.4 Where might slaves have sworn oaths that do not appear in the record?
The dearth of evidence for slaves swearing and receiving oaths strongly suggests 
that they did not frequently do so. The fact that the majority of the attested cases 
are anomalous strongly implies that they hardly ever did so. But this takes us 
firmly into the realm of the argumentum ex silentio. It is of course entirely pos-
sible that slaves did swear and receive oaths more frequently than our sources 
60 Euphiletus would also presumably have been hoping this would demonstrate to the jurors 
that he had been careful to ascertain the truth, rather than merely relying on the word of his 
slave.
61 Euphiletus later (37) stresses that his opponents allege that he ordered the girl to entrap 
Eratosthenes. Although he does not mention it, surely they would have argued that Euphiletus 
was refusing to hand over the girl for torture. Given the frequency of such claims it would surely 
have been odd if they did not. See Carawan 1998, 294, for the argument that they did not.
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suggest. It is worth bearing in mind that the vast majority of oaths sworn by slaves 
recorded in the Nottingham oath database are informal oaths (see ch. 13). These 
informal oaths account for some 84% of all the oaths sworn by slaves. The vast 
majority (89%) of the informal oaths sworn by slaves are unambiguously true, 
which strongly suggests that slaves knew the value of an informal oath.
Significantly, almost a third of these informal oaths are sworn by slaves to 
other slaves. Remarkably 26 out of the 27 informal oaths between slaves are obvi-
ously true, which is a far better strike rate than oaths sworn between the free! Given 
that so many of the informal oaths sworn by slaves were uttered to other slaves, it 
is tempting to speculate that slaves would have sworn formal oaths to each other 
more frequently than our sources suggest. The answer to why slaves had such 
little impact on our oath data would not be that slaves did not frequently swear 
or receive oaths, but they did not frequently exchange oaths with the free, and 
that our elite sources were therefore not interested in talking about the majority 
of the oaths that they were swearing.62 This may suggest that, in the well-known 
formulation of Orlando Patterson, slavery was seen as a form of “social death”.63 
At the very least, it suggests that when it came to oaths in archaic and classical 
Greece slaves were seen as largely irrelevant. Nonetheless, the examples we have 
discussed show that for Euripides, Sophocles, and Aristophanes oaths sworn by 
slaves and to slaves were occasionally useful “to think with”.64
7.3 The oaths of the gods
I.C. Torrance
7.3.1 The river Styx
It should be expected that oaths sworn by divinities differ in some important 
respects from oaths sworn by mortals, and our sources provide some fascinat-
ing details regarding the ways in which the gods were imagined as swearing in 
ancient Greek thought. Since an oath requires the guarantee of a power greater 
62 The exception to this rule is the genre of comedy. All of the examples of informal oaths be-
tween slaves come from comedy except for the chorus of satyrs in Sophocles’ Ichneutai (fr. 314): 
eight from Aristophanes’ Frogs, sixteen from Knights, three from Peace, and four from Wasps. But 
given the prominence of slaves in comedy this is not at all surprising.
63 Patterson 1982.
64 This section was much improved by stimulating debate with Niall McKeown. I trust that the 
final result does justice to his efforts to assist me. Any errors are entirely my own.
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than the swearer, the gods can hardly invoke themselves as oath witnesses 
(although Poseidon does in a comic passage discussed below). Divinities tend to 
invoke powers older than themselves in the oaths they swear.65 Zeus, or the head 
of Zeus, can be and is invoked as oath-guarantor by many other gods, as we shall 
see, but the river Styx is identified as the official oath-guarantor of the gods in 
Hesiod’s Theogony (400),66 and a libation of water from the Styx was a binding 
guarantee for a divine oath (Thg. 784, 793). The installation of Styx as oath is of 
central importance in Hesiod’s representation of Zeus’ social and political order 
not only because it provides a method of conflict resolution among the gods (Thg. 
782‒5), but also because the children of Styx (Zeal, Victory, Power and Force, Thg. 
384‒5) come under the control of Zeus through their mother.67 A fragment from 
an unidentified work by Aristotle (fr. 821 Gigon) explains that Styx’s daughter 
Nike (Victory) had helped the gods in their struggle against the giants, and in 
exchange for her good deed, Zeus ordered the gods to swear their oaths by Nike’s 
mother Styx. An alternative, philosophical, explanation given is that water is the 
mother of all things, and the poets call the river Styx the mother of the gods.
The immortal nature of the gods naturally means that they cannot die if they 
commit perjury. Hesiod also describes for us the punishments for divine perjury, 
which include lying in a comatose state for one year and subsequent exclusion 
from participation in divine life for a further nine years, with reintegration pos-
sible only in the tenth year (Thg. 793‒806). Empedocles in his Katharmoi (fr. 115 
D-K, 1‒12) gives a slightly different account of consequences for divine perjury, 
where punishment includes wandering apart from the gods for thirty thousand 
seasons among mortals, exchanging one hard way of life for another, being 
pursued by the strength of the air and the sea and being spat out by the sea on 
the ground in the rays of the shining sun and the swirl of the wind, hated by all. 
Extended exile and suffering are thus common denominators in both versions, 
and it seems that Empedocles was influenced by Hesiod in his formulation.68
Styx or its waters are invoked as oath witness by several divinities swear-
ing formal oaths. Demeter swears the “oath of the gods” on the harsh water of 
the Styx in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (259). The mighty water of the Styx is 
“the great oath of the gods” in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes (518). Hera com-
65 Cf. Janko 1992 ad 14.271‒9.
66 M.L. West 1966, ad 400 compares Styx in the divine realm to Horkos, the personification of 
oath, in the world of men.
67 See Clay 2003, 7, 22, and cf. Lincoln 2012, 16‒17.
68 M.R. Wright 1981, 65 with n.33 observes the similarities between D-K fr. 115.12 and Theog. 
800. On Empedocles as the daimon now in human form, see M.R. Wright 1981, 69‒76.
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mands Hypnos (Sleep) to swear an oath to her on the inviolable water of Styx 
(Iliad 14.271). In Pindar (Ol. 7.64‒8), the “great oath of the gods” which Lachesis is 
instructed to keep should be understood as an oath on the river Styx.69 The com-
bination of Gaia (Earth), broad Ouranos (Heaven) above, and the dripping water 
of the Styx, is a formulaic triad of oath-guarantors invoked by divinities in epic. 
In three Homeric passages, the same language is used verbatim, once by Hera in 
the Iliad (15.36‒8), once by Calypso in the Odyssey (5.184‒6), and once by Leto in 
the Homeric Hymn to Apollo (84‒6).70 In all three cases, Styx is “the greatest and 
most dread oath among the blessed gods” (Il. 37‒8 = Od. 185‒6 = h. Ap. 85‒6). A 
paraphrase of this formula is used in Demosthenes Against Boeotus II where Man-
titheus claims that Plangon deceived his father “with an oath, which seems to be 
the greatest and most dread among all humankind” (Dem. 40.10). The context 
of the deception was as follows. Mantitheus’ father, Mantias, had agreed to pay 
Plangon thirty minae if she declined an oath-challenge to swear that he was the 
father of her sons. She agreed but double-crossed him by accepting the challenge 
and thus forcing Mantias to acknowledge the sons as his own.71 Mantitheus claims 
that Plangon swore an oath agreeing to this arrangement (Dem. 39.3) and accuses 
her of manifest perjury (Dem. 40.2). We are never told exactly what she swore, 
however, and she may have phrased her oath cleverly in order to avoid perjury, 
in spite of Mantitheus’ accusation. The paraphrase from the Iliad is clearly meant 
to emphasize the gravity of her deception, which is, by implication, presented as 
equal to Hera’s use of the oath to deceive Zeus (discussed in more detail below).
Being transposed into the realm of humankind, the oath referred to by Man-
titheus contains no reference to the river Styx. According to Herodotus (6.74), the 
Arcadians believed that the waters of the Styx were visible at a spring in the town 
of Nonacris, but the story that the mad Spartan king Cleomenes tried to make the 
Arcadian leaders swear oaths to him by the water of the Styx is obviously a sign 
of his degeneration into lunacy.72
69 Pindar’s sixth Paean also contains a fragmentary reference to the oath of the gods on Styx 
(fr.52f.155).
70 Clay 2006, 39, notes that Leto’s oath “is not treated in the usual epic manner” since Leto 
modifies the suggested phrasing; cf. also Fletcher 2008, 29, who observes that Leto’s oath to 
Delos “is carefully phrased so that it emphasizes Apollo’s honors more than Delos’ rewards”.
71 This is our only surviving example of an oath-challenge being accepted; see further S&B 
103‒4.
72 Cf. M.L. West 1966, ad 400, pace Hirzel 1902, 174f.
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7.3.2 The head of Zeus
In addition to oaths by Styx, the invocation of the head of Zeus seems to be an 
exclusively divine formula. In the oath sworn by Hera to Zeus in Iliad 15 (36‒46), 
she invokes not only the formulaic triad discussed above but also Zeus’ head and 
their sacred marriage bed. These forces are listed, surely, as part of Hera’s manip-
ulation of Zeus. The oath she swears is extremely deceptive, claiming that it is not 
by her will that Poseidon is harming the Trojans and helping the Achaeans, when 
in fact Poseidon would not have taken any action had he not been told by Hypnos 
(Sleep) that it was safe to do so (14.354‒60), and Hypnos is executing Hera’s busi-
ness. The oath seems false and Callaway argues that the oath is unsworn.73 Cal-
laway’s arguments overlook the fact that calling the gods to witness, which Hera 
does at Il. 15.36 with the word istō “let x know”, is in itself an act of oath-taking.74 
Nevertheless, Callaway is correct to point out that Hera is careful with her use of 
language since she did not explicitly order Hypnos to speak with Poseidon. This 
means that there is enough of a break in the chain of causation for Hera to be able 
to swear this oath with impunity.75
Both additional sanctifying witnesses, the marriage bed and Zeus’ head, 
appeal to the relationship between Zeus and Hera. The significance of the mar-
riage bed is obvious,76 but parallel oaths in which female divinities invoke the 
head of Zeus demonstrate that this oath formula is associated with chastity. In 
Sappho (fr. 44A.4‒7) Artemis swears by Zeus’ head that she will always be a virgin 
hunting on the mountain peaks, and in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite (26‒8), 
Hestia swears by Zeus’ head that she will remain a virgin for all time.77 Of course 
we remember also that the virgin goddess Athene was born from Zeus’ head. In 
the Iliadic passage, then, Hera may well be stressing her fidelity to Zeus as a way 
of manipulating his affections by invoking his head. An unusual oath in Eurip-
ides’ Helen where Helen invokes the head of her husband as sanctifying witness 
underlines both her chastity and her predicted apotheosis.78
73 Callaway 1993, 17‒21.
74 See ch. 1 on what constitutes an oath and what does not.
75 See §10 for further examples of manipulation of oath-language.
76 Callaway 1993, 18, emphasizes that the bed symbolizes the union between Zeus and Hera 
and gives extra gravity to her oath, but implies that it is not a heavenly power, which seems 
unjustified. 
77 On the links between the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite and Lesbian poetry, see Faulkner 2008, 
ad 25‒32 and pp. 45‒7.
78 See Torrance 2009.
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Our only other two examples of referencing the head of Zeus in oaths are 
abortive. In the Homeric Hymn to Hermes (274‒6), Hermes offers to swear an oath 
by Zeus’ head but never actually does so, and in Sophocles’ Women of Trachis 
the dying Heracles asks his son to swear an oath on Zeus’ head (1185) but Hyllus 
invokes only Zeus (and not his head) in his oath (1186). The exchange between 
Heracles and Hyllus seems to confirm that the oath by Zeus’ head is restricted to 
divinities. Hyllus, who is certainly not divine, does not use the formula, in spite 
of being instructed to do so, while Heracles’ imminent apotheosis is emphasized 
by his suggestion of this particular sanctifying witness.79
7.3.3 Hermes and Hera
As we have seen, Hermes and Hera both manipulate the oath by Zeus’ head to 
suit their purposes. More than any other gods, Hermes and Hera use oaths and 
oath-language as tools for their own benefit. In the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, the 
infant Hermes first offers to swear the oath by Zeus’ head (274‒6) stating that he is 
not responsible for stealing Apollo’s cattle (even though he is) but avoids perjury 
by never actually swearing the oath.80 Next he swears (by way of a self-curse)81 
that he did not drive the cattle home (oikade) nor cross the threshold (379‒80), 
which is technically true since the cave in which he has hidden the cattle is not 
his oikos,82 and he had slipped in through the keyhole (146). Then he swears a 
great oath by the “finely adorned porches” of the gods stating that he will never 
pay Apollo compensation for the theft (384‒5). Hermes thus cleverly implies that 
he is innocent of the theft without compromising himself on oath.83 When given 
79 Cf. Torrance 2009, 4.
80 Callaway 1993 and Fletcher 2008 both recognize this oath as offered, with the future “I will 
swear” (omoumai), but unsworn. Vergados 2012, ad 274‒7 disagrees stating that “Hermes’ words 
at 275‒6 are simultaneously the oath’s tenor and execution”. The problem with this analysis is 
that Hermes uses the expression “I promise” (275: hupiskhomai) which is a clear indication that 
he is not swearing the oath. Gagarin 2007, 45‒6 argues that, in a judicial context, “oath-offers are 
treated as equivalent to oaths”, but that there is a difference in Greek thought between religious 
oaths and rhetorical oaths, the latter being “technically not oaths but oath-offers” (46). 
81 The formula ὣς ὄλβιος εἴην “so may I prosper” (h.Herm. 380), i.e. if I am telling the truth, 
includes within its scope the opposite implication of “so may I suffer if I am lying”. 
82 The term oudos “threshold”, used here (h.Herm. 380), refers especially to the threshold of a 
house (see LSJ s.v. οὐδός). 
83 Callaway 1993, 22‒3, followed by Fletcher 2008, 20‒1, argues that the oath remains unsworn. 
The text quoted above (M.L. West 2003b) implies that the oath is sworn, but there are some tex-
tual issues here. μή is West’s emendation for καί at the beginning of line 385. καί would break 
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the choice by Apollo to nod in assent or to swear a great oath confirming that he 
will never steal Apollo’s lyre or bow, Hermes avoids binding himself with an oath 
and promises by nodding his assent (514‒23).84 The contrast between the decep-
tive Hermes and the truth-telling Apollo is also marked through oath-language, 
when Apollo swears to introduce Hermes to the immortals to enjoy prestige and 
fortune, to give him fine gifts and never to deceive him (460‒2). It seems impor-
tant that neither Apollo nor Zeus is fooled by Hermes’ deception,85 and the final 
oath-reference of the hymn demonstrates Apollo’s seniority over Hermes. Neither 
Hermes nor any of the other gods can know the destinies that Zeus contrives, 
since Apollo has sworn a “powerful oath” that none but he shall know these 
things (535‒8). Oath-language thus restores the balance of power. The tricks of 
Hermes are no match for Apollo’s prophetic knowledge.
Hermes in the Homeric Hymn is cast as skilled in the manipulation of oath-
language, and the two examples from Aristophanes in which Hermes swears 
oaths confirm this general characterization within the remit of comedy. The gods 
in comedy are both revered and derided, and Hermes is no exception. The oath 
sworn by Hermes in Peace comes in a sequence which makes a mockery of his tra-
ditional abilities to use clever or ambiguous language.86 Having hurled a torrent 
of abuse at Trygaeus, calling him a villain (miaros), an arch-villain (miarōtatos), 
an utter villain, and an arch-villain of all villains in the space of two lines (183‒4), 
Hermes then asks Trygaeus his name, his place of birth and his father’s identity. 
To each question, Trygaeus responds “Archvillain”, turning Hermes’ language 
back against him (185‒7). Finally, in exasperation, Hermes swears an oath invok-
ing Earth that Trygaeus will die if he does not say what his name is (188‒9). The 
oath works and Trygaeus immediately gives his true identity. In this scene then, 
Hermes uses an oath to elicit the information he desires but not in the way we 
might expect. He manages to regain control of the situation by swearing an oath 
but Trygaeus is the one who comes off as witty. In Wealth, by contrast, Hermes 
the sequence in which case, as discussed by Vergados 2012 ad 384 and 385, the oath-formula 
remains without any accompanying statement. See also N.J. Richardson 2010 ad loc. on the tex-
tual problems in this passage. Whichever way we read the text, whether the oath is sworn or 
unsworn, Hermes avoids perjury.
84 Fletcher 2008, 24‒8, treats this oath as sworn in an exchange of friendship with Apollo, but 
Hermes is said to promise by nodding his head (521: ὑποσχόμενος κατένευσεν), so that he avoids 
swearing an oath once again! Vergados 2012 ad 554 comments that nodding the head “is not a 
form of oath elsewhere”, and it seems that it is not a form of oath at all.
85 Observed by Fletcher 2008, 19.
86 Hermes is the god most commonly credited with the invention of language. See Gera 2003, 
115‒18.
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swears the kind of deceptive oath which might be expected from him. When he is 
asked by Carion whether it was he who had knocked hard on the door, he denies 
it emphatically with an informal oath by Zeus (1101‒2). Hermes had, in fact, 
knocked on the door, in full view of the audience. However, it is still possible for 
him to assert, without committing perjury, that he had not knocked hard.87 These 
two comic oaths sworn by Hermes, then, encapsulate both aspects of the repre-
sentation of gods in comedy. Hermes’ traditional associations with manipulation 
of language are underlined in Wealth, while they are challenged in Peace.
The female counterpart to Hermes as divine manipulator of oaths is Hera,88 
and her strategies are comparable if not identical. We have already seen how Hera 
swears a duplicitous oath to Zeus about the involvement of Poseidon in harming 
the Trojans. She does not volunteer oaths which are then left unsworn, as does 
Hermes, but she does swear and elicit several oaths in order to achieve her plans 
behind Zeus’ back. Hypnos only agrees to help Hera by putting Zeus to sleep 
after she confirms on oath her promise to grant him Pasithea as a reward (Iliad 
14.270‒82). Hera also twice elicits oaths from other gods. The most important of 
these is the oath reported by Agamemnon in Iliad 19.101‒33. Hera had requested an 
oath from Zeus, asking him to swear that whatever child of Zeus’ blood was born 
on that day would be lord over his neighbours. Hera then accelerated the birth of 
Eurystheus and delayed that of Heracles, thus ensuring Eurystheus’ dominance 
over Heracles against Zeus’ will. Aristotle discusses this passage and suggests 
that it is reasonable for Hera to ask for an oath because she is afraid that things 
will not go as she wishes (Arist. fr. 387 Gigon). Zeus is enraged by the deception. 
He hurls the goddess Delusion (Atē) out of Olympus, swearing a second strong 
oath that Delusion shall never again come back there (Il. 19.125‒31). The oaths 
are reported by Agamemnon in order to justify his deluded behaviour regarding 
Briseis, since even Zeus can be deluded. These oaths of Zeus also serve to contex-
tualize the formal oath that Agamemnon will swear shortly thereafter, declaring 
with the gods as witnesses that he did not sleep with Briseis (Il. 19.175‒275). The 
weight and seriousness of Agamemnon’s oath is confirmed by the fact that even 
Zeus is bound by oaths. It is interesting that these are the only two examples of 
Zeus swearing oaths in the entire corpus of archaic and classical Greek literature. 
We should not doubt that Zeus really was imagined as having sworn the oath 
to Hera. Aristotle takes the oath at face value, and it serves as an explanation 
for the fate of Heracles (see ch. 3). Still, Agamemnon’s allusions to the oaths of 
87 Cf. Sommerstein 2001, ad 1102.
88 Hera also has some association with control of language since she grants a human voice to 
the horse of Achilles in the Iliad (19.407); cf. Gera 2003, 15, 114.
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Zeus underline his attitude of superiority as he seeks to create a parallel between 
himself and the king of the gods.89
In Iliad 21 Hera once again receives an oath from a male god, the river Xanthus, 
but this time it is volunteered. Xanthus (Scamander), who is being attacked by 
Hera’s son Hephaestus at her request, swears to Hera that he will never drive the 
day of evil away from the Trojans, not even when all the city of Troy is burning 
with ravening fire on the day the Achaeans burn it (373‒6). The oath is made on 
the condition that Hera should call off Hephaestus, which she does immediately. 
The text of the oath is identical to the one Hera claims to have sworn with Athene 
in Iliad 20. There Hera used the oath as an excuse to reject Poseidon’s sugges-
tion that she should help him to save Aeneas from destruction (313‒17). Poseidon 
then goes alone to save Aeneas since he is fated to survive the Trojan war. It is 
hardly surprising that Hera, Troy’s great divine enemy, refuses to assist even a 
single Trojan, but the fact that the god of Troy’s own river swears an identical 
oath lends further momentum to the sense maintained throughout the Iliad that 
Troy is doomed.90
7.3.4 Oaths sworn by gods to mortals
Gods do not often swear oaths to mortals. The oaths of Hermes in Peace and 
Wealth are sworn to human characters, but even in comedy and satyr-drama, dis-
cussed in more detail below, there are remarkably few cases when we consider 
that Dionysus in Frogs (who swears numerous oaths) plays the role normally 
assigned to a human hero and has mortal sensibilities. Occasionally gods swear 
oaths to mortals to emphasize their rage at human actions. In the Homeric Hymn 
to Demeter, Demeter swears an oath to Metaneira, that she would have made her 
son immortal but now he cannot escape death, a statement sworn in anger when 
Metaneira spies on her (259‒62).91 Similarly, when Apollo swears that Neoptol-
emus will neither return home nor reach old age, he is reacting to the murder 
of Priam at the altar of Zeus (Pindar, Paean 6 fr. 52f.112‒16).92 On two occasions, 
89 Even in his attempt at reconciliation with Achilles over Briseis, Agamemnon’s offering of 
gifts can be read as an assertion of dominance; see D.F. Wilson 1999.
90 On Troy presented as doomed to fall in the Iliad, see the insightful comments of Graziosi & 
Haubold 2010, 7‒8, 33‒4, and ad 96, 438‒9, 447‒9 with further references.
91 On the narrative parallels between the experience of Metaneira and that of Demeter in this 
hymn, see Felson-Rubin and Deal 1994.
92 In Pindar’s version, Neoptolemus dies in Molossia before reaching his home (Paean 6 fr. 
52f.105‒11).
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Odysseus, whose grandfather Autolycus was notoriously skilled in oaths (Od. 
19.395‒6, Pl. Rep. 334b3), extracts oaths from the goddesses Calypso and Circe. 
In the case of Calypso (Od. 5.117‒87), Odysseus already has a special relationship 
with her so that when he asks her to swear an oath that she is not planning some 
painful trial for him by instructing him to leave Ogygia, she simply smiles and 
gives him the oath he requests. The situation with Circe is rather different. It is 
actually Hermes who advises Odysseus, before he encounters Circe, to ask for 
her oath that she is not devising evil against him (Od. 10.299‒301) and Odysseus 
follows this advice (Od. 10. 343‒6, cf. 381). Both oaths are demanded from female 
divinities who desire Odysseus and could thus be said to be susceptible to his 
charms, and both oaths are extracted by Odysseus as a form of self-protection. 
The action is consonant with Odysseus’ careful and vigilant character.
Our final example of a god swearing an oath to a mortal is ambiguous. It 
comes from Aeschylus’ Libation Bearers where Apollo seemingly binds himself 
to Orestes with an oath to support his crime of matricide. As Orestes hesitates to 
murder his mother and turns to his companion for advice, the previously mute 
Pylades famously replies with his only three lines of the play (900‒2) in which 
he asks Orestes to consider the future of Apollo’s oracles and of “pledged oaths 
sworn in good faith” (901: πιστά τ᾽ εὐορκώματα), recommending that Orestes 
should rather make enemies of all mortals than of the gods. The language is enig-
matic. It is not entirely clear what oaths were sworn nor by whom. Was there an 
oath sworn by Orestes to Apollo agreeing to carry out the matricide, or did Apollo 
swear to protect Orestes after ordering the crime? Garvie observes that the latter 
reading is easier for grammatical reasons,93 and it is not impossible that both 
parties are to be envisaged as having entered into a sworn agreement with Orestes 
vowing to commit the deed under oath. In any case, the reminder of these oaths is 
enough to steel Orestes’ resolve and contrasts with Clytaemestra’s failed attempt 
to bind the daimon of the Pleisthenids with a sworn pact in the previous play (Ag. 
1566‒76).
7.3.5 Divine pacts in Aeschylus
Oaths sworn by divinities are surprisingly rare in tragedy, given that the gods 
feature so prominently in this genre and often appear as characters. Lyssa (the 
personification of madness) invokes Helios as witness and swears to Iris that she 
is acting against her will in Euripides’ Heracles (858), and an anonymous tragic 
93 Garvie 1986, ad 901.
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fragment refers to the “great oath” of the gods being fixed (trag. adesp. 145b: 
ἄραρε γὰρ 〈×〉 ὅρκος ἐκ θεῶν μέγας). Remarkably, all our other examples of oaths 
sworn by divine figures in tragedy occur in Aeschylus’ Oresteia. This confirms 
both the importance of the gods as agents and characters in the trilogy, and the 
significance of oaths in each drama.94 In addition to the possible oath of Apollo 
to Orestes, there are several references to oaths between deities. The first oath 
mentioned in the trilogy describes how former enemies Fire and Sea joined in a 
sworn conspiracy (Ag. 650: ξυνώμοσαν) to destroy the Argive host on its voyage 
home from Troy. The same language of conspiracy, our earliest example of such 
usage,95 appears in the description of Sleep and Toil, identified by Clytaemes-
tra’s ghost as “authoritative conspirators” in Eumenides (127: κύριοι συνώμοται), 
and it is possible that the agreement between Athena and the Erinyes is treated as 
a sworn pact at the end of the Eumenides (1044).96
All the oaths sworn by the gods in the Oresteia affect humans in significant 
ways. Fire and Sea cause the destruction of the Greek fleet on its return from Troy, 
Sleep and Toil facilitate Orestes’ brief escape from the Erinyes, and the agreement 
between Athena and the Erinyes ensures their blessings on the people of Athens. 
Similarly, the divine oath referred to by Cassandra in Agamemnon ensures a par-
ticular fate for the humans involved. When she mentions prophetically the “great 
oath” μέγας ὅρκος of the gods, which confirms that Agamemnon’s corpse will 
lead Orestes to return (Ag. 1290, 1284),97 we can recognize that Clytaemestra’s 
attempts to make a sworn pact with the daimon of the Pleisthenids to avoid further 
kin bloodshed are entirely futile (Ag. 1566‒76). Due to their divine knowledge and 
their power to shape the fate of humans, the gods can swear oaths predicting 
future events in a binding manner, as we have seen also with Apollo’s oath fore-
telling the doom of Neoptolemus (Pindar Paean 6 fr. 52f.112‒16), and Demeter’s 
prophecy concerning Demophoön (h. Dem. 259‒61).
94 On oaths in the Oresteia see Fletcher 2012, 35‒69, and see Sommerstein 2010a on oaths in 
Eumenides.
95 Fraenkel (1950) ii ad 650, S&B 122. Such language of conspiracy becomes far more common 
from the 420s in Athens; see S&B 120‒8.
96 See Sommerstein 1989 ad 1044.
97 1290 must be transposed to precede 1284 in order to make sense; see Denniston and Page 
(1957) ad 1284ff. The phrase ‘great oath’ (megas horkos) is often associated with the sworn state-
ments of gods, e.g. Iliad 19.113, Odyssey 5.178, 10.299, 343, Hes. Thg. 400, 784, cf. Iliad 15.38, Odys-
sey 5.185‒6.
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7.3.6 Gods swearing in comedy
Old Comedy contains an extraordinary number of oaths, mostly informal. The 
Nottingham oath database lists 798 references. Only 42 of these are sworn by 
gods, 32 of which occur in Frogs (31 sworn by Dionysus and one by Pluto). We will 
discuss Frogs separately below. This leaves just ten other oaths sworn by divini-
ties in comedy. Of these, we have already discussed the oaths of Hermes in Peace 
and Wealth. The other six deities who swear oaths in comedy are Iris and Posei-
don in Birds, Poverty and Wealth in Wealth, and Rhea in an anonymous fragment.
The issue of gods swearing oaths in Birds is significant because it forms part 
of a broader discourse in the play on swearing oaths in general and on invoking 
the gods in oaths, which we discussed in §5.3.2. Iris swears two informal oaths 
to Peisetaerus and since his ultimate goal is to make himself leader of the city of 
birds which claims to be superior to the gods, the oaths sworn to him (including 
the one sworn later by Poseidon) are not interactions between a god and an ordi-
nary mortal, particularly since the deaths (and thus mortality) of both Iris and 
Zeus are imagined as possibilities in this comedy (Birds 1224, 1642‒3). Both of Iris’ 
oaths are emphatic statements made in frustration. Irritated at Peisetaerus’ inter-
rogation about how she got into the bird city, she swears by Zeus that she has no 
idea “by which gates” she entered, mimicking Peisetaerus’ question which she is 
answering (1210). When Peisetaerus asks whether there was any chief bird who 
“stuck (epebalen) an entry pass” on her, Iris, indignant at the sexual innuendo, 
exclaims “By Zeus no one stuck anything on me!” (1216). Informal oaths by Zeus 
are normally the weakest kinds of oaths and generally constitute particularly 
emphatic statements as here. What is interesting about this scene, however, is 
that Peisetaerus repeats Iris’ first oath “By Zeus, I have no idea” (1220) in response 
to her next question so that “1220 … mockingly echoes 1210”,98 and the power of 
the gods is challenged by Peisetaerus.
Similarly in Peisetaerus’ exchange with Poseidon, he is able to challenge a 
divinity by persuading Poseidon that mortals should swear oaths by birds as well 
as by gods. Poseidon thinks this is a marvellous idea (Birds 1614), a sentiment 
which he emphasizes with an oath by Poseidon (!). This is the only occasion on 
which a god invokes himself as sanctifying oath-witness and it highlights Posei-
don’s dim-wittedness in this comic representation. Poseidon’s second oath is 
addressed to Heracles and is another informal oath by Zeus. It occurs as the Trib-
allian is speaking unintelligibly. Heracles assumes, because it is what he wants 
to assume, that the Triballian is advocating the handing over of the mysterious 
98 Dunbar 1995, ad 1220.
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divine Princess to Peisetaerus. Poseidon objects (ineffectively) exclaiming “by 
Zeus” that the Triballian is not saying to hand her over but is twittering like the 
swallows (Birds 1680‒1). This statement at once emphasizes the garbled speech 
of the Triballian with a familiar expression stressing incomprehensibility, and at 
the same time wittily brings the language of birds to the fore. Heracles’ greed in 
attempting to gain support for the hand-over in order to get the promised recom-
pense of becoming sovereign and receiving a supply of “birds’ milk”, i.e. rare and 
priceless delicacies, is also emphasized.99
The oaths of the gods in Birds are essentially comedic in value, but those of 
Wealth and Poverty in Wealth serve to reinforce some of the most important issues 
of the play. Wealth’s first oath is an emphatic statement invoking Zeus declaring 
that all people who acquire wealth become wicked, without exception (110‒11). 
The invocation of Zeus seems pointed here since if all rich people are wicked, it is 
because Wealth is blind – and it was Zeus who made him so! Similarly, Wealth’s 
second oath invokes all the gods in stating that he is reluctant to enter into the 
house since no good has ever come from him doing so (234‒5). Finally, Poverty 
also swears an informal oath by Zeus emphasizing that her life is very different 
from a life of destitution (551). Each of these oaths is sworn to the mortal Chremy-
lus in the imaginary world of the play. They underline significant ethical issues 
which are never entirely resolved in the drama. At least they are resolved only in 
the realm of comic fantasy, not in any real terms. The comedy’s great plan is to 
give Wealth back his sight so that he can make the virtuous rich and the wicked 
poor with the incentive of wealth making everyone virtuous (Wealth 489‒97). 
Chremylus, who considers himself virtuous (28), does become rich after Wealth 
regains his sight, but Poverty raises important objections to Chremylus’ plan 
in the agōn which Chremylus does not refute. Specifically Poverty argues that 
if she is abolished humans will cease to work since humans engage in industry 
because of her (i.e. to avoid poverty, Wealth 507‒34). Scholars have debated the 
play’s apparent contradictions regarding the necessity of abolishing Poverty for 
everyone to be wealthy.100 The oaths sworn by the deities Wealth and Poverty 
would seem to support a pessimistic understanding of the drama’s resolution as 
an utter fantasy impossible in the real world. If we take the oaths at face value, 
then in the real world (whatever may happen in the world of comic fantasy) all 
who acquire wealth will continue to become wicked, and the poor will continue 
to toil away without ever attaining financial security (553‒6). The dedication of 
cheap boiled vegetables at the new shrine of the god Wealth at the end of the play 
99 See Sommerstein 1991, ad 734 on birds’ milk.
100 See Olson 1990, Konstan 1995, 75‒90, McGlew 1997, Sommerstein 2001, 13‒20.
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may well have served as a reminder that the events represented in the comedy are 
impossible in real life.101
Finally, the oath sworn by Rhea in an anonymous comic fragment presents us 
with another impossibility, this time a mythological impossibility. She swears an 
informal oath by Zeus stating that Apollo did not give Cronus a loan of money or 
goods but gave him an oracle predicting that he would be overthrown by his son 
(com. adesp. 1062.11‒13). The line exploits a Greek pun on the verb χράω which 
means both “to lend” and “to prophesy”. The impossibility of this scenario is 
based on the fact that the son who overthrows Cronus is Zeus, Rhea’s son, and 
Apollo is the son of Zeus, so that he could not have been alive to predict his father 
overthrowing his grandfather! In the comic universe, however, this does not seem 
to be a problem.
7.3.7 The case of Frogs
The case of Frogs presents us with an anomaly. Hades (Pluto) swears one oath 
towards the end of the play (1509‒14), but the god Dionysus swears numerous 
oaths totalling thirty-one. In fact, however, since Dionysus plays the role nor-
mally assigned to a human hero in Aristophanic comedy, the anomaly is not as 
significant as it first appears. There are several indicators of Dionysus’ “human” 
attributes in Frogs. Segal observed that Dionysus appears in the first part of the 
play “as an ordinary mortal”.102 He is called the most cowardly among gods and 
men by Xanthias (486), and is labelled the most villainous of humankind by Eurip-
ides (1472). Moreover, he is unable to prove that he is a god in the whipping scene, 
where his attempts to mask his pain are comparable to those of his slave Xanthias 
(631‒73). Jay-Robert shows that structurally, by comparison with the roles of gods 
in Wealth and Peace, the function of Dionysus in Frogs actually parallels that of 
the mortal heroes Chremylus and Trygaeus in those respective comedies.103 Lada-
Richards has discussed in great detail the various roles played by Dionysus in 
Frogs where he seems to undergo an initiatory rite of passage that is informed 
by Greek civic and religious experience.104 Habash demonstrates that Dionysus 
plays the roles of different participants in his own festival.105 These features of 
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the representation of Dionysus further blur the line between human (participant) 
and divine (recipient of cult).
In spite of the complications surrounding the status of Dionysus, it cannot 
be denied that he was a major and clearly identifiable god for the ancient Greeks. 
Since it is not feasible to address all thirty-one of his oaths, we will omit from our 
discussion the weaker informal oaths by Zeus and “the gods” which tend to func-
tion as emphatic statements.106 This leaves us with several oaths by other specifi-
cally named gods, two oaths made by means of a self-curse and a “Sophoclean” 
oath, which we have already discussed in §5.2. We saw in §6.1 that oaths made by 
context-specific gods hold more weight than those made by Zeus, and this is true 
in comedy also. So in Knights the Sausage-seller wins an exchange of oaths with 
Paphlagon by invoking Poseidon instead of Zeus (336‒9).107 Apart from Zeus, the 
deity invoked most frequently by Dionysus in his oaths is Apollo, and Pluto’s oath 
invokes Apollo also.
Dionysus’ first oath by Apollo comes in his exchange with Heracles in which 
he is attempting to prove his bravery. He claims to have fought in the battle of 
Arginusae, on board Cleisthenes’ ship, and to have sunk twelve or thirteen enemy 
ships (49‒51). Dionysus’ slave Xanthias completes the line with an aside “and 
then I woke up!”, implying that the statement would only have been true in a 
dream. Dreams and prophecy were strongly linked in Greek thought and the 
dreams related in Greek literature are virtually all prophetic,108 making Apollo 
an appropriate deity to invoke in this instance, as the god of prophecy. Similarly, 
when Pluto swears by Apollo at the end of the play that he will engineer the 
arrival of various contemporary figures into Hades if they do not get there quickly 
(1509‒14), it emphasizes the prophetic nature of his claim. Apollo’s cultic asso-
ciations also include patronage of seafaring as overseer of embarkations (Apollo 
epibatērios) and as a guide in the form of a dolphin (Apollo delphinios).109 The 
function as epibatērios might well have been evoked in our first passage where 
Dionysus claims to have “embarked upon” (48: ἐπεβάτευον) the ship of Cleis-
thenes.110 Sailing is precisely the context in which Dionysus next invokes Apollo 
106 Dionysus’ oaths by Zeus appear at 1‒3, 6, 69‒70, 86, 127‒8, 164‒5, 173‒4, 181, 490‒1, 499‒501, 
912‒14, 1046‒7, 1087‒9, 1157‒8, 1433, 1460, 1480‒1; oaths by “the gods” appear at 152‒3, 928‒30, 
971‒80.
107 Sommerstein 2007b, 127‒8.
108 The exception is the false dream sent to Agamemnon by Zeus in Iliad 2, but even there the 
expectation is that Agamemnon will treat the dream as prophetic.
109 Pausanias (2.32.1‒2) discusses Apollo epibatērios, which is a synonym for Apollo embasios, 
used by Apollonius Rhodius (1.403‒4). On Apollo delphinios, see Graf 1979.
110 On the sexual innuendo implied in this line, see Sommerstein 1996, ad 48.
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when he agrees with Aeschylus that Euripides has taught sailors to talk back to 
their officers (1072‒4).
In fact the gods invoked by Dionysus during the contest between Aeschy-
lus and Euripides consistently imply that Dionysus favours the arguments of 
Aeschylus. Although he seems to waver between one poet and the other, Dio-
nysus invokes weightier deities when he agrees with Aeschylus. Dionysus had 
previously sworn an oath by Demeter when he agreed with Aeschylus that rich 
men were pretending to be poor (and thus avoiding public duties) because Eurip-
ides had taken to dressing kings in rags in his tragedies (1065‒7). Lastly, we have 
the sequence in which the opening lines of the Libation Bearers are scrutinized. 
Euripides objects that Orestes is made to say the same thing twice when he states 
that he has come and has returned. Dionysus agrees with a weak oath by Zeus 
(1155‒9). Aeschylus defends his language explaining that returning implies a 
return from exile and so is different from having simply come to the land. Dio-
nysus agrees with a stronger oath by Apollo (1160‒6), here also an appropriate 
divinity since we know that Apollo has ordered Orestes’ return. Euripides objects 
once more claiming that Orestes cannot have “returned” from exile because he 
does so in secret. Dionysus agrees with a pointed oath by Hermes, qualified by 
the phrase “I don’t understand what you mean, though!” (1167‒9). The invocation 
of Hermes might appear to cap the previous oath by Apollo implying that Eurip-
ides has won the argument, but in fact the choice of Hermes at this specific point 
coupled with the claim not to understand demonstrate that Aeschylus is still on 
a winning streak.111 Hermes as the god of duplicitous language is appropriately 
invoked at the moment when Dionysus recognizes Euripides’ argument as clever 
but fails to see its logic. Moreover, Hermes is the god addressed by Orestes in the 
opening line of the Libation Bearers, which has just been scrutinized (1138‒50). 
Hermes is thus naturally associated with Aeschylus at this moment in the drama.
The only other god to be invoked in an oath by Dionysus is Poseidon. This 
oath comes relatively early in the play when he swears that he has indeed seen 
all the father-beaters and perjurers in the sea of mud (273‒6). Poseidon as the sea 
god is thus an appropriate choice for the oath-statement, which is marked by the 
joke that Dionysus can still see these villains (i.e. in the audience). This leaves 
the oaths made by means of a self-curse. The sequence occurs when Dionysus 
realizes that his disguise as Heracles is getting him into trouble and he appeals to 
Xanthias to change clothes with him for the third time. He begins his appeal with 
a self-curse: “May I perish most miserably if I do not love Xanthias!” (579). Xan-
111 Segal 1961, 215 discusses how the ultimate choice of Aeschylus is not surprising in light of 
Dionysus’ development.
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thias needs more convincing, however, and Dionysus offers a further self-curse 
if he ever takes away the clothes from Xanthias: “may I perish most miserably 
and utterly myself, my wife, my children and bleary-eyed Archedemus!” (586‒8). 
The oath formula is serious but simultaneously contains two important jokes. 
The first is that Dionysus is not normally regarded as having had any wife except 
Ariadne112, and she is either long dead113 or immortal.114 The second is the inclu-
sion of Archedemus, an Athenian politician who is likely to have been one of the 
men charged with “deceiving the people” into condemning the commanders at 
Arginusae to death.115 Even if Dionysus breaks his oath, the consequence of being 
rid of Archedemus functions as an incentive for Xanthias, as noted by Sommer-
stein.116 Xanthias replies “I accept your oath” (589), thus demonstrating how this 
kind of self-curse constituted an oath in the eyes of the Greeks.
The single oath of Pluto in Frogs, with its implications of prophecy, creates 
an important contrast to the oaths of Dionysus, which are far more comparable 
to those of mortal Aristophanic heroes both in number and in content. Oath-lan-
guage in Frogs, then, further contributes to the complex representation of the god 
Dionysus as having mortal qualities.
7.3.8 Silenus and the satyrs
If the oaths of Dionysus in Frogs do not contain the implications of power and 
control we might expect in oaths sworn by gods, neither do the oaths of Silenus 
and the satyrs in satyr-drama. Although technically immortals, Silenus and the 
satyrs are at the bottom of the food chain since one of their distinguishing charac-
teristics is being enslaved. Their oaths are unmarked by aspects of divine power 
and language or predictions of the future. In Sophocles’ Trackers the satyrs swear 
an emphatic statement “by Zeus” to Silenus that the footprints of the cattle are 
pointing the wrong way (fr. 314.118‒19). Aeschylus’ Theōroi contains a fragmen-
tary reference to an oath which may have been the athlete’s oath taken by the 
satyrs (fr. 78c.1 Radt = 78c.37 Sommerstein), and so an oath normally taken by 
112 Hes. Thg. 947‒9; Eur. Hipp. 339; [Epimenides] fr. 3 Fowler = FGrH 457 F 19.
113 e.g. Odyssey 11.321‒5.
114 Hes. loc. cit.; [Apoll.] Epit. 1.9, crediting the couple with four (mortal) children – Thoas, 
Staphylus, Oenopion, and Peparethus (cf. Eur. fr. 752a) – seems to be following a similar tradi-
tion.
115 See Sommerstein 1996, ad 417 on the identity of Archedemus.
116 Sommerstein 1996, ad 588.
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mortals.117 Two of Silenus’ oaths are sworn to mortals. One is the oath of Silenus 
to Danaë in Aeschylus’ Net-haulers (Diktyoulkoi). He swears by the gods to support 
and protect her, but his oath is completely ineffectual since Danaë nevertheless 
assumes she will be treated outrageously (fr. 47a.765‒6). The second is Silenus’ 
oath to Odysseus in Euripides’ Cyclops in which he makes an emphatic statement 
“by Zeus” that he has not seen the wine Odysseus has but smells it (154).
The pattern of Silenus’ oaths in Cyclops is interesting. He swears a total of 
six oaths, five of which are statements invoking Zeus, including the oath just 
mentioned, but most of which are sworn to the Cyclops. He swears that he will 
not weep (554‒5), that he will not hand over the wine until he sees the Cyclops 
taking the garland (558‒9), and that the wine-pourer (i.e. Silenus himself) is not 
unfair (560). The remaining oath by Zeus is the first oath of the play, spoken as 
an aside by Silenus in the prologue. He lists various labours he had performed 
for Dionysus including unlikely heroic actions during the Gigantomachy (3‒8). 
He breaks off suddenly with the line “Come, let me see, am I telling a dream I 
had?” (8). Silenus’ boasts sound suspiciously improbable,118 and the mention of 
a dream is clearly a cue for the audience to question, with Silenus, the validity of 
this narrative.119 The notion is rejected, however, as soon as it is raised with an 
assertory oath “No by Zeus”, and the qualification “since I displayed the trophies 
to Bacchus” (9). In Frogs, as we saw above, Xanthias’ addendum to Dionysus’ 
improbable oath about having sunk twelve or thirteen ships at Arginusae, the 
aside “and then I woke up”, explains how the oath might be true – if it were a 
statement made about a dream. Here we have a similar concept worked out rather 
differently. The oath is linked not with the original claims but with rejecting a 
notion of fantasy. It signals that Silenus believes the account to be true, in spite of 
his momentary equivocation, and it may even have been accompanied by a physi-
cal joke – what were the “trophies” that Silenus displayed to Dionysus? Perhaps 
he points to some evidence of “trophies” on his person, unconvincing ones at 
that since it was well known that Athena had defeated Enceladus. The function 
of this sequence, as I have argued elsewhere, is to draw audience attention to 
the fictional qualities of poetic narrative in this drama, which rewrites one of the 
most famous episodes from Homer’s Odyssey.120
Only one of Silenus’ oaths is elaborate, invoking a long list of deities. It is 
countered with an oath by the chorus of satyrs, which seems to contradict it 
117 On oaths of athletes, see Perry 2007.
118 See Seaford 1984 ad 1, 5‒9, 7, 8, cf. Ussher 1978 ad 5‒8, Biehl 1986 ad 7f.
119 Cf. M.E. Wright 2006a, 39.
120 Torrance 2013, 258‒9 and 245‒64.
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directly. Who is telling the truth? Is someone lying on oath? We will discuss these 
oaths in §10.2,121 where it will be argued that careful scrutiny of the language used 
demonstrates that both parties can be understood as technically telling the truth.
121 See also §5.3.1 on Silenus’ invocation of “the whole race of fish” in this oath.




Achilles has long been said by scholars to be an exceptional character in the Iliad, 
particularly in his use of language.1 This also applies to Achilles’ oaths, which 
show several unique linguistic usages. This section will look at all three of Achil-
les’ oaths in the Iliad, and analyse them both in terms of their oath features and 
of how they relate to Achilles’ character more generally within the epic. There 
are two other scenes in the epic where an oath would be appropriate but Achilles 
does not use one – an examination of these scenes proves that they also contrib-
ute to Achilles’ extraordinary characterization.2
The first oath that Achilles swears happens very early in the epic. As the poem 
opens, a plague has struck the Achaean army, and Achilles calls an assembly of 
the leaders to find out what has caused Apollo’s wrath. He calls upon the seer 
Calchas to reveal the cause, which is, of course, the fact that Agamemnon has 
taken Chryseis, the daughter of Apollo’s priest Chryses, and refuses to give her 
back despite Chryses’ supplication. Calchas worries that if he reveals Agamem-
non as the source of the Achaeans’ pain, Agamemnon will be angry, which would 
place him, as a man of lower status, in considerable danger. So he asks Achilles 
to protect him:
“O Achilles, dear to Zeus, you order me to explain  
the rage of lord Apollo, the far-shooter.  
And I will tell you. But you agree, and swear to me,  
to willingly defend me, with words and with your hands.  
For I think I will anger a man, who greatly rules  
over all the Argives, and the Achaeans obey him.  
For the king is stronger, when he gets angry with a lesser man –  
even if he keeps his anger down in the moment,  
but he holds a grudge from then on in his chest  
until it comes to fruition. But say if you will save me.” (Il. 1.74‒83)
1 For discussions of unique aspects of Achilles’ language, see Parry 1956; Reeve 1973; Claus 
1975; Hogan 1976; Friedrich and Redfield 1978; Scully 1984; Nimis 1986.
2 Kitts 2005, 51: “…some of the most striking examples of oath-making premises…occur where 
oaths are anticipated but absent”.
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Calchas’ oath request is specifically about status. Since he is of lower status than 
Agamemnon “who greatly rules over all the Argives”, he will need another man 
of higher status to protect him. Achilles, as another basileus, is of equal status 
to Agamemnon in that respect, and should be able to fulfil the oath. At the same 
time, this suggestion of equal status between them sows the seeds for the strife 
that follows.
Achilles’ response stokes this spark of strife that Calchas starts. He responds 
directly to Calchas’ concern about status, first more generally, but then by naming 
Agamemnon specifically:
“Take courage and speak, revealing whatever divine will you know;  
by Zeus-loved Apollo, to whom you pray, Calchas,  
when you disclose divine will to the Danaans:  
no one, while I am still living and seeing above ground,  
will lay his heavy hands upon you besides the hollow ships,  
not even if you speak of Agamemnon,  
who now boasts to be the best of the Achaeans by far.” (Il. 1.85‒91)
Achilles’ oath moves from the anonymous ou tis “no one” of line 88 to naming 
Agamemnon at line 90, possibly in a rhetorical flourish to reassure Calchas 
about the lengths he will go to protect him. But here Achilles also risks provok-
ing Agamemnon’s anger, through the implication that Agamemnon is the one to 
blame.3 What’s more, Achilles goes on to add the formulaic relative clause “[he] 
who now boasts to be the best of the Achaeans by far” to describe Agamemnon – 
“the cumulative addition in which insult lies”, as Kirk says.4 Achilles’ language 
here is ambiguous, not just because, as Kirk points out, the use of the verb euk-
homai appears throughout the Iliad as either positive or negative (it can denote 
either “boasting” based on fact or “claiming”),5 but also because this is the first 
instance of this verb in the poem, so there is no precedent for what it might mean 
here. Even more telling is that Achilles refers to himself twice after this in book 1 
as “the best of the Achaeans” (1.244, 1.412) with no such qualification. So within 
Achilles’ oath, this early in the epic, Achilles makes it clear that he has a status-
based tension specifically with Agamemnon.
3 See Karavites and Wren 1992, 5. Karavites follows Erbse in seeing Achilles’ oath here as a 
gambit that forces him to save face with Agamemnon later on at the loss of cooperation with the 
Achaeans. 
4 Kirk 1985, 62 (on 1.91‒2); see also Griffin 1980, 52. 
5 Kirk 1985 on 1.91.
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Achilles’ oath here also shows the first instance of his unique oath-language, 
as he swears by Apollo with the phrase ou ma gar Apollōna (1.86). Again, we have 
to take into account that this is the first oath sworn in the Iliad, so it might not 
appear as unusual to the audience. But throughout the epic, Achilles is the only 
character to use the ou ma / nai ma construction for oaths.6 This construction 
is common in later texts, and is usually employed in dialogue, particularly in 
comedy and Plato, for emphasis or assertive effect. Achilles’ early usage suggests 
an emphatic way of speaking that might also be more naturalistic, and that cer-
tainly stands out from the rest of the oath-formulae in the epic. Achilles’ first 
oath to Calchas here then serves to establish two things, both of which are only 
revealed as the epic unfolds: Achilles has intense, specific relationships, and he 
expresses himself through emphatic language.
This second aspect of Achilles’ character shows itself very clearly in his next 
oath, which is not uttered in response to a request, but is rather a volunteered, 
sworn threat.7 Once Agamemnon sends men to take Briseis from Achilles, he 
angrily swears this threat (which will come true): 
“But I will say this, and swear a great oath,  
by this sceptre, which will never again bear leaf nor branch,  
since it has now left behind the cut stump in the mountains,  
nor shall it ever bloom again, since the bronze blade stripped  
bark and leaf; and now at last the sons of the Achaeans  
carry it in their hands when they administer  
the justice of Zeus. And this will be my great oath to you:  
some day longing for Achilles will come to the sons of the Achaeans, 
all of them. Then stricken at heart though you will be, you will be able  
to do nothing, when in their numbers before man-slaughtering Hector  
they drop and die. And then you will eat out the heart within you  
in sorrow, that you did no honour to the best of the Achaeans.”  
So spoke the son of Peleus, and threw to the ground the sceptre  
that was studded with golden nails, and he sat down. (1.233‒46)
6 Cf. Achilles’ oath at 23.43. See also Griffin 1986, 52; Fletcher 2012, 26. For ou ma or nai ma, the 
only other example in Homer outside of Achilles’ three uses in the Iliad is spoken by Telemachus 
in an oath at Odyssey 20.339. There are no examples of this construction in Hesiod; only two exist 
in the Homeric Hymns (both in the later Hymn to Hermes, at 384 and 460). The only other early 
example (7th c. or earlier) is Sappho fr. 95.9, which is contextually ambiguous. See §5.1, pp. 80‒1 
n. 18.
7 Hanna Roisman (1984, 30) draws attention to the use of horkos to signal a one-sided oath, or 
a volunteered oath, in contrast with horkia, which signals a pact between two sides.
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Achilles starts here by swearing on Agamemnon’s sceptre, which he holds in his 
hand.8 This serves as visual appropriation of Agamemnon’s power that Achil-
les further undermines and subverts when he throws it to the ground to seal his 
oath.9 His first words, the formula ἀλλ’ ἔκ τοι ἐρέω “but I will speak this out”, 
is another rare usage that appears only three times in the Iliad, each time signi-
fying a threat (cf. 1.204, 2.257). Achilles’ use of nai ma (234) corresponds to his 
earlier ou ma in his oath to Calchas, and shows again his emphatic use of lan-
guage. The whole speech is full of vivid language: his description of the sceptre 
contains two hapaxes (ἀναθηλέω, 1.236; δικασπόλος, 1.238) and the rare word 
ἀμύσσω (1.243; cf. 19.284), and his whole speech is made more emphatic through 
the violent throwing of the sceptre at its close. This oath is also unusual in the 
fact that it is not only a threat, but, as a threat that is to come true, a prophecy. 
Achilles is the only Iliadic character to use an oath to either of these ends. In this 
prophecy-threat, Achilles combines his violent rage reacting to the moment with 
a wide-ranging perspective on (some of) the consequences of this moment in the 
future. This is similar to the kind of contrasts that fill Achilles’ long speech to the 
embassy at 9.308ff., where specific complaints about Agamemnon (9.315, 335‒7, 
338ff.), and even Odysseus (9.312f., 346), contrast with broad gnomic statements 
about life and death (9.318‒22, 337).10
8 Fletcher (2012, 21) rightly calls this an “unusual oath” for its being sworn by a sceptre. Kitts 
goes much further, saying: “To swear by a perverted symbol – a dead sceptre – is to undertake a 
perverted justice, here manifest as the corruption of fairness and good faith among the combined 
orce of the Achaean armies.” at Kitts, (2005, 105). Karavites (1992, 19 n. 2) gives several Roman 
parallels to this use of the sceptre. The Iliad itself provides parallels, with Agamemnon and Hec-
tor both swearing to Zeus with their sceptres in hand (see next note). While Achilles does not 
swear by Zeus here, but by the sceptre, Zeus must be implied here, as the sceptre stands for his 
justice. Aristotle also mentions monarchs swearing by lifting up the sceptre (Politics 1285b14).
9 Cf. 7.406‒11, where Agamemnon swears on his sceptre to seal the truce for recovering the dead, 
and 10.319‒31, where Dolon requests a sceptre-sworn oath and Hector complies, to assure Dolon 
of his prize should he successfully complete his scouting mission. The language in both these 
cases is very similar. After Agamemnon swears to Idaeus, we are told (7.412): “So speaking, he 
lifted up his sceptre to all the gods ...” Dolon asks Hector (10.321): “But come, lift up your sceptre 
and swear to me ...” And when Hector responds, we are told (10.328) that he “took the sceptre in 
his hands and swore to him”.
10 Achilles’ deft manoeuvring between specific complaints against Agamemnon and rumina-
tions on his role as a mortal warrior stands in direct contrast to Friedrich & Redfield’s claim 
that “Achilles is characterized by immediacy and easy dominance … His lively intelligence and 
imagination display the situation to him in vivid relief; he lacks the patience to look beyond it.” 
(1978: 285)
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Achilles’ last oath comes in book 23, and has similar elements of emphatic 
language and prophecy. Still in mourning for Patroclus, Achilles refuses to wash 
off his battle-filth, and to emphasise his refusal, he swears an oath:
He stubbornly refused them, and swore a great oath:  
“No, by Zeus, who is highest and most excellent of the gods,  
there is no right in letting water come near my head,  
until I have put Patroclus on the pyre, and heaped dirt on his body,  
and cut my hair, since never will a second  
pain like this come to my heart, not while I stand among the living.” (23.42‒7)
Once again, Achilles uses ou ma to begin his oath; but instead of an agreement, 
or a threat, his statement here is a promise of future actions, where he says what 
he himself will (or won’t) do, and why. The what – refusing to wash – is a promise 
of future action as a response to the moment: the why – because the loss of Patro-
clus is the worst thing that will ever happen to him – expresses Achilles’ perspec-
tive on the future. Achilles here once again combines an intense response to the 
moment with an extended perspective.
Of the three oaths that Achilles swears in the Iliad, one he swears as a response 
to an invited oath of protection, one is a volunteered sworn threat, and another a 
volunteered sworn assertion of future action: in each he uses either nai ma or ou 
ma, suggesting emphasis. Considering oaths more generally, most volunteered 
oaths attempt to forge trust where there is no basis for trust, or where the swearer 
has no faith he will be believed – in the Odyssey, all but one of the volunteered 
oaths are to swear that Odysseus is coming (or has come) home. Achilles uses 
his volunteered oaths to enforce expressions of intense emotional responses to 
specific relationships and losses (first of Briseis, then of Patroclus). If we can find 
the strong language, the indications of intense personal relationships, and the 
combination of specific feelings that fit that moment with broader knowledge 
that make Achilles unique just in these three oaths, than it is just as useful to look 
at those scenarios where an oath is pointedly missing. Not coincidentally, both of 
these scenarios are linked to the fate of Hector’s corpse, as Hector becomes the 
focal point for Achilles’ intense grief for Patroclus that we saw in his last oath.
The first of these scenes comes in book 22, where Hector makes an unusual 
oath-request before starting single combat against Achilles, that whoever should 
win should return the body of the loser to their people:
“But come, let us take the gods (as witnesses) (theous epidōmetha), for they are the best  
witnesses and observers of agreements (harmoniai).” (22.254‒5)
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This is the only use of epidōmetha in extant language to call on the gods for 
the purpose of an oath, and harmoniai is also a hapax in the epic, making this 
oath-proposal entirely unique.11 Achilles’ response to this proposal is a brilliant, 
caustic refusal, just as rife with unique language in its vivid portrayal of Achilles’ 
hate:
“Hector, wretch, do not speak of agreements (sunēmosunai) to me.  
As there can be no trusted oaths (horkia pista) between men and lions,  
nor can wolves and sheep share like mind (homophrona thumon),  
but must always turn evil thoughts against one another,  
so you and I cannot be friends, nor can there be  
oaths for us two, until one of us falls,  
and Ares who fights under the shield’s guard gluts himself on his blood.” (22.261‒7)
Achilles does use the word horkia in his rejection, at 262 and 266, but there is also 
unusual language in his response, as he uses the hapax sunēmosunai to refer to 
Hector’s proposal, and the hapax homophrona to describe what he and Hector 
cannot be. Perhaps this range of vocabulary is meant to suggest the absoluteness 
of Achilles’ rejection; there is no agreement of any kind, in any terms, that Hector 
can propose to Achilles.12 In this profound hate, Achilles still defines a relation-
ship between the two men, in line 265, where he not only uses eme kai se “me and 
you” to describe himself and Hector, joined with a conjunction, but even a dual 
at the end of the line (nōïn “us two”). Their relationship is specifically described 
through their absence of a relationship – Achilles’ hatred for Hector is unique, 
and cannot be overcome.13 This defies our normal expectations of conditions in 
11 N.J. Richardson 1992, ad loc.
12 See D. Cohen 1980. Regarding this scene he says (58‒9): “Achilles is not saying that there 
can be no oaths between men and lions, or himself and Hector, but rather that there can be no 
obligations, or agreements, no relationship at all except struggle to the death without conditions 
… Hector has suggested not oaths, but such a reciprocal binding agreement that would alter their 
relationship of unconditional hostility. The mutuality and binding character of his proposal are 
expressed not only in its content, but also by words like ἐπιδώμεθα and ἁρμονιάων. ἁρμονιάων 
which in Homer usually refers to bonds, cords, or fastenings, conveys this sense particularly 
forcefully. Achilles’ rejection of Hector’s proposal in [sic] directed to just this binding, relational 
aspect, for his words deny the possibility of any connection between them which might oblige 
him to place constraints upon his conduct.” Cohen is wrong in saying “Hector has not suggested 
oaths”; Hector must be suggesting an oath in his calling the gods to witness, and Achilles’ re-
sponse, with its rejection of oaths, confirms this. 
13 Kitts is right here in asserting that Achilles’ “passion is not to be softened by the conven-
tions which refine and protect social intercourse”, but she goes too far in claiming that Achilles’ 
rejection of these oaths here “happen because he rejects the very foundations they are built 
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war; there is usually a chance for compromise even between the most bitter of 
enemies, where an oath can be used to establish trust where none exists (see ch. 
4). But Achilles does not operate according to generic social rules, and instead 
responds to the intensity of his specific relationships, from how he expresses his 
motives to how he uses language with his interlocutors.14
Achilles’ final exchange supports this, as it is a scene where we would expect 
an oath, but Achilles does not give one. In book 24, Priam, aided by the gods, 
walks into the hut of Achilles and throws himself at the warrior’s knees to ransom 
the body of Hector. The conversation between the two men has several significant 
points in reflecting on Achilles’ character and the specificity of his relationships, 
and in many ways, serves as a counterpoint to his interaction with Hector. Priam 
manages to mollify Achilles with his first speech, appealing to his sense of pity 
and his relationship with his own father, Peleus:
“But respect the gods, Achilles, and pity me,  
remembering your own father, for I am even more pitiful…” (24.503‒4)
Achilles responds not with words here, but with gesture and emotion, as the nar-
rator tells us that Achilles takes the old man’s hand, pushes him gently away, 
and “the two remembered” (24.509). The use of the dual pronoun tō unites the 
two men in this intimate act of grieving together, as does Achilles’ momentary 
physical gesture of taking Priam’s hand, which he does again at 24.515 when he 
finally responds verbally. As Achilles marvels at Priam’s bravery in coming to him 
like this to beg for Hector’s corpse, he says, “Your heart is iron” (24.521). Achilles’ 
compliment for Priam here inverts Hector’s disapproval of Achilles at 22.356ff., 
after Achilles has refused once again to ransom his body: “I look upon you and 
I know you well, that I wasn’t about to persuade you. For the heart in your torso 
is iron” (22.356‒7). After this exchange, Priam begs Achilles not to delay, but to 
give him back his son, and Achilles, though angry for a moment, obeys, prepar-
ing the body himself and putting it in a wagon for Priam to return to Troy. Then 
the two men spend more time together, as Achilles asks Priam to eat with him. 
Here Achilles tells the story of Niobe, how even she ate after the murder of her 
upon: compassion, self-restraint, and mutual trust” (Kitts 2005, 52). Achilles’ rejection here is 
particular to Hector, as the killer of Patroclus. For proof of how the specificity of Achilles’ rela-
tionships affects his adhesion to social conventions, a quick glance at how he treats those who 
work at Agamemnon’s bidding, but are not Agamemnon, gives a clear picture: he properly wel-
comes the heralds at 1.334‒48, and the embassy at 9.196ff. 
14 Friedrich and Redfield (1978, 280‒1) discuss Achilles’ profuse usage of the vocative, with 
titles and epithets, as a sign of the intensity of his personal relationships.
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children, and he uses the dual to describe himself and Priam: “But come, for we 
two (nōï) also, brilliant old man, we should think about food” (24.618‒19) After 
they finish eating, they gaze upon each other, each in turn admiring the other 
(24.628‒33), before speaking again. Achilles makes a bed in the porch for Priam 
(in case someone should see him in the tent and tell Agamemnon) and finally 
asks him how many days he will need for Hector’s funeral. Finally we come to 
the place where we might expect an elaborate oath between enemies as in book 3 
(3.267ff) or even the kind of oath that swears a truce for the burial of the corpses, 
as in book 7 (7.408‒13). But Achilles agrees to the eleven-day truce that Priam asks 
for without ever swearing an oath of assurance; instead he promises to hold up 
the fighting for as long as Priam needs, and grabs his right wrist to reassure him.
So (Achilles) spoke, and took the right hand of the old man  
at the wrist, so that he wouldn’t be afraid in his heart. (24.671‒2)
This gesture is odd, to say the least, and is usually associated with marriage:15 
there is no equivalent gesture anywhere in the Iliad. If we do take the gesture 
to represent a sort of marriage, then this bond between Achilles and Priam is 
the fulfilment of a relationship that was deemed impossible between Hector and 
Achilles. Immediately before Hector faces Achilles in battle in book 22, he says to 
himself:
15 Lateiner 1995, 57 says of this gesture: “An eloquent, informal gesture in Iliad 24, persuasive 
to participants and compactly communicative to the audience, is this hand-on-wrist grasp. Thus 
Hermes and Achilleus both guide Priam, indeed assert their control over Priam’s postures and 
distance, while reassuring him verbally and non-verbally of friendly attitude.” Lateiner glosses 
over the real difference between these two points of physical contact: Achilles grabs Priam not to 
direct him physically, as was the case with Hermes, but to enforce his promise. Davies 1985, 628 
also glosses over the hand/wrist difference: “The gesture (of the handshake) was also sometimes 
used in 5th century vase painting in the context of marriage… It has been suggested that the 
scene on a volute krater in Boston which appears to show the departure of a warrior, may in fact 
show Achilles with Deidameia and is a scene with a deliberate double meaning: departure and 
wedding.” This would make sense in the context of another wrist-grab in Homer, where Odysseus 
grabs Penelope by the wrist as he leaves her (Od. 18.257‒8). The only other interesting wrist-grab 
in the Iliad is on the description of Achilles’ shield, where young men and young women dance, 
holding each other’s wrists at 18.593‒4. It’s noteworthy that the same vocabulary of ēïtheos 
“young man” and parthenos “maiden” is used here as in Hector’s lines at 22.126‒8. These two 
romantic contexts would point to courtship/marriage symbolism. For further discussion of grab-
bing the wrist as a marriage gesture, see Flory 1978, 71 n. 5. See also M.W. Blundell 1989, 46: 
“Enmity is ended or friendship sealed and perpetuated by the provision of a wife.” This marriage 
imagery here evokes the creation of a bond of friendship, but certainly in an unexpected way. 
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“There is no way now from behind a tree or a rock  
to whisper to him, like a girl and a young man,  
how a girl and a young man whisper to each other.” (22.126‒8)
Hector here wishes that he and Achilles might talk as though courting,16 Achilles 
grabs Priam as he would a bride; the former impossibility is reconciled through 
this latter gesture. So we have a scene that, in its absence of oaths between Achil-
les and Priam, perfectly redeems Achilles’ refusals to take an oath with Hector 
in book 22. The specificity of relationships remains constant: Achilles uses the 
dual to describe both himself and Hector as well as himself and Priam, and both 
relationships are driven, albeit to different ends, by a grief that overwhelms social 
norms and undermines our expectations about the uses of oaths.
This examination of Achilles’ oath-scenes shows several unique attributes 
that contribute to his overall characterization. First, he is alone in his use of nai 
ma or ou ma in his oaths. Secondly, Achilles is exceptional in his use of volun-
teered oaths, using them as threats or as emphatic statements, rather than to 
establish trust. Next, Achilles sometimes incorporates insight into the future 
into his oaths, whether it be the broader implications of his alienation from the 
Achaeans, or an understanding of his own personal future in the wake of losing 
Patroclus. The scenes where Achilles does not swear an oath with an enemy 
are just as extraordinary: Achilles is the only character to refuse an oath in this 
context, while his agreement with Priam completely defies all social expecta-
tions. These unique features of Achilles’ uses (and avoidances) of oaths are an 
important factor of his character construction that flesh out our intuitive feelings 
about Achilles: he is passionate and direct, and has an extraordinary capacity for 
emotion in the moment while still seeing the bigger picture. Perhaps most impor-
tantly of all, Achilles’ actions are dictated by the intensity of his specific personal 
relationships, rather than standard social expectations, and this is particularly 
clear in his oath-scenes.
16 The use of oarizemenai here, used elsewhere only in the narrator’s description of Hector and 
Andromache’s encounter at 6.516, suggests that Hector views his relationship with Achilles in a 
courtship context. Achilles avoids such language, but does fantasize under the threat of the river 
at 21.279‒80 that he wishes Hector would have killed him, and equates himself to Hector (“I wish 
that Hector would have killed me, he who is the best man who was brought up here; then a good 
man would have struck, and a good man would have been slain”).
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8.2 Odysseus
Odysseus serves as a counter-point to Achilles in our consideration of oaths and 
characterization in Homer, spanning as he does both the Iliad and the Odyssey. 
While it always tricky to take the two epics together, it is helpful in thinking about 
character consistency across tradition, and how characters from one story remain 
“themselves” in another. But as we will see in our examination of the Odyssey, 
the main problem in considering the characterization of Odysseus is whether he 
is ever “himself” at all.
Odysseus only has one oath in the Iliad, and as we saw with Achilles, it is a 
volunteered oath that emphasises something said, here, with intense emotion: 
Odysseus uses a self-curse to cement a threat. Responding to Thersites’ com-
plaints about Agamemnon, Odysseus rebukes him, before launching into this 
self-cursing threat:
”...But I will speak out to you and it will be something that will happen –  
if I happen upon you again, being as foolish as you are now,  
then no longer will the head of Odysseus be above his shoulders,  
and no longer would I be called the father of Telemachus,  
if I don’t, grabbing hold of you, strip off your own clothes,  
your cloak and your tunic, that wrap around your shameful bits,  
and send you away, crying out, to the fast ships,  
having struck you with shameful strikes out of the assembly.”  
So he spoke, and struck his back and his two shoulders  
with the sceptre. (2.257‒64)
This oath serves a similar function to the example of Achilles’ throwing down 
the sceptre at the end of book 1, where a curse-oath emphasizes a threat. Here, 
too, almost in parody, Odysseus seals his curse with the sceptre, bringing it down 
hard on the back of Thersites, a physical gesture of violent authority that re-
enforces his strong words. This is the only oath that Odysseus actually swears 
in the Iliad,17 and it has a clear parallel with a similar self-curse that Odysseus 
swears in the Odyssey.
Odysseus’ self-curse in the Odyssey comes when he is disguised as the Cretan, 
as he is from shortly after his arrival in Ithaca in book 13 until his staggered rev-
elations throughout the epic’s final books. Here, before Telemachus has been 
introduced, but after Odysseus has recognized him, the Cretan tells Telemachus 
17 Odysseus is, of course, instrumental in bringing about the oath of truce between Achilles and 
Agamemnon, but does not swear himself. See Il. 9.180, 9.274‒6, 19.141, 19.155‒95. 
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about what he would do should Odysseus or Telemachus return to Ithaca as he 
quizzes him for more information about the suitors:
“If I were so young, with this in my heart,  
or if the son of blameless Odysseus, or even the man himself  
might come from wandering, then there’d still be a share of hope.  
And then right away, may a strange man cut my head from me,  
if I wouldn’t become an evil to all the suitors,  
when I came into the great hall of Laertes’ son Odysseus.” (16.99‒104)
This self-curse “may a strange man cut my head from me / if I wouldn’t become an 
evil to all the suitors” is certainly similar to the head-removing self-curse that the 
Iliad’s Odysseus swears to Thersites, with its focus on Odysseus’ karē (Il. 2.259; 
Od. 16.102), and might even be related, since that oath focused explicitly on Odys-
seus self-identifying as Telemachus’ father (Il. 2.260), and here he is talking, in 
disguise, to Telemachus. But in the Iliad, that karē clearly is Odysseus’. As the 
Oath Database notes,18 the self-curse of Od. 16.102, perhaps even more than the 
rest of the oaths that Odysseus swears in disguise in the Odyssey, confuses the 
identity of the speaker. Whether the Cretan or Odysseus is speaking at this point 
in the oath becomes obscure in the transition between the third person singular 
elthoi “(he) might come” (referring to either Telemachus or Odysseus) in line 101 
and the nominative first person participle elthōn “coming” in 104, as the self-
curse becomes, much like Achilles’ sworn threat at Iliad 1.233‒46, a prophecy of 
the carnage Odysseus himself will wreak in his own halls in book 22. This oath 
does cleverly force Telemachus into revealing who he is to Odysseus (16.113‒20), 
and it is only a short time after this that Athene tells Odysseus to reveal himself 
to his son (16.167ff.): here this volunteered oath creates a connection that allows 
their conspiracy against the suitors to begin (16.169f.).
Of Odysseus’ remaining volunteered oaths in the Odyssey, in every instance 
the Cretan swears that Odysseus is coming home, to create trust in this fact where 
there is none in the experience of his interlocutors; Eumaeus, Penelope, and 
Philoetius.19 Mixing in this sworn truth with a multitude of lies about himself, 
Odysseus as the Cretan in these books (he is, after all, polutropos “many-wayed”, 
1.1, and is the grandson of Autolycus, “who surpassed men in stealing and with 
the oath; the god Hermes himself had given these to him”, 19.395‒8) is character-
18 See the Nottingham Oath Database, “Remarks” on #555. 
19 These oaths come in a series of “lying” speeches by Odysseus that have received considerable 
scholarly attention. See Stanford 1950; Trahman 1952; Haft 1984; Emlyn-Jones 1986; S. Richard-
son 1996. 
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istic in how he uses language and disguise to his advantage. Every time, Odysseus 
protects his own identity while ascertaining through his interlocutors’ responses 
whether they might be allied with him against the suitors.
Despite each of his interlocutors’ loyalty to Odysseus, and their general 
acceptance of the Cretan and their hospitality towards him, none of them accepts 
these oaths about Odysseus’ homecoming as true. This signals a shift from a tie 
between oaths and characterization – is a man trustworthy? – to one between 
oaths and narrative – is a story trustworthy? These scenes all make it clear that 
the value of an oath in the Odyssey is no longer as firmly tied to determining char-
acter or relationships between characters, but instead falls on judging the truth 
of things said.20
Odysseus as the Cretan volunteers the first of these three oaths about Odys-
seus’ homecoming to the swineherd Eumaeus in book 14.21 Eumaeus provokes 
the oath, by saying, before he even names Odysseus as his lord, that vagabonds 
come telling lies about him (14.122‒32), and won’t persuade anyone: “Old man, 
there is not any man who could come here bringing news of him, that would per-
suade his wife and beloved son” (14.122‒3). So the Cretan swears an oath,22 to 
emphasise that he is telling the truth about Odysseus’ homecoming:
20 Roisman (1984, 74) almost suggests this in her assessment of apistos in the Odyssey, say-
ing that “its derogatory meaning changes from ‘untrustworthy’ to ‘unbelievable’, ‘beyond one’s 
experience”, and she gives the example of Eumaeus’ refusal to believe that Odysseus will return 
at 14.121‒32.
21 For an elegant reading of the whole conversation between Eumaeus and Odysseus, see 
Minchin 1999. 
22 This oath is definitely sworn – it is a volunteered oath of emphasis, not unlike Achilles’ oaths 
at Il. 1.233‒46 and Il. 23.42‒7, and does not require an Invitation (as defined by the schema of 
Arend 1933). The Execution is the oath itself, which starts with the call to witness (ἴστω νῦν 
Ζεὺς…, 14.158). For a treatment of this oath as an oath, see Minchin 1999. This stands against 
Callaway’s claim (followed by Fletcher 2012, 28) that here “there is no Execution or Conclusion, 
since Eumaeus refuses the oath … As I have defined an oath scene the oath is not completed if it 
is not accepted: Odysseus has merely offered an oath. The use of the future sense (μυθήσομαι) is 
another indication of the offering, and is seen in the other two scenes as well. Finally, Eumaeus 
does not accept the offer, and thus has refused to participate in the religious act of the oath, an 
act which involves two parties” (Callaway 1998, 162‒3). This is nonsense. An oath can most cer-
tainly be sworn by one person in order to emphasize the truth of a sworn statement, or to swear 
to future action or inaction by the individual, as we have seen in the oaths of Achilles in this 
chapter. Moreover, the use of μυθήσομαι here is not unusual in how it signals a coming oath, and 
draws attention to a statement that is about to be made: see not only the other oaths of Odysseus 
at Od. 19.269 and 23.265, but also preparations for statements made immediately after at Od. 9.16, 
11.507, and 19.245. This use of μυθήσομαι parallels that of ἐρέω in oaths at Il. 1.76, 1.233, and Od. 
20.229; and ἐρέω in emphasising the truth of a statement that is about to be made, particularly in 
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“Dear friend, since you completely deny it and won’t still say that this man will come,   
 but your heart is always untrusting;  
So I will not just tell you, but with an oath,  
that Odysseus will return…”  
“…now let Zeus, first of the gods, and the guest-friendship table,  
and the hearth of blameless Odysseus, where I’ve come (be witness).  
Truly all these things will come to pass as I say.  
Some time within the year Odysseus will be here,  
at the waning of one month and the beginning of another,  
he’ll return home, and pay back whoever  
here dishonours his wife and his shining son.” (14.149‒52, 158‒64)
The Cretan claims that Eumaeus is untrusting (apistos, 14.150), but rather than 
a general characteristic, he says this specifically in response to the herdsman’s 
disbelief in Odysseus’ homecoming. The oath that the Cretan swears responds to 
this, and, through swearing, attempts to make the story of Odysseus’ homecom-
ing pistos, trustworthy. Eumaeus gently refuses to accept Odysseus’ volunteered 
oath here, saying “let’s leave (easomen) this oath” (14.171), but the herdsman 
shows no offence – despite this perceived lie, Eumaeus continues on as though he 
believes everything else about the Cretan, and that the stranger remains worthy 
of his hospitality.23 Of course the irony is that Odysseus is telling the truth about 
this one thing, and this only: everything else he says, his entire persona and how 
he presents himself, is a falsehood.24
After this oath is “left aside” by Eumaeus, Odysseus, deft as he is, uses two 
other oaths to back himself on the point of Odysseus’ homecoming. First, the 
the formulae ἐρέω ἔπος οὐδ’ ἐπικεύσω (Il. 5.816)/ μυθήσομαι οὐδ’ ἐπικεύσω (Il. 19.269, 23.265), as 
well as the other familiar formulae of emphatic “telling” like ἀλλ’ ἔκ τοι ἐρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τελέεσθαι 
ὀΐω / ἀλλ’ ἔκ τοι ἐρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται· (Il. 1.204, 2.257, Od. 2.187, 17.229, 18.82), etc. 
However, while we can say that this is an oath sworn, Harsh is absolutely right to question a 
certain aspect of this oath: “…the oath which he [Odysseus in disguise] has sworn concerning 
the return of Odysseus is a strange oath (14.145‒164). How can a man with no sign from Heaven 
swear what another man at a distance and under no obligation to him will do?” (Harsh 1950, 
8). The Cretan swears here for the actions of Odysseus, and this has no direct parallel: Hector 
at Il. 7.76‒91 and Achilles at Il. 1.233‒46 both swear to the actions of others related to their own 
actions: this seems to suggest a further conflation of “Odysseus” and “the Cretan” through his 
speeches. 
23 S. Richardson 1996, 396. 
24 It is important to note that Odysseus has only sworn here that “Some time within the year 
Odysseus will be here, at the waning of one month and the beginning of another, he’ll return 
home, and pay back whoever here dishonours his wife and his shining son” and not to any other 
element of his story. So this cannot be considered a “‘sneaky’, deceptive oath, as Odysseus does 
not swear as who he really is”, as in Köhnken 2009, 56 n. 38. 
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Cretan says that the Thesprotian Pheidon swore to him that he was about to put 
Odysseus on a ship home (14.331‒3) – a reported oath that is also a lie, but that, 
through reporting an oath from a man of higher status, might go further in con-
vincing Eumaeus.25 Eumaeus again rejects the idea: “But these things are out of 
order, I think, and you will not persuade me, speaking about Odysseus.”26 And 
he goes on, “and why should you, being such a man, lie falsely?” (14.363‒4) So 
while Eumaeus implicitly trusts the Cretan, “being such a man”,27 he continues to 
disbelieve his statement that Odysseus will come home, even when it is offered 
on oath.
So the Cretan finally volunteers another oath, one that is not actually sworn, 
saying to Eumaeus:
“The heart in your chest is indeed untrusting,  
since I even swearing on it, I cannot bring you round, nor can I persuade you.  
So come now, let us make an agreement. And from here on out  
the gods will be witnesses to us both, those who hold Olympos.  
If your lord returns into this house,  
you will dress me in clothes, a tunic and a cloak, and send me  
to go to Doulichion, to where it is dear in my heart.  
But if your lord doesn’t come as I say,  
set your slaves on me, and throw me down from a great rock,  
so that another beggar will avoid cheating you.” (14.391‒400)
The Cretan tries to bargain with a proposed oath-exchange, and here the oath is 
never taken.28 The Cretan goes so far as to suggest that Eumaeus throw him from 
a great rock if he is lying, but if he is telling the truth, that he should receive some 
clothes. Again Eumaeus denies him, saying that he could hardly be mindful of 
Zeus and hospitality if he started throwing his guests off large rocks – so Eumaeus 
implicitly calls the Cretan a liar again, but, again, does not reject him otherwise: 
the heart in Eumaeus might be untrusting (apistos, 14.391, cf. 14.150), but it is only 
so regarding the story that Odysseus is coming home.
25 Minchin 1999, 343.
26 Emlyn-Jones (1986, 10) n. 6 suggests that the τά γ’ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον at 14.363 refers not only to 
the falsity of Odysseus’ homecoming, but also a problem with “its artistic arrangement”. 
27 With respect to what sort of man the Cretan is meant to be here, Walcot 2009, 146 suggests 
Odysseus’ goal with his speech (and oath) to Eumaeus is not to convince of the truth, but instead 
to imprint on the herdsman just what kind of beggar he is, not a professional beggar, but instead, 
someone fallen on hard times. 
28 Cf. Hector’s proposed oath exchanges at Iliad 22.254‒67 and 7.76‒86.
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The Cretan’s next volunteered oath is also about Odysseus’ homecoming, 
this time sworn to Penelope.29 Unlike with Eumaeus, the Cretan here does not 
volunteer any information about Odysseus’ homecoming in his first speech. But, 
as he fabricates his background story once again,30 with variations, he does say 
that he saw Odysseus once in his homeland of Crete. Even mentioning Odysseus 
is enough to rouse suspicion in Penelope, who then tests the Cretan, asking for 
proof that he really did entertain Odysseus (19.215).31 The Cretan gives her the 
details of Odysseus’ cloak, to which Penelope immediately responds positively, 
declaring to the Cretan: “Stranger, before you had my pity, but now you will be 
a friend to me, respected in my palace-rooms.” (19.253‒4) Penelope has a first 
recognition (σήματ’ ἀναγνούσῃ, 19.250) here that foreshadows the sēmata we will 
see again in her next “trial” of Odysseus in book 23 (19.250=23.206).32
Once the Cretan passes the test by describing Odysseus and his clothes, and 
Penelope says as much, he goes on to volunteer the news that Odysseus is coming 
home, weaving in the story of the cattle and the Phaiakians (19.273‒82), the first 
true stories that he’s recounted from his own adventures. He then moves to the 
reported oath: “So Pheidon, the king of the Thesprotians, told me, and he swore 
it before me, pouring a libation in his house, that the ship was drawn down, and 
the crew were ready to take Odysseus back to his beloved country.” (19.287‒90; cf. 
14.131) And from this reported oath, he reiterates with an oath of his own:
“…I will give you an oath on this.  
Now let Zeus first, highest and most excellent of the gods,  
and the hearth of blameless Odysseus, which I have arrived at, be witness:  
Truly all these things will be accomplished as I say.  
Some time within the year Odysseus will be here,  
at the waning of one month and the beginning of another.” (19.300‒7; cf. 14.158‒61)
This oath is very much like the one we saw him offer Eumaeus at 14.158ff. Unlike 
Eumaeus, Penelope does not directly dismiss the oath, or say that the Cretan 
is lying. Instead she responds by expressing her wish that Odysseus would be 
coming home,33 but then says that she knows he will not. In this way, it feels as 
29 For further discussion on Odysseus’ exchange with Penelope in book 19, see Harsh 1950; 
Walcot 2009, 150‒1; Vlahos 2011, 37‒45; Louden 2011; Reece 2011. 
30 The narrator confirms these lies, and the skill used in telling them, at 19.203: “Saying many 
false things, he made them seem like truths.” 
31 Cf. Penelope’s “trying” Odysseus at 23.181.
32 See Vlahos, 2011; Louden, 2011; Reece, 2011;  
33 The oath sworn here by Odysseus is similar to that sworn by Theoclymenus to Penelope at 
17.155‒9, and her response is also similar. Harsh notices these parallels as well as the formulaic ὦ 
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though the trustworthiness of the story – that Odysseus is coming home – has 
gained ground.
The next iteration of the homecoming oath comes in book 20, in an even 
shorter exchange, this time between Odysseus as the Cretan and Philoetius the 
ox-herd. Philoetius comments first on Odysseus’ appearance, saying that he 
looks “like a king or a lord…” (20.194) “And then, standing close to Odysseus, 
he took him by the right hand and addressed him in winged words…” (20.197‒8) 
Philoetius not only imagines a resemblance between Odysseus and the Cretan,34 
but he also immediately establishes a trust relationship with him by taking his 
right hand. Philoetius continues to address the Cretan, and comes to the subject 
of Odysseus. Where Eumaeus said that Odysseus must be dead (14.133‒47), and 
Penelope said that Odysseus would not come home but implied the possibility of 
his still being alive (19.357‒60), now Philoetius says: “As I think of it, tears come 
to my eyes, with remembering Odysseus, since I believe that he has rags like this, 
wandering among men, if he is still alive and sees the light of the sun” (20.204‒7). 
This is where the Cretan responds enthusiastically to the oxherd, and swears his 
oath of Odysseus’ homecoming:
“Oxherd, since you seem to be a man who is not evil or senseless,  
and I myself recognise that wisdom arrive in your thoughts,  
for this reason I will tell you this, and swear a great oath on it.  
Now let Zeus first, highest and most excellent of the gods,  
and the hearth of blameless Odysseus, which I have arrived at (be witness).  
Odysseus will come back while you are still in his house,  
and you will see him with your own eyes, and if you want to,  
the killings of the suitors, who are rulers here.” (20.227‒34)
Here the Cretan makes slight alterations to his oath. Now the time has grown 
shorter: Odysseus won’t come home within the year (14.162f., 19.306f.), but while 
Philoetius is in the house, and he is invited to witness not just the oath, but the 
death of the suitors that the oath foretells. Philoetius’ response almost con-
fuses the identity of the Cretan and Odysseus, as he says: “I wish that the son of 
Cronus would make that so, stranger, and then you would know what strength 
these hands have.” (20.236‒7) Philoetius does not directly agree with the Cretan’s 
γύναι αἰδοίη Λαερτιάδεω Ὀδυσῆος (19.583): “When Odysseus does not use this formula, he here 
addresses Penelope with ὦ γύναι, the words with which he addresses his wife before leaving for 
Troy (18.259) and the regular address to a wife. He never addresses her, as the suitors do, by her 
“maiden” name. All this may well suggest to Penelope that the speaker is Odysseus.” (1950, 11‒12)
34 Cf. Penelope at 19.358f.
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oath of Odysseus’ homecoming, but unlike Eumaeus and Penelope, he does not 
say that it will not be so. Even Eumaeus seems to be won over by this oath, as 
he responds to the exchange by joining in the prayer that Odysseus will come 
home (“so in the same way as this did Eumaeus pray to all the gods”, 20.238). 
These responses to the oath here are significant, because they almost exactly 
mirror their responses that cause Odysseus to reveal himself to them in book 
21 (20.235=21.199; 20.237‒9=21.202‒4). The sworn story of Odysseus’ homecom-
ing is more plausible as the plot moves forward, and Philoetius’ and Eumaeus’ 
responses to that story are what allow Odysseus to trust them to help him against 
the suitors.35
The story of Odysseus’ homecoming becomes more believable as the plot 
drives forward to its realization. This is a story that gains its own momentum, 
independent of the characters’ trustworthiness. In this way a pattern emerges, 
but a pattern completely different from that which we saw in the Iliad. Here, there 
is never any doubt whether Odysseus as the Cretan is a trustworthy man, only 
whether he is telling a trustworthy story. The trustworthiness of that story then 
changes according to its place and function in the larger narrative. This paradox 
between the trustworthiness of the man and that of the story becomes more com-
plicated when we consider oaths in the characterization not of the Cretan, but of 
Odysseus.
With the exception of the oath sworn with the suitors’ families at the end 
of the Odyssey (24.546), Odysseus’ oaths and self-curses in both epics are all 
volunteered. As with Achilles, these volunteered oaths often lend emphasis to 
something said. The majority of these oaths in the Odyssey assert that Odysseus is 
coming home, and this story must be sworn to those who have no reason to trust 
in it. While Odysseus is in disguise and lies about who he is as he gives all of these 
homecoming oaths,36 Odysseus never swears to anything false, nor does he use 
these oaths in a directly manipulative way. The Iliad and the Odyssey both char-
acterize Odysseus as a liar, but we can also say, with confidence, what Stanford 
has said: “Homer’s Odysseus never either in Iliad or Odyssey bears false witness 
against a φίλος.”37
35 Callaway, 1998, 166: “So we have moved from total disbelief to active hope that Odysseus 
will return.”
36 For the designation of these oaths as “tricky” and the association of Odysseus’ use of oaths 
here and his relationship with Autolycus (and Hermes’) uses of tricky oaths, see n. 24; cf. Cal-
laway 1993, 19. 
37 Stanford (1950, 48). 
9 Oratory and rhetoric
A.H. Sommerstein
In S&B ch.5 it was repeatedly seen how the various obligatory and optional oaths 
that were ubiquitous in Athenian lawcourt practice might be exploited for rhe-
torical purposes.1 In this section I want to cover two topics which are also con-
nected, but a little less closely, with the working of the courts: discussions of 
the forensic exploitation of legal oaths by teachers and theoreticians of rhetoric, 
who were naturally as aware of the possibilities they offered as were its actual 
practitioners,2 and three or four ways of using oath-language which, from the 
370s or 360s onwards, become standard features of the orator’s technique.
A fascinating example of what an orator can do with an oath-procedure 
appears to lie behind a passage, at first sight decidedly enigmatic, in the so-called 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1432a5‒11), usually ascribed to Anaximenes of Lamp-
sacus, a contemporary of Aristotle:
And it is possible to smuggle through a piece of testimony in this kind of way: “Testify for 
me, Callicles.”3 – “No, by the gods, I won’t, because I tried to stop that man doing what 
he did.” And in this way, though he has given false evidence in the course of refusing to 
testify, he will not be liable to a prosecution for false testimony. Accordingly, when it is to 
our advantage to smuggle testimony through, we will make use of it in this way; but if our 
opponents do anything of the sort, we will expose their skulduggery and tell them to put it 
into writing and testify to it.
What is going on here? As often happens in the Aristotelian corpus, the argument 
has been presented very sketchily and needs to be fleshed out. The idea seems 
to be that one can “smuggle through a piece of testimony” by pretending that a 
witness is hostile when he is actually friendly. As discussed in S&B §5.10, it was 
often considered a good ploy to call a witness who was expected to be uncoopera-
tive, put to him a statement that he would not be able to accept, and force him to 
resort to the exōmosia, swearing that he did not know this statement to be true. 
In the case imagined here, Callicles is either a friend of the prosecutor who calls 
him to testify (a fact unknown to the defence), or else the prosecutor has paid 
1 Various other forms of rhetorical exploitation of oaths, particularly that of presenting one’s 
opponents or enemies as perjurers, are valuably discussed by Martin 2009.
2 Though one practitioner who became a teacher, Isocrates, seems to have refused on prin-
ciple ever to use oaths for such purposes (see ch. 15). For what it is worth, there are also no oaths 
in the (much smaller) surviving remains of the works of Isocrates’ own teacher, Gorgias.
3 Or “Lysicles” (the manuscripts and other textual witnesses are divided).
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him. He calls Callicles to the stand and asks him to testify to some such statement 
as “I encouraged the defendant to commit [whatever crime he is accused of], and 
he did so”. Since this is self-incriminating, the defence will expect Callicles to 
refuse to confirm it, and indeed he does refuse. The trick lies in the way he does 
so. For (by prior collusive arrangement, of course) what he says is “No, I won’t 
testify, because I tried to stop that man doing what he did.” The italicized state-
ment is (we are to understand) false, but because it has been made, not as part of 
a witness statement, but in the process of refusing to make a witness statement, 
Callicles is not liable to be sued for giving false testimony – because he has not 
given any testimony at all! Of course he had no business making a statement like 
that to the jury if he wasn’t actually a witness; but (he will claim, if challenged) 
it just slipped out by accident. He then takes the exōmosia. Thus the prosecutor, 
by calling Callicles, has managed to put two false statements in front of the jury – 
that the defendant had committed the crime with Callicles’ encouragement, and 
that he had committed it despite Callicles’ dissuasion – without incurring any 
liability, whether religious or legal. Moreover, while Callicles will have denied the 
first statement (or at least denied knowing it is true), he will not have denied the 
second. To take a concrete (if slightly different – and purely imaginary) example, 
elaborating on a rhetorical trick that in modern times has become proverbial:
X falsely accuses Y of beating his wife.  
X prepares a witness statement for Z: “Y beats his wife regularly.”  
Z, called to the stand, says “No, I can’t testify to that; actually Y has stopped beating her.” 
Z swears that he does not know the prepared statement to be true.
X has thus got Z to tell the jury, falsely, that Y has in the past beaten his wife 
(and is thus guilty as charged) without either committing perjury or giving false 
testimony.
As Anaximenes says, the expert rhetorician will not only be able to use this 
ploy effectively himself but will also be alert at detecting it when used by others. 
The tell-tale feature will be the calling of a witness who is unknown to the opposi-
tion and who rejects the statement put to him. The recommendation to “tell [the 
party calling the witness] to put [his allegedly impromptu statement] in writing 
and testify to it” is a little over-compressed. For one thing, while it is the pros-
ecutor who would put Callicles’ statement in writing, it is Callicles himself who 
would “testify” to it; more importantly, by the time the opposition speak, it is too 
late to ask the prosecution to draft witness statements and get them confirmed. 
Rather, the defence will say something like this (the following passage is of my 
own composition):
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Either what Callicles has said to you here is true, or it is not. If it is true, why did he not go 
to the prosecutor and tell him straight away, why did the prosecutor not draft a statement 
based on what Callicles had said, and why did Callicles not testify to that statement, instead 
of taking a course that opportunely shields him from any risk of prosecution for false testi-
mony? There can be no reason; therefore what he has said to you is a lie.
In the Rhetoric of Aristotle, oaths (by which is meant oath-challenges, on which 
see S&B §5.11) are listed among the “artless proofs” (atekhnoi pisteis) alongside 
laws, witnesses, contracts, and tortures (i.e. torture-challenges). What “artless 
proofs” have in common is that they are all types of evidence,4 as opposed to 
“artful proofs” (entekhnoi pisteis) which are types of argument. Aristotle gives an 
elaborately structured discussion (1377a8‒b10) of the arguments which can be 
used by a party (i) refusing to give the opposition the opportunity of taking an 
oath, (ii) refusing to accept a challenge to swear, (iii) accepting such a challenge 
(or offering one’s own oath), and (iv) issuing one. All four possibilities are consid-
ered on an equal basis, with no apparent awareness that (iii) and (iv) are almost 
the only ones to appear in actual lawcourt practice and that those who reject oath-
offers or oath-challenges made by their opponents normally say nothing about 
it.5 Similarly, advice is given not only to those whose opponents are prepared to 
swear an oath that contradicts one they have previously sworn, but also to those 
who are in the same position themselves – to whom the only worthwhile advice 
would in fact be “don’t do it, or if you must, don’t draw the jury’s attention to it”.
To turn now to my second topic. Orators, like other speakers, frequently use 
informal, and sometimes formal, oaths to add force and emphasis to their state-
ments. But sometimes laying emphasis on the truth of a statement can be an iron-
ical device serving to convey to the listener the suggestion that the statement is 
probably not true; the Greek particle dē “truly” was frequently used in this way,6 
as once was English “forsooth” (which meant literally “in truth”). In general 
4 Laws were items of evidence on the same footing as witness-statements, contracts or chal-
lenges; in a private suit, any law that either side wished to have read in court had to be specified 
at the arbitration hearing and sealed in the evidence jar (echinos). The jury, though sworn to 
decide the case according to the law (see S&B §5.4), were neither assumed nor expected (as a 
modern judge theoretically is) to have a complete knowledge of the law: if a litigant lost his case 
through failing to cite a law which would have been decisive in his favour, that was his fault, not 
the jury’s, just as if he had lost through neglecting to call a vital witness.
5 Likewise detached, to an even greater extent, from forensic reality is the treatment of tor-
ture-challenges (1376b31‒1377a7), where much more space is given to arguments against the reli-
ability of torture (hardly ever found in actual speeches) than to those in its favour (which are 
very common).
6 See Denniston 1954, 229‒36.
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the ironical use of oaths was not common in Greek, because (as the practice of 
“sidestepping” makes clear in another way – see ch.10) it was the wording of an 
oath, not the intention behind it, that was binding on the swearer. In one context, 
however, oaths could safely be used with an ironical significance: if a speaker put 
them into someone else’s mouth. And this became a convention and a cliché in 
what is called the oath of the “imaginary objector”.
It was commonplace for a speaker to anticipate, and refute in advance, a point 
that might be raised by his opponents – usually, of course, presenting that point 
in a highly tendentious way, setting up a straw man that would be easy to demol-
ish. This was already a regular device in the fifth century, as some examples from 
drama show. In Euripides’ Trojan Women, produced in 415, Helen, captured at the 
fall of Troy, is speaking for her life in front of her husband Menelaus, and arguing 
that her elopement with Paris was not her fault but that of the goddess Aphrodite. 
She continues (Tro. 951‒5):
At this point you might have a plausible argument against me: when Alexandros [Paris] 
died and went below the earth, since I was no longer bound in a union that a goddess had 
made, I should have left my home and gone to the Greek ships. Well, that is precisely what 
I kept trying to do!
Still earlier, in Euripides’ Telephus (produced in 438), the disguised Telephus uses 
a very simple form of the trope when arguing that Telephus and the Mysians had 
been justified in resisting a Greek attack: “Someone will say ‘they shouldn’t have 
done’” (Eur. fr. 708) – to which Aristophanes, imitating/parodying Telephus’ 
speech and applying it to Sparta’s decision to declare war on Athens in 431, adds 
” … well then, say what they should have done!” (Ar. Ach. 540). In actual oratory 
the “anticipated objection” was at first usually signalled by a phrase like eipoi 
tis an “someone may say”; the following is an example from one of the earliest 
surviving speeches ([Lys.] 20.16‒17):7
This man shows in many ways that he is loyal to you; in particular, if he had wanted to make 
any revolution against the mass of your people, he would never have left the country only 
eight days after becoming a member of the Council [i.e. the Four Hundred]. But someone 
may say (eipoi an tis) that he sailed off for gain, like some men who took to making plunder-
ing raids. Well, no one can show8 that he is in possession of any of your [public] property; 
in fact they accuse him of anything rather than his conduct in office.
7 This speech is too early to have been the work of Lysias; it appears to date from soon after 
the first restoration of democracy in 410.
8 Or perhaps “That means that no one can show …”, in which case the point would be that 
the implicit accusation of piracy is a red herring to divert attention from the prosecution’s lack of 
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The sole example in the earlier orators of the use of an oath in an “anticipated 
objection” comes in an ekklēsia speech (or what purports to be one), that of 
Andocides in 392/1 supporting the proposals for ending the Corinthian War that 
had emerged from the conference at Sparta to which he had been one of the Athe-
nian delegates. At one point in this speech (Andoc. 3.13‒16), he asks what valid 
reason Athens could have for continuing the war:
So that our city may have her freedom? But she already has it. Or so that we may build walls? 
We get that right by the peace treaty. Or to have the right to construct warships, and to repair 
and retain the existing ones? That is provided for too, because the agreement says that the 
cities are to be autonomous. Or to recover the islands of Lemnos, Scyros and Imbros? It is 
explicitly stated that these shall belong to Athens. Well then, to regain the Chersonese, and 
the colonies, and land abroad owned by Athenians, and debts owed to them? But our allies 
and the Great King won’t agree to all that, and we can’t gain it in war without their aid. Or, 
by Zeus, must we fight until we have imposed our will on the Spartans and their allies? But 
I don’t think we have the resources for that, and if we do succeed in it, what can we expect 
the barbarians [i.e. the Persians] to do to us on the morrow of our success?
The function of “by Zeus” (nē Dia) here seems to be not so much to signal that this 
is a suggestion by an imaginary opponent (for so too are the five that precede it) 
as to mark it as the climax of the series.
Lysias, whose speech-writing activity seems to have ended about 380, never 
uses oaths in imaginary objections9 (indeed he does not use imaginary objections 
much at all); they first appear in the mid to late 370s, in the speech On the Estate 
of Nicostratus by the outstanding speech-writer of the next generation, Isaeus. 
The “someone may say” trope has by now passed through two further stages of 
development. In the first place, the words of the imaginary objector (whether pre-
sented in direct or in indirect speech) came frequently to be reinforced by an oath. 
When first used, this formula may have been designed to indicate that the imagi-
nary objector was making his point very earnestly and that prima facie it had con-
siderable plausibility; but very soon it became simply a signal that the statement 
being made was an imaginary objection, being set up for a crushing refutation. 
Once this convention was established, the phrase “someone may say” was redun-
dant, and from now on it is usually omitted;10 and this stage has already been 
reached in On the Estate of Nicostratus:
evidence to support their actual charges. The speaker, of course, may himself be trying to divert 
attention from the fact that he has made no attempt to rebut the accusation.
9 Neither, unsurprisingly, does Isocrates (see n. 2 above). 
10 It is, however, retained in several passages (e.g. Dem. 20.3, 21.222, 23.64), including the only 
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Consider the greatest point, the one that testifies most strongly to Chariades’ shameless-
ness. When his [supposed] adoptive father11 died, he did not take up the body, did not 
cremate it, did not collect his ashes, but left all these tasks to be performed by those not 
related to the deceased: how utterly impious must he be, then, after having performed none 
of the customary rites over him, to claim to be the heir to his estate? “But, by Zeus, after 
having done none of these things, he administered Nicostratus’ estate.” But you have already 
had testimony about that, 12, and most of it he himself does not deny (Isaeus 4.19‒20).
It is entirely typical that the speaker insinuates part of his own case (“after having 
done none of these things”) into a sentence (it is hardly ever more than one sen-
tence) that he has put into the mouth of an opponent.
In the speech On the Chersonese (8.15‒17) Demosthenes strings together three 
oaths of this kind in quick succession. He has argued that if Philip of Macedon 
lays siege to Byzantium, the Byzantines are certain to seek Athenian help:
And then, if we are not able to send an expedition from Athens, and there is no adequate 
assisting force in being in the region, there will be nothing to save them from destruction. 
“That’s because, by Zeus, they are out of their wits and incredibly stupid.” So be it, but all 
the same they need to be saved because that’s in our city’s interest. And, what’s more, it’s 
not yet clear to us that he [Philip] won’t enter the Chersonese – to judge by the letter he 
sent to you, where he says he’ll defend himself against those living in the Chersonese. If we 
have the force that’s in existence, it will be able to come to the aid of that country and to do 
some harm to Philip’s territory; but once it’s disbanded, what shall we do if he enters the 
Chersonese? “We’ll put Diopeithes13 on trial, by Zeus.” And how will that help the situation? 
“We can send an expedition from here.” And if the wind won’t let us? “But, by Zeus, he won’t 
attack.” And who’s going to guarantee that?
Altogether there are about eighty instances of this use of nē Dia.14 The great 
majority are in the Demosthenic corpus, where they occur in speeches of all types, 
forensic and political, and from all periods of Demosthenes’ activity;15 there are 
two occasions when the trope is used in speeches attributable to Apollodorus son of Pasion 
([Dem.] 49.64, 52.26).
11 Chariades claims that Nicostratus had adopted him by will; his opponents say this will is 
a forgery.
12 Not in the surviving speech; this is, however, supplementary to the main speech or speeches 
delivered by the actual claimants, Hagnon and Hagnotheus, and they had doubtless called wit-
nesses on the matter referred to.
13 The Athenian general commanding forces in the region.
14 On two occasions (Isaeus 4.24 and Dem. 8.17) the objector’s statement is negative and the 
formula is ma Dia.
15 In addition to the two that appear in speeches by Apollodorus (see n.10 above), they are also 
found in two other speeches in the corpus that are universally agreed to be spurious: there is one 
in [Dem.] 58 (Against Theocrines) and six in [Dem.] 25 (Against Aristogeiton I).
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five in Isaeus,16 three in Hypereides,17 and one in Deinarchus.18 The trope is not 
used at all by Aeschines – which, in view of the great length of his three speeches, 
is probably not an accident.
From the 350s onwards another variety of the trope becomes popular. In this, 
the orator asks a question, invents an answer which might be given by someone 
determined to disagree with him, and then tears this answer to pieces. Here is a 
Demosthenic example from a dispute between two sons of Mantias of Thoricus by 
different mothers. Boeotus has been claiming the right to be known by the name 
of Mantitheus, which happens also to be the name of his half-brother; the latter 
– who, unlike Boeotus, has no alternative name to fall back on – asks what will 
happen, in various situations involving compulsory civic responsibilities, if the 
two men have precisely the same name.
What if some other magistrate appoints [“Mantitheus son of Mantias of Thoricus”] to 
perform a liturgy – say the archon, or the king, or the athlothetai19 – what indication will 
there be which of us they are appointing? By Zeus, they will add the words ‘the son of 
Plangon’, if they mean you,20 and my mother’s name21 if they mean me. And who has ever 
heard of that, or by what law could one insert that supplementary designation, or anything 
else except the father and the deme? (Dem. 39.9)
In this case the invented answer is one that Boeotus could really (and, as a matter 
of fact, quite reasonably) have given. But sometimes the device is used in a spirit 
of savage irony, and the answer offered is obviously false –
You must … consider what on earth Meidias can have suffered to make him plan to take 
such ferocious revenge for it on a fellow-citizen. If it is something terrible and monstrous, 
you will forgive him; but if it is nothing of the kind, then just look at the unbridled barbarity 
which he displays towards everyone who crosses his path. Well, what has he suffered? “By 
Zeus, he lost a big lawsuit, so big as to strip him of his worldly goods.” But the lawsuit was 
only for a thousand drachmae! (Dem. 21.88)
16 Isaeus 3.24, 73; 4.20, 24; 7.33.
17 Hyp. For Euxenippus 11, 14 and Against Diondas 8.25 (Carey et al. 2008, 11).
18 Dein. 2.8.
19 These magistrates, among their other duties, appointed the chorēgoi for the City Dionysia 
and Thargelia, for the Lenaea, and for the Great Panathenaea respectively.
20 Although this answer is presented as being one that Boeotus might give, Mantitheus does 
not adopt Boeotus’ persona when uttering it: the second person still denotes Boeotus, and the 
first person Mantitheus himself.
21 As is usual, the speaker avoids mentioning the name of a respectable living woman con-
nected with himself, but is happy to refer to his opponent’s mother by name; see Schaps 1977 
and Sommerstein 1980.
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– or obviously such as no sane person, or no self-respecting person, would give, 
as in the following two instances:
It is written in his law, “And if any of the debtors has been, or is subsequently, punished 
additionally with imprisonment, he may be released on providing sureties that he will pay 
the sum due by the ninth prytany.” So what resources will there be? How is an expedition 
going to be sent out? How shall we enforce payment, if every debtor posts sureties according 
to this man’s law, instead of fulfilling his duty? By Zeus, we will say to the rest of Greece “We 
have Timocrates’ law here; please wait till the ninth prytany, then we will send out our expe-
dition”! That’ll be all we can do. And if you need to defend yourselves, do you imagine that 
our enemies will wait for the dodges and crookeries of our local villains? (Dem. 24.93‒94)
So I, who had observed our city, on so many notable occasions, willingly fighting for the 
interests of others – now when we were taking counsel, in a manner of speaking, about the 
city’s own future, what was I going to instruct or advise her to do? To bear grudges, by Zeus, 
against those who wanted us to save them, and to seek excuses that would lose us every-
thing! And who wouldn’t have put me to death, and rightly too, if I had attempted even by 
word [let alone action] to put any of our city’s former glories to shame? (Dem. 18.101)
Once this use of nē Dia became established, it might sometimes function as little 
more than a sentence-adverbial, with very little surviving of its original meaning, 
and serving merely to signal irony, as in this instance, again from the Chersonese 
speech:
If … it is manifest that Philip – before Diopeithes and the settlers, whom he now accuses of 
having caused the war, ever left Athens – had unjustly seized many of our possessions … 
and had all the time continually been taking control of Greek and barbarian territory and 
organizing it against us, what is this that is being said, that we must “either go to war or 
keep the peace”? We don’t have a choice in the matter: all that remains is to do the thing 
that is absolutely right and absolutely necessary, which these speakers deliberately ignore. 
And what is that? To fight back against one who is already waging war on us. Unless they’re 
saying, by Zeus, that so long as Philip keeps his hands off Attica and the Peiraeus, he is not 
harming our city and is not making war! (Dem. 8.6‒7)
Note that nē Dia here stands outside the clause giving the supposed content of 
what “they’re saying”. Roughly speaking, the message it conveys is “Of course 
they’re not actually saying this in so many words, and they wouldn’t be prepared 
to admit that it’s implicit in what they do say – but it is, and it’s an absurd posi-
tion to take”. We are well on the way to the time when nē Dia can be used in this 
sense by a believing Jew like Josephus without any apparent awareness that it is 
actually an oath by a pagan god:
He [Manetho] says that King Amenophis had a desire to see the gods. What gods? If he 
meant the gods who were recognized by Egyptian law – the ox and the goat and the croco-
dile and the baboon – he could see them already. But how could he see the heavenly gods? 
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And why did he conceive this desire? Because, by Zeus, another king before him had seen 
them! In which case he had learned from this predecessor where they came from and how 
he had managed to see them, so he did not need any new technique for the purpose (Jos. 
Against Apion 1.254‒5)
In another, related rhetorical use of nē Dia, it comes to be virtually a more 
emphatic equivalent of the familiar particle men “on the one hand”; it says to 
one’s hearers “yes, this statement is true and important, but another statement 
is coming that is also true and is much more important”.22 Thus Demosthenes in 
the Second Philippic, quoting what he claims to have said to the Messenians about 
the danger of trusting monarchs bearing gifts, after instancing the examples of 
Philip’s treatment of the Olynthians and the Thessalians:
But these things are in the past, and everyone can see them. You now behold Philip making 
gifts and promises: you should pray, if you are wise, not to see the day after he has cheated 
and tricked you. Well, there are all sorts of things, by Zeus, which have been invented for the 
protection and safety of cities – palisades, walls, trenches, and everything of that kind. They 
are all the work of men’s hands, and money has to be spent on them. But there is one means of 
protection which is possessed innately by all wise men alike, which brings blessing and safety 
to all, but especially to democracies confronting tyrants. And what is this? Mistrust! Keep 
watch on that, hold fast to it; if you maintain that, you will never suffer disaster (Dem. 6.22‒24)
Unlike the oath of the “imaginary objector”, this use of nē Dia is also found in the 
speeches of his great rival Aeschines, who here exploits it the more effectively to 
damn Demosthenes’ ancestry.
There was one Gylon of Cerameis, who [after being prosecuted for treason and fleeing the 
country before trial] came to Bosporus23 and there acquired as a gift from the local rulers 
the place known as The Gardens. He married a woman who was rich, by Zeus, and brought 
him a large dowry in gold, but was a Scythian by race. She bore him two daughters … one 
of whom, in defiance of the laws of the city,24 Demosthenes of Paeania took as his wife, to 
become the mother of this denunciating busybody that you have here (Aeschines 3.171‒2)
At the same time, oaths of greater weight, often taken in the name of two or more 
gods or of “the gods” collectively, were frequently used to add force and cred-
ibility to key assertions, as Plato (Laws 949a-b) complains. Numerical particu-
lars of such oaths will be given in ch. 13; like the other kinds of oaths we have 
22 English for this purpose can use phrases such as “to be sure” and “it is true that”; German 
has the particle zwar (derived from zu wahr “for a truth”).
23 i.e. Crimea.
24 Unlikely to be true, since Demosthenes’ right to citizenship was never, so far as we know, 
challenged in the courts. 
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seen, they first make a significant appearance in Isaeus and are most frequent in 
Demosthenes. They can be used for a variety of purposes. Here, for instance, is 
Demosthenes trying to disparage the importance of the actual charges of illegal-
ity against the decree awarding him a gold crown, and to distract attention from 
the weakness of his defence to these charges:
As for the arguments which this man produced about the laws attached to his indictment, 
churning everything up and down, I don’t suppose, by the gods, that you understood them, 
and I myself couldn’t make out what most of them were about; but I shall speak to you, 
straight and simple, about the rights of the matter (Dem. 18.111).
And here is Aeschines getting maximum mileage out of allegations of appalling 
depravity that he hasn’t actually made, and for which he probably has no evidence:
The crimes and outrages which I have heard this fellow [Pittalacus] has committed against 
the person of Timarchus are such, by Olympian Zeus, as I would not dare to mention to you. 
They are things which he was not ashamed to do in actuality, but if I described them to you 
clearly in words I could not afterwards bear to live (Aeschines 1.55).
I end by citing a remarkable passage, again from the Chersonese speech, in which 
Demosthenes combines the two usages we have just been talking about. He seems 
at first to be using an oath in the sense of (indeed, in combination with) the par-
ticle men to say “yes, this is true, but there’s more to come”; but as he proceeds, it 
becomes clear that the first half of the antithesis is the one that carries the weight: 
“disgraceful but not disastrous” turns into “not disastrous, but disgraceful”, and 
we realize that the oath is not designed to diminish but to enhance the force of the 
statement to which it is attached, and that Demosthenes is doing what he does so 
often, affirming that his policy of strenuous resistance to Macedonian power is in 
line with the principles and ideals that Athens has always championed, striking 
the same note that he does even more memorably in the Marathon oath (Dem. 
18.208; see ch. 13 ad finem) a dozen years later.
If there is any god (for there could never be a human being with enough credit-worthiness 
for the task) who could guarantee that, if you keep quiet and let everything go, that man 
[Philip] won’t come for you in the end, then while it is disgraceful, by Zeus and all the gods, 
and unworthy of you and of your city’s record and of your ancestors’ deeds, to let all the rest 
of the Greeks fall into slavery for the sake of your own ease, and I myself would sooner be 
dead than have said such a thing – all the same, if someone else says it is so and persuades 
you of it, then so be it, don’t resist, surrender everything! But if nobody believes that – if on 
the contrary we all know that the more we let him extend his power, the stronger and more 
dangerous will be the enemy we have to face – then why are we hesitating? What are we 
waiting for? When, Athenians, shall we do what needs to be done? (Dem. 8.49‒50)
10 “Artful dodging”, or the sidestepping of oaths
10.1 The difficulty of proving an oath false: the case of 
Euripides’ Cyclops
I.C. Torrance
Although there are unequivocal examples of perjury in the corpus of archaic and 
classical Greek texts (on which see especially ch. 12), it seems that, on the whole, 
the ancient Greeks were careful about avoiding perjury and sometimes used 
ambiguous phrasing to do so. Some of the more extreme examples of purposely 
duplicitous phrasing will be discussed by Andrew Bayliss in the remainder of 
this chapter.1 By way of introduction to this phenomenon, I will discuss here the 
example of Silenus’ formal oath to the Cyclops in Euripides’ Cyclops (example #4 
in the table in §10.2 below). It seems at first glance to constitute a straightforward 
perjury, and Judith Fletcher has discussed it in this light,2 but it is possible to 
argue that the language of Silenus is carefully ambiguous, and the example high-
lights the potential difficulty of proving an oath false.
Silenus makes a statement on oath in which he denies selling the property 
of the Cyclops to Odysseus and his men (Cycl. 262‒9). This seems to contradict 
directly the oath of Odysseus sworn immediately beforehand in which he stated 
that Silenus was selling the sheep in exchange for wine (253‒61). Moreover, the 
audience has seen that Odysseus and Silenus were indeed engaged in the trans-
action described by Odysseus when the Cyclops returned to his cave, and the 
chorus of satyrs promptly throw in their own oath stating that they saw Silenus 
selling the Cyclops’ property to the strangers (270‒2). On the face of it, it seems 
that Silenus is lying on oath. If the oath is indeed a perjury, however, it is curious 
that it is formal and elaborate, far more so than any other oath in the play. Silenus 
invokes as sanctifying witnesses Poseidon (as the Cyclops’ father), great Triton 
and Nereus, Calypso and the Nereids, the sacred waves and the whole race of fish 
(262‒5), and expresses a formal curse for perjury, that his children (the satyrs) 
whom he loves very much should perish wretchedly (268‒9). The length of the 
oath and its formal details should make us wonder whether Silenus really is com-
mitting perjury. It is possible that the curse on the satyrs is supposed to be a joke, 
and that Silenus really does not care about them. This would seem to be con-
firmed by the satyrs’ contradiction of their father’s oath, expressed with a curse 
1 On the subject of duplicitous or ambiguous oaths, see also Torrance 2012, 301‒12.
2 Fletcher 2005, and 2012, 146‒57.
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against him (270‒2). Seaford compares Soph. Ichn. 157, where Silenus calls the 
satyrs “the basest of beasts” and stresses Silenus’ cowardice in this scene, sug-
gesting that “[t]o invoke destruction on oneself is more convincing than invok-
ing it on others”.3 However, if the “others” in question are one’s own children, 
then the oath-curse conforms to the expected punishment for perjury for mortals, 
which was the extinction of one’s family line. Seaford is right to stress that nor-
mally a swearer would put a conditional curse on themselves as well as on their 
children, but we can compare the fate of Jason in Euripides’ Medea. He breaks 
his oath and although he survives, he is punished by the death of his children 
and the death of his new bride by whom he had hoped to have more children (see 
pp. 133‒4 for further discussion). Silenus’ expressed curse conforms to expected 
terms for human oaths,4 but since he and the satyrs are immortal there is no 
possibility that either he or they will perish miserably, and they do not. The joke, 
then, seems to focus on Silenus’ cleverness in using an oath-curse which does not 
apply to his species.5
Even if the oath-curse is not valid, there remains the long list of deities 
invoked as sanctifying witnesses. As is discussed in §6.1, the number and identity 
of divinities called to witness an oath can add solemnity to that oath, and it is 
striking that, although Silenus swears six out of the nine oaths in the play, this 
is his only formal oath, and the only oath in which multiple deities are called 
upon as witnesses.6 It would be remarkable for Silenus to perjure himself with 
his most elaborate oath. The sea-divinities Silenus invokes are chosen, in the 
first instance, for their connection to the Cyclops who is the son of Poseidon.7 
The deities are also appropriate given that the play is set on the coast of Sicily. If 
Silenus is committing perjury, then it would be expected that he will be hounded 
by the forces who have witnessed his oath, but there is no indication that this 
happens. The end of the play is vague concerning the fate of Silenus, but one can 
reasonably assume that he will join the satyrs in returning to the service of Dio-
nysus (Cycl. 709). Judith Fletcher has argued that the implied rape of Silenus by 
3 Seaford 1984, ad 268.
4 See also S&B 86 with n. 90 on the validity of swearing oaths on the heads of one’s children.
5 A comparable joke occurs in Aristophanes’ Frogs (586‒8) when the god Dionysus swears an 
oath in which he specifies his own death and that of his wife (who is either immortal herself, or 
long dead) as a conditional curse.
6 Silenus swears informal oaths at Cycl. 8‒9, 154, 554‒5, 558‒9, 560. Odysseus, the chorus of 
satyrs and the Cyclops swear one oath respectively at 253‒61, 270‒72, 585‒6.
7 We will later discover that Polyphemus has no care for his father or for any of the other gods 
(Cycl. 316‒35), but their power is never in question.
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the Cyclops is his punishment for perjury,8 but the rape is never confirmed, and 
even if it is to be imagined as having occurred, this would be an unparalleled and 
unprecedented punishment for perjury. The normal punishment for immortals 
who committed perjury was exclusion from their community for a period of many 
years as we saw above (§7.3.1). With no comparative data, it is difficult to conclude 
that a Greek audience would have made any connection at all between a poten-
tial rape and swearing a false oath. Fletcher’s arguments highlight the complex 
nature of this case. Silenus certainly appears to be committing perjury without 
incurring any punishment, unless we posit, as Fletcher does, that he is punished 
in Polyphemus’ cave. However, since oath-language can be cleverly manipulated 
to avoid perjury, as the remainder of this chapter shows, it is worth considering 
exactly what language Silenus uses in making his sworn statement.
Silenus claims that he was not selling the property of the Cyclops to the 
strangers (Cycl. 267‒8 μὴ τὰ σ᾽ ἐξοδᾶν ἐγὼ | ξένοισι χρήματ᾽), but the infinitive 
used in the indirect-statement construction can be read as equivalent either to 
an imperfect indicative (“I was not selling your property to the strangers”) or to a 
present indicative (“I am not selling your property to the strangers”). The former 
would be perjury, but the latter is perfectly true. Silenus is not at that point selling 
anything. If he swears on oath that he is not in the process of selling the prop-
erty, he is not contradicting the oath of Odysseus, who swears by means of a self-
curse, using imperfect tenses, that Silenus was in the process of selling sheep in 
exchange for wine (253‒61). Similarly the subsequent oath of the satyrs in which 
they state that they saw Silenus in the process of the selling the goods (270‒2) 
does not make Silenus’ oath untrue.9 All three oaths in this exchange can be read 
as technically true. The ambiguity of Silenus’ oath-statement, coupled with the 
formality of the oath with its additional sanctifying features (numerous deities 
invoked, and a curse specified), and the lack of any clear perjury-related punish-
ment, suggest that Silenus’ oath is true.
Of the remaining oaths sworn by Silenus in Cyclops, several are basic factual 
statements related to the wine. Silenus swears that he has not seen the wine 
which Odysseus has brought but can smell it (Cycl. 154), that he will not weep 
about loving the wine which does not love him back (554‒5), that he will not 
hand over the wine until he sees the Cyclops taking the garland and has a little 
taste himself (558‒9), and that the wine-pourer (i.e. Silenus himself) is not unfair 
8 Fletcher 2005 and 2012, 146‒57.
9 The satyrs make the statement with a conditional curse on their father, a comic response to the 
conditional curse that he had placed on their heads. In spite of the unusual curse-formula of the 
satyrs, the passage is clearly meant to be a counter-oath to that of Silenus.
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(560). Silenus’ first and last oaths, however, are less straightforward. In the pro-
logue he lists several uncharacteristically brave actions, which he claims to have 
accomplished for Dionysus during the Gigantomachy (1‒8). He then breaks off 
and wonders whether he had dreamt it all, before confirming with an oath that 
it was not a dream since he had displayed the spoils of his victories to Dionysus 
(8‒9). The sequence is rather striking. As Seaford observes, it is highly unlikely 
that Silenus actually performed any of the feats of combat which he claims to his 
credit.10 The fact that he questions the validity of his own narrative seems to func-
tion as a cue for the audience to question it also.11 The affirmatory oath is then 
unexpected, as are the reported “proofs” displayed before Dionysus. The function 
of the oath here is to stress that Silenus believes he has accomplished the brave 
deeds he has listed. Similarly, in the last oath of the play sworn by the Cyclops 
where he states that Silenus is Ganymede (585‒6), it is clear that this is what the 
Cyclops believes in his drunken stupor. In these cases the swearers’ belief over-
rides the factual accuracy of their statements and the oath cannot be regarded as 
a perjury, since intention is an important element in the Greek understanding of 
perjury, as will be discussed further in ch. 12.
10.2 The concept of sidestepping
A.J. Bayliss
The Greeks had a tricky reputation when it came to oaths. According to Herodotus 
(1.153) the Persian king Cyrus the Great dismissed the Greeks as a people “who 
have a place set apart in the middle of their city, where once assembled they 
deceive each other swearing oaths”.12 The thrust of Cyrus’ jibe is clearly that the 
Greeks condoned casual perjury,13 and the evidence we possess on first reflec-
tion suggests that Cyrus was not misinformed about the Greeks. For out of the 
10 Seaford 1984, ad 1, 5‒9, 7, 8, cf. Ussher 1978, ad 5‒8, Biehl 1986, ad 7f.
11 Silenus draws the audience’s attention to the fictional potential of poetic narrative. On meta-
poetic games in Euripides’ Cyclops, see Torrance 2013, 245‒64.
12 It has been well noted that it is particularly ironic that Cyrus chooses to make this jibe to the 
Spartans, the least mercantile of the Greeks (S&B 165‒6; Lateiner 2012; Cartledge 2006, 25). But 
perhaps the fact that the Spartans appear to have been the most ready to deceive their fellow 
Greeks with oaths (see Bayliss 2009) makes them the right target after all? It is also worth bear-
ing in mind that Plato (Laws 917c) considered perjury in the marketplace such a potential hazard 
that the market-sellers in Magnesia were to be forbidden from swearing oaths in order to promote 
their wares to customers (see p. 389).
13 Lateiner 2012, 159.
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2096 entries for formal oaths recorded in the Nottingham database no less than 
268 (12.5%) represent either an accusation of a false or broken oath or discussion 
of the concept of a broken oath. But taken together these passages need not mean 
that the Greeks were happy perjurers. Rather, the relatively frequent accusations 
of oath-breaking should be interpreted as a signal that the Greeks were very much 
not content with casual perjury.14 Clearly some Greeks were prepared to break 
their sworn word or to lie under oath, but concrete examples of this are compara-
tively rare. Presumably some Greeks were more willing to consider perjury in a 
crisis, for Democritus (fr. 239) laments that base people swear oaths in a tight spot 
and do not bother to keep them when they get out of that tight spot.
But swearing a false oath was considered dangerous, as the oft-discussed 
case of Glaucus the Spartan makes clear15. According to Herodotus (6.86) the 
Spartan king Leotychidas claimed that Glaucus was punished by the gods for 
even thinking about swearing a false oath. When Glaucus asked the oracle at 
Delphi whether it would acceptable to lie under oath in order to cheat some Mile-
sian strangers out of their share of a sum of money that had been left with him on 
trust he received the following reply:
For now, Glaucus son of Epicydes, you have an immediate profit; to win by oath and steal 
the money; swear, since death awaits even the man who swears well. But Horkos has a child 
with no name, nor hands, nor feet, but swift in pursuit, until he has in his grasp all a man’s 
offspring and household, which he destroys. But the offspring of the man who swears well 
shall afterwards be better.
Although this passage has generated some scholarly confusion,16 the procedure 
involved here is obviously that of the oath-challenge (S&B §5.11), and Glaucus 
was clearly asking Apollo whether it would be acceptable to swear a false oath 
denying that he received the money on trust. Our sources make it clear that 
fraudulent claims could be made by both the depositor and the trustee,17 and 
14 The relatively frequent accusations of perjury should been seen as a reflection of the fact 
that the very nature of a sworn agreement inevitably implies that a false oath might be sworn, or 
that the oath might be broken, rather than the fact that oaths were actually frequently broken. 
As Hollmann (2005, 286, citing Burkert 1996, 170) notes, “the institution of the oath is inevitably 
accompanied by that of the false oath”.
15 See p. 281 and S&B 168.
16 Scott (2005, 318‒319) argues that there are three possibilities: an oath of denial, an oath of 
complaint to the ephors, and an oath of denial before the ephors. But the first seems the most 
obvious, and by far the least complicated. Mirhady (1991, 78) rightly treats this story as an oath-
challenge. 
17 Aelian (VH 3.46) cites a law from Stagira which reads: “do not claim what you did not put 
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it appears that claims and counter-claims could only be verified under oath. In 
theory the disputing parties could maintain the dispute right up until the point 
at which oaths were required without any penalty. The Greeks were not alone in 
allowing this possibility – in Near Eastern texts backing out at the last moment is 
known as “stepping back” from the oath.18
But Glaucus was not even allowed that option. When Glaucus entreated 
the god to pardon him for contemplating a false oath he was given the terrify-
ing response “that to tempt the god and to do the deed had the same effect”. 
Although modern scholars tend to focus on the unsuitability of Leotychidas as 
a commentator on the rights and wrongs of human behaviour,19 his message is 
blunt and clear: even though Glaucus summoned the Milesian strangers and gave 
them back their money, “there are today at Sparta no descendants of Glaucus, 
nor any household that bears his name; he has been utterly rooted out of Sparta”. 
Leotychidas’ lack of personal morality need not diminish the potency of his 
message. Indeed, it may even enhance his message with Herodotus wanting his 
audience to see that even someone as dubious as Leotychidas can see that the 
gods punish perjury.20
on deposit”.
18 Sandowicz (2011, 36) discusses the options available to those involved in Babylonian oath-
challenges, and identifies “stepping back” and “retreating” as options open to those who have 
claimed moneys left in trust, but then thought better of perjury. She notes that as far as the Baby-
lonians were concerned, “losing a case was preferable to ‘light-heartedly swearing a solemn oath 
by one’s god’ [nīš ilišu kabti qalliš zakāru]”.
19 Several modern attempts to explain this story (e.g. Immerwahr 1966, 214; T. Harrison 2000, 
118; Scott 2005, 319) have been undermined by the knowledge that Leotychidas is by no means 
the best mouthpiece for a morality tale. We know that Leotychidas owes his throne to Cleomenes’ 
bribing the Delphic priestess and his own denunciation (under oath no less!) of Demaratus in 
court (Hdt. 6.65‒6), and that he will be deposed after being caught accepting bribes (6.72), and 
modern scholars have been too eager to focus on this aspect to the story. Johnson sees Leotychi-
das’ speech as much better suited than meets the modern eye. Attempting to view the speech as 
Herodotus’ contemporaries would have done, Johnson argues that Leotychidas’ speech is not de-
signed to convince the Athenians that they should hand over the men, but rather to demonstrate 
that his goodwill had been lost, just as Glaucus had lost Apollo’s favour. As Johnson (2001, 22‒3) 
puts it, “Herodotus…does not clumsily attribute an ineffective moralizing speech to the immoral 
Leotychidas” but rather he gives Leotychidas a blunt message that the Athenians and Aeginetans 
of his own day would understand – the threat of Spartan displeasure and punishment. This 
works even better if one interprets Leotychidas as issuing an oath-challenge to the Athenians – a 
challenge they do not accept. Effectively the Athenians have placed themselves in the position of 
Glaucus and are asking for retribution.
20 Lateiner (2012, 168 n41) speculates that the Glaucus story was “perhaps an ancient and use-
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But keeping an oath could lead to disaster too. When Euripides’ Hippoly-
tus swore an oath not to reveal to anyone what Phaedra’s nurse was about to 
tell him he could not have foreseen the trouble his oath would cause him. When 
the awful consequences of his oath became apparent Hippolytus lamented: ‘my 
tongue swore, but my heart is unsworn’ (Eur. Hipp. 612). This line, which illus-
trates perfectly the plight of someone who has regretted swearing an oath when 
circumstances have changed, became notorious because it seems on first reading 
to advocate the breaking of an oath.21 Aristophanes parodied Euripides’ line and 
the poet himself on more than one occasion (Thesm. 275‒6; Frogs 1471),22 while 
Hygiaenon went so far as to accuse Euripides of impiety because of the line (Arist. 
Rhet. 1416a31‒2). In a slightly different vein the twentieth-century philosopher J.L. 
Austin interpreted the line as the ultimate get-out clause for an oath, arguing that 
Euripides “provides Hippolytus with a let-out, the bigamist with an excuse for his 
‘I do’, and the welsher with a defence for his ‘I bet’.23 But the reality is that despite 
its notoriety Hippolytus’ line is not obviously advocating perjury,24 and it is not 
a successful escape clause.25 Although it could be argued that Hippolytus was 
punished, like Glaucus, for even contemplating perjury,26 we must bear in mind 
ful example of Delphic boilerplate for intending cheats”, and suggests that the phrasing parallels 
the Hesiodic picture of Horkos.
21 S.R. West (2003, 444) argues that the line “became notorious”, and emphasises that Hip-
polytus’ statement “makes a deeper impression on Phaedra…than Hippolytos’ subsequent assur-
ance that he regards his oath as binding”. For a fuller discussion of this utterance of Hippolytus 
and reactions to it, see §11.3.
22 In Thesm. 275‒6 Euripides’ in-law feels the need to remind the tragedian that it was his heart 
that had sworn an oath to save him rather than merely his tongue (Euripides will go on to keep 
his oath, contrary to expectations), while the decidedly un-godlike Dionysus in Frogs (1471) uses 
Hippolytus’ line to counter Euripides’ claim that he has sworn by the gods to bring him back from 
the underworld.
23 Austin 1965, 10.
24 Mikalson (1991, 86) argues that “It is ironic and most unfair that this line, spoken by a char-
acter proven, in all tragedy, most loyal to oaths in the most trying and tragic circumstances, 
should have laid Euripides open to ancient and modern charges of impiety, promoting perjury, 
and hostility to traditional religion”. When Plato (Tht. 154d) casts Socrates gently mocking the 
eponymous character for an ambiguous answer which is “in the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue 
will be convinced but not our heart” he seems much closer to the mark than Aristophanes or 
Hygiaenon. Cicero (de Officiis 3.108) did not interpret Euripides as advocating perjury, and in fact 
cited Euripides’ line as evidence that oaths must be kept.
25 It is such an unsuccessful escape that Phaedra leaves the letter accusing him of rape because 
she is sure he will denounce her, despite his specific statement (656ff) that he will respect his 
oath and keep silent, and 612 explains why she disbelieves him.
26 Fletcher 2012, 191.
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that Hippolytus ultimately keeps his oath despite the fact that doing so destroys 
any chance he has of defending himself, ruins his reputation and his relationship 
with his father, and ultimately costs him his life, and that the goddess Artemis 
explicitly praises him for doing so (Hipp. 1305‒10).27
The stories of Glaucus and Hippolytus suggest that there were three options 
available to a man in trouble: (1) keeping the oath and suffering; (2) breaking 
the oath and suffering; or (3) swearing a false oath and suffering. But other 
Greeks found a fourth option: they dodged or sidestepped their sworn obliga-
tions28 while ensuring that they did not perjure themselves. This could involve 
interpreting the oath in an unexpected manner, or intentionally phrasing a false 
oath in such a way that it was no longer technically false, or a combination of 
both.29 Thus, Hippolytus might have been able to find a way out of his oath “not 
to reveal” what the nurse told him in a similar manner to the way in which the 
young Demetrius Poliorcetes is said to have dodged an oath of silence imposed on 
him by his father. According to Plutarch (Dem. 4) Antigonus the One-Eyed bound 
Demetrius by an oath of silence and then informed him of his plan to murder 
Mithridates who was one of his hetairoi. Demetrius was appalled, but “though he 
27 Mikalson (1991, 86) argues that Hippolytus’ line should be seen as a “momentary lapse, an 
immediate angry outburst by a character who almost immediately…reassumes and then main-
tains a proper, even exemplary, attitude towards his oaths”. Benardete (2000, 94) stresses that 
Artemis praises Hippolytus for keeping his oath, and argues that the chorus need no such praise 
for keeping their oaths because unlike Hippolytus who considers breaking his oath “it never oc-
curs to them to break it”.
28 There is a minor problem of nomenclature here. Wheeler (1984, 253‒74) includes Themison’s 
successful dodging of his sworn obligation in a catalogue of 45 examples of what he designates 
“sophistic interpretations” of oaths. This tag is based on Eustathius’ use of the term ὅρκος 
σοφιστικός. But it is a serious stretch to argue that this practice is “what the Greeks called a 
ὅρκος σοφιστικός” based on the writings of a twelfth-century AD theologian. There is in fact no 
ancient source which uses the term, and the oath for which Eustathius coined the term (Odys-
seus’ entirely true oath to Penelope in his guise as the old beggar at Odyssey 19.303) is not dis-
cussed in this chapter because it does not really qualify as a dodging of an oath in the first place! 
Others have preferred to call the practice an attempt to “weasel” out of an oath (Lateiner 2012, 
163; Bolmarcich 2007, 38). The Nottingham oath team chose the slightly less negative term “artful 
dodging” for the online database and for S&B, and this term has achieved a certain currency in 
modern scholarship (Fletcher 2012, 31). But for this chapter I have chosen to employ also the term 
“sidestepping”, partly because I have come to consider this terminology more appropriate, and 
partly because of the phenomenon of “stepping back” from oaths in Near Eastern texts. 
29 Wheeler (1984, 254) describes such practice as “neither perjury, i.e. swearing something 
false, nor breaking an oath, but rather an overly literal interpretation of the wording of the oath 
or agreement, of playing on some ambiguity of meaning to produce an interpretation contrary 
to that intended”.
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did not venture to open his lips on the matter or to warn him orally, because of his 
oath”, he managed to sidestep his oath by drawing Mithridates aside while they 
were hunting and writing “fly, Mithridates” in the dirt with his spear. Demetrius 
was able to save his friend who would have been murdered unjustly and keep his 
oath to his father because he did not break his silence. Plutarch stresses that he 
has chosen this anecdote to provide an illustration of “the strong natural bent of 
Demetrius towards kindness and justice”, which strongly suggests that Plutarch 
approved of Demetrius’ sidestepping of his sworn obligations.
This technique would not have helped Glaucus, but he could have dodged 
out of paying his debt by swearing an oath that was true but misleading rather 
than trying to swear one that was obviously false. Hermes did just that when he 
offered to swear by Zeus’ head “that he himself is not responsible [for the theft 
of Apollo’s cattle], and that he hasn’t seen anyone else stealing the cattle” (lines 
274‒6), but later swore merely that “he did not drive the cows home nor cross the 
threshold” (lines 379‒80), and that “he will never pay compensation for ruth-
less theft” (lines 383‒5). As Torrance notes above (§7.3.3), although both oaths are 
true, neither actually proves that Hermes is not a thief. While Zeus and Apollo 
are not fooled by Hermes’ trick, neither compels him to clarify whether or not he 
really did steal the cattle, so the ruse does get Hermes off the hook so to speak. 
Furthermore, the fact that Zeus laughed at his young son’s cunning (lines 389‒90) 
implies strongly that he did not regard Hermes’ attempt to use oaths to deceive as 
morally unacceptable.30
That Hermes’ trick could be morally acceptable is significant. For chronologi-
cally Hermes’ oath is merely the first of many oaths in Greek literature which can 
be said to have been dodged or sidestepped. Table 3 provides the details of 35 
such sidestepped oaths from what I have termed the “mythical past” to the end 
of the classical period.31
The aim of this chapter is to explore the variety of techniques that Greeks 
employed to sidestep their sworn obligations. Although the vast majority of pas-
sages are from works which can be placed in the genre of historical writing in its 
broadest sense (e.g. Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as Plutarch, Polyaenus 
and Pausanias), the majority come from what Wheeler has called “the genre of 
30 Wheeler (1984, 260) suggests that the Zeus who laughs indulgently at his infant son’s decep-
tion is Zeus Epiklopeios (wily, trickster, thief).
31 This table is based partly on that of Wheeler (1984), but includes several instances that 
Wheeler missed, and excludes numerous non-Greek and post-classical instances that Wheeler 
included. It also excludes several instances which did not strictly involve oaths, but instead 
vows. Although the focus of this chapter is the archaic and classical periods, later sources are 
included where they discuss events from these periods.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































256   10 “Artful dodging”, or the sidestepping of oaths
anecdotes”,32 which means that it will be frequently impossible for us to sep-
arate historical reality from literary motif. Nonetheless we should still be able 
to explore the extent to which the Greeks deemed it acceptable to stretch the 
meaning of an oath to one’s advantage, or as Fletcher puts it, just how far the 
Greeks were willing to go “to outsmart the oath”.33
10.3 “The art of Autolycus”: extremely careful wording to 
conceal the truth
A.J. Bayliss
Hermes was not the only individual to construct an oath to hide the fact that he 
was a thief. Others excelled at what Redfield has categorized as “the art of Autoly-
cus” in the light of Homer’s claim (Od. 19.396) that Autolycus “excelled all men 
in thievery and in oaths”.34 A prime example is the sixth-century philosopher 
Lasus of Hermione (#17, #18) who is said to have stolen a fish, and then given it to 
a bystander. When the fishmonger exacted an oath from him, Lasus swore “that 
he did not have the fish himself, nor did he know anyone else who had taken 
it”. The oath was technically true because Lasus no longer had the fish himself, 
and the bystander had not “taken it” but had been given it. Lasus instructed the 
bystander to swear that “he had not taken it himself, nor did he know anyone else 
who had the fish”. This oath was technically true too, for Lasus had “taken it”, 
but he himself “had it”.
Although both of these oaths were true, this sort of sophistry would have been 
impractical in the real world – all one would have needed to do was exact the 
correct oath from either Lasus or the man in possession of the fish! Such trickery 
also seems to have been deemed morally unacceptable outside the philosophical 
“classroom”, for in Aesop’s version of the story (#33) when a boy stole a piece of 
meat from a butcher and hid it in another boy’s garment and “swore that he didn’t 
have it, and the one who had the meat swore that he didn’t take it”, the butcher 
angrily observes that “even if you manage to deceive me, you will never deceive 
the god by whom you have sworn falsely”, and Aesop notes that “the fable shows 
that even if we succeed in deceiving our fellows by swearing falsely, there is no 
way that we can deceive the gods”.
32 Wheeler 1984, 255.
33 Fletcher 2012, 31.
34 Redfield 2003, 258. See also Wheeler (1984, 260‒2) who argues that Autolycus was regarded 
as the first man to swear deceptive oaths.
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Together these stories probably explain Pausanias’ cryptic claim (10.30.2) 
that “Pandareus was implicated in the theft of Tantalus and the trick of the 
oath”. Presumably Tantalus denied under oath that he had stolen Zeus’ golden 
dog when it was Pandareus who had stolen the dog and deposited it with him. If 
this is the case, the ruse failed spectacularly, with Zeus burying Tantalus under 
Sipylus as punishment for his actions (Σ Od. 19.518). These ruses also probably 
explain the Sausage-Seller’s claim (Ar. Knights 418‒24) that when he stole food 
from the markets “if they suspected a trick, I hid the meat in my crotch and denied 
the thing by all the gods”,35 although it should be borne in mind that elsewhere 
(Knights 298, 1239) the Sausage-Seller does happily admit to real perjury.
As Torrance has noted above (§7.3.3), even the goddess Hera resorted to such 
trickery. When Zeus rightly blames Hera for the fact that Poseidon is attacking 
the Trojans against his wishes, Hera swears (Iliad 15.36‒46) that it is “not by my 
will that Poseidon is harming the Trojans … but it is his own passion that urges 
and drives him”. But the reality is that Hera has orchestrated the whole affair 
by ensuring that Hypnos put Zeus to sleep so that he would not be able to act 
against Poseidon if Poseidon chose to assist the Greeks. Clearly the veracity of 
Hera’s oath (by Zeus’ own head no less!) rests on the fact that she did not explic-
itly order Hypnos to tell Poseidon that Zeus was out of action so to speak, and that 
there was thus sufficient wiggle-room in the chain of causation to keep the oath 
technically true. But the fact that Zeus effectively tests the veracity of her oath by 
demanding that Hera order Poseidon to cease and desist suggests that he has not 
been entirely convinced by Hera’s careful phrasing. So while Hera gets away with 
her artful oath, Zeus gets his way without the need to fulfil his threat to beat her 
for disobeying him.
Where Hera left just enough wiggle-room, Lichas (#2) crossed the line 
between sidestepping and perjury in Sophocles’ Trachiniae. Bound by an oath 
by “great Zeus” to “speak what truth he knew”, when Deianeira demanded to 
know the identity of the principal captive (actually the daughter of King Eurytus), 
Lichas responded, “A Euboean; of her parents I have no means to say (οὐκ ἔχω 
λέγειν)”. Clearly Lichas was attempting to bamboozle Deianeira into believing 
that “I have no means to say” meant the same as “I do not know”. But the fact 
that soon afterwards Lichas was denounced by the Messenger (427), and later has 
his brains dashed out by Zeus’ son at Zeus’ sanctuary, with “his skull crushed to 
fragments, and his hair bedaubed with blood and flecked with scattered brains” 
(779‒82), strongly suggests that Zeus did not see his attempt to dodge his oath as 
acceptable.
35 Zafiropoulos 2001, 114; Bowie 1993, 55.
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The vast majority of artful dodges discussed in this chapter were more obvi-
ously successful than those of Lasus, Tantalus, Hera, or Lichas. A prime example 
is the dodge attributed to the mythical Spartan king Soös (#5) who found himself 
besieged in a rugged waterless spot after defeating the Cleitorians and captur-
ing some of their territory.36 Starved of options (literally) Soös negotiated a truce 
whereby the Spartans would surrender the conquered territory to the Cleitorians 
if he and all his men “would drink” from a nearby spring. The Cleitorians clearly 
took “would drink” to mean “would be allowed to drink” and assumed that the 
agreement guaranteed the return of their land. But Soös clearly intended that 
the agreement would be binding if and only if he and all his men drank. In an 
effort to ensure that the oath could be sidestepped Soös assembled his men and 
offered to confer the kingship of the area upon the one who refrained from drink-
ing. However, not one of the Spartans possessed the required self-restraint, and 
they all drank from the spring. Soös went down to the spring after everyone else 
and merely splashed himself with water, thus ensuring that the terms of the oath 
were not quite fulfilled. Soös then led his army off, not only retaining control of 
the formerly Cleitorian land but also his kingship because he had not drunk. Plu-
tarch stresses that Soös ensured that the Cleitorians were there to see his actions 
and that the Spartans were able to keep the territory “on the plea that all had not 
drunk”. The Cleitorians were deceived because they never imagined that Soös’ 
terms actually included the caveat that if not all his men drank the agreement 
would be null and void.
Significantly, there is no hint of criticism of Soös in Plutarch’s account, not 
even from the Cleitorians he has deceived. In fact Plutarch stresses that Soös was 
“held in great admiration” because of his achievements including the trickery 
perpetrated against the Cleitorians. It seems likely that the fact that Soös’ ruse 
relied on the Cleitorians assuming that he meant more than he said rather than 
a distortion of the truth made his deceptive oath admirable rather than morally 
dubious.
36 This story is clearly later invention, with even Soös himself dismissed by Cartledge (1979, 
90; 1987, 23) as a fourth-century “spurinym”.
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10.4 The “Thracian pretence”
A.J. Bayliss
The story of Soös and the Cleitorians fits well with Lateiner’s assertion that “oaths 
can seduce participants to under-negotiate difficult and complex transactions”.37 
It is surely significant that Soös’ deceptive oath is one of many examples of side-
steppings which occurred in the context of diplomatic exchanges regarding 
sworn truces, for there is perhaps no more difficult or complex negotiation than 
a peace treaty or a truce. I have already discussed in S&B §11.1 the tense state of 
affairs that existed with two armies in the field of battle, and the frequency of 
these stories (no less than 15 of the 35 instances of sidestepping in this chapter 
took place in the context of a sworn truce) suggests that the ambiguity generated 
by hostilities was ideal for deceptive oaths. Perhaps the most notorious decep-
tive oath employed in truce negotiations is the so-called “Thracian pretence”. 
Ephorus (#5) claims that the Thracians first used this particularly cunning ruse 
against the Boeotians when they, the Phoenicians, and the Pelasgians were 
vying for control of Boeotia. After the Thracians and Boeotians agreed a truce 
and swore oaths that they would not attack each other for a specified number of 
days, the Thracians attacked the unsuspecting Boeotians at night on the grounds 
that nights were not included in the oath. From this incident apparently arose the 
proverb of “Thracian pretence” (Θρᾳκία παρεύρεσις), and the Thracians there-
after had a bad reputation when it came to oaths, with Zenobius (4.32) stating 
“Thracians do not stand by oaths” (or “Thracians do not understand oaths”).38
The Thracian pretence is a recurring motif in our sources. The Spartan king 
Cleomenes allegedly employed it against the Argives in 494 BC (#19), agreeing 
to an armistice for seven days, but attacking them on the third night when he 
saw that the Argives were sleeping because of their reliance on his oath. When 
Cleomenes was later reproached for “the violation of his oath”, he denied the 
charge, arguing that he had not included nights in his sworn statement, only days. 
Just as the Thracians were criticized by the Boeotians, Cleomenes was heavily 
37 Lateiner 2012, 161.
38 Torrance (S&B 311) links this story with Herodotus’ information (5.7) that the Thracians only 
swore oaths by Hermes. If so, it would only be fitting that the Thracians excelled at deceptive 
oaths. It is also worth pondering whether the fact that one of the reasons for Conon, Bacchius, 
and Aristocrates being known as “the Triballoi” in their wild youth because of their alleged ten-
dency to commit perjury casually (Dem. 54.39) owes its origins to the deceptive reputation of the 
Thracians demonstrated here.
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criticized for his use of this ruse, and Plutarch implicitly links this incident with 
Cleomenes’ later grisly death.
But the Thracians’ dodge was repeated by other generals without criticism. A 
Spartan named Leucippus (#11) reputedly founded a colony at Callipolis (near the 
port of Tarentum) after persuading the Tarentines to allow him to encamp there 
for what was worded as “day and night” (ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα), but what the Taren-
tines believed would be the duration of a day and a night.39 When Leucippus did 
not leave after a day and a night, the Tarentines insisted that he should leave.40 
However, Leucippus stated that the sworn agreement stipulated that he could 
stay while there should be day or night, with the absence of the word mian “one” 
meaning that the agreement was actually forever. When the Tarentines realised 
they had been tricked they allowed Leucippus and the Spartan colonists to 
remain. There is no hint of criticism in either source which records this incident.
Ironically enough the Athenian commander Hagnon is said to have employed 
the “Thracian pretence” against the Thracians (#20) when he founded the Athe-
nian colony of Amphipolis at the Nine Ways on the Strymon river in 437/6 BC. 
According to Polyaenus (6.53) the Athenians were acting in accordance with an 
oracle that told them to return the Thracian king Rhesus’ bones from Troy to his 
homeland and to found a city there.41 When the local Thracians tried to prevent 
the Athenian colonists from crossing the Strymon, Hagnon kept them at bay by 
making a truce with them for three days. Each night he led his troops across the 
river in secret. They buried Rhesus’ bones, and built fortifications by the light of 
the moon. When the Thracians returned after three days and saw the finished 
wall, they charged Hagnon with breaking his oath. But he replied that he had 
done nothing wrong, since they had made the truce for three days and not three 
nights.
There is an air of unreality about these stories. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely 
that Cleomenes ever made this agreement with the Argives, for Herodotus’ earlier 
account of the battle (6.78‒80) makes no mention of an oath and has Cleomenes 
deceiving the Argives by a different means altogether.42 The fact that the same 
39 Malkin (119 n13) goes so far as to have Leucippus “becoming an Achaean” in this version of 
the story, but there is no need to read that much into Strabo’s thin account.
40 In Strabo’s version, when the Tarentines asked Leucippus to leave, he asked them to return 
at night. When they did so he then told them to return the next day. This process was repeated 
for several days until the Tarentines realised that they had been deceived.
41 Hagnon’s ruse comes after an oracle warned the Athenians that their attempt was “unau-
thorised by Heaven”, but that once they have returned Rhesus’ bones “Fate shall render it a 
glorious deed”.
42 The story of Cleomenes using the “Thracian pretence” probably owes its origins to 
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ruse is used again and again even to the point that the Thracians could be duped 
by their own “invention” suggests strongly that by the time Polyaenus was writing 
the Thracian pretence had become a “floating anecdote” which could attach itself 
to anyone. Why else would the protagonists – especially the Thracians – fail to 
recognise that the trick was coming?
Nonetheless these stories are useful when it comes to assessing the reaction 
of the protagonists and the sources. Both Hagnon and Leucippus are said to have 
survived their dodges with their reputations unscathed whereas Cleomenes and 
the Thracians (when they are the perpetrators rather than the victims) are criti-
cized for their deceptive oaths. As I have argued elsewhere, the difference may 
well be that both Hagnon and Leucippus were fulfilling oracles, and therefore 
their actions could be seen as endorsed by the gods.43 It may also be important 
that whereas Cleomenes and the Thracians use the ruse to attack their enemies, 
Leucippus and Hagnon (like Soös) use the ruse for self-defence. It is also surely 
significant that they were duping outsiders, which is something that the Greeks 
seemed to do with pride. According to Dougherty, “these accounts justify Greek 
claim to new territory not in physical or military terms but as a result of their 
mental prowess”.44 Although the Leucippus story (as Dougherty is quick to point 
out) is a case of Greek outwitting Greek, it is very much cut from the same cloth as 
the “Greeks outwitting dopey locals” literary motif.45 The fact that Hagnon was 
using the “Thracian pretence” against the Thracians surely leaves the impression 
Cleomenes’ reputation for sacrilege. Not only did he bribe priests at Delphi (Hdt. 6.66), he also 
later tried to convince the Arcadians to break their oaths of loyalty to Sparta and swear an oath 
of loyalty to him personally, invoking the Styx (Hdt. 6.74). Given that only gods swear by the 
Styx (see §7.3.1), Cleomenes is clearly out of line here. The fact that Cleomenes later went mad 
drinking neat wine and hacked himself to pieces with a knife suggests that he was perhaps not 
an ideal moral compass for us!
43 Bayliss 2009, 248.
44 Dougherty 1993, 53.
45 The same theme is present in the Greek versions of the foundation myth of Carthage. Ap-
pian (Pun. 1.1) describes how Dido from Tyre tricked the local inhabitants of North Africa into 
allowing her to found Carthage. The local inhabitants initially tried to repel the Tyrians, but 
when they asked only for as much land as an ox-hide would encompass, they were ashamed to 
deny them such a small favour. Appian states that the locals could not understand how a town 
could be built in so narrow a space, and wishing to unravel the subtlety, agreed to give it up, 
and confirmed their promise with an oath. The Phoenicians then cut the hide into a very thin 
thread, and enclosed the place where the citadel of Carthage would stand. This story is hinted at 
by Virgil (Aen. 1.367‒8), and Servius in his commentary on Virgil explains that Dido exploited the 
ambiguity of the term tenere which could mean either “to cover”, but also “to circumscribe” or 
“to encompass”. Cf. Dougherty 1993, 59 n40.
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of the non-Greek Thracians being remarkably foolish, if not asking for trouble 
when they agreed to the oath.
10.5 Capturing the commander
A.J. Bayliss
Whereas Soös is said to have employed a trick to escape a siege, other command-
ers devised alternative means of attacking their enemies after making truces. A 
well-known ruse involved luring the enemy leader out to a parley and then attack-
ing while he was occupied (cf. Polyaenus 7.27, 4.2‒4). Unlike Soös’ trick this par-
ticular ruse did not depend upon oaths. But another common tactic appears to 
have been to capture the enemy commander during a parley by lulling him into a 
false sense of security by means of an oath that was designed to be sidestepped.
The earliest and most historically reliable example of this tactic comes from 
Thucydides of all authors. Thucydides (3.34) notes that when the Athenians were 
besieging the city of Notium during the Peloponnesian War the Athenian general 
Paches (#23) summoned Hippias (the commander of the Arcadian mercenar-
ies stationed at Notium) to a conference on condition that if his proposals were 
unsatisfactory he would restore Hippias “safe and sound” (σῶν καὶ ὑγιᾶ) to the 
fortress. When Hippias came out Paches kept him under guard, but unfettered 
(therefore also undamaged),46 and made a sudden and unexpected attack on the 
fortress. Paches then took Hippias back into the fortress, “just as he had agreed to 
do”, and as soon as he was inside, seized him, and shot him down.47 Paches then 
put to death all the Arcadians and “barbarians” in the city and handed it over to 
the Colophonians.
Thucydides adds no further details, and makes no comment on the rights and 
wrongs of Paches’ behaviour, which is remarkable given that the episode belies 
Pericles’ claim (Thuc. 2.39) in the funeral oration that it is the Peloponnesians, 
not the Athenians, who deploy “devices and deceits”.48 Thucydides’ silence is all 
the more remarkable when one considers that Thucydides’ contemporary audi-
ence would have known that not long after his sidestepped oath Paches commit-
ted suicide in the courtroom when he failed to persuade the Athenians at home 
46 Lendon (2010, 185‒6) argues that Paches was “fulfilling the exact terms of the promise” and 
stresses that he did not use chains because they would have chafed Hippias.
47 This story is repeated virtually word for word by Polyaenus (3.2).
48 Hesk 2000, 99.
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that his conduct while in office was entirely above board (Plut. Nic. 6; Arist. 26).49 
Paches’ notoriety was such that as late as the 390s an Aristophanic character 
is appalled by the thought that Paches’ son, Epicurus, might call him “daddy” 
(Ar. Eccl. 644‒5). It is tempting to think that this episode, which ended with the 
summary execution of his opponents, may have helped bring about Paches’ 
downfall. Although our only other evidence suggests that Paches was charged 
with raping two Mytilenian women whose husbands he had caused to be killed 
(Anth.Pal. 7.614), this charge may have been merely one of many brought against 
Paches.50
The Spartan commander Dercylidas (#26) is alleged to have used a similar 
stratagem to defeat Meidias the tyrant of Scepsis in Asia Minor, thus turning 
Euripides’ claim (Bellerophon fr. 286.7) that “tyrants break oaths to sack cities” 
on its head! According to Polyaenus (fr. 39) Dercylidas swore that if Meidias 
the tyrant of Scepsis came out for a conference he would send him back to the 
city quickly. When Meidias emerged, Dercylidas ordered him to open the gates 
and threatened to kill him if he did not. As soon as Meidias opened the gates, 
Dercylidas announced, “Now I release you to the city, for I swore this, and I am 
coming in with my force, for I did not swear about doing this”. Polyaenus records 
an extremely similar stratagem employed by Dercylidas’ contemporary Thibron 
(#27), but this time provides considerably less detail. In both cases our hopes 
of assessing the relative morality of the device are again thwarted by a lack of 
detail from our only source. This is almost certainly because Polyaenus was not 
interested in the morality of the acts, but rather their utility for Lucius Verus’ war 
against the Parthians.51
But we do have one more example with which to work. The manner in which 
Dercylidas explains his trick to his audience by indicating exactly what he did 
not swear – the very information that Meidias assumed his sworn statement had 
included, namely that he would not enter the city by force – echoes (or is echoed 
in) the accounts of Alexander the Great’s deception (#31) of a group of Indian mer-
cenaries in 327 BC. Our earliest source – Diodorus (17.84.1‒5) – indicates that Alex-
ander allowed the mercenaries to depart the city under a sworn truce, but then 
followed them and attacked them out of “implacable hatred”. When the Indians 
kept shouting out that the attack was in violation of the sworn treaty Alexander 
shouted back that “he had granted them the right to leave the city, but not that of 
being friends of the Macedonians forever”. Polyaenus (4.3.20) tells a slightly dif-
49 For another possible reference see Ar. Wasps 522‒3.
50 Tuplin 1982, 328 nn16, 17.
51 For a recent discussion of Polyaenus’ motives see Wheeler 2010.
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ferent story, but again Alexander revels in revealing his trick to the enemy. In Poly-
aenus’ version, when the Indians shout reminders of the sworn treaty, Alexander 
retorts that “he agreed that they could leave the city, but had not promised that 
they could go where they pleased”. Whereas Paches, Dercylidas, and Thibron are 
not explicitly criticized by their victims,52 Alexander is explicitly criticized for his 
deception. Diodorus stresses that when the Indians realised what was happening 
they kept shouting that the attack was in contravention of the truce, and called 
upon the gods to witness that Alexander was violating his oath. The Indians in 
Polyaenus’ account likewise shout reminders about the treaty. Plutarch (Alex. 59) 
merely states that Alexander made a truce with the Indians and later massacred 
them. Plutarch does not give voice to the Indians, but chooses to criticize Alexan-
der himself, noting that “this act adheres to his military career like a stain (kēlis); 
in all other instances he waged war according to custom, and like a king”.
On first glance it would appear that Alexander has crossed a line by employ-
ing this dodge in this fashion. But if we were tempted to see this as clear criticism 
of the tactic we need to bear in mind that neither Diodorus nor Polyaenus criti-
cizes Alexander as Plutarch does. In their accounts it is only his victims who criti-
cize Alexander. Moreover, Arrian (Anab. 4.27.3) provides an alternative version of 
the story where Alexander is the innocent party. In Arrian’s version Alexander 
agrees to a truce which stipulates that the Indians will join his army. When Alex-
ander learns that the Indians intend to violate this treaty he slaughters them. 
While it is tempting to see Arrian as whitewashing Alexander, it is entirely possi-
ble that his account reflects the original version of events as described by Ptolemy 
and Aristobulus, and that Diodorus and Polyaenus reflect a later reworking of 
the events.53 As I have argued elsewhere,54 it was common for classical-period 
deceptions not involving oaths to be rewritten by later sources to involve an oath. 
Cleomenes’ alleged use of the Thracian pretence in 494 is a case in point. So too is 
Dercylidas’ capture of Scepsis from Meidias. The eyewitness account provided by 
Xenophon (Hell. 3.1.20‒8) does not mention a side-stepped oath, although it does 
describe deception and clever word-play. According to Xenophon, Dercylidas 
gained access to Scepsis by promising Meidias “full justice”, but later deprived 
him of Scepsis by proving that the city actually belonged to the Spartans. After 
52 Nonetheless Lendon (2010, 185‒6) is at pains to point out that Paches chose a particularly 
“nasty and slow way to die”.
53 Modern scholars (e.g. Bosworth 2010, 40) typically prefer Arrian on this matter. Baynham 
(2012, 28) argues that if the Indians had indeed broken their oath Alexander was in his rights to 
do so, but if they had not, what he did was a massacre. Tarn played it both ways, arguing that it 
was either an “abominable quibble” or a “horrible mistake” due to translation problems.
54 Bayliss 2009.
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Meidias admitted that the city had previously belonged to his mother-in-law 
Mania, and that she had been a subject of the Persian Pharnabazus, Dercylidas 
argued that given that Pharnabazus was his enemy, Scepsis ought now to belong 
to the Spartans, not Meidias. Given that the stories of Cleomenes and Dercylidas 
were reworked to include sneaky oaths, it is entirely possible – if not likely – that 
Alexander slaughtered the Indians because they violated a sworn agreement and 
that later tradition reinvented this as deliberately deceptive swearing by Alexan-
der. The fact that his father Philip engaged in similar practices (#28) might have 
influenced later sources.
10.6 Other careful or dubious interpretation of wording: agree-
ments that end sieges
A.J. Bayliss
While it is unclear whether Alexander used a carefully phrased oath to mas-
sacre large numbers of the enemy, we can be certain that other Greeks did just 
that. Perhaps the most notorious example of this type of dodgy interpretation of 
wording is the so-called “Plataean perjury” (#21). According to Thucydides (2.5) 
the Plataeans negotiated an agreement with the besieging Theban army whereby 
if the Thebans withdrew from their territory without doing further harm they 
would return 180 prisoners to them, but then slew their captives and returned 
their corpses. Obviously the Thebans assumed that the Plataeans would return 
their men alive, but the agreement did not make this clear. The Plataeans later 
tried to claim that they did not swear an oath (perhaps relying on the difference 
between an oath and a mere promise), but the Thebans clearly felt otherwise.
Hornblower makes much of the fact that the Thebans later (3.66) mention 
only a “promise” by the Plataeans rather than an oath. This would seem to 
undermine the Thebans’ own case. But we should bear in mind the fact that the 
Thebans also use the term “agreement”, which perhaps suggests that Thucydides 
is putting only general terms for describing the agreement into the mouths of 
the Thebans. Hornblower also concentrates on the fact that the Plataeans steer 
clear of the issue, arguing that this should not be taken as an admission of guilt. 
Rather, he claims, “one would cut a poor figure if one was reduced to saying, ‘Yes, 
we promised but it was not a binding promise because we did not swear an oath’. 
Much better to do what the Plataians actually do and stick to generalities”.55 But 
55 Hornblower 1991, 242‒3.
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although it would have appeared as if the Plataeans were following the letter 
rather than the spirit of the law, the Plataeans could have done just that had they 
promised rather than sworn.
West argues that “[m]orally the Plataeans were in a very weak position 
whether or not their undertaking was confirmed by an oath”.56 But the Plataeans 
were on even weaker ground in trying to use this technique against allies of the 
Spartans. The Spartans were the masters par excellence of the deceptive oath, 
and would ultimately bring down the Plataeans by a similarly dubious oath (#22). 
According to Thucydides the Spartans lured the Plataeans into surrendering to 
them by swearing that “only the guilty would be punished and not contrary to 
justice”. But once the Plataeans had surrendered they found to their horror that 
the Spartans chose to define guilt and justice as whether or not they had rendered 
service to the Spartans and their allies during the current war.57 The way the Pla-
taeans were caught out by the sidestepping of an oath after (allegedly) sidestep-
ping an oath themselves is reminiscent of the manner in which the Thracians are 
said to have been caught out by Hagnon when he employed their own notorious 
stratagem against them. But this time we are not dealing with a floating anecdote: 
our source is reliable and the massacre of the Plataeans was all too real. Although 
the Spartans would later regret the decision to sack Plataea (Thuc. 7.18), it was not 
because of the ethics of this oath, but rather because they decided that the pre-
existing oaths of the Thirty Years’ Peace might have been violated.
10.7 Substitution
A.J. Bayliss
The majority of cases we have discussed thus far involved exploiting words that 
were implied but left unspoken. But another common ruse involved metonymic 
interpretation of the terms that were spoken. For example when the Olympic 
athlete Eubotas of Cyrene (#25) was bound by an oath to marry the courtesan Lais 
and return home with her, he had an image of her made and left with that instead 
of the actual girl. Aelian makes it clear that he did so “in order not to appear to 
be breaking his agreement”, and even has Eubotas state that “he was bringing 
her and not breaking his agreement”. There is an additional pun in that Eubotas’ 
56 S.R. West 2003, 438.
57 Hornblower (1991, 447) calls this “shocking”.
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claim that he would “bring” (agein) Lais could mean “to marry” as well as “to 
lead”.
Eubotas is not the only Greek to have employed this ruse of substitution. 
Paches, who has already been mentioned for another exploit, is said to have 
sworn that the enemy would be spared if they put aside their “iron” (#24). His 
enemies naturally assumed that this meant their weapons, but when they had 
complied with these terms by surrendering their weapons, Paches ordered them 
all to be killed anyway since they still had iron fibulae on their cloaks. But we 
have to bear in mind that this account was written by Frontinus many centuries 
after the fact as part of a collection of “sundry ruses and devices” (de variis consi-
liis). Thucydides makes no mention of such an act by Paches, so it should there-
fore be seen as a later invention, as with Dercylidas and Cleomenes.
The Chians took the ruse of substitution one step further when they sur-
rendered to the Erythraeans (#13). According to Plutarch (Mor. 244f-245b), after 
terms were agreed whereby the Chians would evacuate the city carrying “only 
one cloak, one himation, and nothing else”, their wives found a way for them 
to sidestep their oaths. They ordered their husbands to keep their weapons and 
to inform the Erythraeans that the spear serves as a cloak and the shield as a 
tunic to men of spirit. The men took their advice, and the Erythraeans were so 
frightened by their act of boldness (tolma) that they allowed the Chians to depart 
unmolested. The only way for this ruse to work would be for the Chians to be 
naked apart from their shields and spears, which perhaps helps to explain why 
the Erythraeans were so stricken by the “boldness” of the Chians!58
Ergias of Rhodes (## 9, 10) reports that a group of Phoenicians led by a certain 
Phalanthus who were being besieged in the citadel in Ialysus by the Greeks led 
by Iphiclus agreed to withdraw under a truce, whereby the Phoenicians swore 
to take with them only “whatsoever they carried in the belly”, and the Rhodians 
swore “to supply boats for their departure”. When Iphiclus agreed to these terms, 
Phalanthus tried to deceive Iphiclus by slaughtering and disembowelling sacrifi-
cial victims and filling their bellies with gold and silver. Iphiclus learned of the 
“trick” (epitekhnēsis) and attempted to stop him, but Phalanthus cited the terms 
of the oath he had sworn, which were that they were permitted “to remove what-
ever they had in the belly”, a fact which Iphiclus could not dispute.
58 When considering the reaction of the Erythraeans, it is worth bearing in mind Plutarch’s 
claim (Ages. 34) that when the Spartan youth Isadas fought stark naked (without clothing or 
armour) against the Thebans those who fought against him thought that he must have been 
superhuman.
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In a passage that is positively Herodotean,59 Stobaeus (#32) records an anec-
dote whereby another thief – a certain Cydias – attempted to do what Glaucus 
failed to do when he denied having received a deposit from his friend Archetimus 
under oath. When it was agreed that Cydias would purge himself by an oath he 
gave Archetimus a hollow cane filled with the money and swore he was return-
ing the deposit. Presumably the cane was meant to indicate that Cydias owed 
Archetimus nothing, or that the cane was all that was left of the money. Clearly 
Cydias was hoping that Archetimus would return the cane so that he could keep 
the money, or else the ruse would be pointless. But the angry Archetimus smashed 
the cane on the ground and Cydias’ deception was revealed. Cydias died almost 
immediately, and Stobaeus stresses that his premature death was ascribed to his 
false oath being exposed to witnesses.
But perhaps the most striking case of substitution comes from a charter myth 
about the foundation of the colony of Locri Epizephyrii related by Polybius and 
Polyaenus (#12).60 According to both authors the Locrians made a sworn agree-
ment with the Sicels that they would be friends and share the country “as long 
as they trod on this earth and wore heads on their shoulders”. This was clearly 
intended to imply forever. But when the Locrians were taking this oath, they put 
some soil into the soles of their shoes, and some heads of garlic on their shoul-
ders. In this state they took their oath, but subsequently emptied their shoes of 
the soil, and threw away the heads of garlic. When the occasion presented itself, 
they expelled the unsuspecting Sicels from the country. Although the spirit of the 
agreement was violated, the formal clauses were not.61
These stories are particularly useful when it comes to evaluating the ethics 
of sidestepping oaths. For whereas the Chians were praised for their boldness 
and Eubotas was praised by his wife for his fidelity to her,62 the reputation of 
the Italian Locrians took a battering because of their sidestepped oath, with the 
saying “Locrian agreements” (Λοκροὶ τὰς συνθήκας) becoming proverbial for 
59 The passage so resembles Herodotus that at least one nineteenth-century commentator (Lec-
tor 1839, 749) ascribed it to Herodotus. This error probably comes from the fact that the 1791 com-
mentary on Herodotus by the Rev. W. Beloe (Herodotus, translated from the Greek) and Larcher’s 
Notes on Herodotus (1829) discussed the Stobaeus passage when treating Hdt. 6.86.
60 Although this story is clearly a charter myth, Graham (1982, 172) notes that the native cem-
eteries die out at about the time the colony of Locri Epizephyrii was founded in the early seventh 
century.
61 Domínguez 2007, 419.
62 According to Aelian (VH 10.2) Eubotas’ wife set up an enormous statue of him in Cyrene in 
recognition of his fidelity.
 10.7 Substitution   269
bad faith.63 Indeed, the Locrians’ reputation was so tarnished that Polybius was 
at pains to explain to his audience that these dodgy Locrians were the Locrians 
of Italy, not those of central Greece. Once again, it might be the case that the 
intent of the sidesteppers is the crux. For where the Locrians set out to deceive 
the Sicels, Eubotas and the Chians were merely making the best of a bad situa-
tion. Indeed, the Chians did intend to keep their oaths as they were worded. Even 
when they were denounced as cowards for planning to lay down their arms they 
piously informed their wives that they had sworn an oath which they could not 
break. The Locrians had no such scruples.
The fate of Phalanthus and the Phoenicians is also illustrative. Although it 
seemed that the Phoenicians were likely to get away with their artful sidestepping 
of their oaths, Iphiclus devised a trick of his own (#10), giving the Phoenicians 
boats without oars or rudders, arguing that they had sworn to provide boats and 
nothing else. Although it is tempting to see both parties as equally successful in 
their attempts to deceive each other with oaths, Ergias states that the Phoeni-
cians were “at a loss” (ἐν ἀπορίᾳ) and compelled to leave much of their money 
behind for Iphiclus to collect. It is also worth bearing in mind that the Phoeni-
cians were driven to surrender their position in the first place by the fact that 
Iphiclus had artfully fulfilled an oracle to the effect that “they would control the 
place until ravens turned white and fish appeared in their mixing bowls”. The 
Phoenicians had hitherto believed that this would never happen, but Iphiclus 
managed to introduce small fish into the mixing bowl from which Phalanthus’ 
wine was served by way of one of Phalanthus’ aides, and released ravens smeared 
with gypsum into the skies. These sights convinced Phalanthus that “the place 
was no longer theirs”. The message seems to be that the Phoenicians were asking 
for trouble by trying to trick the Greeks, and the Greeks made them pay a heavy 
price. For not only had the Phoenicians decided they had no right to keep posses-
sion of Rhodes, they had already been deceived by the wily Greeks whom they 
were trying to deceive themselves! Any attempt to deceive Iphiclus was surely 
bound to end badly – at least as far as the Greeks were concerned.
63 Domínguez 2007, 419. Redfield (2003, 258) argues that “the story represents the Locrians as 
natively duplicitous, manipulators of the literal”.
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10.8 False foundations
A.J. Bayliss
The Persian general Amasis took the Locrian ruse which relied on the wording “as 
long as they trod on this earth” a step further against the Barcaeans (#16). Accord-
ing to Herodotus (4.201) when Amasis led an expedition against the Lydian city 
of Barca he realized he could not take the city by force, but might be able to by 
guile. Amasis dug a wide trench, laid frail planks across it, and then covered it 
with a layer of earth. Amasis then invited the Barcaeans to meet with him on 
the hidden trench. A truce was agreed, with both two parties giving and accept-
ing a sworn assurance that their treaty would be valid “while the ground where 
they stood was unchanged”. Just as the Sicels had interpreted “as long as they 
trod on this earth” to mean permanence (or at least throughout the lifetime of 
the swearers) the Barcaeans believed their agreement with Amasis to be unshak-
able. “Trusting the oath” they opened their gates and came out of the city, and 
allowed all their enemies who wished to enter within the walls. Amasis immedi-
ately ordered the destruction of the hidden bridge and captured the city. Clearly 
the ruse works because of “the seeming impossibility of the ground under their 
feet ever vanishing”.64 But by setting things up carefully Amasis made the impos-
sible possible!
We have already seen that intentional manipulation of oaths typically draws 
criticism from ancient commentators. But this is not the case with Amasis. 
Although modern scholars seem united in their condemnation of Amasis’ ruse,65 
Herodotus (4.201) makes it clear that this was not a false oath, explicitly stating 
that the Persians destroyed the bridge “in order to abide by the oath sworn with 
the Barcaeans”.66 The difference between Amasis’ deliberate manipulation of 
the oath-exchange and that of the Locrians may be that Amasis can be seen to 
be righting a wrong by his actions. The purpose of his campaign was to punish 
the citizens of Barca for the slaying of King Arcesilaus of Cyrene and King Alazir 
64 Hollmann 2005, 286. Lateiner (2012, 163) argues that the Barcaeans were “depending on a 
geographical stability lodged in a formula of impossibility”.
65 Dewald (1993, 60) and Immerwahr (1966, 243 n17) see his device as treachery; Hollmann 
(2005, 302) calls it a “false oath”; for Goodchild (1970, 11) it is “an ignoble ruse”. Gera (1997, 
174) argues that the Persians use this “trickery” (dolos) to “break their oath”, which seems to 
be missing the point altogether. Chamoux (1953, 152) is less critical, calling the tactic a “trick”. 
Applebaum (1979, 26) seems alone in not mentioning the oath exchange or Amasis, merely com-
menting that “Barka was besieged and taken by the Persian general Aryandes”.
66 Polyaenus (7.34) stresses that “the ground, on which the two sides stood when they made 
the treaty, no longer existed”.
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of Barca. Indeed, the Barcaeans actually doom themselves by arguing that they 
were collectively responsible for the murders when asked to hand over those 
responsible for the death of Arcesilaus.
We should also bear in mind that the oath-exchange is not the only example 
of trickery in this passage. The Barcaeans have already shown their ingenuity 
in discovering mines that the Persians were digging under their walls (a smith 
carries a shield around the inner side of the walls and smites it against the ground 
of the city – when he finds hollow ground the shield rings out), digging coun-
termines, and slaying the engineers (Hdt. 4.200; Aen. Tact. 37.6‒7).67 Thus, the 
implied message might be that the Barcaeans have already engaged in trickery 
and are therefore asking for trouble when entering into a treaty with Amasis.
The danger to the Barcaeans is particularly apparent when one considers that 
they are engaging in games with the Persians on dry land. Greek mastery of the 
sea and Persian mastery of the land is a recurrent theme in Herodotus’ Histories 
and wider Greek literature.68 Herodotus’ narrative demonstrates that the city of 
Cyrene and by extension the colony at Barca exist only because of the Theran 
fisherman Themison’s inherent mastery of the sea which allowed him to sidestep 
an oath to Etearchus. According to Herodotus (4.154) the Cretan ruler Etearchus 
tricked Themison and bound him under oath to do whatever he wished, and then 
asked Themison to throw his daughter into the sea (katapontōsai, literally “sub-
merge in the sea”). Themison did indeed throw the girl into the sea “in order that 
he might fulfil the oath he had sworn”, but cunningly tied a rope around the girl 
and immediately hauled her out of the water again. The girl Phronime will later 
become the mother of Battus the founder of Cyrene, and the Cyrenaeans will set 
up a colony at Barca. All this was made possible by Themison’s manipulation of 
the sea. But Barca ultimately falls because the Greeks placed too much confidence 
in their understanding of the Persians’ natural element, the land. Although the 
Barcaeans are known as horsemen and famed for their chariots, their confronta-
tion with Amasis ends with the Persians proving themselves the true masters of 
land warfare. Overall the saga suggests that the Greeks ought not to stray too far 
from their own domain, that of the sea.
67 Intriguingly, Aeneas Tacticus (§39) also discusses the use of covered trenches by the besieged 
as a means of fooling the besiegers. It would be deliciously ironic if the Barcaeans were undone 
partly by their own attempts to deceive the Persians.
68 See for example Hdt. 1.27. Hirsch (1986, 226) discusses “the recurrence of the land/sea motif” 
in the writings of Herodotus and his contemporaries, and later (p. 229) argues that Herodotus 
“seems to regard mastery at sea as being part of the Greek nomos, while the nomos of the Persians 
confines them to the land”.
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Gera argues that the Persians are punished for their trickery with the failure 
of the subsequent expedition against Cyrene (4.203).69 But this is not in keeping 
with how Herodotus portrays the events. According to Herdotus:
1. After capturing Barca the Persians hand the guilty over to Pheretime who mu-
tilates them and impales them on the city walls.
2. The Persians then appear before Cyrene and the Cyrenaeans admit the Per-
sians into their city on the pretext of fulfilling an oracle on the matter.
3. Badres (the commander of the fleet) recommends capturing the city
4. Amasis (land commander) refuses on the grounds that the sole objective of 
their mission was Barca.70
5. After passing through Cyrene “they” (it is not stated who) are sorry that they 
had not taken Cyrene, and try (unsuccessfully) to enter the city a second time.
6. The Persian soldiers withdraw in panic and set up camp nearby.
7. Aryandes (the supreme commander) recalls these soldiers, and the whole 
army withdraws into Egypt.
8. Pheretime dies having been afflicted by worms as punishment from the gods 
“so that mankind might see that violent vengeance earns the gods’ grudges”.
Significantly, Herodotus does not seize the opportunity to blame Amasis for the 
failure to capture Cyrene.71 Instead, Amasis is cast in a positive light. He refuses 
to attack Cyrene despite the good opportunity, because it would not be right to 
do so. These are hardly the actions of a man meant to be seen as a shameless 
perjurer! It is Pheretime who incurs the displeasure of Herodotus and the gods 
for her dreadful treatment of the Barcaean captives.72 Significantly, later tradi-
tion had that it was Pheretime and not Amasis who deceived the Barcaeans (Suda 
ε1006).73 Unlike the reworking of the tales of Cleomenes and Dercylidas which 
introduced an oath where none had been, the later reworking of the Barcaean 
story changes the identity of the deceptive swearer, perhaps because of Phere-
time’s alleged polluted death.
69 Gera 1997, 174.
70 Amasis states that “he had been sent against Barca, only against Barca, of all the Greek 
cities”.
71 Although Hollmann (2005, 302) casts Amasis’ oath as false he notes that Herodotus does not 
link the failure of the overall campaign to the oath.
72 Chamoux (1953, 152 ) has Pheretime display “eastern cruelty” before being struck down.
73 Gera 1997, 174.
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10.9 Dodging the “blank-cheque” oath
A.J. Bayliss
The vast majority of the techniques discussed thus far were oaths which were 
devised to trip up the unwary. But one final technique involves turning an unfair 
or deceptive “blank-cheque” oath against the instigator. As the name suggests 
the blank-cheque oath requires swearers to bind themselves to carry out as yet 
unspecified acts.74 Swearers of blank-cheque oaths took an immense risk. The 
potential dangers can be seen in the fact that when the Persian queen Atossa 
swore to give the Greek doctor Democedes “whatever he asked” in return for 
secret medical treatment (Hdt. 3.154), Democedes felt the need to offer Atossa 
assurances that he would ask for nothing shameful (literally nothing which she 
could blush to hear). The dangers became a hideous reality for Xerxes when he 
swore to give his mistress Artaynte “whatever she desired” (Hdt. 9.109). Xerxes 
could not have foreseen that the foolish girl would demand a magnificent cloak 
Xerxes was wearing which happened to have been made by his wife Amestris. 
Despite offering the girl alternatives (gold, cities, command of an army!), she 
insisted on the cloak. The result was disastrous, with Amestris wreaking a hor-
rible vengeance on Artaynte’s mother.75
But there were greater dangers than mere happenstance. Braund has argued 
that “blind entry into reciprocity gives power to the other party which may subvert 
ethical norms”.76 This is precisely what the Spartan king Ariston did (#14) when 
he duped his friend Agetus into swearing an oath to give him an item “from what 
he had” and then demanded Agetus’ exceptionally beautiful wife. According to 
74 For the Nottingham Database and in S&B (321) we used term “the blank-cheque oath”. 
Fletcher (2012, 31) calls this the “blind” oath. Hollman (2005, 287) opts for “the device of the 
open-ended oath”. Harrison (2000, 109 n24) prefers the term “rash promises”.
75 For more on this blank-cheque oath see S&B 314‒15. Such oaths typically end in disaster for 
the swearer – as the story of Hippolytus’ downfall due to his blind oath of silence to Phaedra’s 
nurse demonstrates – which means that they make a powerful literary motif. Ovid uses this to 
great effect in his Metamorphoses where Jupiter’s oath to Semele to grant her an unspecified gift 
(3.273ff) and Phoebus’ oath to Phaethon to grant him an unspecified favour (2.31ff) both end with 
the death of the swearee because the oath must be kept despite the fact that the swearer knows 
that it will not end well. Not every swearer of a blank-cheque oath was as lucky as Antigonus 
Gonatas (Ael. VH 9.26). When he drunkenly swore to do what Zeno of Citium asked, the philoso-
pher merely asked the king to go to sleep. A less scrupulous man would have gained much from 
the situation.
76 Braund (1988, 171) argues that “Atossa took a huge risk committing herself blindly to reci-
procity”.
274   10 “Artful dodging”, or the sidestepping of oaths
Herodotus (6.62), Ariston set out to entrap Agetus because he was tortured by a 
passionate longing for Agetus’ wife, the most beautiful woman in Sparta. Ariston 
promised to give to Agetus whatever single item Agetus might choose out of all 
that was his and he bade Agetus to make him the same promise. Agetus (foolishly) 
had no fear about his wife, seeing that Ariston was already married, so he agreed 
and they exchanged oaths (greater than a mere promise) on these terms. Ariston 
gave Agetus whatever he chose out of all his “treasures”, and then, seeking equal 
recompense from him, demanded his wife. Agetus says that he had agreed to any-
thing but that, “but he is forced by his oath and the trick by which he has been 
deceived, and suffers Ariston to take her”. The message is clear – Agetus would 
dearly love to weasel out of the agreement, but he cannot break his oath.
But where Agetus failed to see a way out of his bind the Theran trader Themi-
son (#8) fared better when the Cretan ruler Etearchus tricked him into swearing 
an oath to do whatever he wished, and then asked Themison to throw his daugh-
ter Phronime into the sea. Like Agetus Themison is trapped by an oath that binds 
him to do something he would never have imagined he would have to do when he 
swore his oath. But – as noted above – unlike Agetus the angry Themison found a 
way out of his oath. By tying a rope around the girl and hauling her straight back 
out Themison was able to keep his conscience clear by allowing Phronime to live, 
yet also escape the terrible consequences of breaking an oath.
The two situations were remarkably similar. When Ariston raised the idea 
of taking whatever he desired from Agetus’ property, Agetus assumed that his 
friend would not ask for anything he would not happily surrender. But Ariston 
did not explicitly say so. Likewise when Etearchus asked Themison to swear to do 
whatever he asked after making him his friend, Themison naturally assumed that 
Etearchus would not ask him to do anything unpalatable. But again Etearchus 
did not explicitly say so. The devious behaviour of both Ariston and Etearchus is 
clear to see in that Herodotus describes their deceit as a “device” (mēkhanē), and 
the fact that both Agetus and Themison become “angry” and complain that they 
have been deceived by “the trick of the oath” (τῆι ἀπάτηι τοῦ ὅρκου). But whereas 
Agetus found himself bound by his blind oath, Themison was able to sidestep 
his sworn obligation, literally “freeing himself from the burden of the oath” 
(ἀποσιεύμενος τὴν ἐξόρκωσιν τοῦ Ἐτεάρχου). Themison’s ability to evade the 
oath shows that the danger of the blank-cheque oath is double-edged. Although 
(like Agetus) Themison is imperilled by accepting the request to make a blank-
cheque oath, Etearchus is equally in danger of being tricked himself once he has 
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commenced the process.77 As Lateiner argues, “tricksters too are tricked, deserv-
edly hoisted by their own petards”.78
Herodotus’ unambiguous appraisal of Themison’s actions is reflected in the 
judgements of most modern scholars.79 But none seem particularly sorry for 
Agetus. To an extent one could argue that Agetus was asking for trouble. He is 
explicitly stated to be a hetairos of Ariston,80 and in the light of that one wonders 
why he would have required an oath from his king and friend in the first place. But 
Themison was the unfortunate victim of a guest-friend (xenos) who demanded an 
oath of him. While Herodotus does not explicitly praise Themison for his actions, 
he could hardly make his disapproval of the plotting against Phronime clearer: 
Herodotus calls Etearchus’ wife “a real stepmother”,81 who devised “all evil” 
against Phronime,82 and accuses Etearchus of “devising an unrighteous deed 
against his daughter” because he was “overpersuaded”. There is a certain folk-
tale feel to the story,83 and it may be that there is a hidden message in the names 
of the protagonists: Themison = “The Man who does what is Right”, Phronime = 
“Sensible Woman”, and her eventual lover Polymnestus, the father of Battus, is 
“the man who woos too much”.84 Intriguingly, given that his actions are so ques-
tionable, Etearchus’ name means “true ruler”.85 Elsewhere Pindar (Pyth. 5.77‒93) 
calls Battus “Aristoteles”, which could be translated as “one who brings things to 
the best of conclusions”,86 which would fit well with this folktale. But that good 
conclusion is relatively short-lived. Like the “saga” of Spartan oaths which was 
77 Hollmann (2005, 287) sees Themison as responding to Etearchus’ “manipulation” of the 
oath procedure with a “counter-manipulation, fulfilling the literal terms of the oath…if not 
Etearchus’ intention”.
78 Lateiner 2012, 164.
79 Lateiner (2012, 164) notes that Themison remains as his name implies a good man, and 
“by a sophistical pied de la lettre compliance evades a greater wrong”. Ogden (2008, 21) states 
that Themison “kept to his oath”. P.A. Watson (1995, 230) argues that Themison “fulfils his ob-
ligation”. Osborne (1996, 11) sees Themison as having “evaded his oath” to drown Phronime. 
T. Harrison (2000, 109 n24) argues that “the narrative is shaped around Themison’s ingenious 
fulfilment of the oath”.
80 Scott (2005, 258) interprets his status as an hetairos as greater than a philos, and speculates 
that Agetus was “perhaps a hunting-companion [of Ariston] or periodically invited to eat with him”.
81 Ogden (2008, 21) compares Phronime and the as yet unconceived Battus to Danae and Per-
seus, whereas Watson (1995, 230) includes Phronime’s stepmother prominently in her catalogue 
“the murderous stepmother”.
82 Hollmann (2005, 287) notes that Etearchus’ wife is “all-scheming”.
83 Lateiner 2012, 163.
84 Osborne 1996, 12.
85 Osborne (1996, 12) suggests “just king”, whereas Lateiner (2012, 163) opts for “early ruler”.
86 Osborne 1996, 12.
276   10 “Artful dodging”, or the sidestepping of oaths
kicked off by Ariston’s blank-cheque oath (Ariston will go on to deny his son’s 
paternity under oath, and by so doing doom his son to being deposed by a process 
that will involve Leotychidas accusing Demaratus under oath), and has been well 
noted by modern scholars,87 Themison’s sidestepping of his oath is part of a saga 
of stories about the colony of Cyrene which ends with the fall of Barca by way of a 
similarly sidestepped oath. Perhaps both stories demonstrate that in the long run 
it is difficult to prosper if you dabble in oath-related trickery.
Just as Themison’s sidestepping of his oath secures the future Battiad dynasty, 
Demetrius Poliorcetes’ (#35) sidestepping of his blank-cheque oath mentioned 
above has positive results. Plutarch explicitly states that Demetrius’ actions 
allowed Mithridates to make “himself master of a large and fair territory, and 
founded the line of Pontic kings, which, in the eighth generation, was brought 
to an end by the Romans”. Had Demetrius not found the wherewithal to sidestep 
his oath to his father, none of this would have come to pass. The parallel between 
the two cases is even stronger when we consider that just as Themison’s sidestep-
ping of his oath allowed the Battiads to rule in Cyrene for eight generations, Mith-
ridates’ descendants would rule for eight generations as a result of Demetrius’ 
sidestepping of his oath. Again, the ends appear to have justified the means. But 
once again, the good that comes from the sidestepping does not last forever.
10.10 What does this evidence tell us about Greek attitudes to 
sidestepped oaths?
A.J. Bayliss
The examples discussed in this chapter confirm Lateiner’s claim that “oaths are 
good to deceive with”.88 But clearly some of these dodges were considered more 
acceptable than others. Thus, on the one hand Themison’s sidestepping of his 
blank cheque to avoid an unjust killing oath clearly impressed Herodotus, while 
87 Boedeker (1987, 194) noted that Ariston’s oath sparked off a chain of events that disrupt the 
Eurypontid royal house and bring about the overthrow of his son as a result of another oath. 
Scott (2005, 62) claims, “In view of Ariston’s earlier exchange of oaths with Agetos … it is a nice 
touch to make him swear an oath which he will shortly be able to withdraw”. Lateiner (2012, 
164) links the story of Glaucus as told by Leotychidas to the story of Demaratus’ conception and 
argues that these “otherwise admirable Dorians” all “live under a cloud of dubious oaths”. Else-
where (2012, 168) Lateiner refers to “Spartan oath narratives”. Fletcher (2012, 31) discusses how 
oaths “both generated structure and story” with regard to the tale of Demaratus’ conception and 
ultimate deposition. 
88 Lateiner 2012, 162.
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Soös, Demetrius Poliorcetes, and Anaximenes (#30) were explicitly praised for 
their dodges. But on the other hand Lichas and Cydias were struck down by the 
gods for attempting to sidestep oaths, and the Locrian and Thracian sidestepping 
of oaths led to the abusive terms “Locrian faith” and “Thracian pretence”.
So what conclusions can we draw? Table 1 records whether the sidesteppers 
were criticized or punished for their actions, and whether or not their sidestep-
ping could be seen to be justifiable. A superficial analysis of the data reveals that 
only 11 of the 34 sidesteppers (32%) are explicitly criticized for dodging their 
oaths, and only 6 (18%) are explicitly or implicitly punished for their actions. 
With two-thirds of the cases going without criticism and unpunished, it is tempt-
ing to reach the conclusion that the sidestepping of oaths was more often than 
not seen to be legitimate by the Greeks.
But a closer examination of the evidence suggests that Greek attitudes were 
much more nuanced. Of the 18 examples that could be seen as obviously immoral 
(“No” in the rightmost column), 12 (two-thirds) are definitely or arguably criti-
cized or punished, and most of the remainder are narrated only by writers on 
stratagems (Polyaenus or Frontinus) who do not normally comment on the 
acceptability of the practice. In each of these “immoral” dodges the oath was 
devised by the dodger himself/herself, which perhaps enhances the immorality 
of the act. Of the dodges which are criticized or punished only one (#20) could 
be regarded as morally justifiable, and even then the criticism comes from the 
victims rather than the source. By the same token not one of the dodgers who had 
an oath imposed on him is criticized.
This pattern is even stronger when we look only at examples cited from 
archaic and classical sources rather than from Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzan-
tine sources. Out of these 14 examples only four (#1, 8, 10 and 16) could be seen as 
justifiable, and not one of these is criticized or punished. Of the other nine, all but 
one (#23) definitely attract criticism or punishment (#2, 4, 5, 21, 22, 33) or arguably 
do so (#3, 9, 14). It is thus very nearly the case that in archaic and classical Greece, 
a sidestepper could expect to be criticized or punished if, and only if, his dodge 
was clearly immoral. Furthermore, the exception – Paches – might not actually 
be an exception, for as we have already noted Paches committed suicide in open 
court on being convicted of misconduct in office.
Another means of assessing Greek attitudes to the sidestepping of oaths is 
to put the practice in an international context. Wheeler argues that the sampling 
“yields that Greeks are three times as likely as Romans or barbarians (60% versus 
20%) to perpetrate sophistic interpretations”.89 But given that our sources are 
89 Wheeler 1984, 263.
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almost entirely Greek, a more accurate way of putting it would be that accord-
ing to largely Greek sources the Greeks were more than three times as likely as 
non-Greeks to engage in such deception. Where the Greeks really do stand out 
is in their response to such dodges after the fact. For while non-Greeks are more 
than capable of sidestepping oaths in the heat of the moment – Amasis’ success 
against the Barcaeans is a case in point – they were not necessarily as accepting 
as the Greeks were after the fact. The majority of evidence we have for the side-
stepping of oaths by non-Greeks comes from Roman sources, and that evidence 
strongly suggests that the Romans did not normally consider such practices 
acceptable.90 Indeed, Cicero (de Off. 1.33) argues that such “dexterity” (sollertia) 
is to be avoided at all times. The Roman aversion to sidestepping oaths extended 
even to when they were correcting a wrong like Amasis, or had been placed in an 
impossible situation like Themison. A prime example of this is the post eventum 
reaction to the Roman decision to award land disputed by the Aricians and 
Ardeates to themselves after swearing “to award it to those whom they should 
find it belonged”. Livy (3.71‒2) condemns their decision as “shameful” and deems 
their victory “sullied”; whereas the Greek writer Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant.
Rom. 11.52) defends the Romans by pointing out that the Romans were aggrieved 
at being forced to arbitrate over lands they felt were their own.
But perhaps the best illustration of Roman views is the general praise 
of Regulus for his stubborn fulfilment of an oath to return to his Carthaginian 
captors if he failed to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, and the correspond-
ing condemnation of the Roman prisoners of war who tried to sidestep a similar 
sworn obligation to return to Hannibal after the Battle of Cannae. Cicero (de Off. 
1.39, 3.99‒115), Livy (Per. 18), and Horace (Carm. 3.5) all praise Regulus for keeping 
his oath, and Cicero even has Regulus argue in the Senate against the proposed 
exchange of prisoners that would allow his release. By contrast Cicero (de Off. 
1.40; 3.113), Livy (22.58‒61), and Aulus Gellius (NA 6.18) condemn the Roman pris-
oner who, not following Regulus’ (mythical) example,91 tried to sidestep an oath 
to return to Hannibal’s camp if he failed to convince the Roman Senate to agree to 
ransom Carthaginian prisoners. Although the soldier could claim that by return-
ing briefly to Hannibal’s camp on the pretext that he had forgotten something he 
90 Roman interest in preventing such sharp practice has been discussed. Cf. Wheeler 1984, 
254‒5; Lammert, RE Suppl. 6 (1935) 1356.
91 Of course the fact that there is nothing about Regulus’ oath in Polybius’ much more con-
temporary account of the events to back up Cicero’s claims suggests a later reinvention to prove 
Roman rectitude. Indeed, Cicero cites the story of the Carthaginian prisoners after his first men-
tion of Regulus in the de Officiis.
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was released from the obligation of his oath, the Censors nonetheless condemned 
him for perjury and sent him back to Hannibal in chains. Cicero’s judgement is 
that “deceit does not remove the guilt of perjury – it merely aggravates it. His 
cunning that impudently tried to masquerade as prudence was, therefore, only 
folly”. By contrast the Greek writer Polybius (6.58) was not particularly critical of 
the perpetrator stating merely that he was acting “under the belief that by means 
of this return he had kept his promise and discharged his oath”. Polybius is struck 
not by the immorality of the perpetrator, but rather by the hyper-morality of the 
Romans which meant that Hannibal no longer rejoiced at his victory in the battle, 
but was instead astonished “at the unshaken firmness and lofty spirit displayed 
in the resolutions of these senators”. Clearly the Romans could not tolerate or 
condone a practice that the Greeks could see as acceptable under the right cir-
cumstances. For the Roman writers it is the unbending Regulus, not the artful 
Autolycus, who serves as a role model.
10.11 Conclusions
A.J. Bayliss
This chapter has discussed a host of examples where the Greek sidestepped their 
sworn obligations, either by design or by happenstance. These examples amply 
demonstrate, as Lateiner puts it, that “oaths are good to deceive with”.92 This 
chapter has also explored what types of behaviour the Greeks considered to be 
acceptable and unacceptable when it came to the sidestepping of oaths. When 
this evidence is considered we can draw four clear conclusions:
1. While Greek authors are consistent in their portrayal of the oath as a binding 
contract that must be fulfilled in good faith, regardless of whether doing so 
will benefit the parties involved, they also tend to show that the intended 
outcome of the oath can be legitimately sidestepped – not by perjury or by 
breaking the oath – but by fulfilling the terms of the oath to one’s own advan-
tage. As Scott puts it, “the gods punished perjury, but not being clever”.93
2. Sidestepping was not merely a passive act, when one was caught out by a dis-
advantageous oath. There is considerable evidence in classical Greek litera-
ture to suggest that the Greeks were adept at framing oath-exchanges to their 
own advantage, and were to an extent proud of that skill. As Torrance argued, 
92 Lateiner 2012, 162.
93 Scott 2005, 319.
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“avoiding perjury was important for the Greeks, but tricking a swearee with 
duplicitous language was entirely fair play”.94
3. This practice was deemed acceptable when the sidestepper was acting with 
divine sanction, e.g. Leucippus (#11), avoiding a serious injustice, e.g. Themi-
son (#8), or righting a wrong, e.g. Amasis (#16).
4. But when the sidestepper was clearly in the wrong, e.g Lichas (#2) or the 
Locrians (#12), he/she was more than likely to be criticized for dodging the 
oath.
To conclude it is worth discussing one final example, an alleged exchange 
between Alexander the Great and the philosopher Anaximenes of Lampsacus 
(#30). When Alexander threatened to attack the people of Lampsacus and saw 
Anaximenes approaching to try to dissuade him, Alexander swore by all the gods 
that he would do the opposite of what Anaximenes asked. Clearly this open oath 
was intended to stymie Anaximenes, but the wily philosopher then politely asked 
Alexander to enslave the women and children of Lampsacus, to raze the city to 
the ground and burn the sanctuaries of their gods. Pausanias makes it clear that 
Alexander “unwillingly” pardoned the Lampsacenes because he failed to find a 
way “to counter” (antimēkhanēsasthai) what he calls the “trick” (sophisma) and 
was therefore bound “by the compulsion of his oath”. While all the exempla 
discussed in this chapter are “artful”, I cannot help but feel that the success-
ful dodgers of the blank-cheque oaths like Themison, Demetrius Poliorcetes and 
Anaximenes are the best of the “artful dodgers” or “sidesteppers”. Having found 
themselves bound by a seemingly unbreakable oath they find a way out which 
not only safeguards them against divine retribution but also leads to a greater 
good. That the Greek sources praised their actions is entirely understandable. 
That the Greeks could also praise the likes of Soös, Dercylidas, and Leucippus for 
their carefully crafted dodges which defied “reasonable expectations”95 makes 
them not only truly remarkable, but also a joy to study.
94 S&B 310.
95 Lateiner 2012, 161.
11 The binding power of oaths
11.1 Were oaths always totally binding?
A.H. Sommerstein
An oath (at least a formal oath; for informal oaths, see §13.2) was normally con-
sidered, in principle, to be absolutely binding. The story of Glaucus the Spartan 
(Hdt. 6.86; see §10.2) shows how grave a view could be taken of a man who even 
so much as contemplated the breach of an oath. It is true that King Leotychi-
das is presented as telling this story to the Athenians, not in order to dissuade 
them from committing perjury – for they had not been swearing, or offering to 
swear, to anything – but to induce them to return to him some Aeginetan hos-
tages, whom he and his late royal colleague Cleomenes had seized from Aegina 
and entrusted to the Athenians for safe keeping (as the Milesians in his story had 
entrusted their money to Glaucus). The Athenians had not even denied that the 
hostages belonged to Sparta; they merely said that they had received them from 
both the Spartan kings and did not think it right to return them to only one. If the 
other Spartan king, Leonidas, had been a child, or had been in exile, we might 
have seen this as a transparent evasion, but neither of these was the case; rather, 
Leotychidas was trying to bluster the Athenians into complying with his will by 
putting a quite illegitimate spin on the story so as to suggest that one risked divine 
retribution if one so much as contemplated (not breaking an oath, but) refusing to 
return a deposit under any circumstances whatever. The very fact, however, that 
the story is somewhat beside the point in its context shows that it reflects a view 
that was widespread in Herodotus’ time.
The same conclusion may be drawn from the delicacy that was shown in the 
framing of the oath of loyalty to democracy that was prescribed by the decree 
of Demophantus after democracy was restored at Athens in 410 BC (Andocides 
1.96‒8;1 see S&B 130‒1). Before and during the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, 
a year earlier, various anti-democratic conspiracies (see S&B ch. 6) had been 
hatched at Athens and elsewhere, and many of these had been cemented by oaths 
– or at least no one, other than the conspirators themselves, could be sure that 
they had not been. What could be done about groups that might have sworn to 
each other – as, according to Aristotle, oligarchs in some states still did in his 
1 On the authenticity of this decree, denied by Canevaro & Harris 2012, see now Sommerstein 
2014.
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time2 – “I will bear ill-will to the demos and do it any harm I can”? In the end, 
to the oath that was imposed on all Athenian citizens, committing them to put 
to death anyone who in the future established, or took part in, any regime but a 
democratic one, and to reward and honour anyone who killed such a traitor to 
democracy or died in an attempt to do so, there was added a further clause:
And all oaths that have been sworn, at Athens or in the camp or anywhere else, in opposi-
tion to the Athenian people, I dissolve and release.
This clause may seem at first sight to subvert quite radically the principle of the 
binding force of oaths. It does nothing of the kind. It speaks very carefully not, 
as one might expect, of “oaths that I have sworn”, but of “oaths that have been 
sworn”;3 and the verb “release” (aphiēmi) was widely used in legal contexts to 
refer to an act whereby “a real or potential plaintiff [gave] up what would other-
wise be his right, e.g. to collect what [was] owed to him or to prosecute someone 
who [had] committed an offence against him”.4 The citizen, in other words, was 
not being required to renege on his own oaths previously sworn; he was being 
required to “[give] up what would otherwise be his right” to have others remain 
true to the anti-democratic oaths which they had previously pledged to him. If 
all participants in a sworn conspiracy were to give up that right, the oaths of the 
conspiracy would automatically melt away.5
The Demophantus oath shows, as one would expect, that a sworn pledge 
could at any time be modified, or even abrogated, by the consent of those for 
2 Arist. Pol. 1310a7‒10.
3 This is, according to TLG, the only occurrence of the third-person plural verb ὀμώμονται 
“(they) have been sworn” in any ancient Greek literary text (or document quoted therein) what-
soever. Nor does it occur in any inscription in the PHI epigraphic database (http://epigraphy.
packhum.org/inscriptions/main; accessed 30 January 2014).
4 Carey & Reid 1985, 117. 
5 This ingenious device had, however, a loophole: what if some of the participants in a con-
spiracy were not Athenian citizens, and so did not take the Demophantus oath? Those who did 
take the Demophantus oath would then not have been released from their earlier pledges, and 
so would find themselves bound by two contradictory oaths, one democratic and one anti-demo-
cratic. At Athens this loophole may well have been only theoretical, but “in the camp” – in other 
words, at Samos, where the fleet was based – it would have been of the greatest importance, 
since in 411 Athenian and Samian oligarchs had been working closely together (Thuc. 8.63.3‒4, 
8.73). The most likely explanation is that a similar oath of release had already been taken at 
Samos after the restoration of democracy there (cf. Thuc. 8.73.6). It should be added that an 
oath of reconciliation taken at Dicaea between 365 and 359 (see Voutiras & Sismanides 2007 and 
S&B 141‒3) does include a repudiation by the swearer of any previous oaths he had sworn to the 
contrary.
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whose benefit it was made; provision for such modification was often explicitly 
made in sworn treaties,6 but it must always have been implicit in any case. It 
also shows that its drafter thought an oath could not be abrogated without such 
consent, not even an oath to commit what the swearer afterwards came to regard 
as a crime deserving instant death.
A remarkable story from the mid fourth century shows us a military com-
mander going so far as to launch an attack against men on his own side, with fatal 
consequences, and risk the anger of the most powerful men in his world, rather 
than break an oath he had given to the enemy. The central figure of this story (D.S. 
16.49.1‒6) is Lacrates, a Theban who in 350/49 was commanding the Boeotian 
division of the mixed Greek forces assisting Artaxerxes III of Persia in his attempt 
to reconquer Egypt, whose rebellious king – Nectanebos II, the last of all the pha-
raohs – also had many Greeks in his service. Lacrates was besieging Pelusium, at 
the eastern extremity of the Nile delta, and the city was being valiantly defended 
by Nectanebos’ Greek troops until they learned that their king and his Egyptian 
forces had withdrawn to Memphis, more than a hundred miles upstream. They 
then sent envoys to negotiate with Lacrates, who gave them a sworn pledge that 
if they surrendered Pelusium to him they would all be conveyed back to Greece 
with whatever they could carry with them. On this they surrendered the fortress, 
and Artaxerxes sent his trusted minister and general, Bagoas, with non-Greek 
troops, to take it over. At the gates of Pelusium these troops met the departing 
Greeks and began to plunder their effects; the Greeks “called loudly on the gods 
who had witnessed the oaths”, and Lacrates at once attacked Bagoas’ men, put 
them to flight and killed several of them. Bagoas fled to Artaxerxes and made an 
accusation against Lacrates; but the King’s judgement was that Bagoas’ men had 
got their just deserts,7 and he himself condemned to death those who had been 
guilty of the robbery.
6 As in the Peace of Nicias in 421 (Thuc. 5.18.11) and the subsequent Athenian-Spartan alli-
ance (Thuc. 5.23.6); see Kozak in S&B §10.5. The enabling clause in the latter read: “If it seems 
good to the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians to add or to take away anything regarding the 
alliance, then whatever seems good to them shall be no breach of oath for either.” In the peace 
treaty it ran: “If either party has forgotten something, on any point, about anything, it will not 
be a breach of oath for both parties to change whatever seems best to both parties, after just 
consultation, to the Athenians and to the Lacedaemonians.” This clause in fact caused trouble 
later on, since Sparta’s allies complained that it gave Sparta, in agreement with Athens, the right 
to amend the treaty without consulting them (Thuc. 5.29.2‒3); Sparta could have responded, had 
she wished, that the time to make such complaints was before the treaty had been concluded 
and sworn to, not after.
7 This implies, or ought to imply, that the men were aware of the terms of the agreement made 
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Could it ever be right to deliberately break an oath?8 The issue receives a 
theoretical discussion in the sophistic work known as the Dissoi Logoi (3.6‒7) 
from the late fifth or early fourth century, in the course of an argument designed 
to show that there are extreme circumstances in which the most sacred duties can 
come into conflict and that it may be right (e.g.) to rob a temple if its treasures are 
needed to fund the defence of Greece against barbarian invaders, or to break and 
enter a public building if, during a period of civil strife, one’s father is confined 
there by a hostile faction and under sentence of death. On the topic of perjury, the 
author considers the following case:
If someone has been captured by the enemy in war, and promises on oath that if released 
he will betray his city, would he be doing right to keep his oath? For my part, I think not; 
he should rather save his city, his friends and the sanctuaries of his fathers by breaking it.
One might reasonably see this as a very artificially devised problem, not least 
because such a ploy could be used only once – if it became known that prison-
ers of war were taking oaths of this kind with no intention of keeping them, their 
captors would at once cease giving them the opportunity. It is not surprising that 
we know of no such instance in real life. And it is striking that the ingenious 
author of the Dissoi Logoi cannot think of any more plausible scenario. He pres-
ents a whole series of other examples in which conduct which would normally be 
thought criminal or impious could reasonably be regarded as entirely justifiable; 
two of these are mentioned above, and all the others are credible situations in 
which a contemporary might well have agreed with the author’s verdict.9 Only 
in the case of perjury is he forced to imagine a situation which one cannot seri-
ously envisage arising in reality. And except in one type of case which will be 
discussed presently, no text from the archaic or classical period tells us of any 
instance in which a person plainly violated a formal oath and got away with it.10
with Lacrates. Artaxerxes and Bagoas will certainly have known of these terms; Bagoas will 
doubtless have assured the King that he had ordered his men not to molest the Greeks departing 
from Pelusium – but whether he actually did so order is perhaps another matter.
8 Torrance in §12.1.2 discusses two passages in which Euripidean characters seem to say that 
oaths taken under duress are not binding, but rightly regards them as suspect evidence.
9 Some of them are echoed in Pl. Rep. 331c‒d and especially in Xen. Mem. 4.2.12‒19. To enslave 
the entire population of a captured city (Dissoi Logoi 3.5) would not, one hopes, be regarded as 
justifiable by anyone today, but our author clearly expects that his readers, at least in certain 
circumstances, would see nothing wrong with it; it was what “the Corinthians and Thebans es-
pecially, but also many of the other Greeks” wanted to do to Athens in 404 (the Spartans vetoed 
the proposal: Andoc. 3.21; Xen. Hell. 2.2.19‒20).
10 Unless one counts the Sausage-seller in Aristophanes’ Knights (296‒8, 417‒28, 1239); but for 
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The only situation in which a Greek could realistically conceive of an oath not 
being binding would be if the god in whose name the oath was taken were to be 
overruled by a more powerful god. This possibility is raised twice in The Eumeni-
des, the third play of Aeschylus’ Oresteia trilogy of 458 BC, in which oaths are a 
major theme (see §2.1) – both times by Apollo. After Apollo has helped Orestes to 
escape from the Erinyes and make for Athens where he will stand trial, the Erinyes 
angrily accuse him of aiding a matricide, and an argument develops during which 
he asks them why they are not equally indignant about the murder of a husband 
(like Agamemnon) by his wife. They reply (Eum. 212) that Clytaemestra was not 
blood-kin to her victim; to which Apollo rejoins (213‒18):
Truly you have held in utter contempt the pledges of Hera Teleia [Hera as goddess of mar-
riage] and of Zeus, and treated them as being of no account; and Cypris [Aphrodite] too is 
cast aside in dishonour by this argument, she from whom come the closest, dearest ties 
that mortals have. The bed of a man and a woman, when hallowed by destiny, is something 
mightier than an oath, and Justice stands sentinel over it.
The reference to oaths comes as something of a surprise, since nothing had been 
said about them in the argument up to this point. Possibly we are meant to think 
back to a scene in the previous play, The Libation Bearers (977‒9), when Orestes, 
standing over the slain corpses of Clytaemestra and her lover Aegisthus, said sar-
castically that they had been true to their mutual oath to kill Agamemnon and to 
die together. That was an oath to violate the sanctity of marriage, and as such, 
Apollo seems to be saying, it was sworn in defiance of Zeus, Hera and Aphrodite 
and should be regarded as null and void.
To reach this conclusion, however, takes quite a bit of recollection and ratio-
cination, and many spectators may merely be somewhat puzzled by the idea that 
anything could be “mightier than an oath”. They will probably be something more 
than puzzled when Apollo brings the same idea up again, about four hundred 
lines later. Orestes is being tried at Athens by a tribunal whose members, like all 
Athenian judges, have sworn to give a just decision (Eum. 483, 489), and Apollo, 
acting as his witness and advocate, states unequivocally (Eum. 614‒21) that in 
killing his mother Orestes had acted with justice, because he was obeying a 
command by Apollo which, like all Apollo’s oracular utterances, had been given 
on the instructions of Zeus.
one thing it is crucial to that play that so great a villain as Cleon can only be overthrown by a 
yet greater villain, and for another thing the only act of perjury by the Sausage-seller which is 
described in detail (417‒28) may actually be a case of “sidestepping” (see §10.3).
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I tell you solemnly [he continues] to understand well how strong is this plea of justification, 
and I tell you to follow the counsel of the Father; for an oath can in no way be stronger than 
Zeus.
This time there can be little doubt which oath Apollo is referring to. Since he is 
advising Orestes’ judges on how they should vote, the only relevant oath is the 
oath which they have taken as judges. We have not been told the terms of this 
oath, nor by which gods it was sworn, but Athena’s words later in the trial (674‒5) 
about their voting “in accordance with their honest opinion” suggest that we are 
to think of the ordinary oath of the Athenian juryman, which included a clause 
to this effect (see S&B §5.4).11 Apollo, then, is saying what no real speaker would 
ever dare to say in the Athenian courts: he is saying that the judges should ignore 
their judicial oath.12 He can say this, he claims, because the will of Zeus over-
rides any oath – and that makes theological sense: Zeus, as the supreme god, will 
be able to prevent any other deity from punishing a breach of oath of which he, 
Zeus, approves, and will presumably wish himself to punish anyone keeping an 
oath that runs contrary to his will.
But is the will of Zeus really what Apollo says it is? Apollo is not the only 
child of Zeus who is involved in the dispute over Orestes’ actions, and who is on 
stage at this moment. As he himself points out (662‒6), Athena is also a child of 
Zeus, and indeed more fully a child of Zeus than Apollo is, for she had no mother 
(cf. 736‒8). She gives a preliminary hint of her position by alluding at 674‒5, as 
we have seen, to the phrasing of the Athenian judicial oath. Then she delivers a 
speech announcing the establishment of the Council of the Areopagus, praising 
its justice, its incorruptibility, and its role in ensuring the political stability of 
Athens, and decrying any innovations in its laws;13 and at the end, turning to its 
founder members, she says:
Now you must rise, deliver your votes, and decide the case, respecting your oath. I have said 
my say (708‒10).
11 And was sworn by Zeus and Apollo (together with Demeter)!
12 He therefore cannot say at 679‒80, as many editors make him do, that the jurors should “re-
spect their oaths” when they vote; rather, these words must be spoken by the chorus of Erinyes 
(or by their leader on their behalf) and Apollo given lines 676‒7 which make no reference to the 
oath.
13 This section – by far the greater part – of Athena’s speech is explicitly addressed to “my 
citizens for the future” and is obviously relevant to the politics of Aeschylus’ own day; whether it 
is designed to promote a particular political stance (and if so, which) is a controversial question 
that need not be gone into here (see Sommerstein 1989, 216‒18).
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A very plain rap over the knuckles for Apollo, and that even though Athena 
herself accepts (797) that his oracle did come from Zeus, and even though she will 
in the end herself vote for Orestes’ acquittal (734‒41). The daughter of Zeus is in 
effect telling the judges – and the Athenian audience too – that the will of Zeus 
does not override an oath, that, on the contrary, it is the will of Zeus that oaths 
shall always be kept (it is not for nothing that one of Zeus’s titles is Horkios, the 
oath-god). And presumably we are meant to suppose that they do take her words 
to heart, as any good citizen would. As they vote, Apollo and the Erinyes wrangle 
inconclusively; and when the result is declared, it is a tie14 – which, by a ruling 
Athena has previously given, means that Orestes wins. In considering Athena’s 
subsequent successful efforts to conciliate the Erinyes, now more furious than 
ever at having been, as they see it, cheated and denied justice by the “younger 
gods”, it is worth remembering that but for Athena’s refusal to let Apollo use the 
name of Zeus to overawe and browbeat the judges, but for her insistence that they 
must respect their oath, the prosecution might well not have got a single vote. 
The Erinyes15 may, and do, resent the fact that because of Athena they lost the 
case despite receiving half the votes; but it was also because of Athena that they 
received as many as half the votes in the first place.
11.2 The oaths of lovers
A.H. Sommerstein
There is just one category of oaths that were traditionally regarded as not binding, 
as Pausanias is made to explain in Plato’s Symposium (183b). He is describing 
the extraordinary licence given by Athenian custom to lovers (that is, adult male 
admirers of handsome boys or youths), who are permitted and indeed encour-
aged to do many things which in any other social context would bring disgrace 
on them and to be “willing to undergo a degree of servitude that no slave would 
tolerate”. In particular,
the most extraordinary thing of all – or so most people say – is that if he swears an oath, he 
alone will be forgiven by the gods if he transgresses it, for they say that a lover’s oath is no 
oath: such total licence have both gods and men allowed to the lover.
14 It is, again, a controversial question, and again one that does not need to be discussed here, 
whether this equality of votes is exclusive or inclusive of Athena’s own vote; see Sommerstein 
1989, 222‒6.
15 Who had been midwives to the oath-god Horkos (Hesiod, Works and Days 803‒4) and in 
whose name oaths were taken in homicide and other trials held on the Areopagus (see S&B §5.14).
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The same theme appears in the speech that Socrates extemporizes in Plato’s 
Phaedrus (237b-241d) purporting to prove that a boy would be better advised to 
grant his favours to a man who was not in love with him than to one who was. He 
considers (240e-241c) what happens to a lover who has successfully courted his 
beloved, “making promises with many oaths and beseechings”, and who then, 
his passion fading, “becomes a different person”, refuses to make any return for 
the favours he has received or to fulfil his earlier oaths and promises, and leaves 
his former beloved “indignantly appealing to the gods”, not realizing that he 
would have been far better off giving himself to a man governed by reason rather 
than passion. It is not actually stated that the boy’s indignant appeals to the gods 
go unanswered, but it would vastly weaken the argument of the speech if it were 
assumed that the ungrateful lover could expect divine punishment.16
Despite what might be gathered from Pausanias’ speech, the principle that 
“a lover’s oath is no oath” was by no means a purely Athenian one. As early as 
the Catalogue of Women ascribed to Hesiod (and probably in fact composed in 
the sixth century) it had been dignified with a mythical aetiology (Hes. fr. 124): 
when Zeus raped or seduced Io, who was a priestess of Hera, and was caught by 
Hera,17 he swiftly turned Io into a white cow and then swore that he had not had 
intercourse with her;18 “and because of this he made oaths free of penalty (?) for 
men when they were concerned with the secret doings of Cypris”.
Quite apart from this mythical warrant for the principle, one can perceive 
a further theological rationale for this immunity from punishment granted to 
“lovers’ oaths”. Notoriously, the gods themselves were vulnerable to sexual 
desire, or, otherwise put, “inferior to Eros” (or Aphrodite) (Hes. Thg. 120‒2; Soph. 
Trach. 441‒3, Ant. 787; Eur. Tro. 948‒50; Ar. Clouds 1080‒1), and they would not 
be able to punish mortals for obeying the will of a deity to whose power they 
themselves were subject.
But even the exemption of the lover’s oath should perhaps be regarded as 
more of a humorous catch-phrase than a genuine social fact. It makes only one 
appearance in archaic or classical literature outside the passages already cited, 
in a line of comedy (Philonides fr. 7) in which someone, doubtless a jilted woman, 
says “I think the oaths of adulterers are written in ash” – which, be it noted, is 
16 Cf. also Pl. Phil. 65c.
17 Presumably not in the act (which he could otherwise scarcely have denied) but in compro-
mising circumstances very shortly afterwards.
18 It is not clear whether this sworn assertion is to be taken as a direct lie or as a “sidestep” 
(Zeus swearing that he had not had intercourse with the cow): the aetiology implies the former 
alternative, but the latter would make the transformation more clearly relevant in this context.
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a parody of a line of Sophocles (fr. 811) about the oaths of women.19 It would 
be very convenient for Jason in Euripides’ Medea to excuse by this principle his 
breaking of the oaths he swore to Medea, but he never does: her repeated accu-
sations of perjury he simply ignores. And when the young man Moschion, as he 
tells us in Menander’s Samia (50‒3), visited the mother of the girl he had made 
pregnant and swore that he would marry her as soon as her father returned from 
abroad, it clearly did not occur either to him or to his future mother-in-law – and 
one may well doubt if it would have occurred to any member of the theatre audi-
ence – that his oath was actually worthless. In practice, even in matters of love, 
an oath was an oath was an oath.
11.3 The tongue and the mind: responses to Euripides, 
Hippolytus 612
I.C. Torrance
The absolutely binding power of an oath is well illustrated by the case of Eurip-
ides’ Hippolytus in the eponymous play. The angry statement he makes at Hipp. 
612 – “It was my tongue that swore, but my mind is unsworn” – is uttered when 
his stepmother Phaedra’s nurse reminds him that he has been bound by an oath 
of secrecy which he should not break (611). The line, which seems to have gained 
immediate and unique notoriety, as discussed below, is spoken after Hippoly-
tus has been told of Phaedra’s desire for him. Furious, he threatens to reveal the 
outrageous secret in public, and momentarily contemplates breaking his oath 
with his statement at 612. He soon reveals, however, just forty-five lines later, that 
his reverence for the gods will make him refrain from breaking the oath which 
he took in their name (657). When Theseus returns, Hippolytus again wonders 
whether he should unseal his lips (1060) in frustration at Theseus’ refusal to 
believe him, but decides that it would have no purpose since he would at once 
violate his oath and fail to convince Theseus (1061‒3). Hippolytus’ piety in rela-
tion to oaths is even confirmed by Artemis in the exodos where she praises Hip-
polytus not only for rejecting the Nurse’s proposal, but also for keeping his oath 
of silence even in the face of Theseus’ slanderous accusations (1306‒9). Having 
19 There may be another instance in a fragmentary erotic poem by Bacchylides (fr. 19) where 
a man who has “fled to his dear wife in nothing but his chiton” may or may not be described 
(presumably by his mistress) as [ep]iorkos. 
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been duped into swearing a blind oath, Hippolytus is prevented from revealing 
the truth that would exonerate him.
It is likely that the oath of silence sworn by Hippolytus, and his subsequent 
expression of frustration at being trapped by it, were inventions of Euripides.20 
As Barrett observes, the implication at Hipp. 612 that Hippolytus might break his 
oath, however briefly this suggestion is made, is “essential to the play” since it 
leads Phaedra to believe that Hippolytus “will ignore the oath; and it is in that 
belief (689‒92) that she plots his destruction”.21 The crucial component to that 
plot is the suicide letter in which Phaedra accuses Hippolytus of having raped 
her.22 Hipp. 612 is thus central to the development of the tragedy, and although 
Hippolytus does not break his oath, the fact that he considers doing so seems to 
contribute to his fate. Judith Fletcher observes that a second oath of silence in this 
play is also part of the orchestration of Hippolytus’ downfall, namely the oath of 
the chorus to keep Phaedra’s desire for Hippolytus secret (713‒14),23 and oaths 
of silence seem to be important in Phaedra’s Cretan background. A fragment of 
Bacchylides (fr. 26.8) includes a reference to Phaedra’s mother Pasiphae telling 
Daedalus of her illness (i.e. her lust for the bull) and making him swear an oath, 
presumably one of secrecy.
Hippolytus does not break his oath of secrecy, but as we saw above in the 
case of Glaucus the Spartan the mere contemplation of perjury could be enough 
to condemn his progeny to the perjurer’s punishment of extinction (§10.2). Hip-
polytus’ fate might also be read, in part at least, as a result of his momentary 
temptation to perjure himself. Tragic characters often come to their doom through 
a complex web of causation involving both human and divine agency. In Aeschy-
lus’ Agamemnon, for example, Agamemnon’s death can be read as the result of his 
involvement with Greek impieties against the gods at Troy, but it is also caused by 
his own decisions, and of course by Clytaemestra’s revenge on him for murdering 
their daughter.24 Similarly, in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King, the fate of Oedipus is a 
result of his own actions, but these seem to be guided by divine forces.25 Hippoly-
20 It is likely that an oath of secrecy featured also in Euripides’ lost first Hippolytus play; see 
Barrett 1964, 11, and Talboy & Sommerstein 2006, 259‒60 with n.31. 
21 Barrett 1964 ad 612.
22 On the importance of the suicide letter see esp. Segal 1992 and Torrance 2013, 146‒52.
23 Fletcher 2012, 191‒2.
24 On Agamemnon’s decision-making see Lloyd-Jones 1962, Hammond 1965, Peradotto 1969, 
Dover 1973, Edwards 1977, Konishi 1989; on the importance of Zeus in Aeschylus see Lloyd-Jones 
1956; on the extent of Clytaemestra’s responsibility for the murder of Agamemnon see O’Daly 
1985.
25 On the role of the gods in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King, see Segal 1995, 180‒98 and cf. Segal 
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tus’ destruction in Euripides’ extant play also comes about through a combination 
of human and divine agency. Hippolytus is impious in his rejection of Aphrodite 
who plans his downfall, but Phaedra, her Nurse, the chorus, Theseus, Poseidon, 
and Hippolytus himself, all play a part in events. Segal argued that the manner 
of Hippolytus’ destruction is connected not only to Theseus’ invocation of Posei-
don’s curse upon Hippolytus but also to the fulfilment of the self-curse included in 
Hippolytus’ oath to Theseus in which he protests his innocence (Hipp. 1025‒31).26 
Hippolytus invokes Zeus Horkios and the Earth and states that he never touched 
his father’s marriage-bed nor could even have conceived of doing so. Unusually 
for an oath, as Segal observes, the potential curse for perjury is expressed in very 
specific terms, namely that he should perish without honour, nameless, and that 
neither the sea nor the earth should receive his flesh when he is dead if he has 
been a base man.27 Segal suggests that since Hippolytus is destroyed at a point 
where the land is hidden, “he is in a sense ‘received’ by ‘neither sea nor land’, 
and the hypothetical self-curse (oath of innocence) and ostensible punishment 
(proof of guilt) are fused.”28 Only the intervention of Artemis can bring closure 
for Hippolytus. She is the one who describes him as being in the gloom “under 
the earth” (Hipp. 1416) and who predicts posthumous honours for him (1423‒30). 
She is also the one who praises him for keeping his oaths (1305‒9), but she passes 
over in silence the potential loophole for perjury proposed by Hippolytus at 612, 
and it is clear, as Segal has demonstrated, that oath and curse are inextricably 
intertwined in this play.
The fact that a mere contemplation of breaking one’s oath could be viewed 
as equivalent to perjury is supported by the various appropriations of Hippolytus 
612 in Aristophanes and in Plato, since each adaptation carefully avoids replicat-
ing the situation in Hippolytus. Aristophanes parodies Hipp. 612 three times in 
his extant plays, each time at the expense of the character Euripides. In Women 
at the Thesmophoria, the Inlaw has agreed to dress up as a woman and attend 
the women-only festival of the Thesmophoria on Euripides’ behalf. But he gets 
Euripides to promise to rescue him if anything goes wrong. Euripides first of all 
swears an oath “by the Aether, the dwelling-place of Zeus” (Thesm. 272), but the 
Inlaw feels that this is not a serious enough invocation and Euripides then swears 
1981, 248: “Oedipus’ tragedy…asks whether human life is trapped in a pattern of its or own oth-
ers’ making.”
26 Segal 1972.
27 Segal 1972, 169‒70 shows that in a small number of comparable cases “the situation is un-
usually dramatic” (169).
28 Segal 1972, 170.
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“by all the gods, the whole lot!” (274).29 The Inlaw then asks him to remember 
that his mind has sworn, and not his tongue (275‒6: ἡ φρὴν ὤμοσεν, ἡ γλῶττα δ᾽ 
οὐκ ὀμώμοκ᾽). The parody of Hipp. 612 is clearly designed to prevent Euripides’ 
character from wriggling out of his oath by using the line “my mind is unsworn” 
but the line is never used by Euripides who later in the play perseveres and suc-
ceeds in rescuing the Inlaw, despite two failed attempts. This humorous reversal 
of the original line takes stock of Hippolytus’ implication that there is a distinc-
tion between an oath of the mind and an oath of the tongue, where the former 
would be more binding than the latter.30 Of course, as the events of Euripides’ 
Hippolytus demonstrate, any such distinction is illusory and the use of the line 
from Hippolytus against the character of Euripides is exploited for purely comic 
purposes.31
In Frogs, Hipp. 612 is parodied twice. The first reference comes at the begin-
ning of the play when Dionysus expresses his intention to find a really potent 
poet and bring him back to Athens from the Underworld. Heracles asks him to 
explain what he means by “potent” (gonimon), and Dionysus replies that he 
means a poet who can say daring things like … “a mind that does not wish to 
swear over sacrificial victims, and a tongue that perjures itself separately from 
the mind” (Frogs 101‒2). The adaptation of the original text is once again interest-
ing. Line 102 articulates the element of perjury that is implicit but unexpressed 
in Hipp. 612, and the attempt to create an apparent escape clause from within a 
completely binding agreement is echoed in the previous line through the image 
of the mind (but presumably not the tongue) being unwilling to swear over sacri-
ficial victims. This confirms what we saw in ch. 6, namely that including animal 
sacrifice as part of an oath ceremony was a way of adding additional sanctity or, 
to put it another way, of making the oath more binding. As it happens, Dionysus 
in Frogs ultimately decides not to bring Euripides back to Athens after being won 
over by Aeschylus. Euripides protests and tells Dionysus to remember the gods by 
whom he swore that he would take Euripides home (1469‒70). Dionysus had not, 
in fact, “sworn” to take Euripides home, though he had expressed a strong desire 
to initially, but he is unfazed by Euripides’ accusation and simply replies “‘Twas 
but my tongue that swore; I’m choosing Aeschylus” (1471).32
29 On the problematic nature of swearing oaths by Aether, see §5.3.
30 Cf. Dillon 1995, 142, who suggests that the line is “scandalous because it tempts the audi-
ence to question the validity of the external oath to fix inner truth”.
31 Dillon 1995, 143‒4, also suggests that the Aristophanic parodies of Hipp. 612 are essentially 
humorous.
32 This is a rare example of what we have termed a “Sophoclean” oath outside Sophocles, and 
is discussed in more detail in §5.2.
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Although these passages seem to present the line as a clever means of com-
mitting perjury, it is never actually used by anyone who has sworn a related 
oath. In this respect Aristophanic usage reflects the Platonic dialogues where the 
passage is referenced not in relation to perjury per se but as a means of escap-
ing self-contradiction and reneging on an unsworn agreement. In Theaetetus, a 
dialogue whose subject matter is an attempt to define the nature of knowledge, 
no final definition is reached, but several conclusions are established concern-
ing what knowledge is not. During this pursuit, Socrates manages to trick the 
young Theaetetus into contradicting himself (154c-d). Socrates gives the example 
of comparing, say, six dice with four, and gets Theaetetus to agree that six is more 
than four and that there is no other way of looking at it. He then asks Theaete-
tus what he would say if someone asked him “Can anything become more other 
than by being increased?” Theaetetus, it seems, fails to notice the shift from 
“being” to “becoming”. He has just said that six dice are more than four (where 
there had been no reference to increase), but now seems to think that he will be 
forced to agree that nothing can be more (rather than become more) unless it is 
increased.33 He replies as follows: “If I were to answer with reference to the last 
question, I would say no, but if I answered with reference to the previous ques-
tion, I would say yes, to guard against contradicting myself.” Socrates replies that 
if Theaetetus says yes, the situation will be like that in Euripides – his tongue will 
be incontrovertible, but not his mind. The language of swearing is notably absent 
here, as in the Symposium, where Socrates alludes to Hipp. 612 to excuse himself 
from continuing with the eulogy of Eros. Once he realises that the eulogist’s job 
entails lying, he withdraws from the discussion by saying that it was merely his 
tongue that had promised, and not his mind (199a: ἡ γλῶσσα οὖν ὑπέσχετο, ἡ δὲ 
φρὴν οὔ).
None of the texts in which the line is referenced, then, actually include any 
associated perjury nor contemplation thereof by the swearer. Nevertheless, Aris-
totle tells us that Hipp. 612 led Euripides to be accused of impiety by a certain 
Hygiaenon, and that Euripides responded by saying that he had already given 
his account (δεδωκέναι λόγον) at the Dionysia and that his accuser was wrong 
to bring decisions from the Dionysiac contest into the law courts (Rhetoric 
1416a31‒2). It is not clear exactly what is meant by Euripides giving his account 
of the line at the Dionysia: it may simply suggest that by producing the play at 
the Dionysia he had already submitted himself to the judgement of the audience 
and the contest judges. Avery argues that Hygiaenon “made the line notorious 
33 The distinction is one which is important for Plato, as, for example, in the discussion of 
Simonides PMG 542 in the Protagoras 339b‒347a.
294   11 The binding power of oaths
by twisting its meaning to suit his own purposes”, and it may well be that Hygi-
aenon’s accusation was what created, or at least increased, the line’s infamy.34 
Certainly the most obvious defence against the accusation is that Hippolytus dies 
a gruesome death after imagining a distinction which might excuse perjury, suf-
fering as do other tragic characters who commit explicit perjury (on which see 
§12.1). It also seems that the judges enjoyed the play since they awarded Euripides 
first prize in 428 BC for the production which included this Hippolytus, one of 
only four first prizes won in his lifetime.35
It is ironic, as Mikalson has noted, that the line should have brought charges 
of impiety against Euripides when it is “spoken by a character proven, in all of 
tragedy, most loyal to oaths in the most trying and tragic of circumstances”.36 
The unique reception of this line, however, shows that the sentiment expressed in 
Hipp. 612 was dangerous. Subsequent adaptations meticulously avoid the precise 
situation of the original, and the tragedy as a whole demonstrates that oaths are 
binding in thought, as well as in speech. When Hippolytus states that his mind is 
unsworn, he effectively denies that his oath exists, in part at least, as the result of 
a thought process. He suggests that the oath was taken only as a speech act and 
not as a conscious decision, but in practice it is not possible to separate these 
two aspects of an oath. It is true, of course, that he swore the oath blind, but the 
fact remains that he agreed to swear it nonetheless. For all his pious reverence 
for Artemis, Hippolytus’ complete disregard for Aphrodite shows that he does not 
understand appropriate religious behaviour. Aphrodite openly plans his destruc-
tion and Artemis cannot save him. Similarly Hippolytus does not seem to realize 
that his momentary rejection of an oath, even in thought, might contribute to the 
complex web of destruction in which he becomes entangled.
34 Avery 1968, 24.
35 Gibert 1997 and Hutchinson 2004 question whether the extant Hippolytus (rather than the 
lost Hippolytus) was the one which was awarded first prize, but I agree with Barrett 1964, 13 and 
Talboy & Sommerstein 2006, 266‒9 that the extant Hippolytus must have been the later of the two 
plays and the play which won first prize in 428 (cf. Torrance 2013, 146‒52).




We have already seen in §7.3.1 how perjury among the gods might be punished 
in the divine realm, and in §§10.2, 11.1 and 11.3 how the mere contemplation of 
perjury could result in the most commonly anticipated punishment for break-
ing an oath, namely death or the extinction of the family line. We have also dis-
cussed in ch. 3 how the orchestrated perjury of the Trojans in the Iliad had a 
significant place in the fabric of Greek mythology and at the same time troubled 
classical philosophers. Nevertheless, there remain some important observations 
to be made regarding the way in which the Greeks perceived the consequences of 
perjury and the role of the gods therein. Here we will discuss various examples of 
divine punishment for perjury, and we will see that in most cases punishment is 
violent and severe. On some rare circumstances the gods were imagined as being 
able to pardon perjury, although there is no actual evidence that this was any-
thing more than wishful thinking on the part of humans. Occasionally, punish-
ment seems to have been implicitly deferred from the original perjurers to subse-
quent generations.
12.1.1 Divine action and intervention
The official divine guardians of oaths are variously represented as Horkos (Oath), 
the Erinyes (as oath-curses), Zeus Horkios (guardian of oaths), and also Themis. 
In Hesiod, Horkos is the child of Eris (Strife), and he “brings the most woe to 
humans on earth, when anyone willingly swears a false oath” (Hes. Thg. 231‒2, 
cf. WD 804). The man who swears falsely can expect his family to become “more 
obscure” (amauroterē), but the man who keeps his oath prospers (Hes. WD 
282‒5). In Sophocles, Horkos is the son of Zeus (OC 1767), and Zeus is generally 
perceived as overseeing oaths in his capacity as Zeus Horkios (e.g. Soph. Phil. 
1324, Eur. Hipp. 1025). On one occasion, Themis, as the daughter of Zeus, is called 
horkia (Med. 209). The Erinyes are connected with Horkos in Hesiod in that they 
attended his birth (WD 803‒4), while Oath has a “nameless” child in Herodotus 
who pursues and destroys the family of the perjurer (6.86). This nameless child 
is evidently the manifestation of the oath-curse contained in every formal oath, a 
curse which can be expected to pursue the perjurer (cf. ch. 2).
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In addition to these official stewards of oaths, we have seen in §§5.3 and 
6.1 that a wide variety of context-specific divinities were very often invoked in 
oaths, and that although Zeus is the great overseer of oaths, and appears most 
frequently as a sanctifying oath-witness, sworn statements in which he is invoked 
alone, particularly informal oaths, tend to be weaker than oaths which include 
other or more numerous deities. The remaining official guardians of oaths appear 
infrequently as oath-witnesses. The famous Iliadic truce includes the invocation 
of those who toil under the earth to take vengeance on dead men who have com-
mitted perjury (Il. 3.278‒9) and although there are some textual problems here, a 
parallel passage in Iliad 19 (259‒60) where the Erinyes are clearly invoked makes 
it likely that they are meant also in Iliad 3.1 In an epic where the breach of an oath 
is a central issue, it is not surprising that a reminder of oath-curses is included in 
the list of sanctifying deities.
Elsewhere the invocation of the Erinys is anomalous. In Aeschylus’ Agamem-
non, Clytaemestra invokes three formidable forces – the Justice (Dikē) accom-
plished for her child, Ruin (Atē), and the Erinys – when she swears that no 
expectation of fear treads her halls while Aegisthus lights the fire at her hearth 
and remains well-disposed to her as before (Ag. 1432‒6). She concludes her invo-
cation of the divinities with the phrase αἷσι τόνδ᾽ ἔσφαξ᾽ ἐγώ (1433), which can 
mean either “through whom (i.e. through whose agency) I slew this man” or “to 
whom I slew this man.” Fraenkel assumed the latter with a comment that implies 
the murder is an oath-sacrifice,2 and this is the reading adopted by Fletcher 
who argues that Clytaemestra’s oath is deeply problematic for this very reason, 
because the sacrifice here is offered to the oath-guarantors instead of represent-
ing the fate of the perjurer as is normally the case.3 Certainly there is a grim irony 
to the forces invoked in Clytaemestra’s oath since she will soon suffer at the 
hands of Agamemnon’s avenging Erinyes and the justice that is due for him, as 
she becomes the victim of ruin in the subsequent drama.4 Occasionally, mascu-
line spirits of vengeance (alastores) take the place of the Erinyes, as in Eur. Med. 
1059 when Medea invokes “the alastores below, who dwell in Hades” in her oath 
that she will not leave her children for her enemies to treat shamefully (see §6.1 
for further discussion of this oath). It is striking that Medea herself is an avenger 
1 See Kirk 1985 ad 3.278‒9.
2 Fraenkel 1950, ad 1433; Raeburn and Thomas 2011, ad 1432‒3 and Sommerstein 2013, 8 pre-
fer the former reading but note both possibilities.
3 Fletcher 2012, 49.
4 Sommerstein 2013, 8.
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of perjury (committed by Jason) and is later presented as becoming an Erinys 
(Med. 1260).5
Horkos is invoked once in Sophocles (OC 1767), and possibly once in Pindar 
(Nem. 11.24), although it is impossible to tell whether ναὶ μὰ γὰρ ὅρκον (or ̔́ Ορκον) 
should be understood as “by my oath” or “by Horkos”.6 Apart from Medea 209, 
Themis is invoked once in Sophocles’ Electra by the chorus (1063‒5), along with 
Zeus (literally “the lightning-bolt of Zeus”), and is designated as part of the triad 
of divine witnesses (along with Zeus and Apollo) to the oath of exōmosia formu-
lated in Plato’s Laws 936e, an oath modelled on an actual Athenian practice used 
for refusing to testify but about which we can only reconstruct certain details.7 We 
do not know whether or not oaths of exōmosia were sworn by a consistent triad 
of divinities, but if they were the triad most likely consisted of Zeus, Apollo and 
Demeter, a group of oath-witnesses who appear repeatedly in official oaths sworn 
in classical Athens, from the dicastic oath to sworn treaties, and who are some-
times called theoi horkioi “oath-gods”.8 The rarity with which Themis is invoked 
as an oath-witness elsewhere in Greek literature strongly suggests that the inclu-
sion of Themis in the oath described in the Laws was a Platonic innovation.
Perjurers, then, could expect to be pursued by a variety of hostile divine 
forces, including any or all of the specific divinities named as oath-witnesses in 
the perjured oath and any of the official guarantors of oaths, whether or not these 
had been named in the original oath. Even non-perjurers could expect to suffer 
for keeping company with perjurers. At the end of Euripides’ Electra Castor, a 
patron of sailors, warns against sailing with perjurers (Eur. El. 1355). The implica-
tion is that the fate of the perjurer will affect all on board, and the forces of the sea 
appear as the divine instrument for punishing perjury in two important broken 
oaths in Greek literature. In the Odyssey Odysseus’ men swear that they will not 
slaughter any sheep or oxen they come upon on the island of Helios (12.298‒307), 
but Eurylochus then successfully urges the hungry men to break the oath when 
they have exhausted their own food supply (12.340‒65). After an appeal by Helios 
Zeus punishes the perjury by causing a shipwreck in which all the men drown, 
except Odysseus, who is washed up on Ogygie (Calypso’s island). It is evident 
5 On the significance of perjury in Medea and on Medea’s role in punishing Jason, see Burnett 
1973, esp. 13‒20, Boedeker 1991, Kovacs 1993, Burnett 1998, 196‒207, S.R. West 2003, 442‒3. Pin-
dar also presents Medea punishing the oath-breaker Pelias by slaying him, as implied in Pythian 
4 (165‒7; cf. 251), when Pelias failed to hand over the kingdom to Jason on his return with the 
golden fleece.
6 For further discussion of oaths sworn in Pindar’s authorial persona, see ch. 13a.
7 See S&B 91‒100.
8 On official oaths sworn by Zeus, Apollo and Demeter, see S&B 43‒4, 70‒2, 79, 154, 164‒6.
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that Eurylochus and the men are aware of the risk they will take in slaughtering 
the cattle of Helios. Eurylochus argues that even if Helios is angry and causes 
them to die at sea, it would be a better death than to die of hunger (12.348‒51). 
This may be a persuasive argument to put to hungry men, an example of how the 
sophos nous can persuade someone to do something even if they have sworn not 
to (trag. adesp. 566), but it leads to a dangerous and foolish decision. Contrary to 
Castor’s warning in Euripides’ Electra, Odysseus manages to escape with his life, 
but it is made clear that this is only through the favour of Zeus (Od. 12.445‒6) and 
although he does not die, he experiences serious suffering as a result of his men’s 
perjury.
Elsewhere, in Hellanicus’ account of the First Trojan War (fr. 26b/d Fowler), 
a sea-monster is sent to punish the Trojan Laomedon who had broken his oath to 
pay Apollo and Poseidon an agreed wage for building the walls of Troy. Laomedon 
was known for his treachery, and his fraud is mentioned in the Iliad (21.441‒57). 
In Homer there is no oath, but Hellanicus presents the breach of the agreement as 
perjury. The sea monster is said to have destroyed both those who happened to be 
there and the growing crops, once more demonstrating that divine punishment 
for perjury can include bystanders as collateral damage. Interestingly Laomedon 
himself is not killed by the sea-monster but is required to appease it by offering 
his daughter Hesione. Heracles agrees to save Hesione in return for Laomedon’s 
immortal horses, but Laomedon once again fails to keep his end of the bargain 
and Heracles gathers an army to attack Troy in retaliation, thus leading to the 
First Trojan War.9 Laomedon is eventually slain by Heracles but it is significant 
that his perjury in Hellanicus causes the deaths of many others.10
With the insult to Poseidon, it is appropriate that Laomedon’s punishment 
should be effected by a sea-monster. A sea-monster similarly materializes as the 
manifestation of Poseidon’s curse set in motion by Theseus at the end of Eurip-
ides’ Hippolytus where the title character had briefly considered perjury (see 
further §11.3). It is interesting, however, that both in the Odyssey and in Hellani-
cus, where a serious perjury is reported, it is the sea which acts as the enforcer 
of punishment on the perjurers. Helios and Zeus in the Odyssey, and Apollo in 
Hellanicus, might have been imagined as favouring alternative methods of pun-
ishment. In Euripides’ Suppliant Women (496‒9), for example, the perjurer Cap-
aneus is killed by Zeus’ thunderbolt, and in Sophocles’ Women of Trachis the 
messenger Lichas, who swears a false oath invoking Zeus, is killed by the son of 
9 For further details on Laomedon’s role in Greek mythology see Gantz 1993, 400‒2 and 442‒4.
10 Virgil implies in his Georgics (1.501‒2) that the Romans of his time are still paying for Laom-
edon’s perjury with their blood (referring to their series of civil wars).
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Zeus (Heracles) at a sanctuary of Zeus.11 The importance of the sea as a destruc-
tive power which could afflict perjurers in the Odyssey and in Hellanicus’ Troica 
illustrates a death much feared in Greek thought and underlines the terrifying 
fate awaiting those who break their oaths.12
In one unique case a man who broke an oath in order to escape service in a 
military expedition is plagued by weasels who bite him continually during the 
night while he tries to sleep, eventually causing him to take his own life ( Aristotle, 
tit. 143,1 Gigon, 31.62; see further p. 307 n. 33).13 One must assume some kind of 
supernatural intervention in the work of the weasels, and the passage shows 
how seriously the Greeks viewed avoiding one’s duty through perjury. We are 
reminded of the fact that none of Helen’s suitors breaks the oath which binds 
them to take part in the expedition against Troy, and that (as we saw in Ch. 3) 
although Odysseus apparently tried to avoid the expedition, he was nevertheless 
compelled to take part in it because of his oath.
12.1.2 Violent deaths and escape from perjury
In some cases divine intervention is not specified in the violent deaths of per-
jurers although their fates can be read as a result of their perjury. In Euripides’ 
Phoenician Women the brothers Eteocles and Polyneices both die doing battle 
with each other, but Eteocles’ death can be understood, in part at least, as stem-
ming from the perjury he committed when he refused to hand over the king-
ship of Thebes to Polyneices as agreed (Phoen. 481). A comparable pattern can 
be detected with figures from later times. Aristocrates the Arcadian who betrays 
his Messenian allies to the Spartans during the First Messenian War is stoned 
to death by his own people and his crime is memorialized with an inscription 
mentioning, among other things, that it is a difficult thing for a perjured man to 
escape the notice of god (Callisthenes FGrH 124 F 23.3, Paus. 4.12, Polyb. 4.33). 
This instance highlights the conflation between divine and human punishment. 
Aristocrates is punished by his fellow-citizens, but his death is seen as the work of 
god. Several centuries after him Tissaphernes, a Persian notorious for deception, 
11 See §5.2 for further discussion of this perjury.
12 The view that the Greeks were not natural-born seamen was developed by Lesky 1947. Greek 
myth demonstrates an ambiguous attitude to the sea as a place to be admired but also greatly 
feared, see further Buxton 1994, 97‒104. 
13 This reference comes from extracts of Politeiai attributed to Heracleides (in this case of the 
Locrians [Heracleides Lembus fr. 62 Dilts]), which Gigon regards as all derived from Aristotle but 
to which he gives no fragment numbers.
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repeatedly breaks sworn treaties with the Greeks with no immediately apparent 
consequences.14 He is eventually executed in 395 BC and his death can be read 
as an appropriate punishment for his perjury. However, the case of Tissaphernes 
raises an important question: since death awaits all human beings, and since 
perjury is not always immediately punished, is it possible to tell if death is a pun-
ishment for perjury? Is death a convenient punishment imagined for a crime over 
which humans have little control?15 Or does the crime of perjury always result in 
a violent and premature death of the kinds we have so far discussed?
Let us consider the strange case of the Phocaeans reported by Herodotus 
(1.164‒7). When Cyrus’ general Harpagus laid siege to Phocaea and demanded a 
symbolic surrender, the Phocaeans asked for one day to deliberate before giving 
a response, and used the respite to evacuate the city and flee to Chios. Finding 
the Chians unwilling to give or sell them territory for settlement, they decided 
to migrate en masse to Corsica, where they had established a colony some years 
before. First, however, they returned to Phocaea, slaughtered the Persian garri-
son, denounced powerful curses on any of their own number who did not join 
the migration, dropped an ingot of iron into the sea, and swore not to return 
to Phocaea until the ingot reappeared. But at the first stop on their westward 
voyage (the Oenussae islands off Chios), more than half of them were overcome 
by “longing and regret for their city and the familiar haunts of their country” 
and sailed home, breaking their oath, while the rest, “those who were keeping 
the oath”, sailed on to Corsica. Herodotus then follows the fortunes of this latter 
group. From their base in Corsica they seem to have engaged freely in piracy, 
and they managed to get themselves involved in a war with a powerful Etrus-
can-Carthaginian alliance. The Phocaeans were victorious in a naval battle, but 
it was a Pyrrhic (or, as Herodotus puts it, a Cadmean) victory, because after it 
they had not a single serviceable warship left, and they abandoned Corsica and 
sailed to Rhegium; many of their ships’ crews, captured by the enemy, had been 
put to death, especially by the Etruscans of Agylla. The refugees in Italy estab-
lished the city of Hyele (Elea). This is hardly the prosperity the Phocaeans might 
have expected for keeping their oaths, although their plundering of neighbouring 
communities suggests that their consequent suffering was well-deserved. More 
importantly, we might well ask what happened to the perjured majority who had 
returned to Phocaea. Herodotus, who brings us the famous cautionary tale of 
Glaucus (6.86), is here strangely silent on the subject. Phocaea still existed in his 
day, and was prosperous enough to pay Athens the respectable annual tribute 
14 See Torrance 2012 for further details.
15 See below, §12.2, on human responses to perjury.
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of three talents (later reduced to two) so that, at first glance, prosperity seems to 
have followed the perjurers.
Several scholars have noted the ritual importance associated with sinking 
iron into the sea as part of the oath. Clearly the gesture is symbolic of a binding 
permanence (see §6.3 for further discussion). The fact that the oath contained this 
powerful sanctifying feature makes it even more remarkable that the oath was 
broken and yet no mention is made of a punishment that afflicted perjurers. The 
issue can be resolved in three ways. Either (1) the eventual deaths of those who 
broke their oath was considered punishment for their perjury, or (2) there were 
conditions under which the gods could forgive perjury, or (3) subsequent genera-
tions of Phocaeans could be expected to pay for the perjury of their ancestors. The 
first possibility is hardly probable since eventual death, being inevitable in any 
case, would be no deterrent from committing perjury. The notion that the gods 
might forgive perjury in certain circumstances can be supported by a few pas-
sages. Hesiod’s Theogony (231‒2) specifies that the god Horkos afflicts men when 
they willingly swear a false oath.16 Implicit in this formulation is that those who 
swear false oaths unwillingly might be spared the same punishment, and certain 
tragic characters suggest that the gods might overlook perjury in some circum-
stances. Agamemnon in Euripides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis (394‒5) claims that divine 
powers know when oaths have been fixed wrongfully or taken under compulsion, 
and a character in Euripides’ Polyidus raises the possibility that the gods pardon 
a person who commits perjury in order to escape death, captivity or violent evil at 
the hands of their enemies (fr. 645). The context of both tragic passages is prob-
lematic, however. Agamemnon tries to suggest that he might evade an oath which 
(he implies) he took under compulsion, but the angle he tries to spin does not 
match his circumstances.17 As to the Polyidus fragment, its text is uncertain, and 
on the likeliest reading18 the speaker is roundly condemning the suggestion that 
the gods might condone a false oath.
We might also add here the aphrodisios horkos, which, although to some 
extent a humorous catch-phrase (as we saw in §11.2), nevertheless also shows 
that the possibility of exemption from punishment for perjury was raised in Greek 
16 Plescia 1970, 83, argues that intention is not important in Homeric perjury because Hector’s 
oath sworn to Dolon in Iliad 10 (321‒32), which he is unable to fulfill because of his death, is said 
to have been epiorkon, which normally means “sworn falsely”. However, it would be anomalous 
to view Hector’s oath as a punishable perjury and it seems more reasonable to follow the reading 
of the passage in LSJ s.v. ἐπίορκος “he swore a bootless oath, i.e. one which he meant to fulfil but 
the gods willed otherwise.” 
17 See ch. 3 for further discussion of this passage.
18 See Collard and Cropp 2008, viii, 102‒3.
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thought. Aristophanic comedy too contains several examples of apparent perjury 
which goes unpunished. Some of these can be easily explained. In Clouds, 
Pheidippides first swears to comply with his father’s wishes, invoking Diony-
sus (91), and then swears a second oath by Dionysus that he will not become a 
student (108‒9), thus breaking his first oath since this is precisely what his father 
wants him to do. In Clouds, however, the role and power of the traditional gods 
is attacked, and the function of Zeus as punisher of perjurers is questioned by 
Socrates (399‒401) who manages to convince Strepsiades that Zeus and his thun-
derbolt do not exist, because otherwise, Zeus would have blasted known perjur-
ers, but in fact his strikes seem quite indiscriminate, hitting temples (including 
his own) and trees (which hardly commit perjury!) At Clouds 1227, where Strepsia-
des is reminded that he swore by the gods to repay what was lent to him, he is 
not concerned about committing perjury against gods in whose existence he no 
longer believes.19 Sommerstein identifies three classes of false oaths in comedy, 
apart from lover’s oaths, which go unpunished: oaths uttered by villains, who are 
presumably to get their just deserts in the end; ironical or exaggerated statements 
not intended to deceive; and “none of the above” referring to nine false oaths, 
all of which occur in late Aristophanic plays and coincide with a decline in the 
perceived power of oaths (see further ch.15).20
It seems, then, that perjury could go unpunished, occasionally, and under 
certain conditions. In an alternative comic universe oaths which would normally 
be binding could be worthless, and in the late fifth and early fourth centuries 
our sources demonstrate an increased challenge to the validity of oaths. Hes-
iod’s description of punishment for perjury on those who willingly swear false 
oaths implies that even in archaic Greek thought there were circumstances in 
which perjury of a formal oath could result in a punishment less severe than that 
described for willing perjurers. In actual fact, however, there is no clear evidence 
that those who broke a formal oath did not suffer divine punishment, and Hesiod 
does not say that those who swore false oaths against their will escaped punish-
ment altogether. Returning to the case of the Phocaeans, we seem to be driven 
to the conclusion that their punishment is envisaged as only postponed: oath 
19 As Sommerstein 2007b, 126 notes, we have no real way of telling whether this oath was 
informal or formal. Sommerstein also notes how Strepsiades is shameless is continuing to use 
oaths “when his behaviour shows he regards oaths as worthless” (135). On oaths in Clouds see 
also §13.2.
20 Wasps 184, Birds 1680, Lysistrata 990, 1236‒38, Women at the Thesmophoria 623‒24, Frogs 
49‒51, 650, 1471, Women at the Ecclesia 553, and see further Sommerstein 2007b, 136‒7.
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curses, like other types of curses in Greek thought, could be delayed from one 
generation to another.21
Cases in which perjury is not punished are extremely rare, and it seems 
important that the perjurer and/or their family should suffer appropriately. Suf-
fering in addition to death or the extinction of the family line is a crucial aspect of 
anticipated divine punishment for perjury, as we have seen in most of the exam-
ples discussed above. Even if the perjurer does not suffer, it is important that his 
(or her) family is expected to suffer instead (e.g. Lyc. Leocr. 79). Moreover, even 
if perjurers seem to profit in the short term, there is, according to Theognis, no 





In archaic and classical Greek literature, where the binding power of oaths really 
mattered in agreements and covenants between individuals (see ch. 10), and 
keeping one’s oath (euorkia) was considered to be a sign of an individual’s virtue 
and integrity (Pind. Ol. 2.61‒70; Soph. Ant. 365‒75; Ar. Wealth 61‒2),22 perjury was 
inevitably marked as a serious moral infraction. In Plato’s Gorgias (525a1), swear-
ing falsely figures at the top of the list of moral failings ascribed to souls receiv-
ing judgement from Rhadamanthys, along with more general faults of injustice, 
deception and boastfulness. Comedy preserves a similar image: in Aristophanes 
perjurers are set alongside other despicable wrongdoers, such as father- and 
mother-beaters, in the same pit in the underworld (Frogs 145‒51, 273‒5), while 
claims about the great benefits of committing perjury in Knights (296‒8, 418‒28, 
1239) are apparently too outrageous even for Paphlagon-Cleon, who is the arch-
villain of the play; they are made by the Sausage-Seller, who defeats him by being, 
or posing as, a still greater villain. Perjury ranked high among the moral offences 
in literary representations.
21 See further Ch. 2 on oath curses.
22 Euripides’ Hippolytus provides probably our best-known example in literature on the sub-
ject of morality and euorkia. See most recently Fletcher 2012, 126‒9. 
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In §12.1, we saw that the gods were, in theory, held responsible for exacting 
punishment in case of perjury. Yet, at the same time, as S&B have shown in detail 
regarding reactions to perceived breaches of oath in interstate alliances and trea-
ties, we should certainly not assume a human passivity or absence of human 
agency in the event of a perceived perjury.23 The present chapter sketches out 
evidence for the nature of the human responses to the moral offence of perjury in 
circumstances of oath-taking among individuals. What did an individual do when 
(s)he discovered that (s)he had been deceived by a false oath? What were the 
means and forms of agency, as depicted in archaic and classical Greek literature, 
through which a victim of perjury could try to affect the life of the perjurer?
There are two general points that need to be stated in advance regarding our 
evidence as a whole for the actual human perception of perjury. First, it was, 
naturally, much easier for an individual to perceive perjury after a promissory 
oath that the swearer did not keep, than after assertory statements about the past 
or present that the swearer did not believe to be true. In the former case perjury 
comes to light through the swearer’s subsequent actions, but in the latter case it is 
more difficult to discern a perjury on the spot and act against the perjurer. Accord-
ingly, evidence for responses to perjury in archaic and classical Greek literature 
is mostly found in relation to promissory oaths.24 Second, as far as we are able to 
tell from the victims’ reactions, nowhere is there any indication that a victim of 
perjury made any differentiation between intentional and unintentional perjury, 
with a view, for instance, to forgiving or justifying the latter.25 Thus despite 
the most famous line of antiquity about oath-taking, which brings to the fore a 
concern about the swearer’s intention (Eur. Hipp. 612, “my tongue sworn but my 
mind remains unsworn“; see §11.3), victims of perjury consistently condemn the 
breach of oaths irrespective of initial intentions.
23 See esp. S&B 147‒247; 280‒90 and 312‒20 with further bibliography. 
24 In Aristophanic comedy, where the vast majority of assertory oaths are informal (see ch. 
13), we can detect a few cases of perjury committed in relation to an assertory oath that are fol-
lowed by an explicit reaction of the interlocutor (Ar. Lys. 989‒92, Wasps 184‒9, Thesm. 623‒7; 
Frogs 49‒51, 650 (exposed in 741‒2). However, we hardly ever witness any other reaction than the 
simple statement of disbelief in, or being unconvinced by, an admittedly exaggerated statement. 
Carawan 2007 has argued that our few attestations of perjury within business transactions also 
relate to assertory oaths between the two parties after quarrels (see n.43).
25 This is also in agreement with the earliest attestation of the word epiorkos in Greek litera-
ture, in Iliad 10.332, which concerns a promissory oath that was made sincerely but was not in 
the end fulfilled. On intentionality and perjury cf. Plescia 1970, 83‒91 who, however, sees the 
term epiorkia mainly in relation to intentional perjury, especially in later theoretical discussions. 
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The following section discusses specific representations in different literary 
genres of the victims’ reactions to perjury as a disruption of bonds of friendship 
and trust among individuals. Since they are largely based on the victim’s accusa-
tions26 their truthfulness, accuracy and objectivity can easily be debated.27 Still, if 
nothing else, they can help us build a sense of the cultural mentality surrounding 
perjury and its policing, without recourse to the unseen actions of the gods. As 
will become evident, the persistent representations of human reactions to perjury 
throughout archaic and classical Greece testify to the continuing human belief in 
the binding power of the oath. Despite any theoretical discussions about a decline 
of the oath in the fourth century related to the readiness of individuals to break 
their oaths (see ch. 15), the responses by the victims balance out any such claims 
and restore the perception of the oath as a serious business among humans.
12.2.2 From friendship to enmity, from trust to distrust
As a means of facilitating interaction among individuals, oaths established bonds 
of reciprocal friendship (philotēs or philia) and more than any other agreement, 
they were used especially to signify a shift from a state of previous enmity to a 
state of friendship (Il. 3.94; h.Herm. 518‒26).28 It is thus common for victims of 
perjury to see it as effecting a breakdown of philia, representing the reverse tran-
sition to a state of animosity and hatred, wherein the (perjuring) previous friend 
is treated as an enemy. In a fragment of Sophocles’ Oenomaus (fr. 472), a speaker 
of doubtful identity ranks the reproach of friends (φίλων μέμψις), along with the 
fear of gods, as a crucial deterrent against committing perjury.29 A clear dem-
26 Admission of perjury by the perjurer is, naturally, very rare in Greek sources. Cf. Thuc. 7.18.2 
where the Spartans come to a retrospective appreciation and conclusion that they deserved their 
disaster at Pylos because they had broken the Thirty Years’ Peace by resorting to war, when the 
Athenians had offered to submit their disputes to arbitration. They admit this, however, only 
as a way of trying to make sense of, and account for, why they had come off worse in the war of 
431‒421. 
27 The opposing scholarly approaches regarding the counter-claims of the parties in relation 
to the perjury of the Plataean oath (see S.R. West 2003 and Hornblower 2007), or to Philip’s per-
jury in Demosthenes (see S&B 280‒90), furnish good instances of this. 
28 See Herman 1987, 50, 59 for oaths sealing rituals of philia; Karavites 1992, 48‒58 for philotēs 
in archaic interstate alliances; Fletcher 2008, 24‒8. Perjury as an offence among previous philoi 
does not come under scrutiny in M.W. Blundell’s seminal study (1989) on the moral principle of 
“helping friends, harming enemies”.
29 Sommerstein & Talboy 2012, 75, following Welcker and Pearson, suggest that most probably 
the speaker is Hippodameia demanding an oath by Myrtilus (to help Pelops with the chariot 
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onstration of such reproach is evident in the blame poetry of the iambic genre. 
Twice perjury is aggressively presented as something that turns a friendship sour, 
and represents the primary ammunition with which the poet launches his invec-
tive against his enemy (Hipponax fr. 115; Archil. frr. 172‒181).30 In fact Archilochus 
fr. 173 establishes perjury as the basic reason for his sustained verbal assault on 
Lycambes:
For who does not know [says Origen] that many who have shared salt and table 
have conspired against their fellow diners? And the history of the Greeks and bar-
barians is full of such examples. It is in fact the reproach which the iambic poet of 
Paros levels against Lycambes for having broken an agreement after salt and table:  
     You have turned your back on salt and table  
     by which you swore a solemn oath  
(Orig. c. Celsum 2.21, trans. Gerber)
Most recently Gagné 2009 has drawn attention to the broken oath of Lycambes 
which underlies the whole tradition of Archilochus’ invective (fr. 172‒181), a 
promise of marriage between his daughter and the poet that Lycambes violated. 
Significantly, the insult is not configured as simply a personal one. Through invec-
tive, Lycambes is presented as an enemy of the poet for having broken his oath, 
and also of the group at large, his aristocratic hetairoi, with whom he shared his 
feasting, wine and poetry (“salt and table”).31 The wider symposiastic context is 
enlisted as a witness of Lycambes’ perjury. The later attestations about his alleged 
suicide and/or those of his daughters (Anth.Pal. 7.351, 352),32 show that accusa-
race against Oenomaus); cf. Calder 1974, 205‒6 who regards the line as a generalized statement 
on behalf of Hippodameia. Recently Fletcher 2012, 137‒8 offers the alternative of an oath of fair 
competition between Pelops and Oenomaus with reference to a group of fourth-century vases 
from South Italy. Among these, she draws attention to an Apulian vase in St Petersburg State 
Hermitage Museum (4323) that features the two of them and the presence of an Erinys (137n. 
36). This Erinys, though, may simply allude to the future revenge curse from Oenomaus against 
Pelops, to be activated after his death in the chariot race ([Apoll.] Epit. 2.7, Σ Eur. Or. 990); or it 
could even be a hint at the curse of Myrtilus against Pelops and his family, after Pelops killed him 
by casting him into the sea off the Peloponnesian coast, when Myrtilus made a sexual advance to 
Hippodameia (Soph. El. 502‒15, Eur. Or. 996‒7, [Apoll.] Epit. 2.8, Σ Eur. Or. 990). 
30 In Hipponax fr. 115.5 the perjurer is described as “trampling upon his oath although he was 
previously a hetairos”. “To trample an oath” is an expression that indicates symbolically the 
reversal of a previous friendship (see Alcaeus fr. 129. 13‒24; trag. adesp. 188b); for the political 
allusions of Hipponax’s philia as revealed by the word hetairos in the sympotic context cf. e.g. 
Degani 1984, 91‒3.
31 See Gagné 2009, esp. 265‒270, Stehle 1997, 240‒2; C.G. Brown 1997, 58‒62.
32 See the detailed analysis of the epigrams in Rosen 2007. Interestingly, as Gagné 2009, 260‒1 
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tions of perjury could be imagined as having significant, and fatal, ramifications 
for the accused party.33 One aspect of this must have been the public humiliation 
of being exposed as a false friend and as a danger to social cohesion.34
The tradition of the violent end of Lycambes’ daughters caused indirectly by 
verbal attacks brings up the question whether perjury, as a rupture of bonds of 
philia among individuals, caused more violent and direct physical interventions 
by the victims of perjury. In contrast to perceived acts of perjury in interstate alli-
ances that lead to war, perjury among individuals is not generally represented 
as leading to overt physical violence, except in one genre, tragedy,35 where 
this happens quite frequently. At one level, when perjurers are punished at the 
hands of their fellow men in the plays without any explicit justification for their 
punishment, the audience can easily assume divine intervention to be at work 
(Parthenopaeus in Aesch. Sept. 529‒32;36 Capaneus in Eur. Suppl. 498; Lichas 
in Soph. Trach. 399, killed by Heracles in 781‒2). But characters in tragedy can 
also explicitly name and present their own aggressive physical intervention as 
a direct consequence of perjury. In the case of Euripides’ Phoenissae, perjury is 
the reason behind the most extreme expression of hostility. The breach of the 
brothers’ mutual oath for ruling Thebes alternately, as articulated by Polyneices 
(Eur. Phoen. 481‒95, cf. 433‒4 and 626‒30), acquires further political implications 
when it leads to the civil war in Thebes and finally to the death of Eteocles and 
Polyneices themselves.37 On a more personal level, the best-known intrafamil-
ial event of perjury, Jason’s betrayal of Medea, at first triggers Medea’s vicious 
noted, in the actual epigrams the daughters of Lycambes take oaths themselves to deny any rela-
tionship with Archilochus. For the likelihood of a connection between the indirect tradition and 
Archilochus’ attacks on Lycambes as reflecting reality, see e.g. Carey 1986 (contra M.L. West 1974, 
26‒8; Nagy 1979, 243‒52 and cf. Burnett 1983, 89‒91). 
33 Suicide by the perjurer himself, and as a consequence of his offence, appears twice in Greek 
literature: in Herodotus (3.74), Prexaspes commits suicide after he reveals to the Persian people 
the truth about the death of Cyrus’ son, Smerdis, and the involvement of the magoi in this, while 
he asks the Persians for revenge, constructing himself as a conditional curse. The second case ap-
pears in a fragment from the Politeiai of Heracleides Lembus (fr. 62 Dilts): a certain Polemarchus 
commits perjury in order to avoid his military service; as a result, divine punishment seems to 
take the form of weasels which bite him during the night and do not let him sleep; this leads him 
to take his own life.
34 Cf. C.G. Brown 1997, 69. 
35 On the issue of perjury in tragedy in general, cf. Mikalson 1991, 80‒7; Fletcher 2012, 123‒57. 
36 The oath of the impious Parthenopaeus that he will sack the city of the Cadmeians in defi-
ance of Zeus ironically remains unfulfilled due to the actual death of the swearer. 
37 Cf. Eur. fr. 286.7 where it is said that tyrants break oaths to sack cities. On the importance of 
the theme of oaths and perjury in Eur. Phoen. see Fletcher 2012, 129‒35. 
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verbal attacks against her former husband, and finally culminates in her per-
sonal revenge on their offspring (1386‒8), which she executes as a divine agent, 
an Erinys (1261).38 Only in these extreme scenarios of revenge, represented in 
tragedy, does perjury lead to direct human physical intervention. Otherwise, indi-
vidual human responses to perjury follow more attenuated, but still very influen-
tial, forms of expression.
One such form relates to exposing the rupture of bonds of trust as a result 
of perjury. In the previous cases of human responses to perjury, the offence con-
cerned intimate relationships among individuals, but in any kind of human inter-
action, oath-taking presupposes the emergence and establishment of a relation-
ship of trust between two or more individuals (see §4.2). Certain criteria could 
condition trust in oath-taking in general: e.g. villains were expected to be more 
susceptible to breaking bonds of trust and suspicion of their tendency to perjury 
is repeatedly reported.39 Yet, obviously, exposing false oath-taking provided the 
securest proof for the wronged party that one was untrustworthy in general and, 
in particular, that one was not to be trusted again in circumstances of oath-taking. 
Such a scenario seems to be envisaged in Antiphanes (fr. 237), where a charac-
ter sees previous false swearing as the only justifiable reason that one might not 
believe a sworn statement:
If someone looks down upon an oath-taker unless he knows that he had committed perjury 
in the past, it seems to me that such a man looks down upon the gods and he himself had 
committed perjury in the past.40
38 On the oath theme in the play see, most recently, Mossman 2011, 42‒5 (and cf. Boedeker, 
1991, Kovacs, 1993, Burnett 1998, 192‒224, S.R. West 2003, 443‒4) who makes the sensible point 
(42 n. 152) that Jason never denies, throughout the play, having sworn an oath to Medea despite 
the accusations she makes. This point refutes Arlene Allan’s claim (2007) that we are meant to 
suppose he never did swear such an oath, contrary to almost all scholars who have dealt with 
the issue of perjury in the play.
39 cf. e.g. Antiphanes fr. 230: “whoever offers an oath to a wicked man is mad (mainetai) be-
cause the gods do now the opposite. If anyone forswears in their name, the man who invited him 
to swear is struck by lightning directly, I believe, because he trusted someone”. It may well be 
that the end of the sentence has been lost and that Antiphanes wrote “…trusted someone wick-
ed” (see ch. 15). In Theognis 399, an advice is given for the good man to flee “oaths that destroy 
men” which implies that the good man should be careful in whom he trusts in oath-taking. Cf. 
also Theognis 284 and Ar. Knights 296‒8, 418‒28, 1239 (mentioned above). 
40 In Democritus fr. 239.1‒3 a perjurer is by definition a wicked man who cannot be trusted. The 
last sentence in Antiphanes identifies the man suspicious of perjury as someone who has com-
mitted perjury in the past, and the same idea is found in Amphis fr. 42, “he who does not believe 
an oath will himself be a ready and clever perjurer”. In ch. 15 these comic fragments are placed 
in the context of mid-fourth-century intellectual discussions that questioned the value of oaths.
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It is thus not surprising that, in our sources, a perjurer in interpersonal oath-tak-
ing is almost never offered a second chance of swearing an oath. One exception 
though stands out in Aristophanic comedy: although clear-cut perjury usually 
does not trigger a human – or, indeed, divine – response in comedy,41 in Aris-
tophanes’ Clouds we find a single case of a victim offering an oath to an already 
known perjurer42 and it is significant because it concerns a money deal, where 
trust is a basic prerequisite.43 After Strepsiades has renounced the traditional 
belief in gods, a creditor visits him, bringing with him a witness and, notably, 
claiming that he is about to “make one of his fellow-demesmen an enemy” (1219). 
He reminds Strepsiades of an oath44 that he had sworn in the past promising 
to repay a loan of twelve minae borrowed from him, the creditor, to buy a horse 
(1222‒30); Strepsiades denies the existence of such a loan (1225‒6). Faced by this 
denial, the creditor challenges Strepsiades to swear another oath denying his 
debt:
Cred. Will you be willing to deny this upon oath of the gods?  
Streps. What gods?  
Cred. Zeus, Hermes and Poseidon.  
Streps. Yes by Zeus! And would pay down three obols too for the privilege!  
Cred. Then may you perish one day for your impudence!
The creditor’s curse on Strepsiades for his shamelessness makes it clear that he 
does not believe him, in spite of Strepsiades’ readiness to swear an oath. Thus 
even in this example, though an oath was offered, the exchange ends up expos-
41 See §13.2 and cf. n.3. For the use of oaths in Aristophanic comedy see also Dillon 1995. 
42 Cf. Aesch. fr. 394 (from an unidentified play): “oaths do not give credibility (pistis) to men, 
but men to oaths”, again suggesting that an oath is to be trusted only if one knows the character 
of the swearer. If not a generalized statement, the line may be a reply to a well-known liar or 
perjurer who offers an oath to the speaker but has his offer rejected on the grounds of previous 
untrustworthy behaviour. 
43 Carawan 2007 and Sommerstein (§4.2 above) have shown that in business transactions an 
exchange of oaths was not required, unless to settle an emerging quarrel: asking for an oath in 
advance would have implied a major lack of trust that has no place in business deals. It is telling 
that in law-court speeches where oaths are reported to settle such quarrels emerging in busi-
ness deals, they are always raised in the context of perjury committed by the opponent (Dem. 
48.51‒52, 54; Isaeus 2.40). The effect that these accusations could have had on the perjurer’s 
future reputation for trustworthiness in business transactions is apparent.
44 As Sommerstein states in §13.2, there is no indication what form this oath took, i.e. whether 
it was informal “yes, by Zeus” as a reply to a request that he would repay the loan or whether 
it was expressed more formally by Strepsiades, “I swear by the gods that I will repay what I am 
borrowing”. 
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ing (again) the unreliability and untrustworthiness of the perjurer who constantly 
lies and is unable to (re-)establish relationships of trust.
The emphasis in this section has been, first and foremost, on the immedi-
ate reactions reported by victims of perjury against the perjurer in interpersonal 
affairs. Within the same context, the following two sections turn the focus spe-
cifically on the conscious involvement, on the part of the victim of perjury, of 
external groups to exercise influence against the perjurer – namely, the wider 
public and the gods.
12.2.3 Bringing perjury to the attention of others
There is a common line of human action traceable in the aforementioned instances 
of a perceived perjury. The invective of iambic poetry broadcasts perjury to the 
participants in the symposium and the public at large. Similarly Medea, through 
her stage performance of being a victim of Jason’s broken oaths, involves the 
chorus – and audience – in an open assault on Jason’s reputation as a hero. So 
too the creditor serially accuses Strepsiades of perjury in front of his witness and, 
again, the audience, while the perjurer himself – in a neat comic twist – seems to 
luxuriate in the possibilities of swearing falsely. Since perjury was such a serious 
moral offence, the most powerful way to influence a perpetrator’s life in human 
terms was to make the offence public and expose him as a perjurer among his 
peers.45 The consequences of being thus exposed ranged from public humilia-
tion and contempt to tangible difficulties in establishing relationships of trust in 
the future.46
45 In formal oath-taking, the social dimensions of the offence of perjury were, for example, 
apparent in efforts to record it on stones: in 419/8 BCE Alcibiades makes this clear when he per-
suaded the Athenians to inscribe under the stele recording the peace of Nicias that “the Spartans 
have not kept their oaths” (Thuc. 5.56.3), exposing the offenders to the public. An Athenian de-
cree of 363/2 BC (RO 39), about the establishment of an agreement between Ceos and Athens, 
reports not only an oath sworn at the making of a past agreement and written on stelai, but also 
“the names of those who had contravened their oaths and agreement” (RO 39.30‒35). As we are 
informed, the latter “returned [i.e. from exile] and overturned the stelai”, a fact that hints at the 
great impact of the public recording and exposure of the offence. 
46 On similar lines, cf. Cairns 1993, 210: “not only does perjury involve disregard of the honour 
of the gods, it reveals both the perjurer’s lack of concern for the honour of those before whom the 
oath was sworn and a reprehensible lack of concern for his own honour – for the exposure, that 
is, of his falsehood which the public nature of the institution makes inevitable”.
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Arguably the quintessential space where public accusations of perjury were 
articulated and worked out was the law-court.47 In the theoretical treatise, Rhe-
torica ad Alexandrum, probably by Anaximenes of Lampsacus, accusations for 
perjury are defined in moral terms and figure as one of the main rhetorical strate-
gies in the court: a litigant is said to be able to disparage the opponent’s oath by 
saying that “the kind of people who commit crimes are also those who are not 
concerned about perjury”; meanwhile, the defence of his own oath is given in 
terms of not only avoiding the fear of the gods but also, very importantly, avoiding 
the shame [αἰσχύνη] among his peers ([Arist.] Rhet. ad Alex. 1432a33‒b4). Gener-
ally, orators’ speeches preserve a wealth of verbal attacks regarding the offence of 
perjury and as Martin (2009) has shown, these kinds of attacks were extensively 
exploited for rhetorical purposes. This is not the place to examine forensic attacks 
on perjury in detail, but two examples of accusations of perjury in homicide cases 
will suffice here to show how speakers could achieve the public exposure of their 
opponent as a perjurer.48
In Antiphon 6 verbal attacks implicating perjury form a main line of argu-
mentation by the speaker against his opponent. The accused chorēgos tries first 
to prove that his accusers are clearly committing perjury when they claim that 
he killed Diodotus by planning his death. He starts with presenting them as “the 
most perjured and impious of all humans” (6.33, 48) and underlines the fact that 
they can easily break any kind of oaths (6.49, 51). At the very end of the speech, he 
explicitly invites the jurors to pay heed to the fact that as perjurers the prosecu-
tors will also try to deceive the judicial body itself (6.51):49
Is there then no court they would not enter intent on deceiving it? Is there no oath they 
would hesitate to swear, these ungodly villains? They know you are the most righteous and 
just jurors in Greece, and yet they come before you intent on deceiving you if they can, 
despite the mighty oaths they have sworn.
47 Note that perjury in Athens did not constitute a legal crime (see S&B 90).
48 Other relevant passages: homicide – Lys. 3.1, 21; Isoc. 18.54, 56 (witness in a previous homi-
cide trial); other private cases – Dem. 39.3‒4; 40.2, 10; Dem. 42.11‒12, 29; [Dem.] 47.31; Dem. 54.39; 
Dem. 58.43; Dem. 21.119, 120‒1; Dem. 31.9; [Dem.] 48.52; [Dem.] 49. 66‒7; Isaeus 2.40; perjury by 
public figures in state or interstate oaths – (Demosthenes) Aeschines 2.153; 3.77; 3.99; 3.149‒50; 
3.208, Dinarchus 1.47; (Aeschines) Dem. 19.94, 134; (Philip) Dem. 2.5, 10; 3.17‒18; 9.15‒16; 10.11; 
11.2‒3; 18.71; 19.132; (Cersobleptes) Dem. 23.170‒3; (Charidemus) Dem. 23.176‒7; (Alcibiades) 
[Andoc.] 4.39. For the invalidity of Demosthenes’ portrayal of Philip as a perjurer see S&B 280‒90. 
49 Cf. Lys. 3.1, 21 where the verbal attacks in a trial for wounding held before the Areopagus 
council are structured in similar terms. 
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Apart from convincing and influencing the judicial body, such ramifications of an 
exposure of perjury in a legal dispute inevitably extend to the space outside the 
courtroom. Characteristically, in Apollodorus’ Against Neaira, the litigant recalls 
the perjury committed by an opponent on a previous occasion, when falsely pros-
ecuting him for homicide. After rejecting the accusation, he comments that his 
opponent “left the court as a perjured man and with the reputation of a ponēros” 
([Dem.] 59.10). Irrespective of the truthfulness of these remarks, the way perjury is 
handled by litigants demonstrates the strong influence that verbal accusations of 
perjury can exercise on a perceived perjurer, simply by his exposure in front of a 
public audience.50 By bringing perjury to the attention of others as an outrageous 
offence, the victim could hit back against his enemy in the expectation that his 
opponent would then not be trusted either by the judges in the present case or the 
public in general in future occasions. The alleged victim of perjury, as long as he 
manages to persuade his audience, holds the reputation and future dealings of 
his opponent in his hands.
12.2.4 Bringing perjury to the attention of the gods
The first part of this chapter (§12.1) examined in detail divine responses to perjury, 
while all of the examples in the present section concerned a perceived perjury 
that involved human agency in its confrontation. At the end of the chapter it is 
worth looking at one type of human response to perjury that is, indeed, based on 
human agency but implicates also the divine through verbal means. This is the 
case of prayers or spontaneous curses against the offender that invoke the gods.
Since gods, as we have seen, can be late in exacting punishment on the per-
jurer, victims of perjury frequently felt the need to remind them about the offence 
and engage them actively.51 Archaic poetry had already laid the grounds for this 
practice. In Alcaeus, perjury is a major component of the alleged treachery of 
50 A similar implication is present in Hypereides fr. 40 Jensen, where we are told that the 
politician Aristophon had acquired the nickname “Ardettus” (a place where official oaths were 
regularly taken) because he so often committed perjury there.
51 Consultation of oracles, as human-divine verbal communication, is also reported in relation 
to perjury, but the evidence is limited. When they suspected interstate perjury, the Spartans con-
sulted the Delphic oracle to find out whether they should go to war with the Athenians, since 
they were convinced that the Athenians had broken the terms of the Thirty Years’ Peace – and 
received the positive answer that the god would be with them whether “invoked or not” which re-
sulted in their attack (Thuc. 1.118.3). Compare also the story of Glaucus the Spartan (§10.2). Much 
later evidence in the “confession inscriptions” from Asia Minor show that individuals visited 
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his former co-conspirator Pittacus (fr. 129);52 as a result, the poet utters a prayer 
for revenge in the sacred precinct of Hera in a personal communication to the 
goddess.53 Most often, however, this form of communication with the divine takes 
the form of a spontaneous, aggressive act of cursing against the perjurer. In the 
invective of Hipponax (fr. 115), the elaborate curse that precedes the actual refer-
ence to his ex-friend’s perjury becomes a powerful verbal weapon against the per-
jurer. The same linguistic feature appears in the language of the victims of perjury 
in drama too. In Aristophanes’ Clouds, as we saw, the creditor curses Strepsiades 
(1236) and invokes the gods (1239) when he realizes that he has been deceived 
under oath. Similarly, in Euripides’ Medea the act of cursing is a typical element 
in the mouth of the heroine, as she brings Jason’s perjury into the open (Eur. 
Med. 160‒72; cf. 20‒2).54 Behind this form of human response a common feature 
of oath-taking may be identified: the human agent re-enacts verbally the self-
imprecation of the oath that the perjurer has broken. By these means the victim of 
perjury aims to reactivate the oath and remind the gods of their role as punishers 
of people who break oaths.55 Especially in cases where there were no other means 
of redressing the wrong suffered or making it known, as for instance in the case of 
Alcaeus, this type of verbal response was the victims’ sole and safe way of influ-
encing the subsequent actions and lives of their offenders in the event of perjury.
It is, thus, apparent that when one turns to human responses among indi-
viduals, accusations and verbal attacks form the main means of affecting nega-
tively a perceived or alleged perjurer in literary accounts. Victims of perjury are 
represented as bringing into focus the breach of fundamental moral values, such 
as friendship or trust established through oath-taking, a fact that naturally had 
a negative impact upon the future dealings of a perjurer with other people. This 
was efficiently achieved by expanding these attacks into wider contexts that 
implicate others as listeners, such as an audience in a lawcourt or even the gods 
temples in order to confess the offence of perjury and ask the divine about what action should be 
taken: see Chaniotis 2004, 34 with reference to BIWK 52, 102, 103, 106, 120.
52 In all probability the same oath is mentioned in Alcaeus fr. 167.1 and 306(g) 9‒11. For a read-
ing of this oath in relation to Near Eastern parallels, see Bachvarova 2007. 
53 Cf. Archilochus fr. 177 where the attested invocation/prayer to Zeus for justice was very 
likely a response to Lycambes’ perjury. Within the same framework of prayers of revenge, we 
can place Archidamus’ prayer for justice (Thuc. 2.74) before the Spartan attack on the Plataeans. 
Archidamus asks the gods’ consent for the justified punishment of the wrong-doers. The perfor-
mance of this prayer indicates Archidamus’ effort to justify the actual human intervention.
54 Cf. further e.g. Eur. Cycl. 270, Phoen. 491‒3, Dem. 10.11, Xen. Anab. 3.2.6. 
55 For this point, esp. in relation to archaic poetry, cf. L. Watson 1991, 56‒62; Giordano 1999, 
55‒6; Bachvarova 2007, 182. 
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themselves, with the latter expected to perform their role as punishers of perjury. 
The persistent representations of human complaints and accusations of perjury 
throughout the archaic and classical periods show that, in practice, the percep-




13.1 How informal oaths are used
For the purposes of this book, an “informal oath” is defined as an oath which 
meets both the following specifications:
(a) The sole linguistic marker is the presence of a phrase consisting of an affirmative or 
negative particle (in Attic ναὶ μἀ, νή, οὐ μά, or μά; for the equivalents in other dialects, 
see §5.1, pp. 80‒1) followed by the name of a god, hero, or Eideshort in the accusative 
case1 (with or without a definite article),2 or alternatively (in Boeotian dialect) ἴττω fol-
lowed by the name of a god or hero in the nominative.
(b) The oath occurs in a prose text or in one of the less elevated poetic genres such as satyr-
drama, comedy, elegy or iambus (for oaths of the same form in epic, lyric and tragedy, 
see §5.1, pp. 81‒3), or in an inscription of informal nature.3
These oaths are very unevenly distributed in our data. The following table shows 
their frequency in texts of various kinds in our period. In the case of satyr-drama 
the figures are necessarily approximate, since it is often uncertain whether a 
quoted fragment comes from a satyr-play or a tragedy, particularly when the 
quoting author does not name the play. In the case of some of the better-preserved 
authors, an approximate figure is given for the total surviving wordage of that 
author’s works4 and for the frequency of informal oaths per thousand words.
1 Or by a plural or dual expression meaning “the gods”.
2 If the god sworn by is Zeus, the article is optional; everywhere else it is normally obligatory. 
Apart from a series of comic passages (Ar. Birds 194; Antiphanes fr. 288; Timocles fr. 41) which all 
seem to be quoting or parodying a tragic line (trag. adesp. 123a), there is only a single exception, 
among passages meeting the above definition of informal oaths – in Plato’s Symposium (219c), 
where Alcibiades swears μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς that his attempt to carry out a reverse seduction of 
Socrates had proved an abject failure. This formula occurs nowhere else in Greek literature, but 
the shorter forms μὰ θεούς and νὴ θεούς appear in a fourth-century lyric poem of elevated style 
if not of elevated subject, the Banquet of Philoxenus of Leucas (PMG 836b.20), and occasionally 
in Hellenistic and Imperial texts of various kinds (Herodas 7.99; Anth.Pal. 7.351.7 [Dioscorides], 
12.48.2 [Meleager]; Plutarch, Aratus 23.6, citing a saying of Persaeus the Stoic datable to 243 BC; 
Aristaenetus, Letter 1.4.4; Julian, Against Heraclius the Cynic 9.25 and Misopogon 22.2). They are 
likely to be poetic in origin. 
3 The known examples are IG i3 1361 (gravestone for a woodcutter), xii(3) 536 (rock-cut erotic 
graffito), SEG 29.77 (“speech-bubble” on vase painting), 36.114 (cup graffito).
4 These figures are based on those given in TLG; that for Hypereides includes the fragments 
of the speech Against Diondas published by Carey et al. 2008 from the Archimedes palimpsest.
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 Wordage Informal Per 1000 
 (thousands) oaths words
Satyr-drama  7 
Sophocles  1 
Euripides  6 
Comedy  682 
Aristophanes 110 589 5.35
Epicharmus  6 
Pseudepicharmea  1 
Eupolis  11 
Cratinus  2 
Other Old Comedy  14 
Antiphanes  15 
Alexis  11 
Other Middle Comedy  25 
Anonymous fragments  3 
Elegy and iambus  4 
Theognis  1 
Ananius  1 
Anonymous fragments  2 
Oratory  248 
Antiphon5 22 2 0.11
Andocides6 18 1 0.06
Lysias7 64 4 0.06
Isocrates 125 0 0.00
Isaeus 33 11 0.33
Demosthenes8 309 196 0.63
5 Both of Antiphon’s informal oaths are in fragmentary works; none is in the three speeches 
preserved complete or in the Tetralogies.
6 The one instance occurs in a political speech (3.15), and is an early example of the use of νὴ 
Δία to introduce words attributed to an imaginary opponent (see ch. 9, pp. 233‒7).
7 There are no informal oaths in lawcourt speeches written by Lysias himself. Three are found 
in the speech Against Andocides (Lysias 6), which is certainly by another (though contemporary) 
hand, and the fourth is in the strange speech Against Fellow Members of a Club (Lysias 8), which 
may also be spurious and was in any case written for delivery (or as if for delivery) at a private 
meeting.
8 The figures for Demosthenes include six informal oaths in the seven speeches in the corpus 
(46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 59) which are generally ascribed to Apollodorus son of Pasion (see Trevett 
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Aeschines 46 21 0.46
Hypereides 22 6 0.27
Lycurgus 15 2 0.13
Deinarchus 19 5 0.26
Philosophical dialogue  508 
Plato9 583 288 0.49
Xenophon (dialogues)10 72 219 3.04
Antisthenes  1 
History  17 
Herodotus 189 0 0.00
Thucydides 153 0 0.00
Xenophon (Hell. & Anab.)11 126 17 0.14
All others  0 
Other prose  96 
Xenophon (Cyropaedia &c.)12 119 93 0.78
Anaximenes13  1 
Aristotle14  2 
All literary texts  1562 
1992, 50‒76). These speeches contain about 30,000 words, so Apollodorus’ frequency is only 0.20 
per thousand words.
9 The frequency of informal oaths varies fairly widely among the dialogues, but in those gener-
ally acknowledged to be late (Parmenides, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, Laws, 
Epinomis) it drops off drastically; these eight works, with some 213,000 words, contain only eight 
informal oaths (0.04 per thousand words), whereas no genuine dialogue outside the group has a 
frequency lower than 0.29 per thousand (Symposium). The dialogues generally regarded as spuri-
ous (Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, Rivals, Theages, Hippias Major, Cleitophon, Minos) have a 
markedly high frequency of informal oaths (fifty in 38,000 words, or 1.32 per thousand). If both 
these groups are disregarded, the average frequency for the genuine early and middle works is 
0.69 per thousand.
10 The Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology, and Hiero.
11 All 17 informal oaths occur in the quoted words of characters (three of them in speeches by 
Xenophon himself in the Anabasis).
12 This covers all works in the Xenophontine corpus not included under “Philosophical dia-
logue” or “History”. Of the 93 informal oaths, all but two occur in the Cyropaedia: there is one in 
the indignant fourteenth chapter of the Lacedaemonian Constitution, and one in a quoted remark 
in Agesilaus (5.5.6). The ratio for the Cyropaedia is 1.13 per thousand, for the other works 0.05.
13 The one informal oath in the so-called Rhetorica ad Alexandrum comes from a snatch of imag-
inary dialogue in an imaginary court case.
14 Both of Aristotle’s informal oaths are in the Politics.
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It is clear from this evidence that the informal oath is overwhelmingly a conversa-
tional phenomenon. Its natural home is in the literary genres that imitate conver-
sation – comedy (and, to a limited extent, satyr-drama), dialogue (especially the 
dialogues of Xenophon, which rarely slip, as Plato’s so often do, from colloquy 
into exposition), and reported conversations in narrative works (though, as was 
noted in §5.1 [pp. 80‒1 n.18], they are entirely avoided in Herodotus, who often 
reports conversations, just as much as in Thucydides who hardly ever does). In 
oratory, these oaths first make a significant appearance in Isaeus, and remain 
relatively frequent in orators of the next generation, especially Demosthenes;15 
they are particularly common in political (as opposed to forensic) speeches (43 
in 46,000 words, or 0.97 per thousand). In all other forms of literature informal 
oaths are very rare.
In all genres, except where our sample is very small, the overwhelming 
majority of informal oaths invoke the name of Zeus. The greatest variety is found 
in comedy, where we find oaths by the following powers: Aglaurus (1), Aphro-
dite (15), Apollo (31), Artemis (10), Asclepius (1), Athena (1),16 Castor (1), Demeter 
(25), Demeter and Kore (“the two goddesses”) (20), Diocles (an Eleusinian and 
Megarian hero) (1), Dionysus (16), Ge (6), “the gods” (27),17 the Graces (1), Hecate 
(8), Helios (1), Hephaestus (1), Heracles (5), Hermes (7), Hestia (2), Kore (1), the 
Nymphs (1), Pandrosus (1), Poseidon (28), the Twin Gods18 (12), Uranus or Heaven 
(8), multiple gods (10),19 unspecified (1),20 non-divine objects (11),21 making a 
total of 253 or 37% of all informal oaths in comedy.
In other genres the figures are as follows:
15 The orators often use νὴ Δία to introduce the words of an imaginary opponent; for this tech-
nique see ch. 9.
16 Remarkably rare, particularly in comparison with the usage of the orators. Was it deliberately 
avoided? In the only instance (Ar. Peace 218) the speaker is another god (Hermes), not speaking 
in his own name but quoting the words of a typical Athenian on a past occasion. 
17 Including one oath by “the twelve gods” (Ar. Knights 235), and one by “the gods and god-
desses” (Anaxandrides fr. 2).
18 Castor and Pollux (when used by Spartans) or Amphion and Zethus (when used by The-
bans).
19 Some of these are combinations like those found in the orators (Zeus and the gods; Zeus and 
Athena; Zeus, Apollo and Demeter; Athena and the gods); three are quotations or parodies of the 
tragic (or satyric) line μὰ γῆν, μὰ κρήνας, μὰ ποταμούς, μὰ νάματα (trag. adesp. 123a). Socrates is 
made to swear by a trinity of scientific “deities” (Ar. Clouds 627).
20 μὰ τόν (Ar. Frogs 1374).
21 Air (Ar. Clouds 667), the almond tree (Eupolis fr. 79), the battle of Marathon (Eupolis fr. 106), 
cabbages (three times), the coming day (Ar. Eccl. 105), the dog (Ar. Wasps 83), the kestrels (Ar. 
Birds 1335). Paphlagon-Cleon is made to swear by the privileged seating (proedria) that he was 
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Orators: Athena (4), Demeter (2), Dionysus (1), “the gods” (36),22 Heracles 
(4), Poseidon (1), multiple gods (23),23 the heroic dead (1);24 total 72, or 29% of all 
informal oaths in these authors.
Xenophon: Apollo (1),25 “the gods” (16), Hera (12 or 13),26 Mithras (1 – a 
Persian), the Twin Gods (2 – both Spartans); total 32 or 33, making 10% of all 
informal oaths in Xenophon.
Plato: Ammon (1),27 the Dog (14),28 “the gods” (17),29 Hera (7),30 Poseidon (1),31 
Zethus (1),32 unspecified (1);33 total 42, making 15% of all informal oaths in Plato.
Satyr-drama: none.34
Other poetry: Cadmilus (1);35 non-divine objects (2).36 All three are in iambic 
verse – two of them certainly, and the third possibly, in choliambics, the less dig-
nified variant of a verse-form that was not considered very dignified in any case.
awarded after his victory at Pylos (Ar. Knights 702), and the Sausage-seller by the punches and 
knife-slashes he suffered as a boy (ibid. 411‒2). On oaths of this type generally, see §5.3.
22 Including three oaths by “the gods and goddesses” and one by “all the Olympian gods”.
23 The most frequent combinations are “Zeus and the gods” (12) and “Zeus and Apollo” (6); 
others are Zeus-Apollo-Athena (2), Zeus-Apollo-Demeter (2), and “Heracles and the gods” (1). It 
is striking that Apollo, who in comedy figures alone in informal oaths more often than any other 
god except Zeus, never does so at all in the orators.
24 In Dem. 18.206‒8, quoted at the end of this chapter.
25 Symp. 4.27; the speaker is Charmides.
26 On eight of these occasions the speaker is Socrates, and on two more it is another member 
of his deme of Alopeke; see the Appendix to this section.
27 Politicus 257b; the speaker is Theodorus of Cyrene, near which Ammon’s famous oracle was 
located, and he describes Ammon as the god of his country (τὸν ἡμέτερον θεόν).
28 The speaker is invariably Socrates; see §5.3.
29 Once “gods and goddesses” (Symp. 219c, spoken by Alcibiades); see above, p. 315 n. 2.
30 On six of these occasions the speaker is Socrates, and on the seventh (Laches 181a) it is 
another member of the Alopeke deme; see the Appendix to this section.
31 Symp. 214d; the speaker is Alcibiades.
32 Zethus, together with his brother Amphion, built the walls of Thebes. The speaker, Socrates, 
himself explains that he is alluding to Callicles’ exploitation of a speech by Zethus in Euripides’ 
Antiope to condemn Socrates and philosophy (Gorgias 484e‒485d).
33 μὰ τόν (Gorgias 466e).
34 The extremely elaborate oath by Poseidon and six other powers associated with the sea 
which Silenus uses to affirm (falsely) that he was not trying to sell the Cyclops’ property to Odys-
seus and his companions (Eur. Cycl. 262‒9) is not an “informal” oath, since it includes a verb 
of swearing (ἀπώμοσ’ 266) and an explicit imprecation against the swearer’s children (268‒9).
35 Hipponax fr. 155b West. Cadmilus or Casmilus was a divinity (sometimes identified with 
Hermes) associated with (according to some, one of) the “Great Gods” (Cabeiri) of Samothrace; 
see Acusilaus fr. 20 Fowler, Nonnus 4.88, Σ Ap.Rh. 1.917, Σ Lycophron 162, 219.
36 Cabbage (Ananius fr. 4) and poppy leaves (iamb. adesp. 57).
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Other prose: “the gods” (1).37
Inscriptions: Apollo (1), Heracles (1).
In literary texts of all kinds there are thus 403 or 404 informal oaths which are 
not simply “by Zeus”, amounting to 26% of the total number of informal oaths; 
the most common of such oaths are those by “the gods” (97), Apollo (32) and 
Poseidon (30), but all the major Olympians are represented with the exception of 
Ares, as are many other gods, some heroes, a number of non-divine objects, and 
even an aposiopesis (μὰ τόν). Frequently (33 times), especially in the orators, two 
or more gods would be invoked in a single oath; on 26 of these occasions (79%) 
Zeus is among the gods named.
As has sometimes been noted above, informal oaths can make handy markers 
of ethnicity. We almost always see this phenomenon from the Athenian point of 
view, so we do not know whether there was a stereotypical oath by which other 
Greeks identified Athenians in their literature or their jokes. But we find Spartans 
swearing by their “Twin Gods”, Castor and Pollux, usually in the easily recogniz-
able form ναὶ τὼ σιώ, or occasionally by Castor alone; Thebans by their own twin 
gods, Amphion and Zethus, or by Heracles (a native of Thebes) and his nephew 
and assistant Iolaus, or with the heavily dialect-marked formula ἴττω Δεύς; a 
Megarian by the local hero Diocles, a Cyrenaean by Ammon, a Persian by Mithras, 
and perhaps a Sybarite woman by Kore38 (Ar. Wasps 1438).
Much richer, though only from comedy, is the evidence for gender differen-
tiation in the use of informal oaths. Of the gods and goddesses invoked in comic 
oaths, the great majority are used either by men only or by women only, though 
a few (including the ubiquitous Zeus) are available to both.39 The patterns are as 
follows:40
37 [Arist.] Rhet. ad Alex.15.7.2‒3.
38 “Perhaps”, because although the Doric dialect form (ναὶ τὰν Κόραν) is appropriate for a 
Sybarite, the choice of Kore as the oath-goddess may merely be appropriate for a woman. It is 
striking, however, that the other two instances in which Kore alone is invoked in oaths are also in 
non-Attic dialects. In Epicrates fr. 8 the speaker is quoting the words of a procuress who swore by 
τὰν Κόραν, τὰν Ἄρτεμιν, τὰν Φερρέφατταν that the girl she was apparently trying to palm off on 
him was a virgin (she was evidently flustered enough to forget that Kore and Pherrephatta were 
one and the same). In Herodas 1.32 (οὐ μὰ τὴν Ἄιδεω Κούρην) the speaker (location uncertain, 
but most likely in a city of Asia Minor or the Aegean islands under Ptolemaic rule) uses an artifi-
cial and slightly inaccurate form of Ionic based on the language of Hipponax.
39 For discussion of these phenomena in the broader context of differences in the language 
used in speech by, and in speaking to, males and females in Attic Greek, see Sommerstein 2009, 
18‒21 (first published 1995).
40 One or two deities are omitted from the table because no passage survives in which the gender 
of the speaker is clear: Hestia (Eubulus fr. 60, Antiphanes fr. 183), the Nymphs (Eupolis fr. 84).
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 Gods Goddesses  
Exclusively male Dionysus  Athena







Exclusively female  Aglaurus
  Aphrodite45
  Artemis




Open to both sexes Apollo46
 Castor and Pollux (Spartan)
 Zeus47
41 In New Comedy (i.e., probably, in the early Hellenistic period) there are two possible instanc-
es of a woman swearing thus: Menander, Dis Exapaton 95 (where, however, the speaker is a man 
imagining what a woman will say to herself, and may have got the oath wrong) and com. adesp. 
1117.4 (where it is likely, but not certain, that the speaker is the Philotis who was addressed in the 
previous line).
42 That is, Demeter alone, without her daughter. By the second half of the fourth century, how-
ever, Demeter could be invoked by women (Antiphanes fr. 26; Philippides fr. 5; Men. Epitr. 955), 
though the formula they used was always νὴ (μὰ) τὴν φίλην Δήμητρα.
43 This, however, occurs only once (Ar. Clouds 773).
44 Oaths by Hera are not found in comedy; for their use (always by men) in Socratic literature, 
see the Appendix to this section. In tragedy (where, by definition, such oaths are not “informal”), 
they appear to be used only by women (ibid.)
45 Used by a man in Ar. Thesm. 254; but this is an exception that proves the rule, since he is at 
that moment donning a woman’s garment.
46 This oath is often claimed to be exclusively male, but it is used by a woman in Ar. Lys. 917 and 
probably also at Frogs 508; see Sommerstein 2009, 19‒20 n.18 (first published 1995).
47 In Menander, women’s oaths by Zeus, though they still occur, have become relatively rare: in 
the eighteen best preserved plays we find only Georg. 34, Perik. 757 and possibly, in an emphatic 
form (μὰ τὸν εὐμένοῦ̣[ντ]α̣ μ̣[οι Διά], see Römer 2012, 118‒20; contra, Furley 2013, 87‒90), Epitr. 
819.
322   13 The informal oath
This body of data may be said to show three basic patterns.
(1) There is an almost complete separation between the oaths proper to men 
and those proper to women. Indeed, by the time of Menander, only the oath 
by Zeus remains “unisex”, and even that has become rare in the mouths of 
women (see note 47). Already in Aristophanes it is overwhelmingly men who 
swear by Apollo, and in his Ecclesiazusae (155‒60) a woman, practising a 
speech she intends to make while disguised as a man, and ordered to cor-
rect a feminine oath (by Demeter and Kore) to a masculine one, substitutes 
an oath by Apollo. The Spartan oath by Castor and Pollux may be regarded 
as an exception that proves the rule: it is most unlikely that Aristophanes or 
most members of his audience had conversed with Spartan women or knew 
how they spoke,48 and since he thus had no linguistic stereotype of the Spar-
tan woman he simply used the same Spartan stereotype for both sexes. From 
about the middle of the fourth century both sexes could swear by Demeter, 
but they used different formulae (see note 42).
(2) With the exceptions already noted, oaths by male gods are used exclusively 
by men.
(3) Oaths by goddesses are usually in comedy reserved for women, but there are 
important exceptions, especially Athena, Demeter (when named alone) and 
Ge. One can only guess why these oaths were considered masculine. Athena 
was of course a particularly male-oriented goddess, indeed a warrior, and 
will certainly have been invoked in oaths of office taken on the Acropolis by 
the highest officials of the state.49 Demeter too was named in official oaths 
taken by men, notably that of the jurors.50 But one can think of no plausible 
reason why Ge, traditionally the oldest of all gendered beings whatsoever, 
should be a divinity for men alone to swear by; and it may reasonably be 
suspected that chance and arbitrary habit played a considerable role in de-
termining what was permitted and what forbidden in this area.
In two comedies of Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae and Ecclesiazusae, char-
acters disguise themselves as members of the opposite sex. In Thesmophori-
azusae the elderly in-law of Euripides (nameless in the text itself, but labelled 
Mnesilochus in the scholia and in marginal speaker-indications) is dressed up 
48 Nor could he learn this from literature, since there was no Spartan poetry (or at least none in 
general circulation) of a kind that would be likely to contain informal oaths typical of ordinary 
conversation and placed in the mouths of women.
49 Cf. [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 55.5 (the nine archons).
50 Cf. the text of this oath cited in Dem. 24.151 (see S&B §5.4).
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as a woman in order to infiltrate the all-female festival of the Thesmophoria, 
and does so successfully until he is unmasked51 (279‒651). In Ecclesiazusae the 
heroine, Praxagora, and a large number of other women (including the chorus of 
the play) disguise themselves as men, with false beards, to gain entrance to an 
Assembly meeting; the meeting itself takes place offstage, but there is an onstage 
dress rehearsal (129‒240), the women depart for the Pnyx singing “like old men 
from the countryside” (285‒310, cf. 277‒9), and on the way back they keep up the 
masquerade until they are sure it is safe to end it (478‒503). In a strongly gender-
marked language it is always a challenging task to speak like a member of the 
other sex, and it is not surprising to find informal oaths being used to highlight 
competent or incompetent masquerading.
Euripides’ in-law in Thesmophoriazusae gets away with it completely, until 
he is cornered as a result of a tip-off coming from outside. He says many things 
which the other women find very offensive, but always in language that a woman 
might use. For a long time he does not use any informal oaths at all, but just at the 
end of his major speech (517), and again in the course of a fierce quick-fire argu-
ment (569) he swears correctly by Artemis.52 In Ecclesiazusae, there is a marked 
contrast between Praxagora – the highly intelligent leader of the women, who 
moreover has been able to listen to many Assembly speeches when she lived on or 
close to the Pnyx as a refugee (243‒4) – and her colleagues. In her speech of more 
than sixty lines at the dress rehearsal (170‒240 – there are some interruptions) 
Praxagora plays safe by using no informal oaths whatever (and likewise manages 
to avoid using any gendered word to refer to herself). The other women, for their 
part, make all sorts of blunders: not only are they, in accordance with a standard 
comic stereotype about women, incapable of thinking for long about anything 
except drink (132‒43, 153‒5), but they swear by the Two Goddesses (155) and Aph-
rodite (189), and address the Assembly as “ladies” (165). They eventually learn 
enough to be able to interject appropriate short remarks in praise of the speaker 
(203, 213), but even after that they once refer to themselves in the feminine gender 
(297). It is not surprising that at the Assembly itself, as we are told by a man who 
51 When he forgets that a woman would not urinate into the type of vessel called a (h)amis 
(633‒4). He would not even have come under suspicion had not the women been warned that 
there was a spy in their midst (574‒602); attention then quickly focuses on him because he is the 
only person present whom the others do not know (614). 
52 He also appeals to (but does not swear by) the Two Goddesses (Demeter and Kore) when 
trying to persuade the women to disregard the report that their meeting has been infiltrated by 
a man (594). All his other informal oaths (552, 555, 567, 615, 623) are by Zeus, the “unisex” oath-
god, who is also during the period of his masquerade invoked in informal oaths by two of the 
real women (609, 640).
324   13 The informal oath
was there, only Praxagora (“a good-looking, white-faced young man”) made a 
speech (427‒54); neither she nor the other women aroused any suspicion.53
One might expect that informal oaths would often be expressed on a “horses-
for-courses” principle, with the god (or non-divine object) being chosen for its 
appropriateness to the speaker, the addressee or the subject-matter. This is so 
only to a limited extent.54 Among divinities, the only one for whom such an effect 
can be found with any frequency is Aphrodite: of fifteen informal oaths by her 
in comedy, eight are uttered in a sexual or erotic context.55 In addition, Socrates’ 
unusual oath by the Graces (Charites) in Ar. Clouds 773 may be designed to express 
his enthusiasm for Strepsiades’ ingenious (kharien) solution to the problem that 
had been posed to him;56 and the oath by Dionysus in Ar. Wasps 1474 introduces 
a description of Philocleon’s drunken behaviour, which includes the performance 
of archaic tragic dances. Otherwise, all we find is a thin scattering of passages in 
which an informal oath names a god with whom the speaker57 or the addressee58 
has some special association.
53 The meeting was unusually crowded, much to the annoyance of those who arrived after the 
quorum was filled and so did not get their attendance fee (380‒93), but the men assumed that 
this was because of the exceptionally important business on the agenda (394‒7) which could be 
expected to attract many who would not normally attend.
54 On at least two occasions in comedy informal oaths are used which are deliberately made 
highly inappropriate to the speaker or the situation: in Ar. Birds 1236‒7, where Peisetaerus tells 
Iris that humans are in future to sacrifice to the birds “and not to Zeus, by Zeus!”, and ibid. 1614 
where Poseidon, commenting on a speech by Peisetaerus, remarks “By Poseidon, that’s well 
said!” Compare also com. adesp. 1062.12 where Rhea, in a speech complaining about her hus-
band Cronus’s habit of eating up his children (or rather of selling them and eating up the pro-
ceeds), emphasizes a statement with μὰ τὸν Δί’ at a time when Zeus (the child who avoided being 
swallowed) cannot yet have been born!  On “horses-for-courses” oaths more generally, see §6.1.
55 Ar. Lys. 554, 855‒8, 939; Thesm. 254; Eccl. 981, 999‒1000, 1008; Wealth 1067‒9.
56 There are two passages in tragedy where an oath introduced by νὴ or μὰ names a divin-
ity seemingly chosen for its appropriateness to the oath’s content. In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 
(1431‒6; see §5.3.2) Clytaemestra, shortly after murdering her husband (partly in revenge for his 
having sacrificed their daughter Iphigeneia), swears “by the fulfilled Justice that was due for my 
child, by Ruin and by the Fury, through whose aid I slew this man” that she has no fear (sc. of any 
counter-revenge) while she has the protection of her lover Aegisthus; and in Sophocles’ Electra 
(881‒2) Chrysothemis, bringing the news of Orestes’ return from exile and finding that her sister 
Electra will not believe it, swears to its truth “by our father’s Hestia [or hearth]” – the goddess of 
the home of which Orestes is the rightful master (as already indicated by Clytaemestra’s dream, 
narrated earlier [417‒23] by Chrysothemis to Electra, in which the hearth figured prominently).
57 Ar. Clouds 519 (Dionysus, whose nursling the poet claims to be); compare, in serious poetry, 
Eur. IA 948‒54 (Nereus, the speaker’s maternal grandfather).
58 Eur. Cycl. 262‒9 (Poseidon, the Cyclops’ father, and marine divinities and entities associated 
with him); Xenarchus fr. 9 (Dionysus – the addressee likes his wine strong); Pl. Gorg. 489e (the 
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There is a neat irony – unintended by the speaker – in the informal oath by 
Hermes at Ar. Eccl. 445. Blepyrus, commenting on Chremes’ report of an Assembly 
speech by an unknown young man (who was in fact Blepyrus’ wife Praxagora in 
disguise) in which it was said that women could be relied on to keep confidential 
information secret, whereas men serving on the Council were leaking secrets all 
the time, remarks “And, by Hermes, that was no lie he told!” Hermes, as we have 
seen (§7.3.3), was the divine patron of deception, a great liar and the archetypal 
tricky swearer – so at first sight it might seem inappropriate for him to be invoked 
to confirm a statement that someone was not lying; but the cream of the joke is 
that while the speaker may well have been telling the truth about the behaviour 
of Council members, he (or rather she) was getting away with a much bigger lie 
about her own identity – a lie, moreover, which was itself evidence of the truth of 
her statement that women were good at keeping secrets!
Non-divine entities invoked in informal oaths, being often chosen ad hoc, are 
proportionately more likely to have a contextual relevance (cf. §5.3.1), though the 
absolute number of instances is again small. In Aristophanes’ Knights, the Sau-
sage-seller swears (411‒13) that he will surpass his rival Paphlagon in shameless-
ness “by the fists whose blows I’ve borne many on many a time from a child up, 
and by the slashes of butchers’ knives” – in other words, by the gutter upbring-
ing that has made him the shameless villain he is; and later Paphlagon affirms 
his superiority to the Sausage-seller by swearing “by the privileged seating that 
Pylos has won for me” that he will destroy him (702). In his Ecclesiazusae (105‒8) 
Praxagora emphasizes her statement that the women’s objective in taking over 
the state is to save it from ruin by adding an informal oath “by the light of this 
dawning day” – the day on which the coup d’état is to take place, but also the 
metaphorical new light that it will bring to Athens.59 Two characters in comedy 
swear by non-divine entities peculiarly appropriate to themselves: the Hoopoe 
(formerly Tereus) in Aristophanes’ Birds (194‒5) swearing by “snares, traps and 
nets”, and Miltiades (returned from the underworld) in Eupolis’ Demes (fr. 106) 
swearing by “my battle at Marathon”.
Mention of Marathon appropriately leads us to perhaps the most sonorous 
and most noble of all the informal oaths in surviving Greek literature, one which 
hero Zethus, recently quoted by the addressee, Callicles, in disparagement of philosophy); com-
pare, in serious poetry, Iliad 1.86‒91, where Achilles swears by Apollo to protect Apollo’s prophet 
Calchas against anyone, even Agamemnon (see §8.1, pp. 213‒5]).
59 A comparable passage in tragedy is Eur. Hipp. 304‒10 where Phaedra’s nurse tells her mis-
tress that if she insists on ending her life it will result in the disinheritance of her children, and 
swears this “by the horse-riding Amazon queen”, the (deceased) mother of their likely supplant-
er, Phaedra’s bastard stepson Hippolytus.
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needs no commentary here60 and with which this section may appropriately con-
clude.
If I were venturing to say that it was I who induced you to think thoughts worthy of your 
ancestors, every one of you would be entitled to resent it. But in fact I am only making plain 
to you your own preferences, and showing that our city upheld these principles even before 
my time; what I did was to take part in the service of applying them to particular situations. 
But this man [Aeschines] denounces the entire policy and urges you to be hostile to me 
because I have been responsible for bringing the city into fear and danger. He is keen to 
rob me of honour in the immediate present; but what he is actually doing is robbing you of 
praise that will endure for all future time. If you convict this man here [Ctesiphon] on the 
ground that my policy was not the best, you will be thought, not to have suffered what befell 
you through the harshness of fortune, but to have made a blunder. But there is no way, no 
way that it was a blunder, men of Athens, when you took it on yourselves to run risks on 
behalf of the freedom and safety of all, I swear it by your ancestors who took the foremost 
place of danger at Marathon, and those who stood in the line at Plataea, and those who fought 
in the sea battles at Salamis and Artemisium, and the many other brave men who lie in the 
public tombs – to all of whom alike, Aeschines, the city gave a public funeral, holding them 
worthy of the same honour, not just to those among them who were successful or victorious. 
(Demosthenes 18 [On the Crown] 206‒8)
Appendix: swearing by Hera61
Both in Plato and in Xenophon, Socrates is represented as having the unusual 
habit of reinforcing some of his utterances with an informal oath by Hera. He 
does this six times in Plato62 and eight times in Xenophon;63 as Dodds noted,64 in 
Plato this oath “always accompanies expressions of admiration”, and with one 
exception (Mem. 1.5.4) this is true of the Xenophontic Socrates as well. We can 
safely assume that this was a habit of the historical Socrates – one that was imi-
tated, indeed, by another of his pupils, Aeschines of Sphettus (D.L. 2.83). It was 
a very unusual one, and no convincing explanation of its origin has ever been 
given. Oaths of the form νὴ τὴν Ἥραν or μὰ τὴν Ἥραν are otherwise extremely 
60 Some remarks will be found in §5.3.3.
61 The following discussion is adapted from Sommerstein 2008b.
62 Apol. 24e; Hipp.Maj. 287a, 291e; Gorg. 449d; Phdr. 230b; Tht. 154d.
63 Mem. 1.5.4, 3.10.9, 3.11.5, 4.2.9, 4.4.8; Oec. 10.1, 11.19; Symp. 4.54. In addition Xenophon makes 
Socrates, in reasserting his innocence after his condemnation, draw attention (Apol. 24) to the 
fact that “it has not been proved that I sacrifice to any new divinities, or swear by or recognize any 
other gods in place of Zeus and Hera and the gods associated with them”.
64 Dodds 1959, 195 (on Gorg. 449e).
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rare, occurring (as we shall see) only three times in all of Greek literature other 
than Plato and Xenophon;65 with the exception of Ares, Hera is the only one of 
the thirteen principal divinities66 who is never invoked in an oath in any surviv-
ing comic text or fragment67 – an absence which I described, some years ago, as 
“a mystery … [since] comedy … is not deficient in expressions of admiration and 
wonderment”.68
Was this just a personal mannerism of Socrates? Was he, as Dodds thought, 
adapting what was “normally a woman’s oath”,69 and if so what might be the sig-
nificance of this? Or was the oath by Hera, contrariwise, as Parker has claimed, a 
“male oath”70 – as we have seen some other oaths by goddesses were, for example 
those by Athena and Demeter?
Now in Plato and Xenophon there are persons other than Socrates who 
swear by Hera – all of them, again, when expressing admiration. Four of these 
are characters in conversations also involving Socrates. They are Lysimachus, 
son of the famous Aristeides, in Plato’s Laches (181a); Callias son of Hipponicus, 
and his brother Hermogenes, in Xenophon’s Symposium (4.45, 8.12); and, in the 
same work, Lycon, the father of Autolycus. Of these, only Hermogenes is ever 
regarded as a close associate of Socrates71 – Lysimachus, indeed, is portrayed as 
never having met him for many years72 – so they cannot be supposed to have all 
65 In Eur. IA 739, however, Clytaemestra swears μὰ τὴν ἄνασσαν Ἀργείαν θεάν (“by the Queen, 
the Argive goddess”, i.e. Hera), and we may therefore assume that in the oath μὰ τὴν ἄνασσαν “by 
the Queen”, quoted by the Euripidean Hermione (Andr. 934) from the lips of her (Phthian) women 
friends, the ἄνασσα is likewise Hera, an appropriate goddess for married women to invoke. PMG 
960, where someone swears “by sceptre-bearing Hera who looks down from Olympus” that he/
she has “a reliable guard-house on my tongue”, may well be tragic too – a female chorus assuring 
some hero(ine), possibly Procne in Sophocles’ Tereus, that they can be depended on to keep a 
secret; see Sommerstein 2010b and Sommerstein & Talboy 2012, 263‒4.
66 That is, the Twelve Gods with the customary uncertainty as to whether Hestia should be 
reckoned as one of them (as in Pl. Phdr. 247a, where without her the gods number only eleven) or 
whether (as on the Parthenon frieze) Dionysus should take her place.
67 Parker 2005a, 270 n.2, ascribes the absence of this oath to metrical difficulties; but νὴ τὴν 
Ἥραν, while unsuited to iambics, could easily appear in anapaestic tetrameters (of which there 
are nearly 1200 in the surviving plays of Aristophanes alone), and μὰ τὴν Ἥραν fits perfectly 
into positions 3‒6 of an iambic trimeter (the line would have no caesura, but none is needed in 
comedy).
68 Sommerstein 2009, 21 n.19 (first published 1995).
69 Dodds 1959, 195.
70 Parker 2005a, 270 n.2.
71 He was one of those who were with Socrates on the last day of his life (Pl. Phd. 59b) and is a 
dialogue participant in Plato’s Cratylus.
72 Cf. Lach. 180d‒181a, 187d‒e.
328   13 The informal oath
picked the habit up from him. Do they, then, have anything else in common with 
Socrates?
Three of them certainly do. Lysimachus, as he himself points out, was 
a member of the same Attic deme as Socrates73 – that of Alopeke, located just 
outside the city walls to the south-east, across the Ilissus from the unfinished 
temple of Zeus Olympios;74 so too, we happen to know, were Callias and Hermo-
genes. That, of course, does not necessarily mean that they lived in the deme; 
indeed, the homes of Socrates75 and of Callias (the latter is the setting for Xeno-
phon’s Symposium, and also for Plato’s Protagoras) were certainly within the city 
itself. However, it does mean that their recent forebears (Lysimachus’ father; 
Socrates’, Callias’ and Hermogenes’ paternal grandfathers) had lived in Alopeke 
in 508/7 BC, and that would not be too long ago for a linguistic habit once typical 
of the village to maintain itself among its former inhabitants and their descen-
dants, particularly since these retained a strong corporate identity and met peri-
odically at deme assemblies and festivals.76
What of Lycon? We do not know for certain what deme he belonged to. Con-
siderable confusion has been caused by the Platonic scholiast77 who identified 
the father of Autolycus with Lycon of Thoricus, one of those who prosecuted 
Socrates in 399 BC. Storey (1985, 322‒4) showed that this was merely an irre-
sponsible guess and that Autolycus’ father and Socrates’ accuser must be dif-
ferent men; there is thus no evidence that Autolycus and his father belonged to 
the deme of Thoricus. There is equally, of course, no evidence that this Lycon 
was a member of any other particular deme, let alone that he was of Alopeke. 
And there is a ready alternative explanation for his use of the expression νὴ τὴν 
Ἥραν. By the time he uses it, he has heard other men at the party do so – Callias, 
Hermogenes and Socrates himself; and since the time when Callias first used this 
oath, no one else has used any oath-expression naming an individual god, except 
for the commonplace oaths by Zeus that peppered every Athenian conversation. 
Perhaps, then, we are meant to suppose that Lycon has noticed that νὴ τὴν Ἥραν 
seems to be in vogue as a formula for introducing expressions of admiration – 
73 Lach. 180d. Socrates’ deme is named as Alopeke in Pl. Gorg. 495d; Aristeides’ in Plut. Arist. 
1.1 and on the ostrakon Ath.Agora xxv 34; Callias’ (and therefore Hermogenes’ also) is known 
from a fourth-century inscription (Ath.Agora xix P26.455) naming a Ἱππόνικος Καλλίου Ἀλωπεκ., 
doubtless his son.
74 See Traill 1974, 53.
75 Who, according to Phaedrus in Pl. Phdr. 230d, never normally went beyond the city walls.
76 Cf. Pl. Lach. 187e (which, admittedly, implies that Socrates as an adult had rarely if ever at-
tended such gatherings), and see Whitehead 1986 (esp. 86‒120, 176‒222).
77 Σ Pl. Apol. 23e.
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and he duly follows this fashion. Alternatively (and perhaps preferably), he may 
simply be aping his very rich host Callias.
I suggest, therefore, that the habit of swearing by Hera, especially when 
expressing admiration, was essentially a local phenomenon characteristic of 
Alopeke (and perhaps, as we shall see, of one or two other demes in its immediate 
neighbourhood). It will have been well established in the village by the late sixth 
century, and maintained itself among the inhabitants and their descendants for 
at least the next hundred years.78 Perhaps it became to some extent known to 
outsiders as a feature of Alopekean speech, which would explain how Plato and 
Xenophon managed, between them, to put it in the mouths of four Alopekeans 
(including Socrates) and only (at most) one member of any of Attica’s 138 other 
demes; but it is also possible that it was perceived at the time merely as a pecu-
liarity of particular individuals and families (such as those of Callias, who was a 
prominent public figure, and of Lysimachus, whose son Aristeides, a one-time 
associate of Socrates,79 will certainly have been known to Plato). Socrates, at any 
rate, used this oath-formula so frequently that it became strongly associated with 
him in particular, and from him it passed to some of his pupils and admirers who 
had no connection with his deme, such as Aeschines of Sphettus (as we have 
noted) and also Xenophon, who puts it into the mouth of at least one, and possi-
bly two, characters in his Cyropaedia.80 After that it disappears, to resurface only 
once, many centuries later, in a letter of Aristaenetus81.
Why Alopekeans in particular should have developed a tendency to swear by 
Hera we do not know. We do know, however, that this is not the only evidence that 
Hera enjoyed a special position in this deme. Hera was not, in general, a popular 
goddess in classical Athens,82 and her name is not in that period a common 
formative element for Athenian names. Sean Byrne’s Athenian Onomasticon83 
78 But probably not all Alopekeans used it. Socrates’ close friend Crito, and therefore also his 
son Critobulus, were members of the deme (Pl. Apol. 33d‒e); the father appears frequently in 
Plato, the son in Xenophon, but neither is ever represented as swearing by Hera.
79 Pl. Tht. 150e‒151a.
80 Xen. Cyr. 8.4.12, and perhaps also 1.4.12, where only one of the three main groups of mss. (y) 
reads μὰ τὴν Ἥραν, the rest having μὰ τὸν Δία: y is not uncommonly right alone, and the reading 
of the other families looks like a banalization, but on the other hand this would be the only pas-
sage in Plato or Xenophon in which Hera figures in a negative oath.
81 Aristaenetus Epist. 1.19.1.
82 “All the functions belonging to a poliadic deity which Hera exercises in Samos or Argos are 
swallowed up in Attica by Athena. None of the other optional extensions of Hera’s powers seems 
here to have been made, either … . She is reduced to her smallest possible extent” (Parker 2005a, 
441).
83 http://www.seangb.org/ (updated 1 January 2014).
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lists only five male Athenians living before 300 BC, and whose deme affiliation 
is known, bearing names that incorporate hers:84 one each named Heracleitus 
(#21), Herodotus (#8), Herodorus (#4), Herotheus (#1) and Heroscamandrus (#2). 
And of these five, two come from Alopeke85 and two more come from small demes 
(Diomeia and Otryne) which probably or possibly lay close to it.86 Even leaving 
aside the latter pair, and given that Alopeke, which supplied ten of the 500 Athe-
nian councillors,87 may be presumed to have had about two per cent of the Athe-
nian citizen population, it can be calculated that the odds against there being, by 
pure chance, two or more Alopekeans in a random sample of five Athenians are 
about 250 to one (p = 0.004).
We do not know what it was about the communities of this little patch of 
suburban Attica that made them take this special interest in Hera, but there must 
have been something. The most plausible speculation would be that Hera had 
a locally significant cult centre in the Alopeke deme, as she is known to have 
had, for example, at Erchia88 and at Tricorythus.89 What we do know is that the 
Alopekeans must have felt they had some kind of special relationship with Hera, 
and that this relationship had an impact on the language they spoke, furnishing 
us with an interesting example of an oath-related dialect feature associated very 
specifically not just with a single polis, but with a small subpart of one.
84 I leave out of account names which are derived, or compounded, from that of Heracles. I 
also omit the Herodorus of IG i3 1018 (tentatively assigned by the inscription’s first publisher, 
and by Byrne, to Rhamnus), since it is unsafe, especially in an inscription from the end of the 
sixth century, to draw any inference about a person’s deme affiliation from the mere absence of 
a demotic.
85 Heracleitus, IG ii2 5582; Heroscamandrus, IG i3 1512. The latter name reappears in the deme 
several generations later (IG ii2 5553 [tombstone, mid third century] and 1706.50 [thesmothete, 
225/4]; doubtless grandfather and grandson), and never in any other. Interestingly, it also fea-
tures in a pseudo-Platonic dialogue (Theages 129a‒c) where Socrates tells how, warned by his 
divine sign, he nearly prevented one Timarchus from taking part in the murder of “Nicias son of 
Heroscamandrus”.
86 Herodorus of Diomeia (IG vii 315.1 and SEG xv 289.5); Herotheus of Otryne (IG ii2 7015). Som-
merstein 2008b, 330 n.31 argues that there is no reason to reject the conventional location of Dio-
meia in the neighbourhood of the Cynosarges sanctuary and therefore also of Alopeke; Otryne 
was in the same tribe as Diomeia and probably located in the same area, since it is likely to have 
belonged to the city trittys (see Thompson 1969, 149; Schaps 1982). Both were very small demes, 
with only a single councillor each; if they were close to the large deme of Alopeke, they will prob-
ably have been very much under its influence. The fifth man is Herodotus of Aigilia (IG xii [6] 262, 
329), a deme generally thought to lie on or near the south-west coast.
87 See Traill 1974, 22‒3 and Table X.
88 See SEG xxi 541 I 6‒11, II 32‒9, III 38‒41, IV 28‒32.
89 R.B. Richardson 1895, 219 n.23.
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13.2 How binding were informal oaths? The case of 
Aristophanes’ Clouds90
Informal oaths seem to have been a ubiquitous feature of everyday Greek con-
versation, and one might well suspect that familiarity had so devalued them that 
they were felt to have little or none of the binding force that formal oaths pos-
sessed (for which see ch. 11). In the present section this question will be exam-
ined with particular reference to comedy. Comedy accounts, as we have seen, for 
nearly half of all the informal oaths in our data, and in our best preserved comic 
author, Aristophanes, they are nearly twice as frequent (per thousand words) as 
in any author in any other genre. Characters in comedy, moreover, are particu-
larly prone to lie, deceive, or twist language, which makes comedy an excellent 
test bed for hypotheses about the extent to which oaths, formal or otherwise, gen-
uinely guarantee the truth of a statement or promise. We shall focus principally, 
but not exclusively, on Aristophanes’ Clouds, because this is a play in which the 
existence and power of the gods, and the validity of oaths, are explicitly brought 
into question.
I shall begin by briefly summarizing the plot of Clouds.91 An elderly farmer 
(Strepsiades), who long ago foolishly married a woman of aristocratic birth used 
to a luxurious lifestyle, has been plunged heavily into debt by her and espe-
cially by their adolescent son (Pheidippides), a devotee of the very expensive 
pursuit of chariot-racing. He has the idea of sending his son to the Thinkhouse 
(phrontistērion) run by Socrates, so that he can be taught the skills of “unjust 
argument” which will enable him to help his father defeat the creditors when 
they go to court, but Pheidippides refuses to go.92 Strepsiades, though very doubt-
ful (with good reason) of his own intellectual potential, then decides to go to the 
Thinkhouse himself. He meets Socrates and asks to be taken on as a pupil, offer-
ing to “swear by the gods” to pay any fee he is charged (245‒6); which prompts 
90 This section is adapted from Sommerstein 2007.
91 That is, of Clouds as we have it. Two versions of the script were known in Hellenistic times; 
one was that which was produced, unsuccessfully, in 423 BC, the other – the one we possess – 
appears to have been partially revised with a view to being produced again (the incompleteness 
of the revision is shown by the survival of outdated topicalities and the absence of at least one 
choral song which would have made it impossible to stage the play without violating the rules of 
the comic competition). See Dover 1968, lxxx‒xcviii; Sommerstein 1997 (with references to earlier 
studies); Casanova 2000.
92 Despite a threat by his father to expel him from the family home (121‒3). The threat is backed 
by an informal oath (by Demeter), but Pheidippides ignores it and Strepsiades makes no attempt 
to implement it.
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Socrates to explain that he and his disciples do not recognize the traditional gods 
– their gods are the Clouds, whom Socrates summons in a cletic prayer and who 
arrive to form the chorus of the play. After formally renouncing all worship of 
the traditional gods (423‒6) Strepsiades enters the Thinkhouse, but proves far 
from an apt learner, and is on the point of being expelled with ignominy when 
the Clouds suggest that he might send his son to be taught in his place. Phei-
dippides this time allows himself to be persuaded into going to the school, is 
taught the new rhetoric and the new morality by the Unjust (or Worse) Argument 
in person, and emerges a “skilled sophist”, able to win any argument however 
hopeless. It is, however, Strepsiades himself who then puts his creditors to flight 
by a mixture of half-understood remnants of his Thinkhouse training, ridicule, 
and violence; in the course of this he repudiates a former sworn promise to repay 
a loan (1224‒9) and blithely offers to deny on oath that he owes the creditor any-
thing (1230‒5). The Clouds, in Strepsiades’ absence, condemn his dishonesty 
(1303‒20), and immediately afterwards he rushes out of his house complaining 
that his son has beaten him up. Pheidippides, making all too good use of his 
education, coolly sets out to prove that he had every right to attack his father, and 
reduces Strepsiades to silence and even acquiescence,93 but he goes too far when 
he tries to appease his father by offering to beat up his mother as well. Strepsia-
des blames the Clouds for what Pheidippides has become, but they tell him it is 
his own fault for trying to evade his debts; he then takes revenge on Socrates by 
burning down the Thinkhouse, and the play ends with him chasing Socrates and 
his pupils away, crying “Chase them, hit them, pelt them … remembering how 
they wronged the gods!” (1508‒9).
It is, at first sight, a paradoxical feature of the play that though all three of 
the major characters reject belief in the traditional gods during at least part of the 
play – and one of them, Socrates, is an unbeliever from beginning to end – they 
all nevertheless go on swearing informal oaths by these gods. Does this, in fact, 
mean that informal oaths were mere casual emphasizers which could be disre-
garded with impunity? And are there any criteria by which we can determine the 
degree of sanctity and significance to be attached to such an oath? It is not, of 
course, very likely that we will find there was a hard-and-fast categorization of 
oaths into those that counted and those that didn’t; we will probably find our-
selves dealing with a gradient, some informal oaths being more “casual”, some 
93 The acquiescence (1437‒9) is dramatically weak and might well not have survived into the 
final script for the second performance, if there had ever been one; see Sommerstein 1982, 148 
and 229.
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more “serious”, with all gradations between, and several factors tending to move 
an utterance towards one end or the other of the scale.
In Clouds there are forty-seven oaths that we actually hear being uttered by 
characters in the action of the play; there are also three references to oaths said to 
have been given in the past (533, 1135, 1227)94 and two offers to swear an oath in 
the future (244‒5, 1232‒5). Of the forty-seven oaths actually uttered, no less than 
forty-six are “informal”; the odd one out is the creditor’s vow to take legal pro-
ceedings against Strepsiades “or else may I not live” (1255). How can we attempt 
to determine the different degrees to which, if at all, these informal oaths were 
felt as solemn and binding?
We could, of course, look at the degree to which they actually influence the 
behaviour of those to whom they are addressed. This, however, will not get us 
very far. There are only two oaths in Clouds that clearly do (or rather did) influ-
ence the addressees’ behaviour, and we do not actually hear either of them being 
uttered. One is the so-called oath (perhaps, in any case, best regarded as only a 
metaphorical one) by which the Athenian audience are said to have bound them-
selves when they gave a good reception to Aristophanes’ first play (528‒33); as 
the following words nun oun “now therefore . . .” indicate, the claim being made 
is that it is because of this “oath” that Aristophanes has chosen to write another 
play with an intellectual theme. The other is the oath, already mentioned, 
which Strepsiades gave when asking for his loan. Since the creditor, pressing for 
payment, reminds Strepsiades about this oath, he had evidently taken it seriously 
at the time, and we can reasonably assume that if Strepsiades had not sworn to 
pay, the loan would not have been made. But we are given no indication of how 
he expressed the oath. It may have been informal – if, for example, he was asked 
whether he would repay the loan and replied νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔγωγε “yes, by the 
gods, I will”, or the like; but it may also, for all we know, have been expressed 
formally (e.g. ὄμνυμι τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδώσειν ἃ δανείζομαι “I swear by the gods that 
I will repay what I am borrowing”). We therefore have no opportunity, in Clouds 
at least, to judge informal oaths by their consequences; we can only judge them 
by their expression and context.
I consider below seven hypotheses about how the expression or context of an 
oath might influence its perceived solemnity and binding force.
94 On two further occasions (825, 1240‒1), a character makes a comment on an oath uttered a 
short time previously by another character.
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(a) Is the oath by Zeus, or by another god or gods?
In all kinds of texts where informal oaths are common, as we saw earlier in this 
chapter, more of them are taken in the name of Zeus than in that of any other 
divinity. Of the 46 informal oaths in Clouds, more than half (26) are by Zeus. It 
is prima facie plausible that this familiarity might breed contempt – that even 
though Zeus was the most powerful god, an oath by him might not be the most 
powerful oath, particularly since it was phonetically shorter and weaker than 
almost any other.
In Clouds, however, the invocation of gods other than Zeus has no particular 
association with key moments in the play, or with the other criteria discussed 
below. There is only one clear correlation detectable in Clouds between this phe-
nomenon and anything else, and it is this.
Of the 46 informal oaths in Clouds, 25 are uttered by Strepsiades. Eleven of 
these precede, and fourteen follow, the moment at which he repudiates tradi-
tional religion. Of the latter, two (at 665 and 814) are by “new” gods (Air and Mist) 
and can be excluded from consideration. Of the eleven oaths he utters while still 
presumably believing in Zeus and the other traditional gods, eight95 are in the 
name of Zeus and three96 of other gods; of the twelve he subsequently swears in 
the name of gods he has repudiated, seven97 invoke Zeus and five98 invoke other 
powers. The extent of the difference may not be of much significance, but its direc-
tion is striking: Strepsiades after his irreligious conversion swears, on average, 
“heavier”, more noticeable oaths than he did before! Of course, the very fact that 
he swears by the traditional gods at all is a notable incongruity, and it contrasts, 
though not in a completely black-and-white way, with the behaviour of the per-
manent inmates of the Thinkhouse: Socrates, his students, and the Worse Argu-
ment between them utter only six oaths by traditional deities, and only two of 
them (773, 1000) are by deities other than Zeus. Strepsiades’ poor understanding 
of the new concepts and theories to which he is introduced is much commented 
on by Socrates and by modern scholars alike,99 and the increased “visibility” of 
his invocations of traditional gods, at a time when he logically should not have 
been invoking them at all, may be one of the dramatist’s methods of drawing 
attention to this. Visibility, however, is one thing; binding force is another, and 
95 217, 250‒1, 261, 327‒8, 329‒30, 343‒4, 346‒7, 408‒11.
96 121, 372, 386‒8.
97 483, 652, 733, 1234‒5, 1238‒9, 1338‒9, 1406‒7.
98 454‒6, 664‒5, 723‒4, 732, 781.
99 See especially Green 1979 and Woodbury 1980.
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there is no evidence in Clouds that an oath by Zeus, simply because it was an oath 
by Zeus, was perceived as less binding than any other.
However, two passages in other Aristophanic plays may be significant. Near 
the beginning of the confrontation between Paphlagon and the Sausage-seller in 
Knights, when the latter has just started to make a speech, Paphlagon twice tries 
to interrupt, saying “will you still not give way to me?” (336, 338). Each time the 
Sausage-seller replies μὰ Δία “no, by Zeus”; on the second occasion, however, 
Paphlagon ripostes ναὶ μὰ Δία “yes, by Zeus”, and this time the Sausage-seller 
delivers a counter-riposte:
 μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ,  
ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ πρότερος εἰπεῖν πρῶτα διαμαχοῦμαι.
No, by Poseidon; I’ll fight it out first for the right to speak before you (338‒9).
This response apparently wins that particular tussle, since Paphlagon can only 
cry in frustrated fury “ah me, I’m going to burst!” (340) – which at least sug-
gests that the Sausage-seller’s substitution of “by Poseidon” for “by Zeus” had 
made it clearer than before that he was determined not to yield. A passage in 
Frogs, contrariwise, may indicate the significance of a refusal to make such a 
substitution. Dionysus, in the underworld, has been terrified out of his wits by 
an apparition, or supposed apparition,100 of the shape-changing demon Empusa 
(Frogs 285‒301). Eventually the demon goes away, as the slave Xanthias assures 
his badly shaken master (301‒5); but Dionysus is not satisfied with Xanthias’ bare 
word, and demands that he confirm it by an oath. Xanthias replies νὴ τὸν Δία 
“yes, by Zeus, 〈she’s gone〉”, but Dionysus asks him to swear a second and then a 
third time – and each time he repeats νὴ Δία “yes, by Zeus”. If he had substituted 
the name of Poseidon or Apollo at the second request, would Dionysus have felt 
it necessary to make a third?
(b) If the oath is by Zeus, does it name him with the definite article?
In almost all informal oaths, as already noted, the name of the god invoked is pre-
ceded by the definite article: one says μὰ τὸν Ποσειδῶ, not *μὰ Ποσειδῶ. The only 
100 The audience can never be quite certain whether Xanthias is actually seeing Empusa or 
only pretending to do so (Dionysus himself never sees her, doubtless being too frightened ever 
to look). 
336   13 The informal oath
significant exception is where the god is Zeus; in his case the article is optional 
and, in Aristophanes at least, is usually omitted101.
To some extent the choice of including or omitting the article is doubtless 
driven by metrical considerations; but this is certainly not the whole story. The 
pattern that we saw under (a), in fact, appears again, mutatis mutandis. The early 
Strepsiades (up to line 411) swears eight times by Zeus, and seven of these are in 
the short form (without the article)102; the later Strepsiades swears seven times 
by Zeus, and only four of these103 are in the short form. Once again Strepsiades’ 
usage changes in the direction of oaths of greater bulk, and once again it changes 
away from the pattern favoured by the permanent inmates of the school, all of 
whose four oaths by Zeus are in the short form. The explanation for this is doubt-
less the same as before.
However, while there is nothing in Clouds, or in Aristophanes generally, that 
clearly indicates that an oath by Zeus with the definite article is more solemn 
than one without, we cannot yet rule out completely the existence of such a dif-
ferential. It is striking, in particular, that in the argumentative idiom whereby 
a political or forensic speaker introduces an actual or imaginary objection in 
order to rebut it (see ch. 9), if the objection is reinforced by an informal oath it is 
always νὴ Δία, not νὴ τὸν Δία or anything heavier.104 Since the speaker is aiming 
to destroy the credibility of the objection, it would not be surprising, to say the 
least, if, among the various oath-formulae that an objector might have used to 
bolster its credibility, it was the practice, when using this technique, to put into 
his mouth the weakest possible.
(c) Is the name of the god invoked accompanied by an epithet?
A prayer, it was thought, was more likely to be effective if the god was addressed 
by a title that was particularly pleasing to him/her or particularly appropriate 
to the occasion.105 An oath is a special kind of prayer, conditionally requesting 
harm rather than good for oneself, and by parity of reasoning it too should be 
101 The ratio in Clouds (seven informal Zeus-oaths with the article, out of a total of twenty-six) 
is fairly typical. Across the eleven extant plays, just under a quarter of all informal Zeus-oaths 
(90 out of 362) have the article; the highest proportion (in Acharnians) is 37.5%, the lowest (in 
Knights) 12.5%.
102 All except the first of them, at 217.
103 733, 1234‒5, 1338‒9, 1406‒7.
104 Typical examples are Isaeus 3.73, 4.20; Dem. 6.13, 6.14, 19.158, 19.272, 21.160, 21.222; Hyp. 
Eux. 14; Dein. 2.8. The idiom is also used by Xenophon (Mem. 1.2.9, Hell. 7.3.10).
105 Cf. Pl. Crat. 400e, Phil. 12c; see Fraenkel 1950, 99‒100, on Aesch. Ag. 160‒1.
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more effective if the god was invoked under a suitable epithet. And in Clouds this 
expectation seems to be borne out. There are three occasions when a god named 
in an oath is given an epithet: all of them are of considerable dramatic impor-
tance, in all three cases the wording of the oath attracts comment from another 
character, and in two of the three passages we shall find other markers showing 
that the oath is of special significance.
We begin with the first oath-utterance in the play (83), at the beginning of 
the first real dialogue between Strepsiades and his son. Pheidippides, asked if he 
loves his father, replies “Yes, by Poseidon Hippios here”. Strepsiades begs him 
not to swear by Poseidon Hippios – the god of horses – because “that god is the 
author of my troubles”. It is even possible that this oath can be said to influence 
Strepsiades’ behaviour; presumably he asks Pheidippides the question because 
he is apprehensive how Pheidippides will receive the proposal that he should go 
to Socrates’ school, and we might wonder whether Strepsiades would have dared 
to make the proposal if Pheidippides had not confirmed his affirmative answer by 
so emphatic an oath.
It is perhaps significant that the next passage to be considered (817) comes at 
the beginning of the second dialogue between Strepsiades and his son. Strepsia-
des is trying to expel Pheidippides from his home; Pheidippides, baffled by his 
father’s behaviour, says to him “You’re not in your right mind, by Zeus Olympios.” 
Strepsiades is amused, and professes to be appalled, that a grown man should 
still believe in Zeus; and the existence of Zeus, and the absurdity of swearing by 
him, are the subject of the next fourteen lines, culminating in the well-known 
reference to “Socrates the Melian”, i.e. the atheist106 (830).
As that oath was linked to the earlier one by its position in a father-son dia-
logue, so it is linked to a later one (1239‒40) by Strepsiades’ laughter. Strepsiades’ 
first creditor, already denied his money with perjury and insults, says furiously 
“By Zeus the great, and by the gods, you shan’t get away with treating me like 
this!” Strepsiades laughs uproariously, saying that swearing by Zeus and the gods 
is risible “to those in the know”. Strepsiades’ treatment of this creditor is his first 
and decisive overt act of immorality in the course of the play.
In Clouds, therefore, it does appear that the presence of an epithet gives 
special prominence and significance to an oath. How typical is this of the Aris-
tophanic corpus? The pattern turns out to be patchy. In Aristophanes’ other five 
earlier plays (down to and including Birds) there are only two informal oaths in 
which the god is given an epithet, and in both cases, it seems, the device is again 
106 As if confusing him with the notorious (and later outlawed) scoffer at religion, Diagoras of 
Melos.
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being used to highlight these utterances – this time for the paradoxical reason 
that their utterers are rogues and the value of their oaths highly questionable. In 
Acharnians (730) a Megarian, renewing acquaintance after a long interval with 
the Athenian Agora, swears by Zeus Philios that he has yearned for it “as for 
a mother”; but the intensity of that love is put in some doubt, to say the least, 
when later, having sold his two daughters for a little garlic and salt,107 he prays 
to Hermes to be able to sell his wife and mother for as good a price (817). And in 
Knights (297‒8) the Sausage-seller, anxious to prove that he is a greater villain 
than Paphlagon-Cleon, swears by Hermes Agoraios that he … commits bare-faced 
perjury! In Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazusae there are considerably more epi-
thetted informal oaths; the majority are uttered by women,108 and neither they 
nor the only one uttered by a male109 seem to have any special significance. In 
Aristophanes’ last three extant plays (Frogs, Ecclesiazusae, Wealth) only one kind 
of epithetted informal oath is found – that by Zeus Soter, which occurs seven 
times.110 Sometimes, but not always, it is used at a moment when the speaker 
feels he really has been blessedly saved from evil111 in Frogs the two moments 
when it is used are moments when the theme of saving Athens in its time of peril 
is particularly strong΄112 It would appear, therefore, that epithets can be used, in a 
particular passage or play, to confer special significance on an informal oath, but 
that they do not always actually do so.
(d) Is the oath-formula a conjunction of two or more invocations?
Such a conjunction creates what one might call a “belt-and-braces” oath: if 
by any chance one of the powers invoked fails to enforce the oath, the swearer 
107 He is starving, which is why he is willing to give so much for so little.
108 Lys. 443‒4, 447‒8, 554, 738‒9; Thesm. 858.
109 Lys. 403, where the Proboulos, swearing by Poseidon Halykos (“the Briny”), says that men, 
because of their laxness in controlling their wives, have only themselves to blame for the wom-
en’s current hybristic behaviour.
110 Frogs 738‒9, 1433; Eccl. 79‒81, 760‒1, 1045‒6, 1102‒4; Wealth 877‒9. 
111 At Eccl. 1045‒6 the young man thinks that his girlfriend has rescued him from the clutches 
of a hideous old woman by putting her to flight (alas, she in turn will be put to flight a moment 
later by an even more hideous old woman); at Wealth 877‒9 an honest man rejoices in Wealth’s 
discomfiture of a sykophant and, he hopes, of all his kind.
112 Frogs 738 directly follows the parabasis, whose main subject has been how best to secure 
the survival of Athens; in 1433‒4 Dionysus, who has just said (1418‒19) that he has come to Hades 
to find a poet ‘so that the City may survive’, expresses for the last time his inability to choose be-
tween Aeschylus and Euripides, prior to subjecting the pair to a final test by asking them for ‘one 
more suggestion each about a way … for the City to secure her survival’ (1435‒6).
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has ensured that another will be available to do so. Hence in taking a formal 
oath, several deities are often specified as “witnesses” or “oath-gods”: in 1234 
Strepsiades” creditor specifies three, and the Athenian “ephebic oath”, as taken 
at Acharnae (RO 88), named seventeen (see S&B 16‒21). As noted earlier in this 
chapter (p. 320), informal oaths by multiple gods are particularly frequent in the 
orators.
Such conjunctions occur twice in Clouds. One is the creditor’s oath at 1239‒40, 
already discussed. The other occurs at 627‒9. This is a significant moment in the 
play: it directly follows the end of the parabasis and thus marks the beginning of a 
new phase in the action, it is the first we have heard of Strepsiades since he entered 
Socrates’ school, and it is the first occasion in the play on which anyone swears by 
one of the “new” gods whom Socrates and his followers worship. Socrates comes 
out of the school and swears “by Respiration, by Chaos, by Air” that he has never 
met such a hopeless and forgetful pupil. This utterance is not addressed to anyone 
in particular, but it is clearly being given the utmost emphasis.
There are only three informal oaths in the rest of the Aristophanic corpus that 
are reinforced in this way, and all have other unusual features. In two of them the 
oath-formulae are comic. The Sausage-seller swears “by the fists whose blows I’ve 
borne … many a time … and by the slashes of butchers’ knives” that he believes 
he will surpass Paphlagon in shamelessness (Knights 411‒13) – responding to, 
and evidently (as he always does) outdoing, Paphlagon’s oath “by Poseidon” that 
he will not do so; and the Hoopoe (formerly Tereus) swears “by earth, by snares, 
by gins, by nets” (Birds 194) – probably parodying a tragic or satyric line (trag. 
adesp. 123a) – that Peisetaerus’ scheme for a bird city is the cleverest thing he 
has ever heard. Likewise expressing enthusiastic approval and admiration are 
the chorus of Knights when they praise the Sausage-seller for an exuberant curse 
on Paphlagon (Knights 941‒2); their oath is in the name of a quite conventional 
triad, Zeus, Apollo and Demeter113 – but, most abnormally, it is uttered in prose.
(e) Is attention drawn to features of sanctity in the environment?
As discussed in ch. 6 above, it was common, when prescribing the terms for a 
formal oath, to specify that it be taken in a sacred place and/or in contact with 
sacred objects. Accordingly, when Strepsiades’ creditor challenges him to swear 
to his denial of indebtedness, he asks that the oath be taken “in whatever place 
113 These three were the ‘Oath-Gods’ (horkioi theoi) by whom were sworn oaths of particular solem-
nity (Deinarchus fr. 29 Conomis) including that of the Athenian jurors (Pollux 8.122); see Fisher 2001, 
254‒5, and S&B 43, 72, 79, 154, 164, 166, 208‒9.
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I may require” (1233); and when Lysistrata’s comrades take their oath of sexual 
abstinence (Lys. 181‒239), they do so with their hands on what, in comedy, is the 
most sacred object known to a woman – a cup of wine.114 In Clouds there seem to 
be a number of representations (some probably fully iconic, others not) of various 
divinities visible in the acting area. When Pheidippides swears by Poseidon at 83, 
a passage we have already examined, he speaks of “this Poseidon here” and must 
evidently be pointing to an image115 and Strepsiades’ choice of Hermes as the god 
to pray to at 1478 is best explained if there is a pillar-image of Hermes in front of 
his door as there was in front of so many real doors in Athens΄116 Since, further, 
the whole performance117 was taking place in the Theatre of Dionysus during the 
City Dionysia, we know that an image of Dionysus was present too.
Any or all of the informal oaths in Clouds that invoke Poseidon, Hermes or 
Dionysus may have been accompanied by a gesture towards the god’s visible rep-
resentation, and one of them, Pheidippides’ oath at 83, certainly was; we have 
seen too that this is not the only indication of special sanctity attached to this 
oath – and we will be coming back to it yet again. Several other oaths taken in the 
name of these deities can also be shown to be of special significance in the play. 
I omit the oath by Dionysus uttered at the beginning of the parabasis (518‒24) 
by the chorus-leader in the name of the poet; this is certainly a very impressive 
oath, prominently placed (and it has an interesting parallel, on the same topic, 
in Wasps 1046‒7, also from a parabasis), but it is not strictly speaking “informal”, 
since the speaker goes on to specify blessings to befall him if his assertions are 
true (“may I be victorious and be thought a true artist”, 520) and, by implication, 
evils to befall him if they are not; I omit also the oaths by Poseidon at 665 and 724, 
which are uttered at the Thinkhouse, not at Strepsiades’ home, and would cer-
tainly not be accompanied by any gesture towards that Poseidon Hippios whom 
the speaker, Strepsiades, so much abhors.
At 90‒91 Pheidippides swears by Dionysus to obey his father’s instruction 
to “go and learn what I’m going to ask you to” (89); he has asked to know what 
it is that he is to go and learn, but his father has insisted on an explicit promise 
to obey before revealing this. Since Strepsiades had objected vehemently to his 
114 In an explicitly signalled parody (cf. Lys. 188‒9) of the conquer-or-die oath taken by the 
Seven against Thebes (Aesch. Seven 42‒8) with their hands touching the blood of a sacrificed bull 
collected in the hollow of a shield.
115 Russo 1962, 172 (1994, 110) argues that the image need not necessarily be visible to the audi-
ence; but see Dover 1968, 104‒5.
116 So e.g. Dover 1968, lxxvi, 265; Sommerstein 1982, 231; Russo 1994, 110.
117 Both the actual performance of the original version of Clouds, and the performance for 
which the revised play was being prepared.
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son’s previous choice of Poseidon Hippios as a god to swear by, we are probably 
meant to notice that Pheidippides now chooses a different god, particularly since 
νὴ τὸν Διόνυσον has the same metrical value as νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ. Perhaps he may 
even begin to raise an arm in the direction of the image of Poseidon before think-
ing better of it and diverting his gesture towards the image of Dionysus.
Having heard where and with whom he is being asked to study, Pheidippides 
swears, again by Dionysus, that he will not do so under any circumstances, “not 
if you gave me the pheasants that Leogoras rears” (109). What is significant about 
this oath is, of course, that it directly contradicts and falsifies an oath taken by 
the same god only eighteen lines previously – a fact which could of course be 
emphasized by a repetition of any gesture accompanying the earlier oath. To such 
flagrantly contradictory swearing, at so short an interval, we know of no parallel 
in any Greek text from the period covered by the project database118 it can reason-
ably be said to indicate that Pheidippides, long before he enters the Thinkhouse, 
is at heart almost as contemptuous of the gods as Socrates himself.
The oath by Dionysus at 1000‒1 is a surprising candidate for special solem-
nity, since the speaker is the Worse Argument, whom one would have expected 
not to believe in Dionysus’ existence or power. It is addressed to Pheidippides, 
and assures him that if he follows the path of traditional virtue as recommended 
by the Better Argument, “you’ll become like the [imbecile] sons of Hippocrates, 
and they’ll call you a pap-sucker [= milksop]”. This is the most noticeable oath 
by a traditional god ever uttered in the play by a permanent inmate of the school; 
and there is a good chance that we are meant to reflect on it, and to reflect that 
it is false. The Better Argument, after all, has himself pointed out (985‒6) that 
the kind of education and upbringing that he favours “bred the men who fought 
at Marathon”, and nobody would think of them as imbeciles or milksops. The 
statement made here by the Worse Argument is the first substantive assertion he 
118 There are, however, other passages in comedy in which oath-expressions are used to draw 
attention to inconsistency or vacillation that does not amount to blatant self-contradiction. 
In Frogs 1119‒76, Euripides analyses the first few lines of Aeschylus’ Choephoroi, showing (he 
claims) that Aeschylus repeatedly “says the same thing twice”. When he finds such a repetition 
in line 3 (“I have come and returned to this land”) Dionysus, once he understands the point being 
made, responds “Yes, by Zeus” (1158). Aeschylus then argues that “come” (hēkō) and “return” 
(katerkhomai) are not in fact synonymous, since the latter could only be said by an exile like 
Orestes; Dionysus responds “Very good, by Apollo!” (1166). Euripides rejoins that katerkhomai 
is anyway not appropriate to Orestes because he was not recalled from exile but came home 
secretly; Dionysus responds “Very good, by Hermes!” (1169). It is thus made very evident how 
limited Dionysus’ critical faculties are, even before he goes on to add that he does not know what 
Euripides means!
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has made during his debate (agōn) with the Better Argument; it is backed by a 
powerful oath; and it is probably to be taken as untrue. But then this is the char-
acter who will presently say (1081) that Zeus is, literally, “weaker than ... women” 
(ἥττων ... γυναικῶν)119.
At 1277 the second creditor swears by Hermes that he will summon Strepsia-
des to court if he is not paid his money. This is the strongest of three oaths that 
he utters, and, reinforcing a threat as it does, it mirrors two powerful oaths by the 
first creditor (1239, 1255; discussed above) and should probably be regarded as 
equalling them in force. The speaker certainly hopes, and probably expects, that 
it will have an influence on Strepsiades – though it does not.
To extend this inquiry to the whole Aristophanic corpus would require us to 
determine for each play which divine images, if any, were part of the stage setting, 
and that would take us too far from our subject; I will therefore, as regards the 
other comedies, concentrate on the one divinity whose image we know to have 
been always present, namely Dionysus. A review of the nine informal oaths by 
Dionysus found in the ten surviving comedies other than Clouds120 does not on 
the whole suggest that invocation of Dionysus (rather than, say, Zeus or Posei-
don) in itself confers any particular extra significance either on the utterance it 
accompanies or on the structural position occupied by the passage in the play.121 
It seems likely, therefore, that the Dionysus oaths of Clouds 91 and 109 owe their 
prominence more to their context (including their proximity to each other) than 
to anything else.
(f) Has the oath been solicited by another person?
The great majority of informal oaths, in Clouds and elsewhere, arise simply from 
the speaker’s desire to add impressiveness and credibility to what (s)he is saying. 
But a small number are uttered because someone else has requested them. To 
solicit an oath (or even a solemn promise) signals that one is particularly anxious 
to secure a guarantee of reliability for what one is about to be told; to give a solic-
ited oath is to give that guarantee, and to break it is to break faith with the other 
119 He means that Zeus is regularly vanquished by desire for mortal females; but that is not 
what he says.
120 Wasps 1474; Peace 109, 1277; Birds 171, 501, 1370; Eccl. 344, 357, 422.
121 However, the three oaths of this type in Ecclesiazusae – the only ones to be found in Aris-
tophanes’ last five plays – are of interest for a different reason: they all occur in the same scene, 
and all in the mouth of the same character, Blepyrus, who in this scene, and in this scene alone, 
is wearing his wife’s clothes (she having “borrowed” his). May this be related to Dionysus’ well-
known tendency to wear women’s garments (as he does in Frogs)?
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party in a matter known to be of considerable concern to them. Hence an oath can 
be expected to have greater solemnity if it has been solicited.
Strictly speaking, there are no solicited oaths in Clouds. The first creditor 
does challenge Strepsiades to deny on oath that he owes him money (1232‒4), but 
he abandons the challenge when it becomes evident that Strepsiades regards the 
oath as a meaningless form of words. There are, however, two oaths which can 
be viewed in a broader sense as having been solicited. Both of them have already 
been shown above to be marked in other ways as being of special seriousness: 
Pheidippides’ oaths by Poseidon and Dionysus at 83 and 91 respectively.
The question “Do you love me?” (82) is a fraught one at any time, particu-
larly when it is asked, as in this case, by one person of another who has a duty 
to love him/her. Immediately before asking this question, Strepsiades has asked 
Pheidippides to kiss him and give him his right hand; this would normally con-
stitute a binding pledge of affection and loyalty (cf. Frogs 754, 788‒9), though it 
was not quite as strong as an oath (cf. Soph. Phil. 810‒13).122 The fact that after 
receiving such a pledge Strepsiades is still sufficiently uncertain to put the ques-
tion indicates that he wants some stronger assurance, and it can be argued that it 
virtually compels Pheidippides to put his answer in the form of an oath. Heracles 
in Sophocles’ Trachiniae (1174‒90; see §5.2) makes things more explicit. He first 
tells his son Hyllus that it is his duty to obey his father; Hyllus promises to do so. 
He then demands that Hyllus give him the pledge of a handclasp (refusing to tell 
him why); Hyllus does so. He next orders Hyllus to swear by Zeus to fulfil what his 
father will command him, explicitly wishing suffering on himself if he breaks his 
oath; Hyllus duly swears (formally, as is usual in tragedy), and is then told what 
the command is: to place his father alive on a pyre and set light to it.
That passage, of course, illustrates not only the relationship between the 
handclasp and the oath but also the ploy of demanding that a person swear to 
do X before being told what X is (see e.g. pp. 174, 273‒6]). Something like this 
sequence, though not quite the same thing, occurs in Clouds 88‒91, where 
Strepsiades, before telling his son what he wants him to study and where, asks 
for a promise that he will obey the request when made, and is answered in the 
affirmative with an oath by Dionysus. Strepsiades has again not exactly solicited 
an oath, but he has shown that he is anxious about the matter and needs a strong 
assurance – even after Pheidippides’ other oath, six lines earlier – so it is not 
surprising that Pheidippides swears again. The oath, as we have seen, is broken 
within three minutes.
122 Cf. A. Allan 2007, 114‒15.
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(g) Has the oath been preceded by explicit discussion of swearing?
What makes an oath informal is that it has no explicit reference to swearing or to 
conditional self-cursing. If, however, such reference forms part of the context in 
which an informal oath is uttered, that immediately tends to make it less infor-
mal. The actual soliciting of an oath is one way, but by no means the only way, 
in which this can happen. Another is illustrated by the last example we shall 
discuss, the paradoxical passage (1228‒9) in which Strepsiades in effect swears 
that a previous sworn promise was false. He has just (though not in so many 
words) denied ever having borrowed money from the “first creditor”,123 and is 
reminded that he had sworn by the gods to pay it (1227) – in effect putting him on 
notice that to deny the debt exists, or to refuse payment, will be an act of perjury. 
He replies:
Well, by Zeus, at that time my Pheidippides didn’t yet know the invincible Argument (1228‒ 9).
Normally we would not attach much importance to an oath-formula of this kind; 
but it is different when we, and Strepsiades, have just been reminded of a previ-
ous oath which he is at risk of breaking. Not that the oath he is actually giving 
at this moment is untruthful: it is perfectly true that Pheidippides had not yet 
learned “unjust argument” at the time when the money was borrowed. It is, nev-
ertheless, flagrantly shameless for him to use an oath to reinforce his statement 
when his behaviour shows he regards oaths as worthless.124
It will have been observed that we have kept coming back to just two sec-
tions of the play where oaths are at the centre of our attention: the first dialogue 
between Strepsiades and Pheidippides (where Pheidippides’ basically amoral 
and impious character is established), and the scenes between Strepsiades and 
the creditors (where Strepsiades in his turn gives a display of gross impiety and 
amorality, which dramatically speaking justifies his subsequent fate). To these 
we may add two other passages in which oaths are the subject of explicit discus-
sion: the second dialogue between father and son (816‒31), where Pheidippides 
is criticized for swearing by Zeus, and, much earlier, Socrates’ first statement, in 
123 When the creditor summons Strepsiades to appear before a magistrate (the first stage in 
bringing a lawsuit), Strepsiades asks what it is about, and the creditor replies “The twelve minas 
that you borrowed when you bought the dark-grey horse” (1224‒5); to which Strepsiades retorts 
“‘Horse’! Hark at him! Me, who you all know loathes everything to do with horses!” (1225‒6). (He 
was, of course, buying the horse, doubtless unwillingly, for his son, not for himself.)
124 A further dose of shamelessness is added by the contradiction between Strepsiades’ implicit 
denial, a moment before, that he borrowed the money, and his admission now that he swore to 
repay it!
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the context of an offer by Strepsiades to swear to pay his fee, that “we don’t credit 
gods here” (247‒8). The key oaths in these passages very definitely are oaths, and 
the discrediting of their validity is one crucial aspect of the sophistic subversion 
of ethical values as presented in this play.
So are there circumstances in which informal oaths do lack all binding force? 
So far as Clouds is concerned the answer might seem to be “no”. Even though 
oaths may often seem to be little more than conversational counters, people 
still do not, in general, swear to statements that they do not believe to be true (if 
relating to the present or the past) or do not intend to be true (if relating to their 
own future actions). Or if they do, they show themselves to be contemnors of the 
divine. Pheidippides and the Worse Argument do so in this play, and so, for a 
time, until he sees the light, does Strepsiades.
But if we look beyond Clouds, things become a little more complicated. 
We cannot here examine all the sworn statements in Aristophanes that are not 
straightforwardly and self-evidently true; let us concentrate on the smaller cat-
egory defined above – assertory oaths which the speaker does not believe to be 
true, and promissory oaths which (s)he has no intention of keeping or which 
(s)he subsequently breaks in a manner showing bad faith. In Aristophanes’ sur-
viving plays other than Clouds, there are about twenty-two of these.125 They can 
be grouped into four classes.
(a) Oaths uttered by villains – or rather by one villain, the Sausage-seller in 
Knights, who claims to outdo Paphlagon-Cleon in wickedness because he is 
not only a thief but a bare-faced perjurer too (297‒8, 418‒24, 1239). There is 
no clear instance of his actually committing perjury during the play itself; 
his sworn promise (“by Demeter”) to prove that Paphlagon had taken a large 
bribe from Mytilene (832‒5) may well seem extremely far-fetched (given that 
Cleon had argued strenuously for the extermination of Mytilene’s male popu-
lation), but it is not entirely clear that we are meant to take it as self-evidently 
false (rather than e.g. as an accusation that Cleon had taken money from the 
Mytileneans by proμising to argue that they should be spared, and had then 
double-crossed them).
(b) Oaths in matters of love – which were often alleged not to count as oaths at 
all. In §11.2 above it was shown that formal oaths were in practice treated as 
binding even in these circumstances, but with informal oaths it is sometimes 
otherwise. In Lysistrata such oaths are sworn by the Third Woman (752), who 
125 Excluding two which refer to events in the world outside the comic fiction: the alleged Spar-
tan breach of the Peace of Nicias (cf. Lys. 513‒14) and the boys who are persuaded by lovers’ gifts 
to break oaths of chastity (Birds 705‒7).
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wants to get out of the Acropolis and back to her husband; by Lysistrata 
(855‒88), who wants to stir up Cinesias’ sexual tension and frustration to 
the highest possible pitch; and by Myrrhine (949), who wants to lull him into 
believing that she is about to satisfy his desires. The deities invoked are Zeus, 
Aphrodite and Artemis.
(c) Ironical or exaggerated statements not intended to deceive. Apart from a single 
example in Birds (1358), these appear only in the three latest plays, Frogs 
(285), Ecclesiazusae (377, 390‒1), and Wealth (380‒1, 657‒8, 987). Typical 
are the ironic statement that Wealth must have been “happy” to be bathed 
in cold sea water (Wealth 657‒8) and the exaggerated statement that the as-
sembly meeting attended by Chremes had ended before sunrise and before 
the second cock-crow (Eccl. 377, 390‒1) – when in fact it had not then even 
begun;126 Chremes only means that it ended very early, before many male 
citizens had arrived. The god invoked is usually Zeus, but once it is Apollo 
(Wealth 987) and once “the gods” (Wealth 380).
(d) None of the above. False oaths for which none of the above explanations is 
available occur in these ten plays as follows; unless otherwise stated, the 
oath is “by Zeus”.
1. Wasps 184 (Philocleon: “my name is Nobody”).
2. Birds 1680 (Poseidon: “the Triballian god is not saying that Basileia 
ought to be handed over to the birds”).
3. Lysistrata 990 (Spartan herald: “I have not got an erection”).
4. Lysistrata 1236‒8 (Athenian diners, offstage: “the Spartans did not  choose 
the wrong song to sing”; it is not stated which god was invoked).
5. Thesmophoriazusae 623‒4 (Euripides’ in-law, disguised as a woman: “I 
come to the Thesmophoria every year”).
6. Frogs 49‒51 (Dionysus: “Cleisthenes and I sank twelve or thirteen enemy 
ships … by Apollo”).
7. Frogs 650 (Xanthias: “I didn’t feel any pain”).
8. Frogs 1471 (Dionysus repudiates a previous oath, sworn in the name of at 
least two gods, to take Euripides home127).
9. Ecclesiazusae 553 (Praxagora: “I don’t know what the Assembly deci-
ded”).
126 Assembly meetings regularly began at sunrise (cf. Ach. 19‒20); the second cock-crow is men-
tioned in Eccl. 30‒31 as having already been heard, and yet the women, who are anxious to reach 
the Pnyx early, do not depart thither until 285.
127 He has not in fact sworn any such oath during the play, but no spectator will think of that 
while watching this scene.
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Three features of this list may be noted. Firstly, such acts of clear perjury, by char-
acters not apparently meant to be seen as villains, are heavily concentrated in the 
later plays – only one of them appears in a play produced before 414 BC. Secondly, 
with one exception, all the oaths are assertory, not promissory. Thirdly, with one 
exception (the same one), either the false statement is one that can do no harm 
(4, 9)128 or else the deception quickly fails because it is not believed (1, 2, 3, 6) 
or is detected (5, 7).129 And the exception itself, Frogs 1471, is easily explained: 
Euripides, of all people, could not complain of being deceived by a false oath, 
because it was he who had made available, in a notorious line of Hippolytus (612; 
see §11.3), an argument that was capable of nullifying any oath whatsoever – and 
Dionysus here quotes half of this line back at him.
This evidence suggests that even in the case of informal oaths uttered by 
characters in comedy, there remained, in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, 
a significant degree of reluctance to attach an oath-formula to a false or insincere 
statement, and an even stronger degree of reluctance to show such an action as 
being successful to the detriment of others; the one exception really proves the 
rule, as it shows the author of what was alleged to be a perjurer’s charter being 
hoist with his own petard. The informal, conversational oath may no longer have 
been envisaged as automatically calling down divine wrath on the swearer if it 
was attached, under any circumstances, to an untrue statement; and there is 
some evidence that attitudes in this respect became somewhat laxer during the 
course of Aristophanes’ lifetime. But an oath, even a seemingly casual one, still 
counted for something – and all the more so when, as in Clouds, the existence 
and power of the gods was at issue.
128 In Lys. 1236‒8, the Athenians’ objective is simply to spare the Spartans embarrassment; 
their falsehood cannot do the Spartans any harm and may indeed benefit them (e.g. by helping 
them win a symposiac game). In Eccl. 553, if Praxagora tells the truth, she risks losing the oppor-
tunity to implement a social revolution which she believes will be greatly to the benefit of men 
and women alike – including Blepyrus, to whom she is speaking.
129 Xanthias’ deception (he is claiming to be the god Heracles, whose costume he was wear-
ing when arrested) is unmasked when he and Dionysus are taken before Pluto and Persephone 
(Frogs 669‒71, 741‒2).
13a Swearing oaths in the authorial person
I.C. Torrance
The authorial voice makes an appearance in many Greek literary genres, but the 
number of authors who swear in the authorial person is remarkably low. Major 
archaic and classical authors such as Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, and Thucydides 
never use a first-person oath in the authorial voice, a fact that is particularly strik-
ing in the cases of Hesiod (who spends much of his time, especially in Works and 
Days, speaking in his own name in a quite specific persona), and of Herodotus 
(who regularly gives his own opinion on reported events). In several cases the 
extant works of an author contain just one example of an oath sworn in the autho-
rial person (Sappho, the anonymous Theognidea, Antisthenes, Aristotle, [Plato]). 
Among the poets Pindar is the author who most commonly uses the first-person 
oath and Bacchylides also (twice) uses the authorial oath in his epinicians. Aris-
tophanes twice gives an oath in his own name, both times on the same issue but 
in two different plays. In prose texts, the works of Aeschines and Demosthenes 
contain by far the most first-person oaths, but other orators do not use them at 
all. Finally, Xenophon appears to use the authorial oath abundantly. However, all 
but two of the first-person oaths in his writings are spoken by Xenophon the char-
acter, and all but one of those appear in the Anabasis, which Xenophon famously 
ascribes in his Hellenica (3.1.2) to the otherwise unknown Themistogenes of Syra-
cuse. In contrast to other works in which authorial oaths appear, there is a sig-
nificant distance created in the Anabasis between Xenophon as author and Xeno-
phon the character within the work. Memorabilia includes one oath by Xenophon 
as a character, and Hellenica and the Constitution of the Spartans each contain 
one oath in the authorial voice.
Since we have already discussed oaths in oratory, we can begin by reviewing 
the relevant findings regarding first-person oaths in this genre before moving on 
to other authors. Most of our discussion will be focused on Pindar and on Xeno-
phon, but we will also discuss the other writers in whose works we find one or 
two authorial oaths before making some concluding remarks and returning to the 
question of why some authors use first-person oaths in their authorial voice and 
others do not.
13a.1 The orators
We saw in ch. 9 how Aeschines and Demosthenes exploited oaths for a variety 
of rhetorical purposes. Their speeches include numerous first-person informal 
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oaths, and although it is beyond the scope of the present study to analyse all 
of these, we can summarize here the uses to which they were put.1 In Demos-
thenes, the oath of the imaginary objector “by Zeus” developed to become “little 
more than a sentence-adverbial” as an oath sworn in the author’s own voice 
(e.g. Dem. 8.7). Similarly the oath “by Zeus” came to be used as a more emphatic 
version of the particle men “on the one hand”, in both Aeschines and Demos-
thenes, drawing attention to the fact that although the statement made on oath 
is true, a more important one is about to be made (e.g. Aesch. 3.172, Dem. 6.23). 
When Aeschines and Demosthenes sought to add credibility to weak assertions, 
they tended to swear oaths not “by Zeus” but “by the gods”, by more than one 
god, or by a god whose patronage was stressed by means of an epithet2 (e.g. 
Aesch. 1.55, Dem. 18.111, cf. Dem. 8.49).
First-person oaths are also found, though less frequently, in speeches com-
posed for personal delivery by Demosthenes’ and Aeschines’ contemporaries 
– Apollodorus, Lycurgus and Hypereides3. There are none in Isocrates (who 
probably avoided them on principle – see ch. 15) or in the older orators such as 
Andocides and Lysias4.
13a.2 Pindar and other poets
Given that the authorial “I” features most prominently in lyric poetry amongst the 
poetic genres, it is not surprising to find that oaths sworn in the authorial person 
belong almost exclusively to this genre, with two additional examples from Old 
Comedy. The bulk of our relevant passages come specifically from epinician 
poetry, mostly from Pindar,5 but also from Bacchylides. The question of identi-
fying the authorial “I” in epinician poetry is a vexed one. Does the “I” reflect the 
poet’s own personal voice, and if so how can we reconcile this with a context of 
public and choral performance? Mary Lefkowitz argued that the persona loquens 
1 On the frequencies of informal oaths in oratory, see §13.1. Martin 2009, 250‒65 discusses the 
use of oaths in Demosthenes’ private speeches. First-person informal oaths occur at Aesch. 1.28, 
52, 55, 61, 69, 73, 76, 81, 88, 98, 108; 2.130; 3.172, 182, 212, 217, 228, 255; Dem. 1.19, 23; 3.32; 4.49; 
6.23, 31; 8.7, 19, 28, 49; 9.54, 65, 70; 10.7, 17, 20, 25, 50; 13.16, 21; 14.38; 15.13; 16.13, 32; 18.13, 111, 129, 
208, 251, 261, 294, 307; 19.24, 46, 52, 67, 122, 129‒30, 141, 171‒2, 188, 212, 215, 235, 262, 285; 20.21, 
151; 21.2, 3, 58, 109, 139, 198, 205, 207; 29.52, 57, 59; Prooem. 35.4, 35.5, 45.1, 46.3, 48.2.
2 On using epithets or invoking multiple divinities to add sanctity to oaths, see § 6.1.
3 Apollodorus: [Dem.] 50.13; 52.9, 14. Lycurgus: Leocr. 76, 140. Hypereides: Eux. 4, 27; Dem. fr. 1.1.
4 Compare the pattern we found in ch.9 for the distribution of “imaginary objector” oaths.
5 Translations for Pindar given in this discussion are either taken from or based on Race 1997.
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in Pindar was the poet and that epinicians were essentially solo performances 
sung by “the poet or his delegate”.6 This explains, according to Lefkowitz, why 
the “I” in the victory odes “always refers to the poet”.7 This position was followed 
by Heath and was later defended by both Heath and Lefkowitz,8 after their argu-
ments were challenged by several scholars.9 The poetic “I” in the epinicia has 
been understood in various other ways. D’Alessio emphasized the conflation 
of the poet’s literary and social personae in first-person utterances.10 Goldhill 
stressed that the authorial “I” could equally well refer to the chorus collectively 
and speaks of a “generalizing ego”.11 Bremer raised the notion of a “paradoxi-
cal ego” similarly aligning himself with the choralists,12 and Calame has recently 
coined the notion of a “polyphonic melic ego”.13
The issue of poetic voice in Greek lyric poetry is complex and may never be 
entirely resolved. Perhaps the most persuasive explanations of Pindar’s con-
troversial authorial “I” come from scholars who stress both its personal and its 
choral potential.14 What is clear, however, about first-person oaths in epinician 
poetry is that they have an immediately obvious purpose in increasing the inten-
sity of praise for the honorand,15 not just by making statements concerning their 
achievements but by making them on oath. In the context of praise, Richard 
Rawles’ formulation of “an ambiguity of voice” in first-person declarations where 
there is “both the general acclaim of the community and the privileged voice of 
the poet” is persuasive.16 Hutchinson comments that the swearing of oaths is 
6 Lefkowitz 1991, 1‒71 (originally published in 1963), and 191‒201 (original published in 1988) 
with 203‒6, quotation from 203.
7 Lefkowitz 1991, 204.
8 Heath 1988, Heath and Lefkowitz 1991, Lefkowitz 1995 (responding primarily to D’Alessio 
1994).
9 Especially Burnett 1989, Carey 1989 and 1991.
10 D’Alessio 1994.
11 Goldhill 1991, 144‒5.
12 Bremer 1990. Other significant proponents of the chorus theory are Carey 1991 and Morgan 
1993.
13 Calame 2011, esp. 137‒8, whose focus is Bacchylides. As observed by Carey 1999, 18‒19, Bac-
chylides generally prefers the third person to designate the poet (in contrast to Pindar); cf. Carey 
1995b, 92‒3, on the unusual prominence of the poetic persona in Pindar, and see also Fearn 2007, 
40‒1 on first person statements in Bacchylides.
14 E.g. Morgan 1993, 15 who argues that Pindar “submerges the choral into a virtually monodic 
personality”. It is possible also that the odes were performed first by a chorus and that later 
reperformances were solos. On the issue of reperformances, see Currie 2004 and Morrison 2012. 
15 On the centrality of praise to the poetics of Pindar, see Goldhill 1991, 128‒66 with further 
references.
16 Rawles 2011, 147.
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“a conventional device” in the epinician genre, “commonly introduced with an 
unneeded vehemence and an elaborate emphasis on the ritual”, and that “these 
endow the present with a degree of fiction”.17 Hutchinson is right to stress the 
frequency of oaths of this type in the genre,18 but it is unclear why he finds the 
vehemence “unneeded” and even less clear why the oaths should “endow the 
present with a degree of fiction”. In fact it seems to be the case that oaths func-
tion to stress the truth of the poet’s claims, as I argue below. Moreover, within 
the seemingly basic function of high praise, there is a remarkably wide variety 
of expression, and the language of oaths fits comfortably into the broader frame-
work of religious language and imagery used by Pindar and Bacchylides.19
In Pindar’s Olympian 2 (for Theron of Acragas, winner of the chariot race in 
476 BC), the poet casts himself as an archer shooting arrows of fame (2.82‒91), 
and as “the divine bird of Zeus” (2.88). He continues: “Yes, bending the bow 
at Acragas, I will proclaim a statement on oath (αὐδάσομαι ἐνόρκιον λόγον) 
with a truthful mind (ἀλαθεῖ νόῳ), that no city within a century has produced 
a man more beneficent to his friends in spirit and more generous of hand than 
Theron” (2.92‒5). Less than thirty lines beforehand (Ol. 2.65‒7), the poet had made 
a general reference to the benefits reaped by good men who keep their oaths. 
These keep “company with the honoured gods” and “spend a tearless existence, 
whereas the others endure pain too terrible to behold”. Pindar stresses a divine 
reward for keeping one’s oath in addition to a divine punishment for breaking 
one. The specification of a particular divine reward for oath-keepers is unusual, 
since it is the conditional curse that is the essential component of an oath rather 
than a conditional blessing, and blessings, when they are mentioned, are nor-
mally referred to in vague terms.20 Certainly keeping company among the gods 
does not appear elsewhere in our sources as a perceived consequence for being 
true to one’s oath. Bowra discusses this passage as an example of Pindar accept-
ing unusual doctrines concerning the afterlife,21 and suggests that Pindar may 
17 Hutchinson 2001, 384.
18 Cf. Burnett 1985, 57, Maehler 2004 ad Bacch. 5.42, and McDevitt 2009, 150 on Bacch. 8.19‒21 
where the oath is one of the elements listed as “the most common recurrent motifs of the epini-
cian”. Maehler 1982 (I.ii), 100 finds the use of oaths in epinicians to make a strong affirmation 
“a little ostentatious”.
19 On religious language and imagery in Pindar see Bowra 1964, 42‒98. Goldhill 1991, 133‒4 
discusses the importance of charis for the interrelations between gods and men in Pindar. On the 
centrality of hero cult in Pindar, see Currie 2005. Carey 1999 discusses how the pathos created 
in the odes of Bacchylides emphasizes “the importance of piety” (28‒9), among other issues. 
20 See further below p. 359 with n. 63 on rewards for keeping one’s oath.
21 Bowra 1964, 90; on the complex views of death expressed in Pindar see also Currie 2005, 
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simply be proposing the reverse of perjurers being punished in Tartarus, as is 
implied in Homer.22 Nevertheless, it seems important to link this assessment to 
the subsequent oath made in the authorial persona. By swearing a true oath, 
Pindar implicitly places himself among the gods, possibly as a theios anēr,23 and 
consolidates the image of himself as the bird of Zeus against whom the crows 
(possibly Simonides and Bacchylides) cry vainly.24
Pindar is emphatic in asserting his own authority as a poet of innate wisdom, 
and as a prophet and interpreter of the Muses.25 The poet is no longer a mere 
vessel through whom the Muse sings, as in Homer.26 Pindar sees himself as 
an essential intermediary figure crafting poetry from the divine knowledge he 
receives from the Muses. There is thus an important degree of separation between 
the information provided by the Muses and Pindar’s finished poetic product. So 
in Olympian 6 (for Hagesias of Syracuse, winner of the mule race, 472 or 468 BC), 
the poet compares Hagesias to the Theban seer and warrior Amphiaraus, and 
concludes (20‒21): “Having sworn a great oath (μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμόσσαις) I will bear 
clear witness (μαρτυρήσω) for him that this at least is so; and the honey-voiced 
Muses will assist (μελίφθογγοι δ᾽ ἐπιτρέψοντι Μοῖσαι)”. This is the translation 
of Race, but Scodel translates the last phrase more literally “the honey-voiced 
Muses will permit me” and objects that several scholars do not translate within 
“the normal semantic field of the verb”.27 The phrase μέγαν ὅρκον “great oath” is 
itself epic in diction,28 so that the contrast between epic and Pindaric expression 
seems to be underlined. In Pindar, the “honey-voiced Muses” produce “honey-
sounding hymns” (Isthmian 2.4 μελιγάρυας ὕμνους) but Pindar also used both 
adjectives to describe his own poetry. In Isthmian 6 (for Phylacidas of Aegina, 
winner of the boys’ pancration), the poem will be equivalent to “pouring a liba-
tion of honey-voiced songs upon Aegina” (Isthm. 6.8‒9: Αἴγιναν κάτα | σπένδειν 
31‒40.
22 Bowra 1964, 92.
23 The heroization or anticipated heroization of the living is significant in Pindar’s work. Cur-
rie 2005, 158‒200 discusses this issue within the broader context of fifth-century Greeks who ar-
guably received religious treatment during their lifetime. D’Alessio 1994, 138 observes that Pindar 
“himself emphasized his relations with the gods and his religious piety.”
24 On the identification of the crows as Simonides and Bacchylides, see Bowra 1964, 6‒7, 10, 
14, and cf. Race 1997, i, 73n.3, though Willcock 1995, 162‒3 is not convinced by this identification.
25 See Bowra 1964, 1‒41 esp. 3‒8.
26 On the development of the poetic voice from Homer to Pindar, see Goldhill 1991, 69‒166, 
and Scodel 2001.
27 Scodel 2001, 124 with n.31.
28 Cf. e.g. Il. 1.233, 9.132, 9.274, 19.113, Od. 2.377, 4.746, 5.178, 10.299, 10.343, 20.229. The expres-
sion is also used to describe the oath of the goddess Lachesis in Olymp. 7.64‒8.
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μελιφθόγγοις ἀοιδαῖς). In Pythian 3.64 Pindar’s poems are “honey-sounding 
hymns” (μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι). Olympian 11 (for Hagesidamus of Western Locri, 
winner of the boys’ boxing in 476 BC) opens with a priamel “in which the needs of 
sailors for winds and of farmers for rain are capped by the need of victors for com-
memorative songs”:29 “if through toil someone should succeed, honey-sounding 
hymns (μελιγάρυες ὕμνοι) are a beginning for later words of renown, and an 
oath-pledge for great achievements (πιστὸν ὅρκιον μεγάλαις ἀρεταῖς)” (Olymp. 
11.4‒6). Here Pindar’s “honey-sounding hymns” are a metaphorical oath, where 
the victory odes for Hagesidamus’ first success are equivalent to a sworn pledge 
of future success.30 This use of oath-language is unusual and it emphasizes the 
authority and validity of Pindar’s poetry. Goldhill reads this as “the divine access 
to truth provided by the Muses and justified by the oath”,31 but Scodel observes 
that in his epinicia Pindar “never cites [the Muses] as an authority for his versions 
of a story, or for any other point of truth.” Rather, “they render songs beautiful 
and appropriate.”32 The distinction is important. The truth is, as Goldhill saw, 
justified by oaths, but it is the poet rather than the Muses who provides their 
content. It follows that, if Pindar’s odes are tantamount to oath-pledges, then 
their content must be true.
The association of truth, oath, and sweet voice occurs in Olympian 13 (for 
Xenophon of Corinth, winner of the stadion and pentathlon, 464 BC). The poet 
proclaims “As for their victories (i.e. the victories of Xenophon’s family) at the 
Isthmus and Nemea, in a brief word I shall reveal their sum, and my true witness 
under oath (ἀλαθής τέ μοι ἔξορκος) shall be the noble herald’s sweet-tongued 
shout (ἁδύγλωσσος βοά) heard full sixty times from both those places.” (Olymp. 
13.97‒100). There is clearly a connection here once again between truth and 
oath.33 In this case listeners have just been told (with reference to Bellerophon 
capturing Pegasus) that the power of the gods can easily bring about what is 
“beyond oath” (Olymp. 13.83: παρ᾽ ὅρκον), or as Race translates “what one would 
swear impossible” (i.e. but would be wrong to do so), and what is “beyond expec-
tation” (Olymp. 13.84: παρὰ ἐλπίδα).34 In Olympian 13, Pindar cleverly uses the 
29 Race 1997, i, 174.
30 Pindar uses the metaphor of an oath also in Nem. 9.16‒17 where Eriphyle is given to Amphi-
araus as wife “as an oath-pledge”; see ch. 3, p. 54.
31 Goldhill 1991, 150, having translated Olymp. 6.21 as “the sweet-voiced Muses will entrust 
me”, objected to by Scodel 2001, 124 n.31.
32 Scodel 2001, 123.
33 Cf. Pratt 1993, 118‒19.
34 Certain other authors similarly warn against swearing that something is impossible, see §5.2 
on Ajax (pp. 106‒8) for further discussion.
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language of oaths in three ways. He emphasizes the near-impossibility of the suc-
cesses achieved by the victor and his family, he asserts the truth of his claims, and 
his oath becomes the poetic “sweet-tongued shout”, a metaphor for his poetry.
The oath in Nemean 7 (for Sogenes of Aegina, winner of the boys’ pentathlon) 
is also connected to song. The passage reads as follows “One who knows me will 
proclaim if I come saying a crooked utterance out of tune. Sogenes from the clan 
of the Euxenidae, I swear (ἀπομνύω) that I have not stepped up to the line and 
sent my tongue speeding like a bronze-cheeked javelin, which releases the strong 
neck from wrestling before the body falls under the blazing sun” (Nem. 7.68‒73). 
Race, whose translation is quoted here, explains as follows: “The pentathlon 
could be won with enough victories in earlier events such as the javelin throw, 
thereby obviating the deciding wrestling match in the heat of the day. The impli-
cation is that Pindar will spare no effort in praising the victor.”35 Carey observes 
that “Pindar’s image of himself as a pentathlete implies a similar achievement 
on the part of the victor”.36 The sentence preceding the oath implies that the 
oath is not a “crooked utterance out of tune”, but is rather a melodious state-
ment of truth. Lefkowitz comments on the fact that this phrase refers to poetry’s 
potential,37 and it is striking that so many of the oaths spoken in Pindar’s autho-
rial persona are connected with an insistence on truth and on beautiful-sounding 
poetry. Of course it is well known that Pindar professed to create a poetry of truth 
in contrast to deceptive fictions.38 He consistently associates lying with blame 
and slander, and truth with his own poetry of praise.39 Since the oath is a tool for 
asserting unquestionable truths among the god-fearing in archaic and classical 
Greece, it is not surprising that Pindar exploits the language of oaths. Swearing 
oaths allows Pindar to stress the pious nature of his authorial voice, it enables 
him to emphasize the truth of his claims, and as such it can be associated with 
poetry itself, or at least with the kind of poetry that Pindar wishes to produce. It 
is significant that Pindar never refers to himself as a witness nor swears an oath 
35 Race 1997, ii, 79 n.2. For a more detailed discussion of the meaning of this difficult passage 
see Burnett 2005, 197‒8 (though Burnett treats the poetic “I” as the choral voice).
36 Carey 1981, 166.
37 Lefkowitz 1991, 140.
38 On the importance of truth for Pindar and his poetics, where the truth, alētheia, is in-
trinsically connected with memory through its etymological meaning as “un-forgetting”, see 
e.g. Bowra 1964, 26‒33, Nisetich 1980, 129, Hubbard 1985, 100‒6, Pratt 1993, 115‒29, Segal 1998, 
105‒32.
39 Archilochus is mentioned in negative terms as a poet of blame in Pyth. 2.54‒6; cf. Most 
1985, 186‒7, Goldhill 1991, 141, Pratt 1993, 120, and the detailed discussion of the association of 
truth and praise in Pindar by Park 2013.
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when discussing mythological events, as observed by Most.40 Oaths are reserved 
for praise of the victor,41 since “in composing mythical narratives, even the truth-
ful poet of praise fictionalizes.”42
Most stresses the legal aspect of the language of oaths and witnessing, sug-
gesting that Pindar is careful to avoid such expressions when referring to events 
of which he does not have a personal knowledge.43 However our final example 
of a Pindaric oath sworn in the authorial persona is one which serves to suggest 
the truth behind an ultimately unprovable claim, so that the connection between 
truth and authorial oaths seems to be of the utmost importance. In Nemean 11 
(for Aristagoras of Tenedos on his installation as a councillor), Pindar suggests 
that the honorand had the potential to be victorious at wrestling in both Pythian 
and Olympian games if only his parents’ extreme caution had not kept him away. 
“Indeed, upon my oath (ναὶ μὰ γὰρ ὅρκον),44 in my judgment, had he gone to 
Castalia and to the well-wooded hill of Cronus, he would have had a more noble 
homecoming than his wrestling opponents” (Nem. 11.24‒6). Pindar is careful to 
qualify his oath concerning a hypothetical outcome of events that did not occur 
with the phrase “in my judgment” (ἐμὰν δόξαν). It is noteworthy that Pindar does 
not do this when he makes sworn statements that are highly subjective in lav-
ishing exaggerated praise on the ode’s addressee. Who is to say, for example, 
whether or not Theron of Acragas really is the most generous man any city has 
produced for one hundred years (Olymp. 2.92‒5), or whether Hagesias of Syracuse 
can reasonably be compared with the mythical Amphiaraus (Olymp. 6.15‒21)? 
Pindar’s use of the authorial persona’s oath in these cases enables him to present 
opinion as fact. Elsewhere, as we have seen, Pindar swears oaths emphasizing 
the truth of his praise for the athletic victories of his honorands, and it seems he 
has imported the technique into Nemean 11 and adapted it to suit an ode which 
was not written to commemorate an athlete.
Like Pindar, Bacchylides uses oaths in the authorial voice to stress the truth of 
his praises since he too seeks to present poetic truth.45 Interestingly, Bacchylides 
40 Most 1985, 176‒7.
41 Pratt 1993, 122‒3.
42 Pratt 1993, 125; see also Bundy 1986 [1962] 3‒4, and Gerber 1982, 69‒70 on Pindar’s lan-
guage of truth and falsehood as a rhetorical device. Carey 1995b, 99‒103 discusses the fiction of 
spontaneity in the composition of Pindar’s odes.
43 Most 1985, 176‒7.
44 The expression is ambiguous, meaning either “I assert by my oath” or “By Horkos”. The latter 
would be an unusual invocation of the personification of Oath as a god, but it would suit Pindar’s 
compressed poetic style. For further discussion of the god Horkos, see §12.1.
45 Carey 1999, 19, notes that the use of the oath for creating authority is one device shared by 
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has a completely unique way of expressing his authorial oath, which eschews 
oath-language but makes reference to “resting a hand on the earth” (8.19: γᾷ δ’ 
ἐπισκήπτων χέρα, cf. the more compressed 5.41: γᾷ δ’ ἐπισκήπτων) while making 
a statement. The action, as noted by LSJ (s.v. ἐπισκήπτω II.3), is tantamount to 
calling the Earth (as goddess) to witness the statement.46 Only two examples 
survive. In one passage Bacchylides declares (πιφαύσκω) that the dust of faster 
horses had never yet besmirched the horse of Hieron of Syracuse (as single-
horse victor at Olympia in 476 BC) in a contest as it rushed towards the finish line 
(5.41‒5).47 The ode was composed to commemorate the same occasion as Pindar’s 
first Olympian, which does not contain a first-person oath.48 It is possible that 
Bacchylides composed this victory ode with Pindar competitively in mind. Bowra 
discusses Bacchylides’ unusually rich use of bird imagery here where lesser birds 
shrink from the metaphorical eagle of song, an uncannily similar pattern to that 
used by Pindar in Olympian 2, where (as we saw above) it is speculated that Bac-
chylides may have been designated as a crow.49 If he was indeed attempting to 
rival Pindar, it is interesting that he includes a first-person oath to stress the truth 
of his praise. In Bacchylides’ only other first-person oath he will make his boast 
(κομπάσομαι) that no boy or man among the Greeks has won more victories in his 
age group (8.19‒21).50 The statement includes the parenthesis “every debt shines 
with truth” (8.20: σὺν ἀλαθείᾳ δὲ πᾶν λάμπει χρέος), where the debt is “the debt 
of praise owed by the poet to the victor”, and the oath contributes to “an espe-
cially emphatic praise of the victor”.51 Moreover, as Calame notes, “the poetic 
word’s authority is all the more imperative” in this ode because κομπάσομαι “is 
the ‘performative future’ and thus corresponds to the act of singing.”52 This use of 
the future gives the illusion of spontaneity to the performance, and is a technique 
Pindar and Bacchylides. Pratt 1993, 116 observes that “Bacchylides’ interest in poetic truth is 
expressed more directly than Pindar’s, and he has virtually nothing to say about poetic lying 
or deception in his surviving verse.” See also Burnett 1985, 58‒9 on the association of truth and 
praise in Bacchylides.
46 See §6.3 on gestures in oath-taking.
47 Presumably, this means that the horse has won every race in which it has run.
48 Both odes seem to have been commissioned by Hieron, see Schmidt 1987.
49 Bowra 1964, 10‒11. Other models also suggest themselves. Maehler 2004, 113 notes that the 
eagle scene is reminiscent of the flight of Persephone’s chariot in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter. 
It seems clear, however, that the eagle in both Olymp. 2 and Bacch. 5 represents the poet. For 
further discussion, see Cairns 2010, 219‒20.
50 The ode was probably written for Liparion of Ceos; see McDevitt 2009, 148‒9.
51 McDevitt 2009, 150.
52 Calame 2011, 123.
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employed by Pindar and by other lyric poets,53 and we have seen that Pindar also 
uses the performative future with an oath in Olympian 2 when he states “I will 
proclaim a statement on oath” (Ol. 2.92 αὐδάσομαι ἐνόρκιον λόγον).54 Both Bac-
chylidean oaths are comparable to Pindaric sworn statements in their effusive 
praise of the addressee, but the notion of placing a hand on the earth raises an 
important question regarding performance. Did the performer(s) actually place a 
hand on the earth while reciting the passage? This would have made a striking 
dance move, and while the question cannot be answered with any certainty, it is 
worth noting that without the hand gesture there would technically be no oath, 
since the gesture itself is what constitutes calling the Earth to witness, turning 
the statement into an oath. If Bacchylides’ use of the first person oath was in any 
way meant to rival Pindar’s, then it stands to reason that the gesture was made in 
order to guarantee the oath’s validity.
Elsewhere in lyric poetry oaths in the authorial voice are rare. Only the works 
of Sappho and the anonymous Theognidea contain one example each of an (infor-
mal) oath sworn in the authorial persona. The relevant passage from Sappho is a 
fragment (fr. 95.9‒10) in which the poet states that she no longer gets any pleasure 
from living, “by the blessed goddess” (οὐ μὰ γὰρ μάκαιραν). Sappho, whose sur-
viving poetry is mostly love poetry of an often intimate nature, never (so far as we 
can tell) declares her love or desire for an addressee on oath. In the only example 
we have of an oath in the authorial voice Sappho chooses instead to stress her 
lack of joy in life and her desire to die, presumably as a result of a love-sickness.55 
This kind of sentiment can be effectively emphasized by an oath, which immedi-
ately implies that the statement is true and, in this case, weighty. Moreover the 
emphatic woe of the speaker stresses the desirability of the unattainable lover, 
so that this oath made in the authorial voice is comparable in function to those 
made to praise an honorand in epinician poetry. The statement is probably made 
53 See W.J. Slater 1969 and Carey 1995b, 99‒103.
54 Pfeijffer 1999, 23, notes that “the announcement is directly followed by its fulfillment” in 
this and other examples of first person futures in Pindar. For an oath offered (with a future tense) 
but not sworn, cf. h.Herm. 274‒6 with §7.3.3.
55 Boedeker 1979 gives an illuminating analysis of the imagery exploited in Sappho fr. 95 and 
demonstrates that “Acheron is transformed to a world of love” which reinforces “the erotic na-
ture of the death-wish” (49), suggesting further that “the desire to die is caused by unfulfilled 
love” (51).
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to Hermes,56 so that if the oath is indeed made in the poet’s voice,57 the interac-
tion with a divinity reveals a fictionalized rather than an actual self.58
The informal oath in the anonymous Theognidea is at the other end of the 
emotional spectrum.59 The authorial voice claims, “by Zeus” (ναὶ μὰ Δί’) that 
even if one of those in the house is sleeping well wrapped up, the revel (kōmos) 
of the poet and his band will be eagerly welcomed (1045‒6). In other words, even 
someone who is sound asleep will be delighted to welcome the revellers. One 
would imagine such a scenario to be highly unlikely, unless, of course, the poetry 
performed by the revellers is so irresistible that it could charm even someone 
woken from a deep sleep. The oath is linked to the poet’s sense of the value of 
his own poetry here far more directly than in Pindar, where oaths (as we saw) 
are associated with excellent poetry by virtue of their association with the truth. 
Theognis is not shy about drawing attention to his poetic skill when, for example, 
he asks his friend Cyrnus to lock away his verses, suggesting that if they are stolen 
all will recognize them as his work since his name is famous everywhere (19‒24). 
It seems that Theognis was keen to defend his worth after political upheavals 
in which he was disfranchised and exiled,60 and it is remarkable that all the 
references to oaths in the anonymous Theognidea relate to the dangers of oaths 
except for this one example in the authorial voice. So the listener is warned not 
to gain wealth by a false oath because the gods will prevail (197‒202), and not to 
trust anyone in any sworn pledge of friendship, not even if he has invoked the 
king of the immortals Zeus as his guarantor (283‒6). The good man should shun 
ruinous perjury and avoid the immortals’ wrath (399‒400). One should never 
swear that something will never be since the gods resent it and they control the 
outcome (659‒60). How is it possible for a righteous man, the kind who does not 
commit perjury, to suffer unrighteously (745‒6)? One should not raise up a tyrant 
nor make a sworn conspiracy to kill one (823‒4). The judicial oaths of men can 
no longer be trusted (1139). If we take the corpus as a whole, a consistent view 
emerges of a poet who believes in the value of his own poetry and of his own oath 
56 Boedeker 1979, 44‒5 summarizes the arguments.
57 It is possible that the first-person speech was attributed to a particular character in a lost 
part of the poem; see Boedeker 1979, 43.
58 Cf. Stehle 1997, 300, and Burnett 1983, 294 who speaks of “Sappho (a fictional Sappho)”.
59 In referring to Theognis versus the anonymous Theognidea, I follow the groupings of M.L. 
West 1993, although the relevant passages are discussed together and a speculative conclusion is 
reached regarding a coherent authorial attitude to oaths in these texts.
60 M.L. West 1993, xiv, and see Cobb-Stevens 1985 on the unsettled political world of Theog-
nis; Figueira 1985, 155 notes that the theme of exile is prominent in the Theognidea, and Selle 
2008, 158‒65 gives a useful summary of themes within the corpus. 
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but who has reason to distrust the oaths of others after (one presumes) having 
been betrayed.61
Our final examples of a poet swearing in the authorial voice are rather dif-
ferent in the sense that, whatever arguments are made concerning the poetic 
“I” in lyric poetry, the “voice of Aristophanes” is certainly conveyed by a chorus 
member rather than by the poet himself but the sentiments expressed relate 
directly to the real Aristophanes. Both oaths stress the poet’s disappointment at 
the lack of appreciation for his first production of Clouds, which had been ranked 
third and last at the City Dionysia of 423 BC, but they represent two distinct modes 
of authorial communication. In Wasps, produced the next year, at the Lenaea of 
422 BC, the chorus reports in their own fictional identity that Aristophanes swears 
vehemently “by Dionysus” that no one ever heard better comic poetry than his 
Clouds (Wasps 1045‒6).62 In the revised Clouds, which (unfortunately) was never 
performed, the chorus-leader speaks as if in the person of Aristophanes (518‒25). 
He swears a formal oath “by Dionysus who reared me” that he will tell them the 
truth, namely that he thought the Athenians were clever and that the original 
Clouds was his most intellectual comedy (but he was defeated undeservedly by 
vulgar men). Unusually, rewards are specified for giving a true oath but no pun-
ishments are named: may Aristophanes be victorious and may he be thought 
of as clever (Clouds 520). This is apparently the only known oath in our entire 
period in which there is a specification of blessings but none of curses; moreover, 
Aristophanes here mentions only rewards that are wholly within human control, 
whereas elsewhere, when blessings are specified at all, they are normally divine 
in nature.63 The oath is a way of soliciting votes from the judges and of promoting 
61 M.L. West 1993, xiv, describes Theognis as “a man…who finds himself betrayed by those 
he trusted”. Another lyric poet who was betrayed by an alleged perjurer is Alcaeus. The author 
reports that he swore a pact with his comrades in Lesbos that they would never abandon any of 
their company, but either die at the hands of men who came against them or kill them and rescue 
the people from their woes (fr. 129.13‒24). The poet’s invective is launched against Pittacus (son 
of Hyrrhas) for “trampling on the oaths” of his fellow men in joining the tyrant Myrsilus and 
sharing power with him. The issue is also referred to in fr.306(g).9‒11 and possibly in fr. 167.1. In 
fr.129 Alcaeus calls for an avenging curse to pursue Pittacus, but in fact, Pittacus would be cho-
sen as dictator in 590 when Myrsilus died, and ruled till 580. The authorial voice here is rather 
different than in our other examples since the poet is not making a statement on oath within his 
own poetry but is rather using his poetry to discuss the breach of an oath he had sworn in a pact 
with others. Archilochus also casts a former friend (Lycambes) as a perjurer in fr. 173, on which 
see further § 5.3.
62 Cf. § 6.3 on the sanctifying features of this oath.
63 An exception is the Hippocratic Oath, which (I argue) is unusual for this reason (see ch. 
14). 
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the quality of the drama.64 Moreover, if the oath is true, and we can reasonably 
assume that Aristophanes really did believe that his Clouds was under-appreci-
ated, it cleverly implies that Aristophanes’ play must win, and that he must be 
thought of as clever, and it is regrettable that the rhetoric was never used on any 
real judges.
The authorial voice presented by the chorus in Clouds undisputedly repre-
sents the identity of its creator Aristophanes who is bringing to the fore a deeply 
personal issue. In the Wasps passage, the author is referred to in the third person 
rather than in the first, and although this means that the poetic “I” is technically 
absent, it is not far away.65 Certainly the presence of Aristophanes’ voice in his 
plays is more obvious than that of Xenophon in the Anabasis, who disguises his 
authorial voice in several ways as we shall now see. We can conclude here by 
observing that oaths in the authorial voice tend to be used in poetry for the pur-
poses of praise, either of an honorand as in Bacchylides and Sappho, or of the 
poet’s own skill as in the anonymous Theognidea and Aristophanes, or both as 
in Pindar.
13a.3 Xenophon
The case of first-person oaths in Xenophon is quite unique. He appears as a char-
acter in the Anabasis and briefly in the Memorabilia, and the former of these 
works will be the most important for our discussion. Although ostensibly a his-
torical narrative of events in which the author played an active role, the Anabasis 
is carefully constructed with a substantial degree of literary artifice, which uti-
lizes a unique narrative strategy.66 The “anonymous” or “pseudonymous” nar-
rator describes the actions and speeches of Xenophon in the third person, or in 
reported first-person discourse, which provides a strong first-person presence in 
spite of the layers of mediation between Xenophon the author and actual histori-
cal figure and Xenophon the character. The issue is complicated further by the 
fact that Xenophon famously claimed in his Hellenica (3.1.2) that Themistogenes 
of Syracuse was the author of the Anabasis. Plutarch commented on this, observ-
64 On self-promotion in the dramas of Aristophanes, see M.E. Wright 2012, 71‒7, who argues 
for an ironical reading of the relevant passages.
65 Compare the parabases of Acharnians and Peace where the poet starts by being third per-
son and then, without warning, shifts into first (at Ach. 660 and Peace 754).
66 See Bradley 2010 for full discussion of the Anabasis as a unique manipulation of genre 
and narrative.
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ing that Xenophon was more persuasive in writing about himself as if about 
another (Moralia 345e).67
In other authors, first-person oaths stress the presence, opinion, or experi-
ence of the author as speaker and can represent an intrusion of the authorial 
voice into an otherwise fictional or mythological context (as in Aristophanes or 
in Pindar). In Xenophon’s Anabasis, by contrast, the artificial degree of separa-
tion between “author” and “persona” is such that oaths placed in the mouth of 
Xenophon the character appear impartial and objective, in spite of the fact that 
Xenophon the author has a vested interest in presenting Xenophon the charac-
ter in as positive a light as possible. Xenophon the character is successfully pre-
sented as a moderate and pious man, a good (if reluctant) leader who cares about 
the welfare of his troops. The oaths he swears help to create this persona and by 
swearing oaths that are shown to be true, his piety is confirmed. Moreover the 
statements made on oath, which mostly concern his care for his troops and his 
defence against a variety of charges, demonstrate in an apparently disinterested 
fashion that Xenophon is an exemplary leader.
The first such oath in the Anabasis comes in the report of an outrage commit-
ted by some Greeks in Cerasus who start a riot of stoning in which three ambas-
sadors are killed. The rioters then arrive at the camp of the Ten Thousand while 
the Cerasuntians are holding discussions with the generals concerning the burial 
of some soldiers recently killed. The Cerasuntians flee back to their ships in terror 
(Anab. 5.7.19‒22), and “by Zeus”, says the character Xenophon, “some of our own 
were afraid” (5.7.22). The point is carefully made. The troops are not as fearful as 
the Cerasuntians who flee, and clearly Xenophon was not afraid since he goes up 
to the men to ask what the trouble was (5.7.23). In fact, he uses the episode as a 
platform from which to expose the negative impact of impious and lawless behav-
iour (5.7.23‒33). Upon his recommendation it was then resolved to purify the army 
(5.7.35). The seemingly conversational oath by Zeus thus serves to emphasize the 
bravery and wisdom displayed by Xenophon as a leader, in contrast to the troops 
who were afraid or behaving impiously.
The character Xenophon also uses oaths to defend himself against charges 
of inappropriate behaviour. When accused of beating his men unfairly, for 
example, he had replied “by Zeus” that since his accusers had taken no stand, 
neither coming to the aid of the men being beaten nor joining in the beating, 
they must have deemed the action to have been justified (Anab. 5.8.21). Imme-
67 For a discussion of Xenophon’s reasons for writing the Anabasis, see Cawkwell 2004, esp. 
59‒67. Grethlein 2012 discusses how the narrator often takes on the perspective of Xenophon 
the character thus contributing further to his positive and apparently impartial representation.
362   13a Swearing oaths in the authorial person
diately preceding the oath, the accusation had been lightened by a humorous 
self-depreciation,68 where Xenophon claims that he now drinks more wine than 
he did before but is hitting no one since he sees that the men are in “fair weather” 
(5.8.19‒20), i.e. that there is no emergency justifying drastic action. Since drink-
ing makes physical violence more likely, Xenophon cleverly demonstrates that 
he is self-controlled by nature. The statement on oath then presents his action 
not only as entirely justified, but also as the decisive measure taken by a natural 
leader in the face of indecision.
The majority of oaths sworn by Xenophon’s character, however, cluster 
around the accusation that he gained wealth at the expense of his men. In a 
series of oaths, Xenophon stresses not only that he has made no material gain, 
but also that the welfare of his troops is his foremost concern. The issue arises 
after Xenophon had persuaded the men to serve as mercenaries in the army of the 
Thracian prince Seuthes during the winter of 399, but the men fail to receive their 
agreed wages. Xenophon is presented as defending the interests of his army when 
Seuthes’ retainer Heracleides claims that there was only money available to pay 
the men for twenty days of the previous month. Xenophon becomes enraged and 
“replied with an oath” (eipen epomosas) that Heracleides was not caring for the 
interests of Seuthes. If he had been, he would have paid the Greeks in full, even if 
it meant borrowing money or selling his own clothes (Anab. 7.5.5). The insignifi-
cant Heracleides is blamed so that a direct confrontation with Seuthes is deftly 
avoided. Heracleides is infuriated by Xenophon’s insults and proceeds to slander 
him before Seuthes “to the best of his ability” (7.5.6). As events develop, Xeno-
phon’s leadership is challenged further when the Spartans come to recruit the 
remainder of the Ten Thousand and Heracleides and Seuthes, seeing their chance 
to end the service of the Greeks without settling their payment, invite the Spar-
tans to solicit the troops predicting that they will quickly abandon Xenophon. 
An unnamed soldier accuses Xenophon of having profited at the expense of the 
troops and he is followed by another and another (7.6.9‒10). The scene is set for 
Xenophon to give his defence speech.
Xenophon swears “by Zeus” that he had turned back after he had set out for 
home because he had heard the men were suffering and so he returned to help 
in any way he could (7.6.11). He then swears a formal oath “by all the gods and 
goddesses” that he has not even received what Seuthes promised to him for his 
own services and that since Seuthes is present, he knows well whether or not 
Xenophon is swearing falsely (7.6.18); and he swears in addition (sunepomnumi) 
that he has not even received as much as the other generals or even as some of 
68 Flower 2012, 105 discusses this technique.
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the captains (7.6.19). Xenophon’s use of oath-language here is reminiscent of the 
pattern we saw in Aeschines and Demosthenes (see p. 349) where more serious 
oaths involve the invocation of more elaborate oath-witnesses than the common 
informal oath formula “by Zeus”. This weaker formula is used in Xenophon’s 
next oath when he anticipates, precisely in the manner of the imaginary objector 
(eipoi … tis an), that he will be asked whether he is ashamed of being so stupidly 
deceived by Seuthes. He swears “by Zeus” that he would have been ashamed to 
be deceived by an enemy, but that in dealings between friends it is deceiving (not 
being deceived) that is shameful (7.6.21).
Xenophon’s main claim, that the welfare of his men is his prime concern, is 
immediately validated after he has finished his speech by the Spartan Charminus 
who swears an oath relating a mildly exaggerated version of Seuthes’ criticism 
of Xenophon as a man who is a friend to the soldiers (made at Anab. 7.6.4), now 
repeated as being “too much a friend to the soldiers” (7.6.39). The oath, which 
is an ethnically appropriate invocation of “the twin gods” (tō siō),69 smacks of 
impartial authenticity, and as Flower comments, “the fact that Seuthes makes 
this remark and that the Spartans believe it is proof for the audience that Xeno-
phon was not in fact receiving money from Seuthes and did not deceive his fellow 
Greeks.”70 Xenophon twice more swears formal oaths protesting his innocence 
in relation to these accusations, both in a private meeting with Seuthes. He calls 
the gods to witness that he had neither received anything from Seuthes that was 
intended for the soldiers, nor asked for his private use anything that belonged to 
them, nor demanded from Seuthes what he had promised (7.7.39). Of course, as 
Flower observes, he never claims that he did not receive payment for his position 
as general;71 and in the final oath protesting his innocence, Xenophon swears 
(omnumi) that even if Seuthes had offered to pay what was due to him, he would 
not have accepted it unless the soldiers were also to recover what was due to them 
(7.7.40). The veracity of such a statement can be neither confirmed nor refuted 
since it is an oath (and a formal one) about what Xenophon would have done 
in a hypothetical situation that never actually existed. It is thus a particularly 
pure case of a statement for which the oath provides the sole possible means of 
confirmation. Whether or not the audience believes the statement depends to a 
large degree on whether or not Xenophon is the kind of person who would use 
69 The oath “by the twin gods” (i.e. Castor and Polydeuces) was specifically a Spartan oath; see 
further §13.1. On occasional references to the different religious customs of the different ethnic 
groups among the Ten Thousand, see Parker 2004, 139‒40.
70 Flower 2012, 164.
71 Flower 2012, 158.
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oaths impiously, and Xenophon the author works very hard to make us believe 
that Xenophon the character would not have done so.72 Therefore the audience is 
guided implicitly to believe Xenophon’s sworn statements.
Xenophon’s actions in the Anabasis are consistently validated by acts of 
divination,73 and two further passages contain oaths sworn by Xenophon pre-
sented in conjunction with sacrificial divination. In a passage relating to the sale 
of his horse, Xenophon is reported to have stated on oath (epomosas eipen) to 
the seer Eucleides that he would not have enough money to pay his travelling 
expenses on the way home unless he sold his horse and his personal belong-
ings (Anab. 7.8.2). Eucleides did not believe him, but subsequently realized that 
Xenophon was telling the truth when he saw the sacrificial offerings (7.8.3). This 
is, chronologically, the last oath sworn by the character Xenophon in the Anaba-
sis, and it is a rhetorical tour de force. The passage is important for addressing 
the potential for audience incredulity regarding Xenophon’s alleged poverty.74 
However the audience is also presented with an objector (actual rather than 
imaginary) to Xenophon’s oaths and with one who is a religious expert. The seer 
then uses his skill at divination to determine that Xenophon’s oath was truthful! 
The narrator is conveniently silent on what sign from the sacrifice would have 
confirmed this,75 but if the audience ever had reason to suspect any of Xeno-
phon’s previous oaths, even minor doubts can now be firmly dispelled.
Sacrificial signs are decisive and authoritative factors throughout the narra-
tive of the Anabasis. In particular, signs from the gods are presented as corrobo-
rating Xenophon’s decision to decline the command of the Ten Thousand in the 
first instance. Sacrificial offerings, the oracle of Apollo, a dream and bird omens 
are all mentioned (Anab. 6.1.22‒24), and he further confirms with a formal oath, 
swearing by all the gods and goddesses, that when he became aware of the army’s 
intention to elect him as sole leader, he offered sacrifices and the gods revealed 
clearly that he must not accept the command (6.1.31). The decision proved fortu-
itous since Cheirisophus, who did accept the leadership, only managed to hold 
on to it for a few days due to the dissatisfaction of the army. It is beyond the scope 
of the present study to delve deeper into Xenophon’s broader use of oaths in his 
writings, but already we have noticed some distinctive trends. We saw in §6.3 that 
72 Cf. Flower 2012, 159. Dillery 1995, 182‒6 discusses Xenophon’s religious views, and com-
ments on “Xenophon’s profound commitment to the sanctity of the oath” (184).
73 On this issue see e.g. Parker 2004, who comments at 133: “For Xenophon, one might say, 
Greek religion is above all a religion of divination”; cf. also Flower 2012, 33‒4.
74 See Flower 2012, 213.
75 Cf. Parker 2004, 145 who points to “our ignorance of exactly how ‘good’ and ‘bad’ omens 
were determined”.
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Xenophon mentions the handclasp as a sanctifying gesture in various oaths as a 
means of stressing both friendship and betrayal. Here we see that Xenophon, the 
third-person character in the Anabasis, is made to swear a cluster of oaths, most 
of which are formal, and all of which pertain to his self-presentation as a pious 
leader whose primary concern is for the welfare of his army.
Xenophon’s writings contain just three further oaths sworn in the various 
manifestations of the authorial persona, all of which are informal. The character 
Xenophon swears one in the Memorabilia, and two more are sworn by the narra-
tor, one in the Hellenica and one in the Constitution of the Spartans. Each of these 
oaths conforms to patterns of authorial swearing that we have already noticed in 
the Anabasis. They are used to create the illusion of impartiality in representing 
the character Xenophon (Mem.), or to stress that wealth is undesirable. In the 
Memorabilia, as in the Anabasis, although in a far more minor role, the character 
Xenophon is introduced in the third person “in order to secure an impression of 
objectivity and hence persuasive force”.76 This sense of objectivity is increased 
by the fact that Socrates shows Xenophon to be foolish (Mem. 1.3.8‒13), and it 
is in this exchange that the oath occurs. Xenophon is surprised to discover the 
apparent dangers of a mere kiss to a pretty face. Socrates then asks Xenophon to 
confirm that venomous spiders although small creatures can inflict excruciating 
and maddening pain if they fasten on the mouth. “Yes by Zeus” (ναὶ μὰ Δί’) con-
firms Xenophon, because they inject something with their bite (1.3.12). Socrates 
is now free to deliver his concluding point, namely that a pretty face is more dan-
gerous than a venomous spider since it can inject a maddening poison from afar 
(1.3.13). The oath here serves to heighten the image of Xenophon as a disciple of 
Socrates, learning from Socrates’ wisdom.
Our final two authorial oaths in Xenophon are statements made by the nar-
rator. In the Hellenica, the narrative “I” intrudes to stress “by Zeus” (ναὶ μὰ Δία) 
that it seems well worth while to consider what Teleutias did to inspire his men to 
be well disposed to him, adding that this is a more noteworthy accomplishment 
for a man than amassing money or facing many dangers (Hell. 5.1.4). We will later 
discover that it was his devotion to their welfare and his willingness to share their 
hardships that gained their favour (5.1.14‒15). It is remarkable that this single oath 
in the authorial voice from the Hellenica, our only oath in the authorial voice 
from all surviving fifth- and fourth-century historiography, should echo precisely 
the qualities stressed on oath by Xenophon’s character in the Anabasis regarding 
his own leadership qualities. Given the fact that we are told in the Hellenica that 
the Anabasis was written by someone other than Xenophon, it seems that Xeno-
76 Gray 2004, 377, and for more detail see Gray 1998, 94‒104.
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phon may have exploited the first-person oath with his direct authorial voice in 
the Hellenica to stress the leadership qualities of Xenophon the character in the 
Anabasis, albeit implicitly, by virtue of the fact that they are entirely comparable 
to those of Teleutias. Certainly it is uncanny that the statement made on oath 
in the first person is so similar in its concerns to the first-person oaths made by 
Xenophon the character in the Anabasis.
The authorial oath from the Constitution of the Spartans also expresses a 
related concern, confirming the negative power of wealth in a more general way. 
Towards the end of the treatise, the narrative “I” states emphatically: “should 
anyone ask me whether I believe that the laws of Lycurgus remain unchanged 
to this day, this by Zeus (μὰ Δία) I could not say with any confidence” (Lac.Pol. 
14.1). The statement is provocative since any contemporary Spartan, asked the 
same question, would presumably have responded “of course!”, and Xenophon’s 
carefully crafted exploitation of the first-person oath elsewhere in his writings 
suggests that this oath too is purposely inserted for rhetorical effect. We are sub-
sequently told that Spartans used to prefer living moderately rather than being 
corrupted by flatterers in other cities (Lac.Pol. 14.2), and that they were formerly 
afraid to appear to be in possession of gold whereas now some even boast of it 
(Lac.Pol. 14.3). In what is ostensibly a work praising Sparta, the criticism is unex-
pected and it has been explained, by some, as representing Xenophon’s disap-
pointment with his contemporary Spartans.77 Others, however, have stressed 
that a tension between praise and veiled criticism is present throughout Xeno-
phon’s writings on Sparta,78 and Noreen Humble has argued that certain flaws 
in the Spartan system are implied through the first thirteen chapters of the Con-
stitution of the Spartans so that “Chapter 14…provides an insightful summary” of 
those flaws.79 Humble suggests that Xenophon saw how, through the Lycurgan 
system, Sparta came to power and then fell, and that it was “this paradoxical 
quality of the Spartan system” with which Xenophon was concerned in this par-
ticular work.80 The oath in the authorial voice supports this interpretation since it 
too is paradoxical in its expression. Its language implies that the laws of Lycurgus 
may no longer be in place (or that contemporary Spartans are no longer adher-
ing to them), but the statement is formulated around whether or not Xenophon 
77 For example, Lipka 2002, 33‒4 suggests that “Chapter 14 [of the Constitution of the Spar-
tans] …deserves a high degree of credibility, if only due to its unexpected criticism of Spartan 
affairs”. See Humble 2004, 215 with nn. 2 and 3 for further references.
78 See Strauss 1939, Higgins 1977, 65‒75, Proietti 1987. 
79 Humble 2004, 225.
80 Humble 2004, 227.
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believes this to be the case, and he does not actually commit to an opinion. In 
other words, he does not censure the Spartans, but by raising the question at all 
and by marking it with an oath in the authorial persona, he paradoxically implies 
a deterioration in the Spartan system which he claims to be unable to determine.
13a.4 Three more authorial oaths in prose texts
Outside Xenophon, Aeschines and Demosthenes, we rarely find first-person 
oaths in prose authors of the classical period. In one fragment of Antisthenes 
(fr. 187.4‒5 Giannantoni), the author apparently swears “by Zeus” (μὰ Δία) that 
Homer did not make the character of wise Nestor treacherous and duplicitous. 
The statement is made during a discussion of portrayal of character in Homer 
where Antisthenes is concerned with defending the reputation of Odysseus, who, 
he says, is more blamed than praised by the poet in comparison to other charac-
ters. We cannot say for certain that the oath belonged to Antisthenes’ original text 
since the passage is reported by Porphyry in a scholium on Odyssey 1.1. However, 
the expression would be at home in the genre, and we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that Porphyry’s report is quoted carefully. The oath here signifies that no 
one could doubt the integrity of Nestor’s character, creating a contrast between 
Nestor and the other characters mentioned (Agamemnon, Ajax and Achilles). The 
oath suggests that Nestor is even more noble than the others, so that an oath in 
the authorial person is here used once again for the purpose of praise.81
It is, by contrast, the lack of nobility which is emphasized in the authorial 
oath from Letter VII attributed to Plato. In the letter, written ostensibly by Plato 
to the friends and family of the dead Dion, the author swears “by the gods” (νὴ 
τοὺς θεούς) that Dionysius did indeed make an agreement not to harm Hera-
cleides (349b4‒7). The exchange reported takes place during Plato’s third Sicilian 
visit. Dionysius has just angrily denied making any such agreement with Plato, 
“looking at [him] in a very tyrannical fashion”. It is technically true that he did 
not make the agreement “with Plato” since he made the promise to Theodotes the 
previous day in Plato’s presence (348d-349b), but the use of an oath here empha-
sizes what is important, namely that the agreement had been made. The tyrant’s 
failure to keep his agreements is thus stressed.
Our final example comes from the works of Aristotle, which contain just one 
oath in the authorial voice. This occurs in Politics (1281b18) where we are told, “by 
81 On the treatise in which this passage occurs, and on Antisthenes’ defence of Odysseus 
more generally, see Montiglio 2011, 20‒37.
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Zeus” (nē Dia) that perhaps it is clear that in certain collectivities it cannot possi-
bly be true that the many have more intelligence than the few. The concept being 
discussed here is that the many have more intelligence than the few because there 
are more of them, and a collective judgment will be better than the judgment of a 
few regardless of intelligence. But this may not always be true, and in some cases 
it most certainly is not. For example, many animals will not have more intelli-
gence than a few men – and, Aristotle adds, there are some humans who for all 
intents and purposes are no better than animals. However, he immediately goes 
on to say that a blanket rejection of the “wisdom of crowds” principle would be 
equally unjustified (1281b18‒21). The oath “by Zeus” is the weakest form of infor-
mal oath (see §13.2) and here it emphasizes a conjecture qualified by “perhaps” 
(isōs), but the passage is noteworthy all the same. Aristotle swears here in his own 
name for the only time in his entire corpus, and he does so to emphasize a claim 
that (in effect) democracy is not always the best form of government, and adds, 
irrelevantly (and contrary to his own theories of the soul and of mental faculties), 
that “some people” are “no different from animals.” The conversational form of 
this type of informal oath is perhaps an indication that Aristotle has let his guard 
down momentarily: he asserts on oath a statement which he believes to be true, 
even though he subsequently tries to cover his tracks.
13a.5 Conclusions
Although oaths in the authorial persona appear in a diverse range of genres, each 
of which has its own idiosyncrasies and agendas, we can nevertheless discern 
a general pattern in which authors consistently introduce oaths in the autho-
rial persona to stress that something is especially worthy of belief. We have seen 
that Xenophon’s use of oaths in the authorial person, the vast majority of which 
occur in the Anabasis, is unique, since it appears to present an impartial record of 
events in which Xenophon the character is distanced from Xenophon the author. 
It is significant, however, that of the remaining authors who most often use first-
person oaths in their works, two pairs of rivals emerge: Aeschines and Demos-
thenes, and Pindar and Bacchylides. The two authorial oaths of Aristophanes are 
also delivered in a context of rivalry. It seems possible, then, that certain authors 
include first person oaths in their own works as part of a framework of rivalry. 
We have already noted that among the orators oaths in the authorial voice only 
occur in the speeches of the political rivals Aeschines and Demosthenes, and we 
also saw how one of Bacchylides’ two surviving first-person oaths (5.41) occurs 
in an ode written to commemorate an event which Pindar’s first Olympian also 
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celebrates. Use of first-person oaths may have developed in these authors, in part 
at least, through their responses to each other.82
Another distinctive thread in our discussion has been exploitation of the 
first-person oath by poets to stress the value of their own work, as occurs most 
obviously in Pindar, the anonymous Theognidea, and Aristophanes, or to elevate 
praise of an honorand (as in Pindar, Bacchylides, and possibly Sappho). Never-
theless, we are left to account for the absence of the authorial oath in some of 
the major authors of the archaic and classical periods. This can be explained by 
looking at the narrative techniques of the relevant authors. In Homeric epic the 
poetic “I” is virtually absent,83 and the narrator’s voice, which plays an impor-
tant role in the Odyssey, especially, exists there in a complex relationship with 
Odysseus’ own narrative voice.84 Mark Griffith has demonstrated that “accord-
ing to the conventions of heroic and hymnic poetry, we should not expect [the 
poet] to intrude himself or his personal opinions there.”85 This analysis holds for 
the Homeric epics, for the Homeric Hymns which are not strongly tied to a spe-
cific location or occasion,86 and for Hesiod’s Theogony.87 As for the absence of 
first-person oaths in Hesiod’s Works and Days, where the poet frequently speaks 
in an authorial voice, I would suggest that this can be explained by considering 
the content of the poem. Authorial oaths in poetry are intrinsically linked with 
praise, either of the honorand or of the poet, but Hesiod’s Works and Days is not 
concerned with praise. Rather, Hesiod famously claims that he will tell etētuma 
“things as they are” (10).88 The type of poem, didactic rather than honorific, helps 
to explain the lack of authorial oaths, as does the representation of oaths in the 
Works and Days. In the Theogony the binding nature of oaths and punishment for 
their breach is stressed, both for mortals and for gods (231‒2, 400, 784, 793‒806). 
In Works and Days, however, the first mention of oaths comes in a prediction for 
82 In a different context, oaths could also be used to cap a rival’s claims in comedy where the 
capping of one oath by another might be exploited as a clever rhetorical technique. See Sommer-
stein 2007b, 127‒8 and §13.2, p. 335.
83 The opening invocation of the Muse in the Odyssey contains the personal pronoun (μοι “to 
me”) but the equivalent invocation in the Iliad does not.
84 See Goldhill 1991, 1‒68, Segal 1994, 113‒86.
85 Griffith 1983, 50.
86 See Griffith 1983, 44‒6.
87 For a defence of this view of Hesiod’s Theogony, see Griffith 1983, 50‒5.
88 Clay 2003, 78 stresses this aspect of Works and Days in contrast to the Theogony whose 
purpose is to praise the gods. Stoddard 2004, 191, makes the radical suggestion that “Hesiod 
adopts the role of the unreliable narrator” in Works and Days (emphasis original). It is unclear 
why an author would wish to present his own voice as unreliable, but Stoddard states that she 
will discuss the issue fully in a forthcoming book.
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a time in the near future when the righteous man who abides by his oath will 
receive no reward, while the villain will actively swear false oaths for his own 
gain (190‒4). This lack of regard for the man who keeps his oath resembles the 
conduct of the poem’s addressee Perses, and subsequent references to forsworn 
oaths being punished (219, 282‒5, 803‒4) are also warnings to Perses.89 This neg-
ative emphasis on the dangers of oaths and oath-taking, in addition to the didac-
tic nature of the poem, which does not seem to lend itself to first-person oath 
statements, explains why the authorial oath is absent.
We are left with the absence of authorial oaths in Herodotus and Thucydides. 
As with Hesiod, this can be explained, in part at least, by looking at each author’s 
attitude to oaths. It is well known that many aspects of traditional religion do not 
feature strongly in Thucydides, although religion is not entirely absent from his 
narrative.90 Oaths do feature regularly in his writing but, as Lateiner has shown, 
his interest in oaths is very much focused on sworn inter-state agreements, their 
breach, and how “[o]aths and their violations delicately indicate the decline of 
traditional social and religious practices, as well as of traditional politics.”91 
Since Thucydides’ attitude to oaths implies that they are not to be trusted, it 
makes sense that he avoids making any sworn statements in the authorial voice. 
At first glance, it is more surprising that Herodotus does not use the technique, 
but this too can be explained by looking at Herodotus’ broader narrative strate-
gies and his attitudes to oaths. Herodotus is prone to giving his audience alterna-
tive explanations for various events, phenomena, and cultural customs.92 Some-
times he voices a preference for one explanation over another, but he tends not 
to try to present his opinion as fact.93 Moreover the authorial voice in Herodotus, 
which is both the voice of the narrator and the voice which focalizes the reports 
of others, emerges as an early form of the distanced “expert persona” due to the 
fact that Herodotus eschews relating autobiographical information.94 This type 
of authorial voice does not lend itself particularly well to first-person oath-state-
ments, which, as we have seen, are often used to suggest the factual nature of an 
utterance and represent an especially marked intrusion of the authorial persona 
89 See Clay 2003, 38‒43.
90 See e.g. Hornblower 2011, 25‒53.
91 Lateiner 2012, 170.
92 This is particularly the case with events or issues that are remote in relation to his contem-
porary Greece. See Hornblower 2002 for an overview of scholarship and further discussion on 
how Herodotus presents his sources.
93 Dewald 2002, 279 notes that Herodotus’ critical comments tend to be speculative opinions 
rather than expressions of certainty.
94 See Dewald 2002, which supersedes Dewald 1987.
 13a.5 Conclusions   371
into the narrative. It is telling that there is not a single instance of an informal 
oath in Herodotus’ Histories, which is the type of conversational oath most com-
monly used for swearing statements in the authorial person, and the absence 
of informal oaths confirms Lateiner’s analysis of Herodotus’ attitude to oaths: 
“Herodotus observed the potency of traditional oaths in familiar and alien societ-
ies, but he perceived that many oath-takers forswear their oaths or find dubious 
ways to claim that they had honoured them”.95 Oaths in Herodotus are serious, 
binding, and dangerous. In this light it is not surprising that he too avoids com-
mitting his authorial voice to sworn statements.
95 Lateiner 2012, 169. Cf. T. Harrison 2000, 120 who observes that Herodotus’ Histories “pro-
vide ample evidence of the expectation of perjury.”
14 The Hippocratic Oath
I.C. Torrance
The short text in the Hippocratic corpus which is known as the Oath has been 
both influential and controversial, and it has a unique reception history among 
ancient Greek oaths, surviving as it does in one form or another to the present 
day.1 As Jouanna notes: “The roots of modern medical ethics…are to be found 
in the Oath”.2 The Oath was ostensibly sworn by men entering the medical 
profession,3 and was composed at some point in the fifth or fourth century BC.4 
It is currently best known for its clauses on refraining from giving a woman a 
“destructive pessary” and from administering deadly drugs. These passages have 
been coopted and, in some cases, substantially rephrased in order to give histori-
cal authority to the condemnation of abortion and euthanasia.5 At issue in much 
1 Some version of the Hippocratic Oath is often used as part of graduating ceremonies at med-
ical schools throughout Europe and North America. On the reception of the Hippocratic Oath, see 
especially Rütten 2007, Miles 2004, and Nutton 1997.
2 Jouanna 1999, 129. See also Flashar 1997, 1‒3, who discusses some significant modern ad-
aptations of the Oath.
3 Although older women often served as midwives, the medical profession in classical Greece 
was almost exclusively male, and the case of Phanostrate, named a “midwife and doctor” on 
her late fourth century funeral monument is a rare exception (see Nutton 2004, 100‒2 and cf. 
Miles 2004, 84). As far as the Oath goes, we note that the doctor-to-be swears, inter alia, to share 
his knowledge with his sons (not “children”) and the sons of his teacher, and that the text is 
composed with masculine adjectives and participles. The text followed here is that of Littré 1962.
4 Edelstein 1967, 55, suggested the second half of the fourth century but Jouanna 1999, 401‒2, 
leaves the issue open noting that some date the Oath to the fifth century and others to the fourth.
5 For example, the National Catholic Bioethics Center’s “Restatement of the Oath of Hippocrates, 
circa 400 B.C.” rephrases the clause concerning the destructive pessary (which reads “I will not 
give a woman a destructive pessary”), and adapts it as follows: “I will maintain the utmost re-
spect for every human life from fertilization to natural death and reject abortion that deliberately 
takes a unique human life.” The passage is mentioned by Miles 2004, 81, and the entire “Restate-
ment” was printed in the program of the Catholic Medical Association’s 76th Annual Educational 
Conference, which took place in Atlanta, Georgia, in October 2007 (http://www.cathmed.org/
assets/files/Atlanta%20Program%20Book.pdf, p. 11, accessed 20 October 2013). Similarly, the 
“Restatement” expands the original Hippocratic Oath’s provision on administering lethal drugs. 
The Oath states “I will not give a drug that is deadly to anyone if asked [for it], nor will I suggest 
the way to such a counsel”. This is rewritten by the National Catholic Bioethics Center as follows: 
“I will neither prescribe nor administer a lethal dose of medicine to any patient even if asked 
nor counsel any such thing nor perform act or omission with direct intent deliberately to end a 
human life.” Translations of the original Hippocratic Oath quoted here are taken directly from 
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scholarship, however, has been the special nature of the Oath which does not 
seem to be representative of wider practice in ancient medicine.6
These issues will not be debated again here. Rather, I would like to investi-
gate how the language, structure, content, and purpose of the Hippocratic Oath 
compare with Greek oaths more generally. Studies of the Oath within its ancient 
context have tended to focus on the relationship between the Oath and the corpus 
of Hippocratic writings as a whole. Some scholars have stressed its anomalous 
nature, in particular its religious tone, which is largely absent from other medical 
writings,7 and it is remarkable that, apart from the Oath, the Hippocratic corpus 
does not contain a single use of oath-language whether formal or informal, in 
spite of a regular exploitation of first-person statements in several Hippocratic 
treatises.8 This is doubtless related to the corpus’s focus on scientific and empir-
ical data, evidencing a belief in “a logical causation that is independent of any 
divine intervention, for good or ill”.9 The Oath, then, would seem to be doubly 
out of place within the corpus, as a religious text which binds the medical student 
to his craft through the invocation of a series of divinities. At the same time, 
however, the content of the Oath is not entirely inconsistent with concerns found 
elsewhere in the corpus. Von Staden, for example, has stressed the significance 
of the term technē in the Oath and elsewhere in the Hippocratic writings.10 More-
over, Jacques Jouanna has shown that scientific purpose and traditional religion 
coexist in those Hippocratic writings where the divine is mentioned, and that 
Hippocratic rationalism was not atheistic.11 I will argue that, while the Oath con-
Von Staden 1996, 407. For a general discussion of the Hippocratic Oath and its role in modern 
medical ethics, see Nutton 1997.
6 King 1998, 139 stresses that the termination of pregnancies was “permitted in all classical cul-
tures” and that the Oath seems to prohibit only the use of abortive pessaries (cf. Littré 1962, 629). 
Miles 2004, 81‒94, argues that this portion of the Oath has been “transformed by history” (82); he 
discusses the status of women and the practice of abortion in ancient Greece and suggests that 
this context has not been properly considered in modern uses of the Oath. Nutton 2004, 337 n.90 
proposes that “it is easiest to take the abortive pessary as representing all abortive methods”, 
although he concedes (68) that the Hippocratic treatise The Nature of the Child contains a famous 
case of abortion and that abortion was practised by various means throughout antiquity. Simi-
larly the reference to administering “a deadly drug” has been variously interpreted as prohibit-
ing euthanasia, vivisection, execution or murder; see Miles 2004, 66‒80 for further discussion.
7 See Nutton 2004, 68.
8 G.E.R. Lloyd 1987, 61‒9; cf. Von Staden 1996, 418. On first-person oaths in classical Greek lit-
erature see ch. 13a.
9 Nutton 2004, 70.
10 Von Staden 1996, 411‒14.
11 Jouanna 2012, 97‒118.
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forms to identifiable norms of oath-taking, it is also unusual and contains several 
distinctive features which help to explain its place within the Hippocratic works.
In its structure and expression, the Hippocratic Oath is, in many respects, 
typical of a formal oath. The swearer uses the performative verb of swearing 
(omnumi) and invokes a series of context-specific deities, making them witnesses 
to his oath (historas poieumenos). As we saw in ch. 6, the number and context-
specific identity of deities invoked could contribute to the solemnity of the 
oath.12 In this case, the deities are Apollo the Healer (Iatros), Asclepius, Health, 
Panacea. The designation of Apollo by the epithet iatros, which means both 
“healer” and “physician”, is clearly important. Apollo is associated with healing 
in classical Greek literature,13 but his identity as healer and physician is stressed 
in this medical context where he is the only Olympian god invoked by name. The 
epithet Paian “healer” is given to Apollo as an oath-witness in a passage of Plato’s 
Laws (664c7) where Cleinias and the Athenian have decided that three choruses 
should entertain the children of the Magnesians with stories of noble deeds, and 
tell them that the best life as declared by the gods is the most just as well as the 
most pleasant. The second chorus should invoke Apollo the Healer (Paian) as 
witness to the truth of what they say.
Two elements seem important in this passage, the only other example of 
Apollo the Healer being used as an oath-witness in our classical sources. First 
is the emphasis on truth, which implies a strong connection between Apollo’s 
powers of healing and his prophetic gifts. The connection is made explicitly 
in Aeschylus’ Eumenides (62) where Apollo is an iatromantis “healer-seer”, 
and in Aristophanes’ Wealth (11) where Apollo “is both healer (iatros) and seer 
(mantis)”, and Nan Dunbar has noted Apollo’s “oracular role at Delphi as adviser 
on cures for diseases both in legend (e.g. S. OT 68‒72) and in history (e.g. Hdt. 
1.85…).”14 The act of swearing an oath is in itself tantamount to guaranteeing the 
truth of one’s claims. However, by invoking Apollo, the medical student is calling 
as witness both a patron of his medical craft (technē) and the god of oracular 
12 So we need not wonder, as does Miles 2004, 16‒17, why Zeus was not invoked, nor Ares.
13 He is given the epithet iatros in Aristophanes’ Birds (584), the point being, as Sommerstein 
1991 observes ad loc., that he “is implicitly being compared with the state-employed physicians 
who were paid very high salaries in return for giving free treatment to all citizens (cf. Ach. 1030‒2, 
Wealth 407‒8, Hdt. 3.131, Pl. Gorg. 514d‒515b)”. Apollo is more commonly called paian “healer” 
(e.g. h.Ap. 517, Aesch. Ag. 146, 1248, Soph. OT 154, Trach. 221, Eur. Alc. 220, Ar. Ach. 1212), and is 
also invoked as akestor “healer” by Orestes in Euripides’ Andromache (900), although Stevens 
1971 notes ad loc. that this is the only instance of this term being used as an epithet of Apollo. See 
also Nutton 2004, 38‒9 on Apollo’s association with healing in Homer.
14 Dunbar 1995, ad 584.
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truths.15 The sincerity of the oath-statement is thus further solemnized, and it 
may be significant in this context that the oath seems to have been recited from 
a set text and not scripted by the individuals who swore it. The second important 
feature of the parallel from Plato is that the Magnesian oath is to be sworn by 
the chorus of men. Similarly the Hippocratic oath is formulated in male language 
and must have been sworn only by men. Invoking Apollo in this context is thus 
appropriate in one further respect, namely that oaths by Apollo tend to be male 
oaths (see §13.1, p. 321‒2).
Oaths by Asclepius also seem to be male oaths. A comic fragment of Alexis’ 
Homoia (fr. 168.1 K-A) contains an informal oath by Asclepius, and Arnott notes 
that swearing by Asclepius is a “standard male oath in later comedy”.16 Asclepius, 
of course, is Apollo’s son and the god of healing. His cult was introduced into 
Athens at the end of the fifth century BC, and Sophocles reputedly had a strong 
connection with it.17 The arrival of Asclepius, however, did not displace Apollo’s 
association with healing.18 Indeed the heading of the main Epidaurus healing 
inscription reads ἰάματα τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀσκλαπιοῦ “Cures of Apollo and 
Asclepius” (IG iv2 [1] 121). It is important that both gods are invoked in the Oath, 
not only as the foremost patron deities of healing, but also as a father-son model, 
since the content of the Oath stresses the transfer of knowledge from father to son 
and the creation of virtual familial bonds between students and their teachers.19 
Health (Hygieia) and Panacea, daughters of Asclepius, are also listed as context-
specific oath-witnesses, and do not appear elsewhere in classical Greek oaths. As 
a final measure of solemnity, the swearer of the Oath calls upon “all the gods and 
goddesses” as the closing witnesses to the list of gods in a formula which could 
15 Miles 2004, 128‒38, argues against the paternalistic view of ancient Greek medicine and 
shows that ancient Greek doctors favoured disclosing their information and prognosis to pa-
tients, linking such truth-telling to the Oath’s clause in which the speaker swears to act “for the 
benefit of the ill”.
16 Arnott 1996, 493. He cites Men. Dysk. 666, Perik. 336, Sam. 310, fr. 85 K-T = 93 K-A, and what is 
now com. adesp. 1092.8 K-A.
17 Nutton 2004, 105‒6 notes that popular tradition subsequently made Sophocles the host of 
Asclepius, and see further Craik 2003, 45‒8. Asclepius features in Sophocles’ Philoctetes (1333‒4, 
1437‒8), in one of his Phineus plays (fr. 710) and possibly in his Phaedra, on which see Talboy & 
Sommerstein 2006, 285‒6. Sophocles also wrote a paean in honour of Asclepius, some fragments 
of which survive (PMG 737). See Connolly 1998 for further discussion.
18 Nutton 2004, 107.
19 The swearer of the Oath agrees to regard his teacher in medicine as equal to his parents and 
the teacher’s sons as equal to his siblings, and to teach them and his own sons what he has 
learned.
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be added to particularly solemn oaths.20 The form of the invocation in the Hip-
pocratic Oath clearly follows the expected pattern for a solemn oath. A detailed 
statement is made with appropriate gods as witnesses and a curse is invoked for 
perjury at the close of the Oath. The formulation of the curse is a little unusual, as 
will be discussed below, but the purpose of the Oath parallels a number of other 
oaths commonly taken in ancient Greece wherever a person held a position in 
which there was a perceived potential for abuse. Archons, generals, members of 
the boulē, jurors, judges in festival competitions, and even the most minor offi-
cials all swore oaths of office stating, in essence, that they would fulfill their func-
tions fairly and to the best of their abilities.21 It seems natural within this climate 
that an oath for physicians was formulated since the nature of their work left 
unprotected patients open to potential abuse.22
Overall, then, the Oath is both recognizable as and typical of a formal oath 
of the classical period. In some of its details, however, the oath is unusual. For 
example, the curse on the would-be perjurer is expressed not as an explicit pun-
ishment but as “the opposite” (tānantia) of specific blessings to be incurred by 
the person who keeps his oath. Rewards are thus stressed rather than a potential 
punishment. The anticipated blessings are prayed for as follows: “May the ben-
efits of my way of life and skill be reaped [by me] having a good reputation among 
all human beings forever” (εἴη ἐπαύρασθαι καὶ βίου καὶ τέχνης δοξαζομένῳ παρὰ 
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον).23 The oath-breaker, then, would suffer a 
bad reputation and a lack of benefits from his way of life and skill. This amounts 
to a metaphorical destruction rather than the literal death or extinction of lineage 
normally expected, whether implicitly or explicitly, in other formal oaths.24 
Moreover, although a brief prayer for blessings as a consequence of keeping one’s 
oath sometimes occurs at the end of official oaths, it is unusual (pace Faraone) 
for such specific rewards to be mentioned or for these to form the bulk of the 
expressed conditions.25 In the dicastic oath, for example, the swearer invokes 
20 See § 6.1.
21 See S&B §§3.1‒4, 5.4, 5.16.
22 Jouanna 1999, 21‒2, discusses the case of Apollonides who served as a doctor at the Persian 
court, took advantage of Megabyzes’ widow, and ultimately met a grim end. 
23 On the interpretation of βίος as “way of life”, see Von Staden 1996, 419‒22, and 1997, 176‒8.
24 See § 12.1.
25 Faraone 2006, 139 claims that the Greeks “often enforced the compliance and truthfulness 
of… oaths by sanctioning them with a balanced pair of conditional self-blessings and self-curses, 
such as we find at the end of the well-known Hippocratic oath”, and similarly states in Fara-
one 2012, 121 that the Greeks “often concluded their oaths with a pair of curses and blessings” 
once again giving the Hippocratic Oath as the only example. I do not share Faraone’s convic-
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utter destruction on himself and his house should he transgress any of the oath’s 
provisions, but expects “many blessings” (Dem. 24. 151: polla kāgatha) if he keeps 
his oath.26 The oath of Demophantus contains a similar clause, which seems to be 
derived from this.27 An oath sworn by Ariston in his prosecution speech against 
Conon concludes in a similar manner also (Dem. 54.41), as does a reconciliation 
oath taken by the citizens of Dicaea at some point between 365 and 359 BC (SEG 
lvii 576).28 A variant on this formula is the oath required of the winner in a homi-
cide trial, who invoked destruction on himself and his house but many blessings 
on the judges should his oath be false (Aeschines 2.87).29 When we are told by 
Hesiod that the family of a man who keeps his oath “is better thereafter” (WD 285: 
μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων) we are given no details as to how exactly this might happen, 
and Pindar’s unique suggestion that those who keep their oaths keep company 
with the gods (Olymp. 2.65‒7) seems purposely designed to implicate the poet 
himself as deserving a place among the gods, as I argued in §13a.2.
There are problems with Edelstein’s theory that the Hippocratic Oath “is a 
Pythagorean manifesto”,30 but the fact remains that the conditional benefits and 
punishments contingent on the oath have a remarkably more philosophical tone 
than any other of our recorded oaths from classical Greece. Earning and main-
taining a good reputation (doxa) both before and after death is a common human 
objective in archaic and classical Greece, a shame culture where reputation was 
of the highest significance, as has been well documented.31 The swearer’s antici-
tion that the Hippocratic Oath is paradigmatic in this respect. The only comparable examples I 
have found, where specific rewards are stressed, are two jokes from Aristophanes, one in Clouds 
(518‒25; see §13a.2) and one in Lysistrata (233‒4) where being able to drink from the wine cup is 
mentioned as a reward for keeping the oath, while the punishment for perjury entails the cup 
being filled with water. The humour in these passages, however, sets them quite apart from the 
serious nature of the Hippocratic Oath.
26 Dem. 24.149‒51 with S&B § 5.4, esp. 71.
27 S&B, 74‒5.
28 See S&B, 86‒7 and 141‒3, respectively, on these oaths.
29 The ekklēsia curse, which called down destruction upon those who committed a variety 
of crimes against the city but many blessings for the rest of the community, is comparable. See 
further S&B, 49.
30 Edelstein 1967, 17‒63, quotation from p. 63. As observed by Von Staden 1996, 409, Edelstein’s 
theory “fails to account satisfactorily for this feature of the Oath: the Oath’s concluding prayer 
and imprecation do not correspond to the aspirations shaped by a Pythagorean belief in the 
transmigration and reincarnation of the soul after death”. Edelstein has difficulty explaining 
why Pythagoreans would invoke the gods in an oath when “some Pythagorean sources stipulate 
that one should not swear by the gods” (1967, 53). See also Miles 2004, 28‒33, on the influence of 
and problems with Edelstein’s theory.
31 See e.g. Fisher 1992, Cairns 1993, Williams 1993.
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pated reward for keeping his Hippocratic oath is in line with such belief,32 but 
it remains striking that the conditional reward and antithetical curse affect the 
name of the swearer and not his body or that of his progeny as was common in 
oath curses. The distinction between name and body, or between appearance 
(doxa) and reality, was important in fifth-century philosophical thought,33 but it 
seems clear from the context of the Oath that doxa, “reputation” or “appearance”, 
is conceived of as being compatible with rather than antithetical to “reality” or 
“truth”.34 A good reputation is expected as a result of remaining true to the oath, 
witnessed by Apollo, the god of oracular truths. However the formulation of the 
reward and inverse punishment seems philosophically charged in the sense that 
it is the name which will be punished rather than the body.
In addition, the medical student expects to enjoy the benefits of his way 
of life (bios) and his skill (technē) as a result of keeping his oath. These three 
rewards (good reputation, benefits from manner of living and benefits from skill) 
can, to a large extent, be understood as depending on human rather than divine 
agency. The divine element is not entirely absent, of course, since a healthy 
cohort of divinities are witnesses to the oath, but the expressed curse on the 
perjurer (namely, a bad reputation, and an inability to enjoy the benefits of his 
life and his profession) is largely dependent on human agency for its fulfilment 
(assuming, of course, that a doctor’s misdeeds are detected), unlike other oaths 
of office in which death and destruction at the hands of the gods are imagined. 
The gods might be thought of as influencing the implementation of the curse in 
the Hippocratic Oath, but their involvement is not expressed.35 The swearer of 
the Oath agrees to maintain his life and his skill (διατηρήσω βίον τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ 
τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν) “in a pure and holy way” (ἁγνῶς … καὶ ὁσίως), which would 
seem to lend a deeper religious content to the oath. However, as Von Staden has 
demonstrated, the notion of a doctor living “in a pure way” (ἁγνῶς) is problem-
atic since it would, by classical standards, prohibit the doctor from coming into 
contact with the pollution associated with death, birth, sexual intercourse, men-
struation and other such common encounters in a doctor’s professional experi-
ences.36 Von Staden argues that the concepts of purity and holiness advocated 
by the Oath have developed beyond their traditional associations, and are here 
32 But a good reputation “is hardly a Pythagorean ideal” (Von Staden 1996, 409).
33 See Dover 1974 (esp. 226‒9, 236‒42), M.E. Wright 2005, 268‒78.
34 Cf. Von Staden 1996, 437.
35 Edelstein does not give due consideration to the religious context of oaths when he sug-
gests (1967, 61) that the Hippocratic Oath “is vouchsafed [sic] only by the conscience of him who 
swears.” 
36 Von Staden, 1996, 423‒4 and 1997, 179‒81.
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internalized, intellectualized and applied to purity of thought rather than purity 
of physical experience.37 Human cognitive acts form the basis of the Oath,38 and 
the secular sphere of the swearer’s life is emphasized by the clause to “be far from 
all voluntary and destructive injustice” (ἐκτὸς ἐὼν πάσης ἀδικίης ἑκουσίης καὶ 
φθορίης) which refers directly to his relationship with other men and women.39
The Hippocratic Oath is at once deeply religious and paradoxically secular. In 
a Commentary on the text, ascribed to Galen, fragments of which are preserved in 
the Arabic tradition, the theory is put forward that medicine “is such an exalted 
science that it cannot [have been] invented by the intellect of man” and must be 
divine in origin.40 In this elusive text, which was apparently a sort of “mythologi-
cal history of medicine”,41 the author (who may or may not have been Galen)42 
seems to have used the Oath to elucidate the religious nature and divine origins of 
the craft of medicine. As the only religious text in the Hippocratic corpus it is not 
surprising that it was chosen for this purpose. However, as we have seen, the Oath 
contains an unusual emphasis on issues of human agency, for all its ostensibly 
religious language and formal structure as an oath.
That the Hippocratic Oath seems to be all-encompassing for every aspect 
of the swearer’s life is another of the Oath’s distinguishing features. If it merges 
the religious and the secular, it also combines the professional and the private. 
Formal oaths in our surviving evidence normally relate to a specific event or to 
a period in office, not to a way of life as a whole. Von Staden rightly claims that 
“few, if any, extant Greek oaths draw attention to the speaker so consistently and 
emphatically”, and further explains that the commitments made in the Oath 
“might largely concern professional conduct, but the amassing of first-person 
forms ensure that they are never separated from an individual, personal respon-
sibility and guarantee.”43 Moreover, it is clear that only those who were not 
members of medical families were required to commit to a written contract, since 
the speaker agrees to teach the sons of his master, should they desire to learn, 
“without fee and written contract” (ἄνευ μισθοῦ καὶ ξυγγραφῆς). The written con-
tract, then, seems to have been added for additional security in safeguarding the 
37 Von Staden 1996, 430‒1 and 1997, 187‒8.
38 Von Staden 1996, 431‒2 and 1997, 189‒90.
39 Von Staden 1996, 428.
40 Rosenthal 1956, fr. B.1.b (p. 59) and cf. fr. B.1.c (p. 60).
41 Rosenthal 1965, 87. The Commentary seems to have focused on the first, historical, part of 
the Oath and not on the deontological second part, as noted by Nutton and Jouanna in Jouanna 
1997, 247‒8.
42 See Rosenthal 1956, 81‒7.
43 Von Staden 1996, 419.
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art of medicine while also allowing outsiders access to training. The oath itself 
also seems to have been conceived for outsiders, at least initially,44 and the sepa-
ration between those who were members of the Asclepiad families and those who 
were not is emphasized by another oath, recorded in an inscription dating from 
c. 360 B.C. (CID I, 12). The speaker must swear that he is an Asclepiad of the male 
line in order to be able to consult the oracle at Delphi or make a sacrifice.45
Nutton’s suggestion that the Oath was developed “in a situation in which 
an earlier pattern of medical education [was] gradually breaking down” seems 
justified,46 and helps to explain the anomalous position of this religious text 
within the largely secular Hippocratic corpus. In a profession where empiricism 
was valued over divine intervention, but where a mythological history was traced 
back to the gods and the practice of traditional religion continued, the unusual 
features of the Oath qua oath also make sense. An oath invoking the mythologi-
cal patrons of medicine was recited by the in-comer, and while the Oath retains 
a clear and traditional religious structure, its human concerns are seen to extend 
beyond its content and into the expected rewards or punishments for keeping or 
breaking the oath.
44 Jouanna 1999, 129 suggests that “originally the entire oath was taken only by disciples from 
outside the family of Asclepiads” (cf. 47 and see also Jouanna 2012, 116‒18), but it is possible, 
at least, that the Oath was taken orally also by members of the medical families. Certainly, as 
Jouanna notes (1999, 129), the oath came to be “uttered by physicians in general”. The Arabic 
tradition, which records references to the commentary on the Hippocratic Oath, includes one 
source which claims that the craft of medicine was transmitted orally from fathers to sons until 
so few heirs remained that Hippocrates decided to commit his knowledge permanently to writ-
ing for fear that it might be lost (see Rosenthal 1956 fr. B.3.f. p. 80). Another states that a lack of 
heirs made Hippocrates decide to take in strangers and teach them the craft of medicine, and 
that he “established the written Covenant for them and made them swear the oaths contained in 
it”, including a clause preventing the swearer from teaching any other “unless he had declared 
before that he would abide by this Covenant” (Rosenthal 1956, fr. B.3.g, quotations from p. 81).
45 The oath of the Asclepiads is discussed by Jouanna 2012, 115‒18.
46 Nutton 2004, 69; see also Jouanna 1997, 214, and 1999, 47, who argues that the “Oath is 
closely tied to the revolution represented by the opening up to outsiders of a school of medicine 
whose teaching was originally reserved for the members of a single family.”
15 The decline of the oath?
A.H. Sommerstein
As we saw in ch. 11, the belief in the binding power of oaths was strong and sus-
tained, and attempts to specify circumstances under which the principle might 
be waived met with little success. At the same time, it could not be denied that 
some people did in fact swear assertory oaths which were false, or promissory 
oaths which they broke; to take only one example, if it were not so, few murder 
cases would ever have come to the Athenian Council of the Areopagus for trial, 
since in every such case the prosecutor had to swear – in circumstances of special 
solemnity – that the defendant had killed, and the defendant that he had not 
killed (see S&B §5.14). Such breaches of oath would, it was thought, be punished 
by the gods – but the gods, notoriously, were often slow in punishing offences, 
and their retribution might be delayed for many generations. So one could never 
be in a position to infer with confidence that because a swearer had not suffered 
anything that looked like divine punishment for perjury, therefore his oath had 
been honest. And on the other hand, if he or his did come to some serious harm, 
this was not necessarily reliable evidence that he had been guilty of perjury on 
any particular occasion, since disasters did not come labelled with explanations 
of their causes.1 In any case, even if it was eventually established that an oath 
had (or had not) been violated, such knowledge would often come too late to be of 
any use at all, and always too late to give any guidance to judges, treaty partners, 
etc., as to whether the swearer should be trusted. On top of all this, the ancient 
and increasingly sophisticated practice of “sidestepping” (see ch. 10), and of 
careful and precise choice of language in oaths, added further layers of uncer-
tainty, and already in the time of Aeschylus (fr. 394) it could be said that “oaths 
do not give credibility to men; men give credibility to oaths” – in other words, that 
a person who could not be trusted when not on oath should not be trusted when 
he was on oath, either.2
1 Unless the sufferer, or his kin, or another interested party, inquired of a god (normally via 
an oracle) why the disaster had occurred, and received an informative response.
2 Much the same is said by a character in Alexis’ comedy Olynthioi, probably from the third 
quarter of the fourth century: “a sensible person ought not to trust people’s oaths, but rather 
always trust the actual facts” (Alexis fr. 165). And in an unknown comedy by Menander’s con-
temporary Diphilus (fr. 101), a character named two types of person whose oaths were worthless 
– the courtesan and the politician, both of whom “swear to anything that suits the man they’re 
talking to” (the nature of New Comedy suggests that he was talking about courtesans and using 
politicians as a well-known standard to which to compare them, rather than vice versa). Already 
in the sixth century Theognis (284, 1139) is warning against putting one’s trust in oaths.
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We should, of course, remember that this is a line from a drama, and was 
spoken by a character who may have had an axe to grind. The same applies even 
more strongly to similar remarks made by speakers in the courts, whose oppo-
nents had all sworn oaths to the truthfulness of the case they were arguing, oaths 
whose reliability the speaker must necessarily attempt to undermine. Neverthe-
less, it is significant that in lawcourt speeches, little or no weight is normally 
placed on the mere fact that the speaker has sworn to the truth of his case; rather, 
he will marshal argument and evidence (including evidence of character) to per-
suade his judges that it is his sworn declaration, rather than his opponent’s, that 
should be believed.
This is already evident in the earliest surviving lawcourt speeches, those of 
Antiphon, which probably all date from within a few years of 420 BC – even though 
they were all written for homicide trials and all make use of arguments that would 
be persuasive only to those of a strongly religious mindset.3 In none of them 
does the speaker argue, either directly or by implication, that simply because he 
has sworn to his innocence (if he is the accused) or to his opponent’s guilt (if he is 
the prosecutor) he is entitled to be believed. In two of the three speeches, indeed, 
the speaker never makes any mention of his own oath. In the third (Ant. 6), the 
defence speech of a choregos charged with causing the death of a boy named 
Diodotus who had been a member of his chorus, he does (§§14‒16); but observe 
how he does it. He reminds the judges that the listening public “have heard the 
words of the man who administered the oath” and says that he would like them 
(the public) “to feel that I was being faithful to that oath, and that in persuading 
you [the judges] to acquit me I was telling the truth”. That virtually concedes that 
the mere fact of his taking the oath proves little or nothing. Rather, he points to 
reasons, entirely independent of the oath, that go to confirm his credibility: the 
fact that his words are subject to refutation by the prosecution, who have another 
speech to follow in which they can expose any lies he may have told;4 the fact 
(if it is a fact) that many of those present have “precise knowledge” of the facts 
of the case; and the fact that he has called witnesses, whose evidence the judges 
should use to help them decide which side’s account of the case is “truer and 
more oath-respecting”.
And yet, while only one of Antiphon’s three clients is made to draw attention 
to his own oath, all three draw attention to the oaths of their opponents – always, 
of course, in order to destroy their credibility. In the Herodes case (Ant. 5), the 
prosecutors had not used the regular homicide procedure but had prosecuted 
3 Ant. 1.3, 31; 5.81‒4, 93; 6.3‒6.
4 He does not mention that he will then also have a second speech, giving him the last word.
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the accused, Euxitheus, by endeixis, thus (he complains) evading the specially 
solemn oaths that were taken in homicide cases both by the parties themselves 
and by all their witnesses. He asserts, indeed, that the prosecutors and their wit-
nesses are not on oath at all (§12) – which is true of the latter but false of the 
former – and accuses his accusers of “knowing very well” that if their witnesses 
had had to take the special “homicide” oaths, they would not have been willing 
to give evidence at all (§15). He does not, of course, mention that he himself, and 
his witnesses, are “unsworn” in exactly the same sense. Later (§§90, 96) he will 
ask for an acquittal on the ground that it will then still be open to his accusers to 
launch a normal prosecution for homicide in the course of which they will have to 
take “the customary oath”. Essentially, he has undermined the prosecutors’ oath 
that they “know well” that he killed Herodes by pretending it never happened.
In the other two surviving cases (Ant. 1 and 6) the two parties (and their wit-
nesses, if any) did take “the customary oath”; and in each case Antiphon’s client 
sets out to prove that they have perjured themselves. The accused choregos in 
Antiphon 6, having stated that his accusers have sworn “that I killed Diodotus by 
planning his death”,5 while he himself has sworn “that I did not kill him either 
by my own hand or by planning”,6 then undertakes to prove that the prosecu-
tors are “the most perjured and impious of mankind” (§33) because their conduct 
for a short time before, and a long time after, they first commenced proceedings 
clearly indicates that they did not in fact believe him to be guilty of causing the 
death of their young kinsman (§§34‒50); and in the last 150 words of his speech 
(§§48‒51) he refers no less than five times to the oath his opponents have sworn, 
now proved (he assumes) to have been insincere (see §12.2.3, p. 311).
In Ant. 1, too, the speaker seeks to disparage his opponents’ oath. He is pros-
ecuting his late father’s wife7 for allegedly poisoning her husband; she is repre-
5 i.e. by planning the act that caused his death (the administration of a drug, either for me-
dicinal purposes or to enhance his performance, which proved to be poisonous).
6 Though these two sworn statements seem contradictory, they may in fact both be true. The 
defendant says (§§15, 17) that he was not present when the drug was taken and neither told the 
boy to take it, nor compelled him to do so, nor gave it to him – but that still leaves plenty of pos-
sible scenarios of indirect responsibility (e.g. ordering one of his subordinates to compel the boy 
to take the drug) which he at no point denies. If one of these scenarios happened to represent the 
truth, the defendant would doubtless claim that it did not amount to “planning” the boy’s death. 
Such a claim might or might not seem reasonable to the judges.
7 The case is traditionally called “Against the Stepmother”, but this is inappropriate. Given 
what we learn about the ages of those concerned, the accused woman must have been married 
to the deceased at the time of the speaker’s birth; in other words, the speaker is the deceased’s 
illegitimate son, the offspring of what would now (but not then) be thought of as an adulterous 
liaison.
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sented in court by one of her sons (the speaker’s half-brothers), and it is he who 
has taken the “customary oaths”. The speaker professes amazement that he can 
swear he “knows well” that his mother is innocent: “how can one ‘know well’ 
the truth of events which one did not oneself witness?” (§28). It is a fair enough 
point (or it would be, were not the prosecutor himself in exactly the same posi-
tion – for he must have sworn he “knows well” that the accused is guilty, though 
all he actually knows is that his father believed her so); but one can certainly 
understand and sympathize with the half-brothers’ position. In all probability 
they were absolutely convinced that their mother was indeed innocent, even if 
their certainty was based on nothing more than her word, their long experience 
of her character, and filial love and loyalty. And unless one of them took the oath 
in the terms in which it was dictated, they could not defend her, and no one else 
would be in any better position to do so; she would be convicted by default, and 
executed. What else could they possibly do? And the phrase “know well” pro-
vided enough wiggle-room to satisfy a reasonable conscience; in Greek, as in 
English, “I know” could mean in effect “I am morally certain”.8
Both in Ant. 1 and in Ant. 6, too, the speakers argue that their opponents 
have no belief in their own case because they have refused to accept a challenge 
to have slaves examined under torture (1.5‒13, 6.21‒7); and the prosecutor in Ant. 
1 explicitly asks how, in view of this, his half-brother can possibly be thought to 
have taken his oath in good faith (1.8). It seems to have been generally accepted 
that such interrogation of slaves was a reliable method of establishing the truth 
(partly perhaps because of its rarity in practice), and Antiphon evidently expected 
that the judges in these two cases would be readier to believe that his clients’ 
opponents had perjured themselves in a particularly solemn oath than that they 
had honest grounds for refusing a torture challenge.9
So by the late fifth century, an oath on its own was not considered to be of 
much probative value; it was recognized that some men’s oaths might be not just 
misleading (as had always been realized) but downright false. And as a result, 
certainly by the middle of the fourth century, it could be respectably argued that 
if you believed a man to be of bad character, you ought not to give him the oppor-
tunity to gain a spurious credibility by offering him the chance to swear that he 
8 There are ten clear examples in Sophocles alone: Trach. 67 (where Hyllus explicitly as-
cribes his “knowledge” to hearsay), Aj. 560, Ant. 89, OT 1455, El. 400, 672, OC 656, 662, 666, 1197.
9 It is in harmony with this that litigants rarely attempt to justify their rejection of such a chal-
lenge; it is apparently considered safer to ignore the matter entirely. On torture-challenges see 
Thür 1977, 1996b; Gagarin 1996; Mirhady 1996, 2000.
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is telling the truth or that he will keep his promise. As someone put it in a play by 
the comic dramatist Antiphanes (fr. 230):
Anyone who invites a wicked man to take an oath is barmy, because the gods now do the 
opposite of what they ought to. If anyone swears a false oath in their name, the man who 
invited him to swear gets struck by lightning right away – and rightly so, if you ask me, 
because he trusted someone.
Since our quotation ends there, we can’t be quite sure whether the speaker is a 
total cynic who thinks no one should ever be trusted, or whether his sentence 
has been truncated and he was actually blaming the perjurer’s dupe for trusting 
someone who he should have known didn’t deserve to be trusted, oath or no oath.
We find the same view taken in court, too. One of the best-known instances 
of an oath-challenge in litigation (see S&B §5.11) is narrated in Demosthenes’ two 
speeches Against Boeotus (Dem. 39.2‒4, 40.10‒11). We do not, for present pur-
poses, need to inquire whether the account of the affair given by the speaker, 
Mantitheus, is true or not; it is sufficient that he – and his expert adviser, Dem-
osthenes – expected it to be credible. As already mentioned (ch. 9, p. 173, 236), 
he is suing his half-brother, Boeotus, in an attempt to stop him from using the 
name Mantitheus. He tells the jury of an earlier case in which his father, Mantias, 
had been sued by Boeotus, who claimed that Mantias was wrongfully refusing 
to recognize him as his son. Mantias did not want the case to go to court, and 
eventually agreed to a deal with Boeotus’ mother, Plangon. Mantias would chal-
lenge her, before the official arbitrator, to swear that he was the father of her 
two sons, Boeotus and Pamphilus, with the outcome of Boeotus’ lawsuit depend-
ing on her response; she would refuse the challenge; Mantias would then pay 
her thirty minae, and she would arrange for Boeotus and Pamphilus each to be 
adopted by one of her own two brothers. She swore an oath “which is regarded 
by all mankind as the greatest and most fearsome” that she would honour this 
agreement. And then she broke it; when Mantias issued the challenge before the 
arbitrator, she accepted it and swore that he was indeed the father of the two 
young men, and he was thus compelled to acknowledge them as his sons.
Now if this story is true, Plangon was a shameless perjurer. But what of 
Mantias? Mantitheus clearly thinks he should have known better than to make 
such a deal, even though, according to Mantitheus’ account, he was pretty much 
blackmailed into it;10 and he speaks (39.25) of Boeotus “having gained a father 
10 He describes Boeotus’ associates Mnesicles and Menecles, who helped him with the law-
suit, as sykophantai, and says Mantias did not want to go to court “for fear that someone whom 
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through his mother’s oath and the naivety (euētheia) of the man who invited her 
to take it”. It is not a very sharp criticism (one would not expect it to be, given that 
it is his father whom Mantitheus is criticizing), but the plain implication of it is 
that a shrewder man11 would have avoided giving Plangon such an opportunity 
for gainful perjury.12
In another passage of Antiphanes (it might even be from the same play, 
though we have no evidence one way or the other) almost exactly the opposite 
view is taken – but with an important reservation (fr. 237):13
When someone shows contempt for the sworn statement of another, unless he knows that 
the person has sworn falsely in the past, in my opinion he is showing contempt for the gods 
and violating an oath that he himself has previously taken.
One can without too much difficulty extract from this evidence – and other evi-
dence of the same kind – a coherent position to which most people would have 
been willing to sign up had it been explicitly put to them. In principle, an oath is 
entitled to credence: Oedipus ought to believe Creon (Soph. OT 647, 652‒3, 656‒7), 
Theseus ought to believe Hippolytus (Eur. Hipp. 1036‒7), particularly since both 
have expressed their oaths in especially powerful terms (see §5.1, pp. 79). On the 
other hand, it would clearly be foolish to believe the oath of someone who had 
a history of committing perjury. The problem lay in the grey area between. What 
if the swearer was someone who had frequently told lies, but had never been 
proved to have lied on oath? What if there was evidence, direct or circumstan-
tial, which strongly suggested that he was lying on this occasion? Such evidence 
he had aggrieved in some other matter – as can happen when one is in public life – might con-
front him there” (39.3).
11 Mantitheus is anxious to make it seem that his father was anything but shrewd; in his next 
sentence, commenting on lawsuits brought by Boeotus against him to secure money allegedly 
due to him from Mantias’ estate, he says to the jury “I think you all know what sort of business-
man my father was” (“i.e. a bad one,” comment Carey & Reid 1985, 185, “so that the money 
claimed by Boeotus does not exist”).
12 The gain she made by it was to have her sons recognized as Athenian citizens and probably 
(though Mantitheus obfuscates this) as legitimate and therefore entitled to a share of Mantias’ 
property at his death. It is not clear, even on Mantitheus’ version of the facts, how Mantias could 
have avoided making the deal, if he really was afraid of a trial for political reasons; perhaps he 
might have phrased the challenge more artfully, e.g. by not specifying what would be the con-
sequence if it was accepted – but an experienced litigant like Menecles would surely have seen 
through such a ruse.
13 Very similarly, but without the reservation, Amphis fr. 42: “He who does not believe an 
oath will himself be a ready and clever perjurer.”
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there is both in the case of Creon and in that of Hippolytus. In Creon’s case the 
evidence is, to any objective observer, weak, and the chorus duly draw attention, 
not only to Creon’s oath of innocence, but to the fact that the case against him 
is “unclear” (OT 656‒7) and that he has no past record of disloyalty (652); even 
so, and even though the chorus swear to their own loyalty in terms as strong as 
Creon had used (660‒2), Oedipus still believes that in letting Creon go free he is 
running a grave risk himself (669‒70). But at least he does let Creon go free. In 
Hippolytus’ case the evidence is to all appearance very strong (Phaedra’s written 
accusation, made all the more credible by her suicide); both Hippolytus and the 
chorus know it to be false, but both are themselves bound by oaths of secrecy. 
Hippolytus’ sworn denial of guilt has to stand alone, and it was not enough for 
Theseus.14
From the late fifth century onwards, we begin to find a trickle of statements 
which suggest that reflection on these problems was in some circles leading to a 
tendency to argue that since oaths were of little real value as a guarantee of truth-
telling or promise-keeping, they should be avoided when not obligatory, and even 
that many of the obligatory occasions for them should be abolished.
The earliest surviving text in this tradition is a fragment of the Persica of 
Choe rilus of Samos, an epic poet of the late fifth century, who said, or more 
probably made a character say, that “there should be no such thing as an oath, 
whether just or unjust”; we have no idea of the context. The next, probably in the 
370s, comes from Isocrates, who thus advised the Cyprian nobleman Demonicus 
(Isoc. 1.23):
When requested to swear an oath, accept for two reasons only – to clear yourself from a 
disgraceful accusation, or to save your friends from great dangers. Never swear by any of the 
gods for the purpose of material gain, not even with sincere intent: if you do, everyone will 
think you either perjured or greedy.15
It can be no accident that Isocrates’ own texts prove that he himself practised 
what he here preaches; nowhere in his 125,000‒word corpus does he, or any 
14 Theseus had in any case already doomed Hippolytus irrevocably to death, by his curse-prayer 
to Poseidon (Hipp. 887‒90), before even giving him a hearing; but he appears to have forgotten 
about this, and Hippolytus did not know of it in the first place.
15 To most people (though not, for example, to Quakers) this will seem an unrealistic counsel 
of perfection, since if Demonicus literally obeyed it, he could never have taken legal proceedings 
and anyone would have been able to defraud him with impunity. However, it may well be signifi-
cant that Isocrates himself, in all his long life, was never the prosecutor or plaintiff in any lawsuit 
([Plut.] Lives of the Ten Orators 839c).
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of the clients for whom he wrote speeches, or any of the characters he creates, 
swear, even informally, to any statement or promise at all, except for those oaths 
which were required by the procedures of the courts in which they are repre-
sented as speaking. There is no sign of any such abstinence in the works of the 
other Attic orators, or during most of the career of Isocrates’ great rival in the 
sphere of advanced education, Plato. The discussion of the ideal state in Plato’s 
Republic hardly mentions oaths, and seems to consider them unproblematic. But 
in his last work, The Laws, it is quite otherwise.
It is probably not significant, despite the parallel with Isocrates, that infor-
mal oaths are notably rare in the actual conversation between the Spartan Megil-
lus, the Cretan Cleinias, and the Athenian who represents Plato’s views (there are 
only four of them, all in the mouth of Cleinias and all to reinforce responses that 
give assent to something the Athenian has said), since this is a general feature of 
Plato’s late work.16 What is significant is a striking bifurcation in the laws regard-
ing oaths in the new Cretan city of Magnesia. The principle behind this is not 
explained until long after many examples have been given of its application – not 
until nearly the end of the long work (949a). It is that oaths shall be required 
in those cases, and only in those cases, “where it is not generally thought that 
gain can accrue to the perjurer”; where, on the contrary, it is widely believed that 
“a sworn denial can bring great and manifest gain”, oaths will be positively for-
bidden, even in situations where states have hitherto made them obligatory. The 
reason given for this is that “it is terrible to think of a city in which … nearly half 
the population have committed perjury and are mixing promiscuously with the 
rest” (948d-e) and thus exposing all alike to divine anger.
There are still a considerable range of situations where Magnesia will require 
an oath – for judges in the courts (948e), those voting in elections of all kinds 
(949a, cf. 767c-d) including someone putting forward an alternative candidate 
against an official nominee (755c-d), judges of musical and athletic competitions 
(949a), and the nomophylakes (guardians of the laws) when they make a decla-
ration that a married couple are persistently refusing to fulfil their procreative 
duties (784c); we also hear of choruses that will sing to young children in praise of 
the virtuous life, one of which (of men under thirty) will invoke the god Paean as a 
witness to the truth of their words (664c). Oaths are mentioned as being required 
16 In the five other certainly genuine dialogues generally regarded as late – The Sophist, The 
Statesman, Timaeus, Critias and Philebus – which together amount to about four-fifths the length 
of The Laws, there are a total of three informal oaths.
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of private citizens before entering another person’s house to search for stolen 
goods (954a) and when refusing to testify in court (936e-937a; cf. S&B §5.10)17.
The areas of community life from which oaths are to be partially or completely 
banned are the market and the courts. Market traders are forbidden under any cir-
cumstances to swear to the genuineness or quality of their goods; if one of them 
does, anyone18 who hears him is not only permitted but required, on pain of 
being designated a “betrayer of the laws”, to inflict physical chastisement on the 
trader (917c). And in court cases, the litigant’s oath which was a feature of every 
Athenian lawsuit is to be abolished, and moreover no citizen19 may swear an 
oath during his speech to increase his credibility, as the clients of Demosthenes 
and others frequently do (948d-949b).
Why is the attractiveness of perjury considered to be so much greater in 
these cases than in the others mentioned? This question is never answered by 
Plato, but the answer is not difficult to discern. The market trader and the litigant 
invariably have a strong material interest in being believed. The trader is always 
anxious to make a sale; the litigant is always anxious to gain, or prevent his oppo-
nent from gaining, the property, or whatever it may be, that is in dispute. This 
necessary material bias is not to be found in any of the other cases. Judges and 
voters, of course, may be bribed, but that isn’t a necessary consequence of being 
a judge or a voter; the same applies to the reluctant witness.20 The man wishing 
to search a house for stolen goods is required to swear “that he expects to find 
them”; a person who took that oath falsely, and then searched the house and 
found nothing, would have gained only the privilege of showing himself up as 
one who pried into other people’s privacy for no good reason, and it would be 
likewise with the nomophylakes if they procured the punishment of a couple who 
had remained childless through no fault of their own.
17 Another passage (917a) reads prima facie as though market traders accused of fraud will be 
required to swear their innocence before the market magistrates (agoranomoi). Taken in context, 
however, it seems to mean rather that the dishonest trader is automatically deemed a perjurer 
because he has lied to a superior (his customer) in defiance of the “laws and cautions” of the 
agoranomoi (on lying to a superior, see below).
18 If a citizen, and not below the age of thirty.
19 The prohibition is not to apply in cases between foreigner and foreigner (949b‒c), because 
perjured foreigners are deemed unlikely to corrupt the citizen body since they will not normally 
grow old or raise children in the city.
20 So Morrow 1960, 290: “The judge is seldom under the temptation that a litigant is always 
exposed to, the temptation of gain by perjuring himself, or by inducing his witnesses to commit 
perjury” [italics mine: AHS].
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Another striking innovation in The Laws, which might well be felt hard to rec-
oncile with the principle just deduced, is that statements made to one’s superior 
are considered to be tantamount to sworn statements. The law governing lying 
and deception begins thus (916e-917b):
Let no one perpetrate, by word or deed, any lie, deception or fraud, calling to witness the 
race of gods, unless he wishes to be greatly hated by them. Such a person is he who shows 
complete disregard for the gods by swearing false oaths, and secondly he who tells false-
hoods in front of his superiors. “Superiors” means the more virtuous in relation to the less 
virtuous, the older to the younger in general and parents to their offspring in particular, and 
likewise men to women and children, and rulers to the ruled. It will be proper for everyone 
to respect all their superiors in every governing relationship and especially in civic magis-
tracies … . For everyone who commits any fraud in the market place is a liar and deceiver 
and perjures himself21 by calling the gods to witness in the face of the laws and cautions of 
the market magistrates,22 neither respecting men nor revering gods.
Any false statement, then, made to a magistrate, or to a parent, or to anyone old 
enough to be one’s parent, or by a woman or child to a man, is deemed to be 
perjury and subject to divine punishment: whenever one is speaking to a supe-
rior, one is regarded as speaking before divine witnesses, whether one has explic-
itly invoked them or not. At first sight there is a major paradox here. Swearing has 
been banned from the market, and largely from the lawcourts, because in these 
environments the temptation to swear falsely is so great that if swearing is permit-
ted the city will be full of perjurers. Yet at the same time a vast number of other 
utterances are declared to have the effect of an oath, and on any realistic assump-
tion about the behaviour of children (or on normal ancient Greek assumptions 
about the behaviour of women, young men, and “the less virtuous”) there will be 
few Magnesians indeed who will not, under this new definition, have committed 
“perjury” at some time in their lives. And this is not an inconsistency between 
two passages in different parts of a long and complex work: the rule that market 
traders may not use oaths in praise of their goods is enunciated less than seventy 
21 I take ἐπόμνυσιν here as equivalent to ἐπιορκεῖ: otherwise it is tautologous (after τοὺς 
θεοὺς παρακαλῶν) and anticlimactic (after ψεύδεται καὶ ἀπατᾶι). The use of ἐπόμνυμι in this 
sense could have been based on passages like Iliad 10.332 (the only occurrence of this verb in 
the poem); Hes. Thg. 793; and Empedocles fr. 115.4 D-K – in all of which the verb is coupled with 
ἐπίορκον.
22 These “laws and cautions” are the rules about market conduct referred to in 917d‒e, which 
will be inscribed on a stele in the market-place by the agoranomoi and nomophylakes. The stele 
is apparently deemed to make these officials symbolically present in the market-place, whether 
they are physically present or not, and false dealing in breach of these rules is thus deemed tan-
tamount to false dealing in the presence of state officials – and therefore to perjury.
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words after the end of the passage just quoted (917c). Again, litigants speaking in 
court are not to be allowed to swear to the truth of what they are saying – and yet, 
since they are speaking before the presiding magistrate of the court, who counts 
as their “superior”, everything that they say will be deemed to have been spoken 
on oath! The only way to make sense of this seeming contradiction is to suppose 
that the new extension of the definition of an oath is of rhetorical rather than reli-
gious significance. It is neither intended nor expected that the gods will pursue as 
a perjurer every child who lies to his father or mother; the object of the law is not 
to invite them to do so, but rather to impress on the population the importance of 
respecting parents, elders and public authorities (and on women the importance 
of respecting men). And after all, the rights of these classes were believed to be 
under divine protection, even if the divine sanctions for their breach were not 
in general as severe as those for breach of an oath. One might say that for this 
limited purpose (the culpability of falsehood) those who are deemed superior by 
reason of virtue, age, gender or civic status are to be treated as if they were gods.
Although, as has been mentioned, speakers in the real Athenian courts at 
this time (the middle of the fourth century) are at least as willing as ever to swear 
solemnly, without any necessity, to the truth of the case they are presenting, it 
was not impossible for them also to take credit for a virtuous reluctance to swear 
and to criticize their opponents, not specifically for swearing falsely, but merely 
for being “unduly” eager to swear and doing so with flamboyant emphasis. There 
is only one surviving case in which this is done, and it is particularly striking in 
that the speaker tries to have his cake and eat it: he condemns his opponent’s 
oath and immediately afterwards takes a very similar one himself. This speaker 
is Ariston, prosecuting Conon for assault (Dem. 54.38‒41), in a passage discussed 
in S&B (§5.8) where it is argued that the only difference between Ariston’s oath 
and Conon’s was that Ariston did not swear on the heads of his children (most 
likely because he had no children)23 and that probably “the main purpose of 
Ariston’s vehement attack on the propriety of Conon’s intended oath is to distract 
the jury’s attention from the likely content of that oath, and from points, crucial 
to Ariston’s own case, to whose truth he is neither swearing himself nor calling 
any evidence”. Nevertheless it is significant that Ariston, speaking before a jury 
many of whom must have had long experience of the practice, can condemn it, 
and can treat it as a mark of virtue to be the sort of man who “would not swear 
even an honest oath”24 (54.40).
23 In any case, producing one’s children in court, and swearing oaths on their heads, were 
perfectly routine ploys (see Carey & Reid 1985, 99‒100). On this passage see also §2.4.4 above.
24 We must understand here “without necessity”, since Ariston immediately goes on to ex-
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A similar tendency appears a generation or so later, in the Characters of Theo-
phrastus. Being “quick to take an oath” is one of the characteristics of the shame-
less man (6.1, cf. 6.8), along with “dancing the cordax while sober” (6.3), failing 
to feed his mother (6.6), and charging interest at an annual rate of about 9000 
per cent (6.9). The busybody (periergos) is, among other things, the sort of man 
who, when about to take an oath (probably in court), says to the public stand-
ing round “I’ve sworn many times before” (13.11).25 Oaths of excusal (exōmosiai) 
seem particularly suspect: the shameless man will take one to postpone a court 
hearing (6.8) and then walk into another court laden with case papers; the arro-
gant man (hyperēphanos) will take one to avoid serving in a post to which he has 
been elected26 (24.5). These are the only references to oaths in the Characters, and 
they are all negative: Theophrastus clearly agrees with the view of Isocrates, and 
the professed view of Ariston, that one should swear as little as possible, and that 
one who swears much probably, a good deal of the time, swears falsely.
But how widely shared was this attitude among ordinary people? We may get 
a glimpse of the development of colloquial usage in the work of Theophrastus’ 
contemporary (and, we are told, pupil) Menander. In the 969 lines of his Dyskolos 
we find one formal oath (at 309‒13, where Sostratos, unprompted, calls on Pan 
and the Nymphs to strike him senseless if he has come to the place with any evil 
intent) and thirty-four informal ones; this ratio of one oath for every 27.7 lines of 
text is hardly changed from the time of Aristophanes, whose eleven extant plays 
contain 663 oaths of all kinds (the vast majority informal) in 15,291 lines of text, 
or one oath for every 23.1 lines. It is clear, too, that on serious occasions oaths can 
quite properly be volunteered, and both they and their givers are treated with 
respect. Both Sostratos in Dyskolos and, as we have seen (p. 289), Moschion in 
Samia win their brides partly by giving oaths to guarantee their honourable inten-
plain how the virtuous man should swear “if he has to”.
25 Many of the public will have done, too, for example as jurymen; but this man is boasting 
about the number of oaths he has sworn as an individual, not for public service but for private 
advantage. Theophrastus’ friend Menander (cf. D.L. 5.36) made a different use of the same ex-
pression in an unknown comedy, where a man, doubtless her lover, says to the hetaira Glykera 
“Why are you crying? I swear to you, my darling, in the name of Olympian Zeus and Athena, 
as I’ve sworn many times before …” (Men. fr. 96). The last clause may be a piece of inadvertent 
self-debunking, characteristic of comedy: the value of the speaker’s oaths has depreciated with 
over-use.
26 Probably as an ambassador (cf. Dem. 19.124), since teams of ambassadors often had to be 
chosen at short notice and nominations made on the spur of the moment; if the election had 
been to a regular office such as a generalship, our man could merely have avoided putting him-
self forward as a candidate.
 15 The decline of the oath?   393
tions: Sostratos by this means wins over the girl’s fiercely protective brother who 
had been convinced he was up to no good. Sostratos’ oath, we know, was volun-
teered; Moschion’s, which is only reported, not enacted (it occurred some months 
before the action of the play begins), may have been volunteered or may have 
been demanded by Plangon’s sceptical mother.27 All this, however, is not really 
inconsistent with the suspicious attitude evident in Theophrastus. Both Sostra-
tos and Moschion swear because they perceive that their interlocutors have good 
reason to mistrust them, and they must dispel this mistrust if they are to achieve 
what their hearts are set on. And neither can be accused of seeking material gain. 
Both their families are much richer than the families of their prospective brides; 
moreover, Sostratos has already made it explicit (Dyskolos 308) that he expects no 
dowry, and Moschion is in no position to insist on one anyway.28
It appears, therefore, that by the end of the fourth century there was a fairly 
widespread view that oaths, at any rate formal oaths, should be taken only when 
necessary – when they were imposed by authority, or when the circumstances 
were such that even an honest man would probably be disbelieved if he did not 
swear. But we should reflect that any serious-minded person would always have 
taken that attitude: it was absurd to call down divine wrath on oneself, even con-
ditionally, for no compelling reason. What is new in the fourth century, then, is 
not so much the attitude itself as its explicit articulation and, from one or two 
authors, an attempt to extend it further. Meanwhile, public authorities, includ-
ing the upstart kingdoms of the Hellenistic world (which badly needed to assure 
themselves of the loyalty of their heterogeneous subjects and soldiers), went on 
exacting oaths as they always had done; and ordinary people carried on swear-
ing, informally and on occasion formally, also as they always had done.
27 Plangon was pregnant, having been raped by Moschion; her mother might reasonably 
have suspected that his promise of marriage was only a ploy to avoid prosecution, particularly 
since it could not be fulfilled immediately (Plangon’s father was abroad on business) and Mos-
chion could at any time make himself scarce (for example by taking service as a mercenary sol-
dier – as he actually pretends to do in the play’s fifth act).
28 Nor does either, in the end, get a dowry. At Moschion’s betrothal ceremony, Plangon’s fa-
ther, Nikeratos, declares her dowry to be “all my property – when I die – which I pray may never 
happen” (Samia 727‒8)! Sostratos’ new brother-in-law, Gorgias, having been given charge of the 
property of his stepfather (now adoptive father) Knemon, does offer a dowry of one talent with 
his sister (Dyskolos 844‒5) – not a large one, by New Comedy’s standards – but Sostratos’ father 
Kallippides refuses it (845‒7) even though he has just given Gorgias his own daughter with a 
dowry three times as large; Sostratos himself presumably approves this, since a short time previ-
ously (797‒812) he gave his father a lecture on the unimportance of material wealth.
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1455: 384 n8
Oenomaus
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absent oaths 66, 67, 75, 219‒21
abstinence, oaths of 161‒2, 177‒8




oaths sworn by 10, 26 n76, 29 n90, 
61‒2, 64, 81, 82, 88, 130, 139, 143, 
213‒21, 325 n56
self-curses of 35
and the suitors’ oath 51‒2, 61‒2, 89
Acropolis, as ritual location for oaths 74, 
137 n16, 138, 322
Admetus 35
Adrastus, king of Argos 53‒4, 60, 136 n16, 
149
Aegeus and Medea 2‒3, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 
84, 166, 167
Aegisthus 9 n14, 82‒3, 176, 296
Aeneas 202
Aeschines of Sphettus 326, 329
Aeschines (orator) 39, 80, 236, 348‒9, 363, 
368
Aeschylus 111, 204, 209, 292
Aether invoked 121, 122, 291
aetiological oaths 48‒59
Aetolian oaths 21 n56
Agamemnon 50‒3, 56, 64, 108‒9
and Achilles 10, 26 n76, 52, 61‒2, 81, 
139, 213‒16
murder of 15 n38, 120, 290
oaths sworn by 10, 26 n76, 50‒1, 65, 
112 n125, 139, 144, 153‒4, 201, 215, 
216 n8, 216 n9
oaths with Menelaus 63, 124‒5
Agetus of Sparta 251#14, 273‒4, 276 n87
Aglaurus as oath witness 113, 114, 318, 321
agora (Athenian), oaths taken in 137
Agyrrhius (politician) 74 n24
Aigilia deme, Attica 330 n86
Air, oaths invoking 121, 318 n21, 334, 339
Ajax 51, 66, 89, 105, 106‒9




Alcibiades 129, 310 n45, 319 n31
Alexander the Great 254t#31, 263‒5, 280
Algea (sufferings), oaths invoking 115
all the gods (and goddesses), invoking 45, 
84, 122, 206, 216 n9, 229, 239, 257, 
280, 291‒2, 362, 364
sanctity of 77, 132‒3, 375‒6
alliances between states 20 n49, 132, 147, 
162‒4, 304
Athens and Argos (in tragedy) 14, 60, 
136‒7, 139, 149‒50, 161
Athens and Argos (political reality) 14 
n35, 150, 163
almond trees as oath witnesses 128, 
129‒30, 318 n21
Alopeke deme, Athens 319 n26, 319 n30, 
328‒30
altars, swearing at 22, 72, 133, 136, 137, 
138, 141, 157
Althaea 9
Amasis (Persian general) 251t#16, 270, 272, 
277, 277#16, 280
ambiguity in oaths 26, 63, 86‒7, 88, 90‒4, 
106‒7, 109, 186, 203, 381
see also duplicitous oaths; false oaths; 
sidestepping of oaths
Amestris (wife of Xerxes) 273
Ammon, oaths invoking 319, 320
Amphiaraus the seer 53‒4, 55, 57, 352, 353 
n30, 355
Subject index
Note: References to ancient texts or authors indicate passages where those texts or authors 
are discussed generally; see the Index Locorum for references to passages where the works are 
cited. ‘t’ indicates that the reference is in a table and ‘#’ denotes the reference’s row within the 
table.
446   Subject index
Amphictyonic League 13, 14 n29, 37 n118
Amphion and Zethus, oaths invoking 80 
n17, 318 n18, 319 n32, 320
Amphipolis 260
Amyntor 10
Anaximenes of Lampsacus 230, 231, 
254t#30, 277, 280, 311
ancestors as oath witnesses 124‒8
Andanian mysteries 159
Andocides 234
Androcleides (Against Olympiodorus) 70, 72
Andromache 136 n15, 181, 183t#7
animals as oath sacrifices 3, 21‒2, 33, 45 
n141, 138‒42, 154, 160‒1, 292
burning of 45 n141, 139, 160


















Aphobus (Demosthenes 27-30) 41, 170‒1
aphrodisios horkos (lover’s oath) 301‒2
see also lovers’ oaths
Aphrodite 8 n9, 57, 114, 137, 159‒60, 285, 
291, 294, 318, 321, 324, 346
Aphrodite Pandamos 159‒60
Aphrodite Paphia 33 n102
(a)pistos ((un)trustworthy) 68, 224 n20, 
225, 226
Apollo 136, 199‒200, 285‒7, 374
Delphinium, women’s oaths in 171‒4
oaths invoking 13, 77, 208, 209, 297, 
318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 325 n56, 
339, 341 n118, 346, 378
oaths sworn by 126, 200, 202, 203, 
204
oracle of 364, 374




Apollo Iatros (Healer) 77, 374‒5
Apollo Paian (Healer) 33 n102, 374‒5, 388
Apollo Pythios 33 n102
Apollodorus (son of Pasion) 235 n10, 316 
n8, 349
Apollonides (doctor at Persian court) 376
Arai (curses) 8, 15, 27 n80






Archilochus 127, 354 n39, 359 n61
archons’ oaths 21 n55, 38 n121, 39 n123, 
137, 138, 141
Ardettus 312 n50
Areopagus as setting for oaths 136
Areopagus Council 15‒16, 18 n45, 37, 38 
n119, 40, 91, 286, 381
see also dicasts’ oath
Ares
absent from comedy and informal 
oaths 320, 327
oaths invoking 28 n85, 60, 83, 113, 
120
Arginusae, battle of 208, 210
Argonauts’ oath 179
Argos
alliance with Athens (political 
reality) 14 n35, 150, 163
alliance with Athens (tragedy) 14, 60, 
136‒7, 139, 149‒50, 161







 Subject index   447
Aristarchus (Against Meidias) 146
Aristeides (son of Lysimachus) 329
Aristocrates of Arcadia 299
Ariston (Against Conon) 44‒6, 84, 377, 391




Clouds and informal oaths 331‒47
Frogs, divine oaths in 207‒10
oath statistics 392
parodies Euripides 246, 291





arrows as oath guarantors 126
Artaxerxes III of Persia 283
Artaynte (mistress of Xerxes) 273
Artemis
and Hippolytus 247, 289, 291, 294
oaths invoking 13, 28, 29 n87, 76, 
87‒8, 134‒5, 178, 318, 321, 346
oaths sworn by 158, 198
temples of 152, 160, 164
Artemisia II of Caria 162‒3
Artemisium, battle of, oaths invoking heroes 
of 125, 326
Aryandes (Persian commander) 272
Asclepius, oaths invoking 77, 318, 374, 375
assertory oaths 1, 181, 182t‒4t, 189t‒90t, 
191, 304, 345, 347
Assyrian oaths 147
Astibarus, king of the Medes 163
Astrabacus of Sparta 175
Atē (Ruin) 55, 120, 201, 296, 324 n56
Athena
effects oaths 154, 161
importance in Athens 149, 286‒7, 329 
n82
oaths invoking 1 n3, 136, 318, 319, 
321, 322, 327, 392 n25
sanctuary at Dicaea 137‒8
Athena Areia 113
Athena Nike 33 n102, 136, 172
Athena Pallas 33 n102
Athena Polias 32 n102, 161
Athena Pronaia 13, 33 n102
Athena the Gorgon-slayer, oaths 
invoking 28 n85, 136, 172
Athenogenes (Hypereides) 167‒8, 169
Athens
Acropolis as ritual location for 
oaths 74, 137 n16, 138, 322
agora, oaths in 137
Aigilia deme 330 n86
alliance with Argos (political reality) 14 
n35, 150, 163
alliance with Argos (tragedy) 14, 60, 
136‒7, 139, 149‒50, 161
alliance with Ceos 310 n45
alliance with Crete 163‒4
Alopeke deme 319 n26, 319 n30, 
328‒30
Ardettus 312 n50
Areopagus Council 15‒16, 18 n45, 
37‒8, 40, 91, 286, 381
and Atlantis 152, 155
Diomeia deme 330
ephebic oath 21 n55, 27 n82, 39 n123, 
83 n26, 113‒14, 117, 339
Erchia deme 172, 330
Otryne deme 330
and Sparta 281, 283 n6, 305 n26, 310 
n45, 312 n51
Stoa of the Basileus 138
Tricorythus deme 330
athletes’ oaths 6‒7, 139, 210, 211 n117
athlothetai, oaths of 137, 236
Atlantis 22 n63, 137 n18, 139, 151‒2, 155
Atossa (Persian queen) 189t#6, 273
Atreus 109, 116, 124‒5
Attis (Phrygian vegetation god) 130




Autolycus 51 n11, 203, 229 n36, 256‒8
Auxo as oath witness 113
Babylonian oath-challenges 245 n18
Bacchylides 85, 348, 350 n13, 355‒7, 
368‒9
448   Subject index
Badres (Persian fleet commander) 272
Bagoas of Persia 283
Barca 251t#16, 270‒2, 276
Barley as oath witness 113, 117
basanos (torture) 166, 180 n44, 185
Basilinna 157‒8, 159, 161
Battus of Cyrene 271, 275
Better Argument (Clouds) 341‒2
binding power of oaths 281‒94, 331‒47, 
381
birds and oaths 120‒1, 205‒6, 318 n21, 
324 n54
blank-cheque oaths 273‒6
see also blind oaths
Blepyrus 325, 342 n121
blessings in oaths 12‒15, 17‒18, 38, 39 
n125, 45‒6, 84‒5, 351, 359, 376‒7
blind oaths 53‒4, 90, 174, 273 n74, 274
Heracles and Hyllus 25‒7, 93‒5, 102, 
105, 145, 199, 343
Hippolytus’ blind oath to Phaedra’s 
nurse 166‒7, 189t#9, 192‒3, 
246‒7, 273 n75, 289‒94
see also blank-cheque oaths
blood rituals surrounding oaths 21‒2, 132, 
142, 152, 340 n114
as analogy for wine 11, 60, 147‒8, 
161‒2, 176
boars as oath sacrifices 40, 139, 140
Boeotian oaths 81, 249t#5, 259, 315
Boeotus 173, 236, 385, 386 n11
boundaries as oath witnesses 113
Breath, as oath witness 121, 339
Briseis 62, 201, 215
broken oaths 50, 55‒8, 168 n22, 243‒4, 
247, 297‒8, 306
see also perjury
bulls as oath sacrifices 22 n62, 40, 60, 122 
n63, 139, 140, 142, 152, 340 n114
business oaths 67‒75, 304 n24
Byzantium 235
cabbages as oath witnesses 112, 128‒30, 
131, 318 n21, 319 n36
Cadmilus as oath witness 319
Cadmus 83 n24
Calchas 64, 81, 213, 325 n56




Callicles (Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) 230‒2
Callimedon (politician) 32 n98
Callipolis 260




Calypso 118, 197, 203, 240
Cannae, battle of 278








Castor and Pollux (Twin Gods), oaths 
invoking 80 n17, 318, 319, 321, 322
Castor (sailors’ patron) 58, 297, 318
castration and tomia 141‒2
celibacy, oaths of 158‒9, 161‒2, 177‒8
Ceos 310 n45
Cephale, altar of Aphrodite 137
Cerasus 361
Chaos, as oath witness 121, 339




Cheirisophus (commander of Ten 
Thousand) 364
cherry wood 126‒7
Chios 251t#13, 267, 269, 300
choregos’ oath in Icaria 135‒6
Chorus, oaths sworn by 25 n73, 31, 32, 89, 
178, 181, 182t#6, 183t#10, 186, 241 n6, 




Chrysothemis (Electra) 82 n23, 87, 324 n56
Cicero 246 n24
 Subject index   449
Cinesias 111
Circe 61 n2, 64, 203
citizenship oaths 20 n49, 113‒14, 117, 148, 
163, 172‒5
Cittus 74
City Dionysia 135, 236 n19, 340, 359
cleavers as oath witnesses 120
Cleinias (The Laws) 374, 388
Cleitorians 258
Cleobule (Demosthenes’ mother) 42, 170
Cleomenes, king of Sparta 174, 197, 
251t#15, 252t#19, 259‒60, 264
Cleon/Paphlagon (Knights) see Paphlagon/
Cleon (Knights)
Cleon (Wasps) 124, 183t#11
Clouds (Aristophanes) and informal 
oaths 331‒47
Clouds, as oath witnesses 121, 332
Clytaemestra 9 n14, 15, 29 n90, 35, 203, 
285, 290, 324 n56
oaths sworn by 15 n38, 82‒3, 87, 105, 
120, 176, 177, 204, 296, 327 n65
Colophon 20 n49
comedy
Ares and Hera absent from 327
divine oaths in 205‒7
false oaths in 302
informal oaths in 122, 137 n16, 195 
n62, 316, 318, 320‒6, 331‒47
see also Old Comedy
commander, capturing 262‒5
Comon 70
competitive oaths 33, 44‒5, 79, 119, 181, 
185, 339, 369 n82




of divinities invoked 1 n3, 132‒6, 
208‒9, 296, 324, 334‒5, 374‒5
of location 130, 132, 134‒8, 149, 150, 
339‒42






Council of the Areopagus 3
counter-oaths 119, 181, 186, 242 n9
cowardice (deilia) personified 116
Cratinus (Knights) 32 n100, 111
credibility of oath-taker 67, 308, 309 n42, 





Oedipus the King 30‒1, 79, 88‒9, 
386‒7
Phoenician Women 83, 125‒6
Cretan Beggar’s oaths (Odysseus) 147‒8, 
188t#1, 188t#2, 188t#4, 191, 222‒9, 
247 n28
Crete, alliance with Athens 163‒4
Creusa (Ion) 28 n85, 82 n23, 136, 172, 
189t#10
Crito (Apology) 329 n78
Critobulus (son of Crito) 329 n78
Cronos 10 n15, 207
Cunaxa, battle of 139, 140, 142
curse-tablets 14 n29, 15 n38, 33 n103
curses see Arai (curses); self-curses
Cyaxares (Astibarus?) 163




Cyrene 20 n49, 22, 148, 163, 253t#25, 271, 
272, 276, 319 n27, 320
Cyrnus (friend of Theognis) 358
Cyrus 144, 147, 175‒6, 243
Daedalus 290
daimones 15 n36, 133, 196 n68, 203, 204
Danaë 211
darkness (skotos), oaths invoking 116
deceptive oaths see duplicitous oaths
decline of the oath 308 n40, 381‒93
definite articles 80 n16, 315 n2, 335‒6
Deianeira 9 n14, 25 n73, 58 n32, 90, 91 




Delian League oath 22 n66, 148
Delphi
oaths at 20 n49, 83‒4
oracle at 244, 312 n51, 374, 380
temple of Apollo 136, 137, 149, 150, 152
Delphinium, women’s oaths in 171‒4
Demaratus of Sparta 3‒4, 22 n62, 174‒5, 
276
deme membership oaths 44 n135, 138, 172
Demeter
informal oaths invoking 318, 319, 321, 
322, 323 n52, 331 n92, 339
oaths invoking 38, 80 n17, 159, 209, 
286 n11, 297, 327, 339
oaths sworn by 196, 202, 204
temples 136 n16, 137 n16
Demetrius Poliorcetes 247‒8, 255t#35, 276, 
277
Democedes (doctor to Atossa) 189t#6, 273
Demonicus (Cyprian nobleman) 387




Demos (Knights) 32‒3, 79, 181, 183t#12
Demosthenes 80, 235, 238‒9, 316, 318, 
348‒9, 363, 368
Demosthenes (slave in Knights) 181, 
183t#11
Dercylidas of Sparta 253t#26, 263, 264
dexiōsis see handclasping
Dicaea 83 n26, 137‒8, 282 n5, 377
Dicaeogenes III 73
Dicaeopolis 35‒6
dicasts’ oath 2 n7, 14, 15‒17, 37‒9, 83 n26, 
138, 165, 286, 297, 340 n113, 376‒7
dikē 12, 14, 15, 104 n92
Dikē (Justice), oaths invoking 120, 296, 324 
n56
Diocles of Megara, oaths invoking 318, 320
Diodotus (Against Diogeiton) 42, 170, 311
Diodotus (Antiphon 6) 311, 382, 383
Diogeiton 42, 138, 170
Diomedes 49 n7, 63, 64, 96, 97
Diomeia deme, Athens 330
diomnumi (I solemnly swear) 91, 94, 96
see also omnumi (I swear)




Dionysus 34, 54 n22, 202, 207‒8, 210, 246 
n22, 292, 321, 327 n66, 340
oaths invoking 135‒6, 159, 302, 318, 
319, 321, 324 n56, 340‒1, 342, 
343, 359
oaths sworn by 34, 78, 110, 190#11, 
190#12, 192, 205, 207‒10, 324, 341 
n118, 346




divination see sacrificial ritual and oaths
divine oaths 195‒212
divine perjury 148, 196‒7, 242
divine punishment for perjury 38‒9, 
295‒303, 312‒14
divorce and oaths 135, 164
dogs as oath witnesses 121, 122‒4, 130, 
131, 318 n21, 319
Dolon, oath with Hector 64, 112 n125, 144, 
216 n9
doxa (reputation), importance of 377
Drys (at Priene) 116
duplicitous oaths 88, 93‒4, 144 n54, 198, 
201, 240, 256‒8, 279‒80
see also ambiguity in oaths; false 
oaths; sidestepping of oaths
Earth (Gaia/Ge), oaths invoking 2, 28, 29 
n90, 120, 143, 153, 197, 200, 291, 318, 
321, 322, 339, 356, 357
earth, touching during oaths 4, 9, 10 n15, 
85, 112, 117, 143, 144, 356, 357
Egyptian practices 148




Electra 9 n14, 82 n23, 87, 88 n36, 105
Eleusinian Mysteries 39
Eleusis 136 n16, 149, 150‒1
 Subject index   451
emphasis in oaths 133 n4, 147, 215‒16, 217, 
221, 224 n22
Empusa 138, 183t#13, 335
enemies, oaths between 65‒6, 89, 98‒9
see also friendship
enemy capture 262‒5
Enyalios as oath witness 113
Enyo 60, 113, 120
Epeian oaths 21 n56
ephebic oath 21 n55, 27 n82, 39 n123, 83 
n26, 113‒14, 117, 339
Ephesus, inscriptions from 139
Epicrates (Hypereides) 167‒8, 169
Epicurus (son of Paches) 262
Epidaurus 375
epinician poetry 349‒57
epiorkia 301 n16, 304 n25
epithets, significance of divine 28 n85, 
336‒8, 349
Eratosthenes (Lysias 1) 165‒6, 193‒4
Erchia deme, Athens 172, 330
Erinyes 6, 7, 8‒19, 27 n79, 37‒8, 101, 204, 
285‒7, 306 n29
Medea as Erinys 26, 28 n84, 297, 308
oaths invoking 120, 296, 324 n56
Eriphyle 53, 54, 58, 353 n30
Eris (Strife) 115 n141, 295
Erythraeans 267
Etearchus of Crete 271, 274, 275
Eteocles (Phoenician Women) 65, 92 n53, 
147, 299, 307
ethnicity-markers in oaths 80‒1, 104, 320, 
363
Etruscans 300
Eubotas of Cyrene 253t#25, 266‒7, 268
Eucleides (seer) 363





Euphiletus (Isaeus) 137, 172, 193‒4
Euphiletus (Lysias 1) 165‒7, 169
Euripides
in Aristophanes 110‒11, 122, 207, 209, 
246, 291‒2
engages with Aeschylean corpus 151
Hippolytus 612 110, 166‒7, 246, 
289‒94, 304, 347
Euripides (contemporary of Ephippus) 32
Eurycleia 177‒8, 181, 182#3, 193, 194
Eurylochus 64, 297‒8
Eurystheus 54, 57, 201






exaggerated statements 44, 106, 302, 346
exōleia 8 n10, 11, 42
exōmosiai (oaths of excusal) 43, 43 n134, 





false oaths 9 n12, 10, 134, 182t#4, 187, 
228‒9, 240‒3, 244‒5, 247‒8, 254t#32, 
255t#33, 256, 268, 295, 301‒2, 303‒4, 
308, 310, 344, 346‒7, 358, 370, 377, 
381, 384‒5, 387, 390‒1
see also ambiguity in oaths; perjury; 
sidestepping of oaths
fear of divine 6‒7, 15‒16, 27‒8, 37, 42 n132, 
305, 311
Figs as oath witnesses 113, 117




fish as oath witnesses 118, 240
Force 196
forgiveness of perjury 301‒4
fourth century, oaths in 308 n40, 391‒3
friendship
broken by perjury 145, 305‒7, 313, 359 
n61, 363
dissolved by oaths 144 n54
distrust indicated by oaths 60, 145
established by oaths 60, 66, 164, 
305‒10
452   Subject index
oaths not required between 
friends 62‒3, 66, 98, 102, 144‒5, 
275
restored by oaths 63, 66, 99
symbols of 98, 99, 127‒8, 144‒7, 163, 
365
Friendship (philia) as oath witness 116
Frogs 207‒10
Gadatas 144
Gaia/Ge (Earth), oaths invoking see Earth 
(Gaia/Ge), oaths invoking
geese as oath witnesses 121, 123
gender and oaths 14 n32, 24 n72, 320‒4, 
327, 375
genitals as tomia 140‒1
Gerarai oath 136, 157‒9, 161, 179
gestures accompanying oaths 132, 137 n16, 
143‒7, 340‒1
see also earth, touching during oaths
Glauce (Medea) 25 n73
Glaucus (Iliad) 63
Glaucus the Spartan (Herodotus) 11, 244‒5, 




“by all the” see all the gods (and 
goddesses), invoking
great oath of the gods (megas 
horkos) 9 n12, 196, 197, 204
oaths of the 195‒212
perjury among the 148, 196‒7, 242
Gorgias (Dyskolos) 393 n28
Gorgias (teacher of Isocrates) 230 n2
Gorgon-slayer (Athena), oaths invoking 28 
n85, 136, 172
Gortyn 20 n49, 135, 160, 164‒5, 169, 
182#2, 182t#1, 185‒6
Graces, the, oaths invoking 318, 321, 324
great oath of the gods (megas horkos) 9 
n12, 196, 197, 204
Guard (Antigone) 90, 103‒6
guilt, inherited 10‒11
Hades (Pluto), oaths sworn by 205, 207, 
208, 210
Hades (Underworld) 28 n85, 34, 110, 208, 
292, 303, 338 n112, 347 n129
divinities and spirits of 11 n18, 117, 
134, 296
Haemon 104, 106
Hagesias of Syracuse 352, 355
Hagesidamus of Western Locri 353
Hagnon of Athens 252t#20, 260, 261, 266
handclasping (dexiōsis)
sanctifying gesture 29 n87, 49, 132, 
343, 365 see also pledges and 
oaths
signifying friendship 63, 98, 99, 102, 
144‒7, 163, 365
Hannibal, oath with Romans 278
Harmonia, necklace of 53, 58
Harpagus 300‒1
head of Zeus in divine oaths 126, 198‒9, 
248
head, touching during oaths 143
heaven, raising hands/objects to 132, 144, 
197
Heaven (Uranus) 10 n15, 122 n160, 197, 318, 
321
Hecate, oaths invoking 133‒4, 318
Hector
body of 217‒21
oaths proposed by 55, 65, 66, 217‒18
oaths sworn by 64, 112 n125, 144, 216 
n8, 216 n9, 225 n22, 301 n16
Hedone, as oath witness 114
Hegemone as oath witness 113
Helen of Troy 79‒80, 233
oaths sworn by 178, 189t#8, 198
suitors’ oath 49‒51, 57, 58, 61, 89, 
106, 109, 145‒6, 299
Helenus (Trojan seer) 52‒3, 96
Heliaia court 16 n39
heliastic oath see dicasts’ oath
Helios (Sun)
island of 64, 297‒8
oaths invoking 2, 28, 30 n90, 31, 84, 
144, 153, 166, 175, 203, 318, 321
Hellenistic period, oaths in 157, 159, 277, 
315 n2, 321 n41, 393
Hephaestus 202, 318, 321
Hera 58 n32, 288, 313, 329 n82, 330
 Subject index   453
effects broken Trojan oath 56, 154
elicits oaths 54‒5, 58, 196‒7, 201
marriage bed with Zeus, oaths 
invoking 198
oaths invoking 285, 319, 321, 326‒30
oaths sworn by 144, 197, 198, 199, 
201‒2, 249t#3, 257, 277#3
oaths sworn to 202
Hera Teleia 285
Heracleides of Maroneia 362, 367
Heracles 35, 54‒5, 58 n32, 100, 149‒51, 
201, 208, 292, 298, 320
in ephebic oath 27 n82, 113, 114
Hyllus, oath with 25‒7, 93, 94‒5, 102, 
105, 145, 199, 343
oaths invoking 27 n82, 133 n4, 318, 
319, 320, 321
oaths sworn by 91‒2, 94, 97, 139, 
182t#5
oaths sworn to 205‒6
heralds in oath rituals 65, 90, 153, 158, 219 
n13, 353
Hermes 203, 220 n15, 223
oaths invoking 68, 119, 126, 129 n38, 
138, 209, 259 n38, 309, 318, 321, 
325, 338, 340‒1, 342, 358
oaths sworn by 126, 199‒201, 248, 
249t#1, 256, 277#1




Herodotus 23, 80 n18, 318, 348, 370‒1
heroes as oath witnesses 124‒8, 320, 326
Hesiod 348, 369‒70
Hesione (daughter of Laomedon) 298
Hestia
oaths invoking 113, 318, 320 n40, 324 
n56, 327 n66
oaths sworn by 143, 158, 198




Hippocratic Oath 21 n58, 76 n2, 77, 133, 359 
n63, 372‒80
Hippodameia 89 n43, 305 n29
Hippolytus 31, 79, 84, 135, 166
blind oath to Phaedra’s nurse 166‒7, 
189t#9, 192‒3, 246‒7, 273 n75, 
289‒94
other oaths sworn by 5 n12, 26 n75, 28 
n85, 31, 291, 386‒7
Hippolytus 612 (Euripides) 110, 166‒7, 246, 
289‒94, 304, 347
history and oaths 21, 317
Homer
Achilles: case study 213‒21
authorial voice in 348, 352, 369
oath sacrifices 153
oaths, language of 80, 88, 141, 197
Odysseus: case study 222‒9
homicide trials 377
oaths in 3, 14, 18, 21 n55, 37, 43, 91, 




see also law-courts, oaths in
Hoopoe (Birds) 325
horkia 141, 177 n37, 215 n7, 218
horkos 84, 160, 162, 166, 215 n7
megas horkos (great oath of the 
gods) 9 n12, 196, 197, 204
Horkos (Oath) 8‒19, 39, 103, 244, 246 n20, 
287 n15, 295, 297, 301, 355 n44
horses as oath sacrifices 139, 141
Hyele (Elea) 300
Hygiaenon 166, 246, 293‒4
Hygieia (Health), oaths invoking 77, 374, 
375
Hyllus 9 n14, 25, 25 n73, 26‒7, 93
oath with Heracles 29 n87, 102, 105, 
145, 199, 343
Hypereides 317t




iambus, oaths in 81, 112, 128‒30, 305‒6, 
310, 315, 316, 319, 377
Icaria, choregos’ oath in 135‒6
Idaeus 65, 112 n125, 122 n125, 144, 216 n9
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idiotes see ephebic oath
Idomeneus 49 n7, 56
imaginary objections in oratory 233‒5, 349 
n4
imprecation oaths see self-curses
increasing sanctity of oaths 132‒55
Indian mercenaries and Alexander the 
Great 263‒5





in comedy 30, 122, 137 n16, 138, 195 
n62, 205‒7, 302 n19, 304 n24, 315 
n2, 316, 318, 320‒4, 331‒47
conversational nature 318, 331






language of 87, 315, 319 n34, 326‒30, 
334‒9
in law-court speeches 232, 316‒17, 
318, 319, 336, 348‒9





Zeus invoked 133, 201, 205‒6, 207, 
208, 296, 318, 320, 322, 334‒8
inheritance disputes 41‒2, 69, 72, 170‒1, 
172‒5
inherited guilt 10‒11
Inlaw (Thesmophoriazusae) 122, 291‒2, 
322‒3, 346
inscribed oaths 20, 26 n77, 132, 149‒52, 
310 n45





Iole (Trachiniae) 25, 90‒1, 92, 93‒5
Ion 136, 172
Iophon 110
Iphiclus 250t#10, 267, 269, 277#10
Iphigeneia 24, 25, 27 n80, 28, 29 n87, 35, 
50, 51, 62, 135, 178, 181
Iphitus 92 n53
Iris 203, 205, 324 n54
iron-lumps sunk 22, 132, 148‒9, 301
irony in oaths 232‒3, 236, 237, 302, 346
Isadas of Sparta 267 n58
Isaeus 234‒5, 236, 239, 318
Ismene 101
Isocrates 230 n2, 234 n9, 316t, 349, 387‒8
ittō oaths 81, 315, 320
Jason (Medea)
curses by 25 n73
oaths by 26, 133, 308 n38
as perjurer 26, 28 n84, 92 n53, 133‒4, 
241, 289, 296‒7, 307‒8, 310, 313




Justice (Dikē), oaths invoking 120, 296, 324 
n56
Kallippides (Dyskolos) 393 n28
kestrels as oath witnesses 121, 318 n21
kings as oath witnesses 124‒8
Knemon (Dyskolos) 393 n28
knives in oath rituals 60, 139, 149, 151, 153
Knossos 164
Kore (Persephone) as oath witness 80 n17, 
318, 320, 321, 322, 323 n52
Kotyto 130
Laches 32
Lachesis 144, 197, 352 n28
Lacrates of Thebes 283
Lais (courtesan of Eubotas) 266‒7
Lamachus 125
Lampon (Birds) 121, 123
language of oaths 76‒85, 199‒200, 315
Achilles’ 214‒21
definite articles with divinity 315 n2, 
335‒6
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ethnicity-markers 80‒1, 104, 320‒1, 
328‒30, 363
exploited by Pindar 354‒5
and gender 321 n42, 323
see also ambiguity in oaths; duplicitous 
oaths; sidestepping of oaths; 
“Sophoclean oaths”
Laomedon (king of Troy) 155, 298




law-courts, oaths in 382, 391
dicasts’ oath 2 n7, 14, 15‒17, 37‒9, 83 
n26, 138, 165, 286, 297, 340 n113, 
376‒7
in Magnesia 388‒91
witnesses’ oaths 21 n55, 41, 43‒4, 137, 
138, 139, 230‒1
women 156, 164‒5
see also homicide trials, oaths in
Lemnos 179
Leochares (On the Estate of 
Dicaeogenes) 73
Leotychidas of Sparta 174, 244, 245, 276, 
276 n87, 281
Leto, oaths of 13, 197
Leucippus of Sparta 250t#11, 260, 261, 280
libations 132, 147‒8
of Stygian water 148, 196
wine and 22, 61, 114 n131, 132, 146‒7, 
152, 153‒4, 163
Libyan oaths 144
Lichas (Trachiniae) 25 n73, 90‒4, 97, 
182t#5, 249t#2, 257, 277, 277#2, 280, 
298‒9, 307
Liparion of Ceos 356 n50
lithos (altar) see altars, swearing at
location of oaths, significance 130, 132, 
134‒8, 339‒42
location of rituals associated with 
oaths 149, 150
Locrian oaths 163, 250t#12, 268‒9, 277, 
280
Love (philia) as oath witness 116
lovers’ oaths 167, 168 n22, 169, 287‒9, 
345‒6, 357
Lycambes 127, 306, 313 n53, 359 n61





Lysimache (priestess of Athena Polias) 161
Lysimachus (Laches) 327‒8, 329
Lysistrata 84, 128, 340, 346
Lysistrata, representing women’s 
oaths 161‒2
Lyssa (madness personified) 203
ma oaths 80‒2, 87‒8, 115, 315, 324 n56, 
326‒7
see also nai ma oaths; ou ma oaths
ma ton Dia oaths 335‒6, 366, 367
magic, sympathetic 148‒9, 151
Magnesia (Platonic) 137, 243 n12, 374, 375, 
388‒91
Mania (mother-in-law of Meidias) 265
Mantias of Thoricus (Against 
Boeotus) 173‒4, 197, 236, 385, 386 
n12
Mantitheus (Against Boeotus) 173, 197, 236, 
385, 386 n11
Marathon
battle of, oaths invoking 115, 125, 318 
n21, 326
temple at 137
market-place and oaths 12 n24, 243 n12, 
389, 390‒1






and Jason’s perjury 25 n73, 26, 28 
n84, 133, 134, 289, 297 n5, 307‒8, 
310
oath with Aegeus 2‒3, 24, 25, 26, 28, 
29, 84, 166, 167
oaths sworn by 82 n23, 133‒4, 166
Median oaths 142 n43, 163
Megarian oaths 81 n19, 320
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megas horkos (great oath of the gods) 9 





Meleager (son of Althaea) 9
Menecles 72‒3
Menelaus
oath-challenge to Antilochus 63, 143
oaths sworn by 63, 124‒5
and Paris 55, 57, 65‒6, 147, 154, 233
and the suitors’ oath 50, 51, 89, 
108‒9, 146
Menoeceus 28 n85, 82, 82 n23, 83
Messene, sacred oath from 159
Messenger (Trachiniae) 90‒1, 94
Messenian oath 163
Metaneira (Homeric Hymn to Demeter) 202
Miletus, oaths from 159‒60, 177
Miltiades, oaths sworn by 115, 325
Milyas (Against Aphobus III) 42
Mist, oaths invoking 121, 334
Mithras, oaths invoking 319, 320
Mithridates (Demetrius) 247‒8, 276





mothers’ oaths 156, 169‒71, 175‒7
multiple sanctifying features 146‒55, 241, 
338‒9, 349
Myrrhine (Lysistrata) 346
Myrsilus of Lesbos 359 n61
Myrtilus 89 n43, 305 n29
mythological oaths 48‒59
nai ma Dia oaths 324 n54, 329 n80, 335‒6, 
358, 365
nai ma oaths 80, 215, 216, 217, 221, 297, 
315, 335, 355
narrative and oaths 224, 369
Nasamones (Libyan tribe) 144
Naupactus 163
nē Dia oaths 234‒9, 316 n6, 318 n15, 
335‒6, 367‒8
nē oaths 80, 87 n34, 315, 324 n56
Near Eastern practices 148, 245, 313 n52
see also Persian oaths; Phoenician 
oaths
Nectanebos II of Egypt 283
negative oaths 80, 329 n80
Neoptolemus 52‒3, 62‒3, 89, 95‒100, 105, 
144‒5, 181, 202, 204
Nereids as oath witnesses 118, 240
Nereus as oath witness 118, 240
Nestor 52, 61, 86 n31, 145‒6, 367
nets as oath witnesses 120, 325, 339
New Comedy 166 n18, 321 n41, 381 n2
Nicias, Peace of 283 n6, 310 n45, 345 n125
Nicias (slave in Knights) 181, 183t#11
Nicias (son of Heroscamandrus) 330 n85





non-divine witnesses to oaths 111‒31, 132, 
138, 319, 320, 324, 325
Nonacris 197
Notium 262
Nottingham Oath Database 156, 157, 159, 
173 n74, 179, 223 n18, 244
Nymphs, oaths invoking 318, 320 n40, 392
Oak (at Priene), oaths invoking 116
oath, definition 1‒2, 76, 140 n31
oath-challenges 14, 21 n55, 41‒4, 46, 63, 
170, 171, 172 n28, 173‒4, 197, 232, 244, 
245 n19, 343, 385
Ocean 148
Odysseus 26 n75, 61, 62, 64, 89, 178, 193, 
298, 367
curses against 25 n75, 26 n75
elicits oaths 202‒3
oaths sworn by Cretan Beggar 147‒8, 
188t#1, 188t#2, 188t#4, 191, 
222‒9, 247 n28
oaths to 61 n2, 64, 211
other oaths sworn by 51, 99, 105, 128, 
186, 222, 229, 240, 242
and the Philoctetes episode 52‒3, 
62‒3, 95‒100
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Oechalia (city of Eurytus) 91, 92
Oedipus 4 n10, 101‒3, 290‒1
and Creon 30‒1, 79, 88‒9, 386‒7
oaths sworn by 88, 89 n40, 136 n16
oaths with Theseus 90, 100‒1, 105, 
145
Oenomaus 90 n43, 306 n29
Oenussae islands 300
official oaths 297, 376
on Acropolis 74, 137 n16, 138, 322
in agora 137
archons’ oath of office 21 n55, 38 n121, 
39 n123, 137, 138, 141
Atlantis 152‒3
choregos’ oath in Icaria 135‒6
citizenship oaths 20 n49, 113‒14, 117, 
148, 163, 172‒5
deme membership oaths 44 n135, 
138, 172
Gerarai oath in Athens 136, 157‒9, 
161, 179
and oath-sacrifices 138





see also dicasts’ oath
Old Comedy 84, 111, 117, 120, 205‒7, 316, 
349
see also comedy




omnumi (I swear) 2, 76‒7, 362, 363, 374
see also diomnumi (solemnly swear)
oracles 203, 207, 250t#9, 250t#10, 250t#11, 
252t#20, 260, 261, 269, 272, 287, 364, 
381 n1
oratory and rhetoric 230‒9
authorial voice in oaths 348‒9
see also law-courts, oaths in
Orchomenus 20 n49, 81 n19
Orestes 15‒17, 25, 27 n80, 116 n144, 176, 
178, 186, 204, 209, 285‒7, 324 n56, 
374 n13
oaths sworn by 1 n3, 14, 136, 150, 
189t#5, 203
seeks oath from slave 87, 187
Otryne deme, Athens 330
ou ma oaths 80‒1, 215, 216, 217, 221, 315, 
320 n38, 357
ou plus accusative 87, 104
Ouranos (Heaven) see Uranus (Heaven)
Paches of Athens 252t#23, 253t#24, 262‒3, 
264 n52, 267, 277, 277#23
Palamedes 51
Palladium 21 n55
Pamphilus (Against Boeotus) 173, 385
Pan, oaths invoking 392





Pandrosus, oaths invoking 318, 321
Pantheia (Cyropaedia) 116
Paphlagon/Cleon (Knights) 32, 78, 118‒19, 
124, 127, 181, 183t#11, 183t#12, 185, 
208, 303, 318 n21, 325, 335, 339, 345
Paphos inscription 80 n18
parental cursing 9 n14, 10 n15, 11 n17
Paris 49, 55, 57, 65=66, 147, 154, 233
Parthenopaeus (Seven Against Thebes) 92 




paternity oaths 22 n62, 172‒5
Patroclus 62, 81, 217
Pausanias (in Symposium) 287
peace oaths see truce oaths




Pelias punished by Medea 297 n5
Peloponnesians 262
Pelops 109, 124‒5, 305 n29
Pelusium 283
Penelope 49 n7, 51, 79, 115, 148, 178, 






avoiding 87, 126, 199‒200, 242‒3, 
247‒8 see also ambiguity in oaths; 
duplicitous oaths; sidestepping 
of oaths
contemplation of, punished 147, 
244‒5, 246‒7, 281, 290, 291, 295 





in law-court speeches 40, 146, 311‒12
in Magnesia 137, 388‒91
Persians 146‒7
and “Sophoclean oaths” 90, 105‒6, 
109
Trojan 56‒7, 154‒5
see also false oaths
perjury, punishments for 2 n6, 295‒314
crop destruction or failure 13, 117, 141, 
148, 155, 298
death 90, 91‒2, 151, 154, 257, 299‒303
dicastic oath 376‒7
divine perjury punished 148, 196‒7, 
242
divine responses to human 
perjury 295‒303, 312‒14
ephebic oath 117
family line extinguished 13, 90, 91‒2, 
241, 244‒5, 295, 306‒7
human responses 299, 303‒14





trust extinguished 308‒10, 312, 
313‒14
see also Erinyes
Persaeus the Stoic 315 n2
Persephone (Kore) as oath witness 80 n17, 
318, 320, 321, 322, 323 n52
Perses (brother of Hesiod) 12, 370





see also Erinyes; Horkos
Persuasion 8 n9, 128
Phaedra 5 n12, 31, 79, 84, 246, 289‒91
Phaedra’s nurse 5 n12, 26, 82 n23, 166, 
189t#9, 192‒3, 273 n75, 289, 325 n59
Phaedrus 130
Phaethon 273 n75
Phalanthus of Phoenicia 250t#9, 267, 269, 
277#9
Phanus (Against Aphobus III) 41
Pharnabazus 265
Phaselis and Caria 162‒3
Pheidippides (Clouds) 302, 331, 332, 337, 
340‒1, 343, 344‒5
Pheidon of Thesprotia 226, 227
Pheretime of Cyrene 272
Philebus 114
philia (friendship) 116, 305, 306 n30, 307
see also friendship
Philia (Friendship) as oath witness 116
Philip of Macedon 44 n137, 80, 235, 238, 
239, 253t#28, 265, 305 n27, 311 n48
Philocleon (Wasps) 124, 324, 346
Philocles 137
Philoctetes 49 n7, 52‒3, 62‒3, 64‒5, 89, 
95‒100, 144‒5
Philoetius 128, 188t#4, 191‒2, 228‒9
Philotades (Aeschines 1) 44 n135
Phobos, oaths invoking 60, 120




Phoenician oaths 188t#3, 250t#9, 261 n45, 
267, 269
Phoenix 9‒10
phratry oaths 20 n49, 21 n55, 37 n118, 
83‒4, 133, 172
Phronime (daughter of Themison) 271, 274, 
275
Phrygian slave’s oath (Orestes) 183t#8, 
186‒7
 Subject index   459
piglets as oath sacrifices 160‒1
Pindar 85, 348, 349‒55, 368‒9
pistis 2, 93, 99 n77, 165, 166, 167, 309 n42
see also pledges and oaths
(a)pistos ((un)trustworthy) 68, 224 n20, 
225, 226
Pittacus 312‒13, 359 n61
plane trees as oath witnesses 128, 130
Plangon (Against Boeotus) 42 n133, 173‒4, 
197, 236, 385
Plangon (Samia) 392‒3
plants as oath witnesses 112, 113, 117, 
128‒30, 131, 318 n21, 319 n36
Plataea, oath invoking heroes of 125, 326
Plataea, Oath of 13, 13 n28, 20 n49, 142, 
305 n27
Plataean perjury 252t#21, 265‒6, 277#21
Plataeans 252t#22, 266, 313 n53
Plato 57, 152 n82, 215, 291, 293 n33, 317, 
319, 326‒9





in law-court speeches 76, 166, 194, 282
in lyric poetry 353, 358
in Sophocles 62, 86, 90, 93, 97, 98‒9, 
102‒3, 105, 145, 434
in Trojan War 61, 63
Pluto (Hades) 205, 207, 208, 210, 347 n129
Pollux and Castor (Twin Gods), oaths 
invoking 80 n17, 318, 319, 321, 322
Polymnestus 275
Polyneices 53, 54, 65, 101 n85, 103‒4, 125, 
147, 299, 307
Polyphemus see Cyclops
poppy leaves as oath witnesses 128, 130, 
319 n36
Porphyry 367
Poseidon 5 n13, 198, 240
curse of 298
oaths invoking 38, 68, 76 n2, 118, 119, 
121, 138, 143, 152, 208, 209‒10, 
240, 291, 309, 318, 319, 320, 321, 
324 n58, 335, 339, 340‒1, 387
oaths sworn by 121, 205‒6, 340, 346
swears by Poseidon 205, 324 n54
temple of (Atlantis) 137 n18, 152




power symbols as oath witnesses 124‒8
see also sceptres as oath objects
Praxagora (Ecclesiazusae) 116, 323, 324, 
325, 346
Prexaspes 307 n33
Priam 55, 65‒6, 139, 153‒4, 202, 219‒20
Priene 116
priestesses’ oaths 28, 136, 157‒9, 161
proedria (privileged seating) as oath 
witnesses 127, 318 n21, 325
promissory oaths 1, 112, 160, 181, 182t‒4t, 
188t‒90t, 191, 304, 345, 381




punches as oath witnesses 319 n21, 339
punishments for perjury see perjury, 
punishments for
purification sacrifices 22 n61, 139 n19
Pylades 24‒5, 28, 135, 178, 203
Pylos 305 n26, 319 n21
Pyron of Pherae 74
rams as oath sacrifices 40, 139, 140
ravens as oath witnesses 121
reconciliation oaths 10, 20 n50, 26 n76, 
61‒4, 69‒73, 83 n26, 137‒8, 282 n5, 377
refusal of oaths 218, 221, 232
Regulus (Roman statesman) 278, 279
religious contexts for women’s oaths 157‒9
repetition increases solemnity 137‒8, 341
repudiation oaths 174, 282
reputations
credibility of oath-taker 67, 309 n42, 
381‒8, 389, 391‒2, 393
importance of doxa 377
Locrians 268‒9, 277
Spartans 266, 276 n87, 310 n45
Thracians 259‒62, 277
see also women and oaths
460   Subject index
revenge curses 9, 10 n16, 11 n17, 15, 25 n73, 
25 n75, 27, 28, 34, 306 n29
Rhadamanthys 123, 303





rivers as oath witnesses 120, 153
see also Styx, river
Roman aversion to sidestepping 
oaths 278‒9
Ruin (Atē) 55, 120, 201, 296, 324 n56
Sacian oath 163
sacrificial rituals and oaths 2‒4, 21, 49, 364
Agamemnon’s murder as 177, 296
enact self-curses 21, 33, 39 n125, 43
increase sanctity of oaths 49, 132, 
138‒42, 149, 150‒1, 152‒4, 292
symbolise death of perjurer 22 n61, 
160, 162
and women’s oaths 159‒62
Salamis, battle of, oaths invoking heroes 
of 125, 326
salt as oath witness 127, 128, 306
Samian oligarchs 282 n5
sanctity, ways of increasing 132‒55, 374
Sappho 348, 357‒8, 369
satyr-dramas 20, 34, 79, 81, 82, 118, 
210‒12, 240‒1, 242, 315, 316
Satyrus, king 73‒5
Sausage-Seller (Knights) 32, 33, 36, 78‒9, 
118‒19, 127, 181, 185, 208, 257, 284 
n10, 303, 319 n21, 325, 335, 338, 339, 
345
Scamander, river 202
sceptres as oath objects 112, 112 n125, 112 
n126, 132, 143‒4, 215‒16, 222
Scythian oaths 21 n56, 142 n43, 152
Sea, swears oath 204
sea
iron-lumps sunk into 22, 132, 148‒9, 
301





seating, privileged (proedria) 127, 318 n21, 
325
secretaries’ oaths 20 n49, 140
self-curses
absent from informal oaths 344
competitive 33, 44‒5, 78
dicasts and 17, 37‒9




in law-court speeches 21 n55, 37‒47
Odysseus 222‒3, 229
official oaths 83‒4, 377 n29
voluntary 20 n50, 20 n51, 20 n52, 24, 
30‒6
Semele 54 n22, 273 n75




sheep as oath sacrifices 60, 139, 140, 149, 
151, 153
shields within oath rituals 22 n63, 60, 141, 
142, 340 n114





dodging the blank-cheque oath 273‒6
false foundations 270‒2




wording to end sieges 265‒6
silence, oaths of 177‒8, 181, 192‒3, 290
Silenus (Cyclops), oaths sworn by 34, 79, 
118, 181, 183t#9, 186, 210‒12, 240‒3, 
249t#4, 277#4, 319 n34
Sitalces (Thracian king) 35 n111, 147
skotos (darkness), oaths invoking 115‒16
sky see Heaven (Uranus)
slaves and oaths 165, 179‒95
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Sleep (Hypnos) 143, 144, 196‒7, 198, 201, 
204, 257
Smerdis (son of Cyrus) 307 n33
snares as oath witnesses 120, 325, 339
Socrates 68, 246 n24, 288, 293, 302, 319 
n26, 319 n28, 319 n30, 319 n32, 365
of Alopeke deme 319 n26, 328‒9
in Clouds 331‒2, 334, 337, 339, 344‒5
death of 326 n63, 327 n71
oaths by the dog 122‒4, 130, 131
other oaths sworn by 121, 324, 326‒9
Sogenes of Attica (winning athlete) 354
Solon 167
song and oaths in epicinian poetry 351‒6
Soös of Sparta 249t#6, 258, 259, 277
Sopaeus 73
“Sophoclean oaths” 4, 62 n4, 86‒111, 208
outside Sophoclean corpus 61 n2, 86 




Spargapises of the Massagetae 175
Sparta 366‒76
and Athens 283 n6, 305 n26, 312 n51
and Plataea 313 n53
Spartan oaths 81 n19, 109 n113, 174‒5, 
189t#7, 190t#13, 243 n12, 266, 276 n87, 
310 n45
sidestepped 249t#6, 250#11, 251t#14, 
252t#19, 252t#22, 253t#26, 
253t#27, 258, 263, 277#22
Twin Gods (Castor and Pollux) 318, 
319, 320, 321, 322, 363
spears within oath rituals 125, 126, 142
sphagia (slaughtered offerings) 21, 140
spondai (libations) 22 n65, 132, 147
see also libations
springs as oath witnesses 120
statues, proximity to during oaths 29 n87, 
132, 135‒6, 137, 160, 164
status and oaths 64‒5, 124‒8, 157, 165‒7, 
213‒14, 226
see also slaves and oaths
status symbols as oath witnesses 124‒8
Stoa of the Basileus, as ritual location for 
oaths 138
streams as oath witnesses 120
Strepsiades (Clouds) 68‒9, 121, 138, 302, 
309‒10, 313, 324, 331‒47
Styx, river 8 n10, 9 n9, 54 n22, 148, 195‒7, 
261 n42
substitution in side-stepping of 
oaths 266‒9
suicide and oaths 146, 262‒3, 277
suitors’ (of Helen) oath 49‒51, 57, 61, 89, 
106, 109, 145‒6, 299
Sun see Helios (Sun)
sword within oath rituals 125‒6, 142
Sybarite oaths 81 n19, 320
symbols of power in oaths 124‒8
symbols of status in oaths 124‒8
Syndeipnoi 51‒2
tables as oath witnesses 127, 128, 306
tagoi 20 n49, 83‒4








Telemachus 10 n15, 51, 81, 222‒3
demands oath from slave 177‒8, 193
oaths sworn by 88, 114‒15, 215 n6
Telephus 233
Teleutias (Spartan commander) 365, 366
temnein (to cut) 21, 140‒1, 154 n90
temples, as location for oaths 132, 135, 137, 
138
Ten Thousand 361, 362, 363 n69
Tenos, paternity oaths 172
Tereus (Birds) 120, 121, 325
Terror (Phobos), oaths invoking 120
Teucer 49 n7, 51, 62 n4, 89, 108‒9
Thallo as oath witness 113
Thebes 53‒4, 83, 125, 142, 147, 149, 151, 
265, 320
Zethus and Amphion 80 n17, 318 n18, 
319 n32, 320
see also Eteocles
Themis 28 n84, 87, 295, 297
462   Subject index
Themison of Thera 247 n28, 250t#8, 271, 
274‒5, 276, 277#8, 280
Themistogenes of Sryacuse 348, 360, 361
Theocles the Chalcidian 250t#7
Theoclymenus 81, 128
Theodorus of Cyrene 319 n27
Theognidea 358‒9
Theognis 111, 358, 359 n61





and Hippolytus 5 n12, 31, 79 n14, 178, 
289, 291, 298, 386, 387
oaths sworn by 5 n13, 30 n90, 60, 
101, 102, 103, 105, 136 n16, 145, 
149‒50, 163
and Peirithous 50 n9, 99 n77
Thesmophoria festival 158, 160‒1
see also Thesmophoriazusae in the 
Index Locorum
Thetis, shrine of 136 n15
Thibron of Sparta 253t#27, 263
Third Woman (Lysistrata) 345‒6
Thirty Years’ Peace 266, 305 n26, 312 n51
Thracian oaths 147, 159 n38, 249t#5, 259 
n38, 277#5
Thracian pretence 259‒62, 264, 277
Threspotian king, oath of 148
Thucydides 23, 156, 318, 348, 370
Thyestes 15 n38, 116
Timarchus (Aeschines 1) 44 n135
Timoleon 254t#29
Tissaphernes (Persian perjurer) 146‒7, 
299‒300
Toil, oaths sworn by 204
tomia (cut pieces) 21, 140‒2, 154 n90
Tomyris of the Massagetae 175‒6, 177
Tongue, as oath witness 121
tongue versus mind in Hippolytus 612 see 
Hippolytus 612
torture (basanos) 166, 180 n44, 185
torture-challenges 232, 384
trampling on oaths 56 n26, 306 n30, 359 n61
traps as oath witnesses 120, 325, 339
treaty oaths 120 n157, 161‒3, 283
see also alliances between states; truce 
oaths
triad of divine witnesses 197, 198, 297, 339
triad of sacrificial animals 140
Tricorythus deme, Athens 330
tripods 60, 136, 149, 150‒1
Triton as oath witness 118, 240
Troezenian women, oath 178
Trojan War
broken oaths 55‒7, 58, 295
oaths during 11, 134, 140, 144, 147, 
153‒4
see also suitors’ (of Helen) oath
truce oaths 60, 249t#5, 251t#16, 252t#20, 
253t#28, 254t#31, 263‒4, 267
in Euripides 65, 147, 151
sidestepping 259‒60, 263‒4, 267, 270
Spartan 189t#7, 190t#13, 191, 252t#19, 
258
Trojan War 55‒7, 134, 139, 140, 144, 
147, 151, 153, 154‒5, 216 n9, 222 
n17, 296
trust
engendered through oaths 60‒6, 88, 
99, 217, 223, 305
extinguished by perjury 305‒10, 312, 
313‒14
obviates need for oaths 67‒8, 98‒9, 
100, 102‒3
see also (a)pistos ((un)trustworthy); 
friendship
truth and oaths in epicinian poetry 351‒6
Trygaeus (Peace) 200
Twelve Gods 318 n16, 327 n66
Twin Gods (Castor and Pollux) 80 n17, 318, 
319, 321, 363
Tyndareos 49, 61
see also suitors’ (of Helen) oath
Underworld see Hades (Underworld)
unoffical Athenian oaths of women 165‒9
unsworn statements treated as oaths see 
“Sophoclean oaths”
Uranus (Heaven) 10 n15, 318, 321
vengeance 29, 134, 175‒7, 188t#1, 191, 296
Victory (Nike) 196
 Subject index   463
Vines as oath witnesses 113, 117
virginity, vows of 158‒9
voluntary self-curses 20 n50, 20 n51, 20 
n52, 24, 30‒6
volunteered oaths 77, 138, 215 n7, 217, 221, 
222, 223, 224 n22, 225, 227, 229
war-dead as oath witnesses 116, 125
see also Marathon
warrior oaths 60‒6
waves as oath witnesses 118, 240
wax images 22, 132, 148‒9
Wealth 206‒7, 346
weapons as oath witnesses 125‒7, 142
weasels 299, 307 n33
Wheat as oath witness 113, 117
wine and oaths
as analogy for blood 11, 60, 147, 
161‒2, 176
libations 22, 61, 114 n131, 146‒7, 152, 
153‒4, 163
and women 84, 128, 142, 161‒2, 168, 
340, 377 n25
witnesses’ oaths 21 n55, 41, 43‒4, 137, 138, 
139, 230‒1
wolves as oath sacrifices 139, 140
women and oaths 58‒9, 80 n17, 82‒3, 
87‒8, 114, 129, 135, 156‒79, 288‒9
and wine 84, 128, 142, 161‒2, 168, 
340, 377 n25
Worse Argument (Clouds) 332, 334, 341‒2, 
345
wrist-grabs 220 n15
written oaths 20, 22 n63, 132, 149‒52, 310 
n45, 379
Xanthias (Frogs) 34, 77‒8, 138, 183t#13, 
192, 207, 208, 209‒10, 335
oaths sworn by 190t#11, 190t#12, 346
Xanthus, river 202
xenia (hospitality) as oath witness 127‒8
Xenophon of Corinth (winning athlete) 353





Zeno of Citium 273 n75
Zethus 123 n170, 319, 325 n56
Zethus and Amphion, oaths invoking 80 
n17, 318 n18, 319 n32, 320
Zeus
and Io 288
oaths sworn by 54‒5, 57‒8, 201




Zeus, oaths invoking 28, 38, 60, 68, 83, 87, 
90, 92, 99, 103‒4, 112 n125, 113, 115, 
117 n145, 128, 132, 135, 138, 153, 154, 
201, 206, 210, 211, 227, 228, 297, 309, 
324 n54, 339, 358, 392 n25
binding nature 334‒6




gender and 320, 321, 322, 323 n52
head of Zeus 102, 126, 198‒9, 248, 
257
informal 133, 201, 205‒6, 207, 315 n2, 
318, 318 n19, 319 n23, 320, 334‒5, 
339, 344, 346
in law-court speeches 234, 235, 236, 
237, 238, 239
lightning bolt of 297, 298
marriage bed with Hera 198
with other gods 132‒3, 319 n23






Zeus Horkios (guardian of oaths) 6‒7, 28 




Zeus Phratrios 22 n64, 133
Zeus Soter 338

